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Chairman: Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 107

The inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty (continued) (A/5977; A/C.1/L.343/Rev.1, L.349/Rev.1 and Add.1, L.350 and Corr.1, L.351, L.352, L.353/Rev.1)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) associated himself with the delegations that had welcomed the Soviet Union's timely initiative. The question was one of great importance, particularly for the smaller countries, which did not feel safe from intervention by more powerful countries, in spite of categorical assurances and virtuous professions, and the fact that the Charter provided for the self-determination of peoples and their right to choose their own institutions. A declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States, if it were put into effect, would help to ensure world peace and security, to promote co-operation and to inaugurate a new order.

2. The Charter of the United Nations expressly condemned, in Article 2, paragraph 4, the threat or use of force against the sovereignty of any State and proclaimed in Article 1 that it was the responsibility of the United Nations to take effective collective measures. However, armed intervention was only one aspect of interference in the domestic affairs of a State, which often assumed more insidious forms; it would be recalled that the General Assembly had condemned such forms of intervention, too, in its resolution 380 (V). But although all States Members of the United Nations had pledged themselves to respect United Nations decisions, the number of cases of intervention constantly increased, with a consequent threat to peace. It was therefore high time that intervention was banned, so that the smaller countries could concentrate their efforts on development.

3. Tunisia for its part condemned interference in any form whatsoever; it had made the principle of non-intervention one of the fundamental elements of its foreign policy and was scrupulous in applying it in relations with all countries, without exception. The principle of non-intervention was also proclaimed in the Pact of the League of Arab States and in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, of which Tunisia was a member; and it had been solemnly reaffirmed, among other fundamental principles, by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Cairo in October 1964, in which Tunisia had participated. It was clear that a declaration on non-intervention would apply only to relations between States universally recognized as such and would not in any way apply to countries that were still colonized. Certain States continued, despite United Nations decisions, to maintain that the countries which they had colonized were subject exclusively to their sovereignty. But it would occur to no one to accuse of intervention in the domestic affairs of a third country a State which gave active support to the peoples of Southern Rhodesia, the Territories under Portuguese administration, South Africa, Palestine and all the other countries still under colonial rule which were victims of armed intervention and subject to foreign domination against their will.

4. His delegation paid tribute to the authors of the various draft resolutions and amendments. It seemed, however, that it would be difficult if not impossible to agree on a single text, since the differences were on questions of substance. Since, firstly, the preparation of such an important declaration required time and the Committee still had a great deal to do before the end of the twentieth session, and secondly, the declaration must be adopted unanimously if it was to be effective, he suggested that the Committee should not take a decision on the draft resolutions and amendments but should refer them, together with the records of its meetings, to a committee whose task would be to study them and prepare a single draft declaration capable of securing general agreement, for submission to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly. In the meantime, delegations which had not had the opportunity to express their views could submit their observations in writing to the proposed committee.

5. Mr. Bohdan LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) observed that the number of speakers in the debate and the unusual proliferation of draft resolutions and amendments clearly showed that the problem was a pressing one, and one of special importance to the United Nations. The representatives of countries of all continents and of all political tendencies had shown

their desire to contribute to the formulation of a declaration on non-intervention, which would undoubtedly improve international relations and enhance the prestige of the United Nations.

6. The last few decades had seen the emancipation of millions of people in Asia, Africa and Latin America from colonial and semi-colonial oppression and political, military or economic dependence. A new order was thus being created in which countries which had once been oppressed were finding their independence and their individuality, were becoming increasingly aware of the part they had to play and could at last make their voices heard. In Europe itself, new socialist countries had emerged from the victorious struggle against nazism. But the process of liberation was far from complete. There were still reactionary forces in the world which refused to recognize the independence, sovereignty and equality of all States and the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government and their own economic and social system. Therefore, although peaceful change was preferable, the radical changes that had taken place in the world had in most cases only been achieved at the cost of bitter struggle, because retrograde forces opposed change.

7. Of course, everyone was free to like or dislike a form of government or a political system; but that did not give any State the right to impose on another a form of government that it preferred or to intervene in its domestic affairs in order to force them into more acceptable paths. Most frequently, the ideology of militant anti-communism served as an excuse for that type of intervention. But while ideological differences were a fact of life, they could never justify intervention. The struggle against colonialism was obviously a struggle against any form of subjection; the substitution of one master for another could hardly be described as liberation. Yet in certain parts of the world the United States was seeking to take the place of the former colonial Powers. That attitude had its roots in the nineteenth century idea that the world should be divided into spheres of influence and that only an elect few were predestined to control it. The United States, while proclaiming that the international behaviour of States should be governed only by the rule of law, was arrogating to itself the right to determine the vital interests of other nations, thus trying to place itself above the law. It preached that there was no distinction between civil war and international war, and it had made intervention its official policy. Thus, the United States had ridden roughshod over the Geneva Agreements of 1954 on Viet-Nam and was brutally seeking to stifle Viet-Nameese patriotic resistance against the new type of oppression. The war conducted by the United States in Viet-Nam was a classic war of intervention. As long as the air raids continued and there were violations of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, as long as the interventionists remained in South Viet-Nam and persisted in their acts of aggression, and as long as the right of the Viet-Nameese people to sovereignty, peaceful unification and independence was denied, all professions of readiness for unconditional negotiations were no more than camouflage for the perpetuation of intervention. The United States armed

intervention in Viet-Nam, which threatened to spread to Laos and Cambodia, was a threat to the peace of the world.

8. Examples of open intervention motivated by contempt for the principle of self-determination were not limited to the continent of Asia. The recent experiences of Cuba and the Dominican Republic had been described by the Cuban representative in the First Committee and by Mr. Juan Bosch. The Congo, Angola and Mozambique, not to mention South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, were examples of attempts by the forces of reaction to block progress.

9. A mere declaration would not, of course, be enough to persuade those who practised intervention to revise their policy, but it would be one way of making clear to them that any intervention in the domestic affairs of other States would be condemned by the world community. Intervention was incompatible with the principle of the coexistence of States with different social and economic systems. "Selective coexistence" was nothing more than a manifestation of the cold war.

10. A number of Western politicians, arguing that national sovereignty was losing its meaning, advocated political integration; but it was clear that that theory was meant to serve the interests of the stronger. The right to sovereignty and independence was of special importance to the smaller countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which had always been targets of intervention. A declaration such as that proposed by the Soviet Union would complement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, would reaffirm the belief that the inevitable processes of history could not be thwarted by military force, and would help to establish a world order based on peace and justice.

11. Mr. ARKHURST (Ghana) said that in the contemporary world it was no longer possible for powerful States to impose their will on weaker States and to serve their economic interests and territorial ambitions at the expense of other States, as in the days when international policies had been governed by the principle of the balance of power. The acts of intervention of the great Powers had ultimately inflamed national desires for independence and freedom, and new trends had emerged. Important restrictions on the freedom of action of States had gradually been introduced, starting with the International Peace Conference at The Hague in 1899 and 1907, and continuing with the establishment of the League of Nations, the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928,^{1/} and, lastly, the adoption of the United Nations Charter. It had now become an accepted international principle that sovereignty did not give States unlimited power and that the sovereignty of each State was entitled to protection by the international community, and that principle had been embodied in the United Nations Charter.

12. Although all States were in theory masters of their own domestic affairs, the realities of the situation were unfortunately quite different. There

^{1/} General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, signed at Paris on 27 August 1928 (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2137).

were many examples of intervention by the great Powers, some of which, in furtherance of their own interests, did not even hesitate to make use of regional organizations to subvert the independence of sovereign States. Regional organizations could help to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of States and make a contribution to the pacific settlement of disputes—a role of which the United Nations Charter took full cognizance. They must, however, conform strictly to the conditions laid down in Chapter VIII of the Charter and in their own charters, and their most powerful members must not force them into intervening in the affairs of other States or into taking enforcement action, since those were practices which reduced their role to a farce.

13. The emergence of many new States from colonial domination had revealed other more subtle forms of intervention in the internal affairs of those States. The economic dependence of former colonial countries on the metropolitan Powers enabled the latter to exert political pressure for the manipulation of governments. Foreign military bases enabled certain powerful military blocs to run the affairs of other States from the sidelines in their own interests, while other great Powers assumed the rights of self-appointed gendarmes on the pretext of maintaining peace and freedom. Those great Powers were prepared to overthrow any government which dared to resist them. Yet any State, large or small, had the inalienable right to choose its own form of government without the threat of intervention. The threat to the independence of small States was now assuming such serious proportions that the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its second session, held at Accra in October 1965, had adopted a very important declaration on the problem of subversion originating in or outside Africa against members of the organization. The situation was the same in Asia and Latin America. It was time for the United Nations to take collective action to eradicate that growing threat. That was why his delegation had warmly welcomed the inclusion of the item in the agenda.

14. Everyone realized what kind of intervention the Committee was discussing; what was needed, therefore, was an effort to arrive at a declaration which would condemn such intervention. The value of such a declaration would, of course, depend on its acceptability to all Member States. Though the adoption of a declaration would not, of course, automatically end all forms of intervention, it could at least be regarded as an earnest of good faith on the part of those Powers whose postures in the ideological conflict made it difficult for them to resist the temptation to interfere in the affairs of other States.

15. All three draft resolutions before the Committee and the amendments sought the same goal: to formulate principles acceptable to all Member States with respect to the inadmissibility of intervention in the internal and external affairs of States. What was needed, however, was agreement on broad principles regarding the nature of the intervention and the steps which Member States should take to prevent it. In that connexion, he regretted that it had not

yet proved possible to set up a working group as the Afghan representative had suggested. Nevertheless, the discussion of the item had highlighted the role of the United Nations in safeguarding the sovereignty of States. The adoption of a declaration on non-intervention would place even greater responsibility on the Organization. The United Nations alone was capable of striking a balance between the needs of the international community and the legitimate aspirations of all States to protect their sovereignty.

16. Mr. NJOROGE (Kenya) said that in view of its importance for all States, the issue under discussion should be considered candidly and in an atmosphere free from rancour and recriminations.

17. Kenya, populated by 9 million people and with a territory of 225,000 square miles, could be described as a small country. Only two years ago it had triumphed over one of the most vicious forms of colonialism; it had resolved to forget its colonial past and to build a democratic socialist State.

18. In order to accomplish that task, Kenya had adopted certain fundamental principles, including those of positive non-alignment, peaceful coexistence, the sovereign equality of States, international cooperation and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. It had also subscribed to the principles set out both in article 3 of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and in Chapter I of the Charter of the United Nations.

19. As some representatives had pointed out, various international treaties and conventions existed prohibiting intervention in the internal affairs of States. Consequently, it was not for lack of guiding principles that violations of the sovereignty of smaller States were committed. It seemed rather that the frequent violations of the principle of non-intervention were due to conflicts of interest among States, particularly among the major Powers which pursued interests of all kinds all over the globe. That competition for world supremacy had succeeded in dividing the international community into two hostile ideological blocs. On the one hand, there were those who upheld capitalist democracy and freedom and, on the other, those who claimed that capitalism was decadent and should be replaced by a revolutionary socialist system. The capitalist and communist countries were divided on the validity and actual application of the theory of revolutionary wars. But each side presented itself as the disinterested guardian of small countries threatened with domination and tyranny by the other side.

20. His own Government accepted the theory of liberation movements in so far as they were directed at colonial and racist régimes. That was why, in the Organization of African Unity and in the United Nations, it supported any measures, including the use of force, designed to defeat apartheid and the racial and colonial policies practised in Mozambique, Angola and Southern Rhodesia.

21. In certain circumstances it might be justifiable for the people of a given country to seek a change of government. But when a liberation movement had as its objective the overthrow of a popularly elected government, it became a threat to the life of the nation

and its citizens. It was that kind of revolution that must be condemned because it was merely a movement of terror and subversion inspired or engineered from outside to serve the interests of a foreign Power or foreign Powers.

22. Foreign revolution was one commodity which Kenya had no intention of importing. The people of Kenya had carried out their own revolution in the years 1952 to 1956 in the face of overwhelming British military opposition, and there was no room for another.

23. The corollary of wars of liberation was another type of war, which aimed at containing communism. The expeditionary forces which were dispatched to foreign lands or the foreign paratroopers sent to rescue white hostages were clear examples of unilateral intervention in the internal affairs of States. Those operations reflected policies which were based on a pathological hatred of communism. A popularly elected government wishing to develop friendly relations with any of the socialist States should have the right to do so without interference. His country accordingly condemned the foreign military interventions which had been carried out against the Congo, Cuba, Viet-Nam and Santo Domingo in order to avert a communist take-over. The peoples of those countries had the right to decide their own future. They were capable of doing so and should be free to seek assistance from friendly States. Furthermore, if the idea of peaceful coexistence was to be accepted, the reality of communism must be recognized.

24. Intervention in the internal affairs of States came in many forms: corruption of leaders, infiltration of trade union movements; military training and various forms of assistance offered to politicians rejected by their own people; press and radio propaganda; clandestine importation of subversive literature; gross interference in national elections for the purpose of installing agents of neo-colonialism in power; the attaching of inadmissible conditions to foreign aid; use of foreign military bases and foreign troops or demonstration of naval strength; interference in the activities of regional organizations aimed at making those organizations the instruments of foreign Powers; and the sinister work of international secret organizations designed to carry out political assassination, coups d'état and direct military interventions in other countries.

25. Those were some of the dangers from which Kenya wished to be preserved, especially as its Government enjoyed the overwhelming support of the people, encouraged public debate on public issues and guaranteed fundamental human rights, and as there were no political prisoners in Kenya today.

26. Wealth or military or economic power did not confer on any State the right to dictate to less powerful States. No foreign Power should assume that it had a better understanding of the needs and aspirations of the Kenyan people than the Government which had been voted into power by that people. It would be inconceivable for any State to think of disrupting the course of peaceful development now under way in Kenya. It was for those reasons that the Committee must do its best to produce a meaningful resolution on non-intervention.

27. Mr. USHER (Ivory Coast) said he would have preferred the expressions "non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States" and "respect for independence and sovereignty" to the paraphrases "inadmissibility of intervention" and "protection of independence"; inadmissibility presupposed a value judgement, and protection involved a form of intervention.

28. In any event, non-intervention in the affairs of others was the backbone of his country's policy. When its leader, President Houphouët-Boigny, had organized the Rassemblement démocratique africain in 1946, he had seen to it that the inviolability of each territory was guaranteed. Consequently, the Rassemblement still survived, on a solid basis of friendship between the governors and the governed, though its members had Governments of differing ideologies.

29. Similarly, it was in order to block interventionism that the Ivory Coast had opposed a federal executive at the level of former French West Africa.

30. At a later stage, the Ivory Coast and some of its friends had set up the Conseil de l'Entente, based squarely on the principle of non-intervention. Every Entente State was thus free to act independently of the others in signing a diplomatic agreement or unilaterally establishing relations which the others did not maintain.

31. Later still, there had been the Union africaine et malgache, succeeded by the Organisation commune africaine et malgache. As a member of those various organizations, the Ivory Coast had never permitted an intervention to be organized from its territory.

32. Finally, on 25 May 1963, Addis Ababa had seen the birth of the Organization of African Unity, whose charter prohibited interference in the internal affairs of States, required respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every State, and condemned political assassination and subversive activities.

33. President Houphouët-Boigny was thus constantly guided by the principle of non-intervention, and the Ivory Coast delegation preferred not to follow the example of those who had lowered the level of the current debate by mentioning a recent incident in Africa. Some countries claimed to be progressive. But was it a sign of progress to maintain concentration camps, compromise the economy by using unrealistic methods and look for subsidies everywhere? That type of progressive attitude led to interpreting the people's discontent as plotting and subversion. Nevertheless, the attempts at assassination and waves of intervention and subversion proved that a plan prepared outside the African continent by annexationists looking for living-space was a threat to peace and stability in Africa.

34. The Government and people of the Ivory Coast had therefore greeted with relief the decisions taken at Accra in October 1965 by the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity upholding the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States and condemning subversion.

35. He insisted on using the term "non-intervention" because some experts had thought of a type of intervention which they regarded as permissible and for which they had found the euphemism "interposi-

tion"; they had in mind action taken by a State to ensure the protection of its nationals and of their interests, as had been the case in Venezuela in 1920 and more recently in Africa. Needless to say, that type of intervention was not admissible. It had been the reason for the failure of the Paris conference of 1929 and the conference held at The Hague in 1930.

36. Intervention which consisted in invading or threatening a State with a view to shaking its resolution was completely unjustifiable, and so was intervention which consisted in upsetting the established order by spreading an ideology which incited a minority to seize power by violence. Subversion always resulted in the installation of a dictatorial government which destroyed all values; above all, it provoked legitimate self-defence, which led to a type of intervention less open to question, since it was provided for in military alliances entered into by a State for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity and of the régime it had chosen. However, whether forbidden intervention or intervention less open to question was involved, many human lives were sacrificed. He therefore fervently hoped that peace would be restored in Viet-Nam, that the independence and sovereignty of the Viet-Nam Republics would be internationally guaranteed and that reunification would be sought by democratic processes free from any foreign influence, whether Chinese or American.

37. He also hoped that all States would refrain from intervening in African affairs, notably in the Congo.

38. His Government wanted Africa's absolute neutrality to be recognized and guaranteed by all, so that Africa would be protected from war and foreign intervention, and it urged African and other States to respect the Charter of the Organization of African Unity which, following the example of the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Charter of the United Nations, had condemned intervention and subversion.

39. His delegation, which welcomed the Soviet Union's initiative in proposing the adoption of a declaration on non-intervention, would have liked the USSR draft to cover both the direct and the indirect forms of intervention, and more particularly subversion, as the latter often led to military intervention and appeared to justify it. The various amendments submitted were appropriate. He thought that the sponsors of the various drafts before the Committee should try to agree on a common text.

40. Mr. REDONDO (Costa Rica) recalled that a reference had been made to his country at the 1395th meeting. When he, himself, together with other Latin American delegations, had been working on the Latin American draft resolution, the USSR representative had implied that the Costa Rican delegation had acted as the tool of foreign interests in suggesting (1392nd meeting) that the question under discussion should be studied by a special committee.

41. The Costa Rican delegation's statement regarding the establishment of that committee contained nothing that could justify the USSR representative's accusations. His delegation had said that, since little time was left, it was difficult to complete the study

of a principle the enunciation of which had taken Latin America over a century of work and negotiation. There had been no intention to challenge the First Committee's competence to deal with the question or, as the USSR representative had wrongly affirmed, to make any proposal or to obstruct the debate; on the contrary, his delegation had taken part in the drafting of the most constructive text on non-intervention before the Committee.

42. The principles of non-intervention was of primordial importance for the maintenance of international peace, co-operation and harmony, and it could never be used as a pretext for violating or failing to observe human rights, as was explained in operative paragraph 5 of the Latin American draft resolution (A/C.1/L.349/Rev.1 and Add.1).

43. Latin American tradition at its best was reflected in that draft resolution, which reconciled two of the fundamental purposes of the modern community of nations: the guaranteeing of the sovereignty of States and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Mr. Fahmy (United Arab Republic), Rapporteur, took the Chair.

44. Mr. FUENTEALBA (Chile) said that intervention destroyed the very foundations of international coexistence, such as the principles of the sovereign equality of States and of the right of peoples to self-determination; the United Nations must regard non-intervention as one of the pillars of peaceful coexistence. While Member States were virtually agreed in theory on the need to refrain from all intervention, intervention was still a current practice which endangered international peace. Since the post-war period had demonstrated that the only way to preserve world peace was by promoting friendly relations and co-operation among States based on mutual respect and tolerance, the United Nations must condemn not only armed intervention but all other forms of intervention, whether direct or indirect, intended to impair the fundamental rights of States.

45. Such practices persisted at a time when States should pool their efforts to solve the economic and social problems by which two-thirds of the world's population was beset. Good laws could not, of course, change human nature, but a declaration by the General Assembly would none the less curb certain interventionist tendencies and mark a step towards the establishment of a system of non-intervention applicable to all; it would also give moral and legal support to the victims. Chile was one of the sponsors of the Latin American draft resolution, a text which was the fruit of the long and bitter experience of the Latin American countries. After paying a tribute to the broad views of Franklin D. Roosevelt, he described the slow evolution of rules of law prohibiting intervention in America, since the Congress of Panama in 1826 to article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States. The clear provision contained in that article had been incorporated in the Latin American draft resolution, but the sponsors were prepared to consider including other formulas which might complement it.

46. The reference to indirect intervention in that draft resolution were given by way of example, and they were supplemented by more general wording, since a broad and varied range of other forms of indirect intervention had to be covered.

47. The practices condemned did not include ideological propaganda, since the dissemination of ideas did not constitute intervention. Moreover, operative paragraph 5 excepted measures taken by the United Nations and other competent organs for the maintenance of peace or the protection of human rights, provided that those measures were in accordance with the United Nations Charter. In that regard, his delegation fully shared Mexico's views on the utilization of force at the international level: there could be no rules of law that were contrary to the provisions of the Charter. Consequently, regional organizations could resort to force legitimately only in order to repel an armed attack, acting in collective self-defence as authorized in Article 51 of the Charter, and if States members of such organizations entrusted to them functions of maintaining peace and security, any action of that kind must be in conformity with Chapter VIII of the Charter. That meant, in particular, that no enforcement action could be taken without the prior authorization of the Security Council as provided for in Article 53.

48. His delegation found much merit in the draft resolution submitted by the USSR (A/C.1/L.343/Rev.1) and in that submitted by Iraq, the United Arab Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania (A/C.1/L.353/Rev.1), but it sincerely believed that the Latin American draft resolution was broader and more complete; it hoped that exchanges of views would lead to the preparation of a text acceptable to the majority. Chile, which had always practised non-intervention, would be glad to collaborate on the important task facing the First Committee.

Mr. Csatorday (Hungary) resumed the Chair.

49. Mr. VINCI (Italy) said that, while it was easy to talk of non-intervention, it was much harder, if not impossible, to define exactly in what sort of domestic affairs of States, and in what sort of questions of independence and sovereignty there could be no question of intervention. The USSR draft resolution contained both too much and too little: too much, because it contained a list of all the things that should not be done; and too little, because it did not specify what the independence and sovereignty of States allowed them to do. Moreover, the authors of that draft appeared to reserve for themselves the right to judge what constituted intervention; and, by referring to some international conferences and not to others, they gave the right to take a decision on the matter to certain States only.

50. Non-intervention was without doubt a very important principle which figured in the United Nations Charter. Indeed, it was fundamental to independence and sovereignty, i.e. to the liberty and equality of States. But it had to yield precedence to the right of every State and, for that matter, of the international community to safeguard its own security through the procedures provided

in treaties in force and also in the Charter. The authors of the Soviet draft resolution, though doubtless well aware of that, had been unable to refrain from stressing certain aspects of the question. But other aspects were also important: if the aim was to protect the independence and sovereignty of States, it was necessary to recognize their right to decide freely what their political destiny was to be and to choose their own lines of development without the slightest interference from without; that meant that they could seek whatever help they considered desirable to that end, and finally, that each State had the right to defend its sovereignty, not only against military aggression, but also against every kind of subversion and terrorism.

51. Of course, no effort should be spared to abolish colonialism and racial segregation as soon as possible; they could give rise to intervention and thus become a source of tension. But no war was lawful, and no one had the right to intervene, in any way, either for or against movements or governments, according to how he judged them: such was the essence of non-intervention and of the protection that ought to be granted to the independence and freedom of States. Italy would therefore have preferred to consider how best to make possible and even encourage peaceful changes for ensuring the progress of mankind in any sphere through international co-operation.

52. The Italian delegation none the less welcomed the Soviet delegation's initiative in requesting the inclusion of the item in the agenda, because it could lead to permanent progress, to the extent that there continued to be exchanges of views on the matter, such as those that had been taking place for some time in the Sixth Committee and in the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. Unfortunately, the wording of the Soviet text could engender controversies rather than bring about positive results through peaceful changes. The amendments, especially those submitted by the United States (A/C.1/L.350 and Corr.1), would provide a more balanced text. If the Italian delegation had only the Soviet text and the United States amendments to choose between, it would choose the latter, but the Committee had also before it the draft resolution submitted by eighteen Latin American countries, a well drafted and balanced text which offered sound principles of international conduct based upon genuine and sincere non-intervention. That was the text that the Committee should adopt as an expression of its views, and the Italian delegation was prepared to suggest certain changes of form which would enable the Committee to give its unanimous approval to a document that set forth clearly the true conception of the United Nations, or at least opened the way to that desirable end.

53. The CHAIRMAN, referring to the statement of the Tunisian representative, explained that the difficulty of which he had spoken at the 1400th meeting was not the difficulty of reconciling the various draft resolutions that had been submitted, but that of reaching an early agreement regarding the creation of a working group.

Organization of the Committee's work

54. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking on a point of order, said he saw no reason to put off a decision on the question before the Committee, as the Tunisian representative had suggested. The present lengthy debate proved that the question was of the greatest importance and a matter of urgency. But the subject was not a new one, and it would be entirely superfluous to have it studied once more by a special committee. The Soviet Union was therefore opposed to holding up the Committee's work in an artificial way or postponing the immediate adoption of a decision.

55. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) observed that the Committee had before it four different texts, and some recently submitted amendments. He, too, was convinced that it was time for the question to be dealt with, and he believed that the Tunisian delegation had merely been seeking the best way for the Committee to bring its work to a successful conclusion. There were still several items on the agenda.

56. He recalled that his suggestions regarding methods of distributing the work had not been taken up. It was now for the Chairman to say how he proposed to arrange the Committee's future work. Perhaps one way would be to deal only with the Cyprus ques-

tion after the item under discussion and to adopt procedural resolutions on at least two of the remaining items.

57. Mr. DEMETROPOULOS (Greece) said it would be hard to decide which, if any, items of the agenda to defer to the next session. He would be sorry if the Committee did not discuss all the items on its agenda.

58. Mr. VIZCAINO LEAL (Guatemala) suggested that one way out of the difficulty would be for representatives to make shorter speeches.

59. The CHAIRMAN said he still believed that with goodwill and hard work the Committee could complete its task. To do so it might have to meet in the evening and even on Sundays. He appealed to the sponsors of the various texts before the Committee to seek a common formula that could command general support, so that consideration of the question could be finished by the end of the week. After that, even though the remaining agenda items were of a political nature, it should be possible, with the co-operation of all concerned, to complete the Committee's consideration of them.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.