

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

TWENTIETH SESSION

Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1400th
MEETING**

Tuesday, 7 December 1965,
at 3.20 p.m.

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

Agenda item 107:

The inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty (continued)

General debate (continued) 275

Chairman: Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 107

The inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty (continued) (A/5977; A/C.1/L.343/Rev.1, L.349/Rev.1 and Add.1, L.350 and Corr.1, L.351-L.353)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN recalled that at the preceding meeting it had been proposed that the Committee should wait until a decision was taken concerning the establishment of a working group before deciding when the list of speakers wishing to take part in the general debate should be closed. Since the establishment of that group involved complex problems, and other ways of accelerating the work of the Committee must be found, he suggested that the list of speakers should be closed at 6 p.m.

It was so decided.

2. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) said that he was profoundly convinced that most of the current world conflicts were due essentially to the intervention of certain States, in general the great Powers, in the domestic affairs of other States for selfish and unjustifiable reasons and in defiance of the most elementary respect for the independence and sovereignty of those States.

3. His Government had always abided strictly by the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign and independent States. It could not be otherwise in view, first of all, of its dedication to freedom, the equality of all States and international peace, which were essential conditions for the progress of its people, and, in the second place, because it respected the international obligations incumbent upon it as a Member of the United Nations and a founding member of the Organization of African Unity. The further fact that the Republic of Guinea was a fully committed member of the African-Asian family of States, whose relations were governed by the principle of peaceful coexistence adopted at the Asian-African Conference at Bandung and reiter-

ated at the Conferences of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Belgrade and Cairo, made it easy to understand why its Government attached the highest importance to the present debate.

4. It was to be noted with regret that despite the many undertakings entered into by all States and despite the obvious need to respect those undertakings scrupulously, acts of intervention were multiplying and taking the most dangerous and diverse forms, ranging from flagrant aggression to subversion instigated, organized and financed by States with imperialist designs on the territory of other States whose political systems they sought to change by provoking acts of violence directed at times against leaders democratically elected by the people.

5. The examples of flagrant aggression were manifold. They ranged from the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic, which was the most recent, to the tripartite intervention against Stanleyville in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and they included Cuba and Viet-Nam. There was no justification or excuse for such actions, whatever the pretexts invoked by the aggressors.

6. His delegation had had occasion to denounce such acts vigorously during the debates in the Committee established under General Assembly resolution 1181 (XII) on the question of defining aggression. The States which were guilty of those forms of direct interference were acting in accordance with irrational motives which could be explained by their superiority complex in relation to other States whose essential attributes of sovereignty they underestimated. No noble intention could be found in those acts of flagrant aggression, for it was always the large States which intervened brutally—and without any great risk—in the domestic affairs of small States. They were rather to be explained by the unavowable desire to make the small States conform to the dictates of the powerful ones in order that all societies might be fashioned in the image of what the powerful States regarded as the perfect society. They were also to be explained by the desire to secure spheres of influence. Such attitudes ran counter to the most elementary concepts of morality, for no morality, no philosophy, no interest permitted a State, whether large or small, rich or poor, developed or undeveloped, to dictate its will to other sovereign States.

7. If direct intervention merited the strongest condemnation, the other and more pernicious type, which took the form of disguised interference or interference by proxy and which was known as subversion, was equally to be condemned. It was manifested in a thousand ways, including poisoning the minds of the

people of a sovereign and peaceful country by the use of the modern information media at the disposal of another country, and by the establishment, organization and financing, with a view to the overthrow of the democratically established order in countries not sharing their political, economic and social preferences, of groups of adventurers who were nationals of those countries.

8. When the Guinean delegation spoke of subversion, it knew what it was talking about. Ever since Guinea had acceded to independence on 28 September 1958, thus provoking the collapse of French imperialism in Africa south of the Sahara, it had been the object of constant attempts at subversion aimed at re-establishing in its territory a régime dedicated to the cause of neo-colonialism. As the Head of the Guinean State had said recently following a plot by imperialist forces against Guinea in which two French Ministers, Mr. Triboulet and Mr. Jacquinot, had played a decisive role: "There has been not one, not two, not three plots in Guinea...but one continuing plot which will last as long as the Guinean peoples' desire for progress, democracy, freedom and independence persists. That plot is not only anti-Guinean but also anti-African." President Sékou Touré had added that the underlying causes of the subversion against the Republic of Guinea were to be found in the "basic contradiction between Africa and the selfish interests of imperialism and the contradiction within the boundaries of the African continent, between the differing régimes adopted by States, depending on whether those régimes adopted by States, depending on whether those régimes are progressive, popular and democratic or whether, on the contrary, they strive to maintain, in camouflaged form, the state of subjection, exploitation and oppression of their peoples. Guinea, by reason of the choice that it has made, its accomplishments and its determination, is the natural target of the Powers which wish to prevent the emancipation of the African continent".

9. The most obvious manifestations of subversion, and for neo-colonialism the most vital, were, of course, the maintenance of foreign military bases, foreign domination of the economy and cultural subservience. Aware of the dangers of that insidious and pernicious form of foreign interference in the domestic affairs of States, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its second session, held at Accra in October 1965, had solemnly undertaken not to tolerate any subversion originating in their countries against another member State of the Organization of African Unity, not to tolerate the use of their territory for any subversive activity directed from outside Africa against any member State of the Organization of African Unity, and to oppose collectively, by every means at their disposal, every form of subversion conceived, organized or financed by foreign Powers against Africa, the Organization of African Unity or its member States individually.

10. The African States had a vital need for stability and peace if they were to be able to devote themselves fully to the development of their societies recently freed from colonialism. His delegation therefore

warmly welcomed the initiative taken by the Soviet Union. The considerations which he had just set forth would guide his delegation in voting on the various draft resolutions before the Committee.

11. Mr. SETTE CAMARA (Brazil) said that he did not intend to review, as had already been done so eloquently by several Latin American representatives, the historical background which had led to the adoption by those countries of the principle of non-intervention. That was one of the pillars of their system; it had been erected in the course of more than a century of sacrifices, and it constituted today the expression of the most legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the Western hemisphere. He would confine himself to a discussion of recent events with a view to stressing the need to focus the spotlight on new forms of intervention, namely, the indirect forms of intervention aimed at creating conditions propitious for the overthrow of legitimate Governments and their replacement by groups dedicated to one party and one ideology.

12. The *de facto* political character of situations in which a State or group of States sought by means of indirect aggression to impose their political system on other independent States made it a matter of urgency to review the principle of non-intervention in the light of the changing circumstances in which intervention had been perpetrated since the end of the Second World War.

13. Ideological imperialism, obeying the norms and principles established by the theoreticians of a single party, had had to change its methods in order to ensure the efficacy of its messianic efforts in different parts of the world. Earlier, a series of direct acts of aggression had taken place. Today the world was confronted with subtler forms of aggression. By infiltration and subversion a new form of intervention, supported and financed from abroad, was threatening the political existence of newly independent States, and undermining the political institutions of many other countries. Acts of sabotage, terrorism and murder were being committed in Africa, Asia and Latin America in the name of so-called national liberation movements. It was for those reasons that, while condemning all forms of intervention, it was essential to pay attention in particular to activities directed by a State or group of States instigating, financing, training and supporting those movements with a view to expanding a political system based on their ideological creed.

14. States that had been victims of that new kind of intervention had the right to take all pertinent steps to safeguard their sovereignty and to preserve their institutions. Groups of States also had the right to resort to competent international organs for support and protection against foreign intervention.

15. In November 1965, at the Second Special Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro, the President of Brazil had stated that it was indispensable to proceed to a revision of the concepts of aggression and intervention. The first must not encompass only conventional manifestations of armed force but other insidious forms of aggression as well, such as guerrilla and psychological warfare. Like-

wise, the concept of intervention must not be confused with counter-intervention stemming from collective action following confirmation of the existence of ideological subversion. He had stated that Brazil did not want to watch any country taking unilateral decisions on behalf of the security of the continent, and was therefore prepared to run the risks and share the responsibilities of collective action.

16. During the general debate in the Committee, reference had been made to a proposal for the establishment of a permanent inter-American force. The Brazilian delegation was convinced that adequate counteraction was necessary to repulse all forms of interference, whether open or based on conspiracy, treason or foreign incitement to rebellion. Those representatives who had conveyed their anxiety and voiced disapproval could be reassured that such proposals would be implemented only if they accorded with the will of the majority of Member States. That had been the case in the past, and Brazil intended to prevent it from being otherwise in the future.

17. Reference had also been made to an article published in a Brazilian newspaper criticizing the proposal. In certain countries the newspapers did not publish articles criticizing the policies of their Governments, and he was therefore not in a position to quote such articles.

18. Many countries were struggling to defend their sovereignty and political independence against various forms of foreign intervention. In Latin America many countries had suffered the consequences of infiltration, terrorism and psychological warfare directed from abroad. Those countries which served as a beach-head for the establishment of such movements in Latin America could be assured that any new attempt to spread calumnies and intrigues, and to assist the infiltration of professional agitators, would be met with prompt and effective counteraction.

19. His delegation trusted that the General Assembly would reaffirm the pertinent principles contained in the United Nations Charter and condemn all forms of intervention, direct or indirect, intended to impair the sovereignty, autonomy or security, or the political, economic and cultural integrity of any State.

20. For that reason his delegation had decided to join with seventeen other Latin American delegations in sponsoring a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.349/Rev.1 and Add.1) which reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention. By adopting that text, the General Assembly would provide all independent States with the highest moral assurance against all forms of foreign interference that might threaten their normal evolution as independent nations.

21. At the present stage in the debate, he saw no objection to creating a working group, as proposed by the representative of Afghanistan, to study intervention in all its forms, provided that the constitution of the group followed the rules current in the United Nations. In view, however, of the proliferation of working groups, it might be desirable for the Chairman to consult with all the sponsors of draft resolutions with a view to arriving at a consensus before taking action on the Afghan proposal.

22. He hoped that all States could be persuaded to play their part in strengthening international co-operation and extending it to fields likely to contribute to the improvement of international relations. With reference to the question under consideration, the Brazilian delegation was convinced of the importance of the role to be played by the United Nations in facilitating the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems.

23. He reserved his delegation's right to comment on the other drafts before the Committee at a later stage in the debate.

24. Mr. LOPEZ VILLAMIL (Honduras), speaking as a sponsor of the Latin American draft resolution said that the General Assembly had given constant attention to the question of non-intervention, which was mentioned in the Charter itself. Despite the political or other considerations which might have led to the inclusion in the agenda of the item under discussion, he hoped that Member States, in their wisdom, would unanimously adopt the principle of non-intervention. It was of overriding importance that actions taken as a result of the cold war should not undermine the authority of the United Nations. Moreover, it was all too well known that the unrestricted use of ideological weapons was giving rise to a confusion of ideas that affected the interpretation of the principles of international law.

25. The history of the great Powers was linked to the history of interventionism. The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.343/Rev.1) was the more surprising in that it seemed to mark a radical change in the historical policy of that country. One could only welcome that initiative and hope that it was not merely a cold-war device or a screen for other intentions. That document nevertheless contained certain ideas that did not correspond with the Latin American draft. It was, for example, important that standards should apply equally to all States and not be capable of being used as a pretext to justify territorial claims arising from the Second World War which were in contradiction with the principles of international law and, in particular, with the principle of legal equality enshrined in the United Nations Charter. However, the delegations which had followed the Soviet Union in the Committee had taken a strictly political point of view, paying little attention to basic historical and legal principles. He recalled the words spoken by the then Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, in June 1964, on the principle of non-intervention and a prohibition against exporting counter-revolution to the socialist countries or revolution to the capitalist countries. Such views differed widely from those of Communist China but were none the less political in origin. The Soviet proclamation of the principle of non-intervention would not be genuinely effective unless it incorporated all the elements needed to ensure that the principle of non-intervention would offer a guarantee to all regions of the world.

26. While no one claimed that the Latin American draft resolution was perfect, it was the fruit of 150 years of experience of independent existence and heavy sacrifices made in the face of external aggression. He drew attention in that connexion

to the incursions by the United Kingdom and by United States adventurers in Central America and to the legitimate claims of Honduras to certain islands usurped by the United States.

27. Thus, for Latin America, non-intervention represented not merely a principle but also an indispensable basis for ensuring independence and territorial integrity and for guaranteeing the legitimate and permanent self-determination of peoples. Referring to the writings of Volney and the Abbé Grégoire, which dated from the time of the French Revolution and had been intended to protect France from attempted intervention by other Powers, he pointed out that the principle of non-intervention had been upheld in Latin America since the Congress of Panama in 1826. He enumerated the Latin American documents in which that principle was set forth and, in so far as other geographical areas were concerned, said that attention should be paid to such international instruments as the Warsaw Treaty,^{1/} the Vienna Conventions,^{2/} the Declaration adopted at the Asian-African Conference, held at Bandung in 1955, the Declaration adopted at the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in 1961, and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. All those instruments had helped to establish the principle that majority decisions by States were the only legitimate expression of their will; multilateral agreements formed the legal bond of coexistence which gave that will its validity.

28. A series of new circumstances had, however, arisen as a consequence of the doctrines of various schools of thought, with the ultimate result that the principle of non-intervention went beyond the considerations that had prevailed in earlier times. The great jurist Bustamante had said that intervention had no legal basis and that only collective intervention, i.e., that undertaken by international bodies such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States and other regional organizations, was legitimate. It was to those new circumstances, or, in other words, to the forms of indirect intervention, that reference was made in the operative part of the Latin American draft resolution. As the Prime Minister of Canada had stated in a letter dated 31 December 1963 to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, it would not be reasonable to condemn the use of force in territorial controversies while at the same time endorsing it in the so-called wars of liberation, nor to condemn the use of direct force without at the same time prohibiting subversion and infiltration. Régimes which claimed to govern with the consent of those who were in fact helpless under their control, and which had provoked a mass exodus in which thousands of people had perished or been shipwrecked in the Caribbean, were themselves satellites as a result of the intervention of a major Power from outside

the continent. They in turn were guilty of indirect intervention through the export of arms, money, equipment and terrorists for revolutionary purposes. That form of intervention, of which Latin America was a victim, was also to be found in other regions of the world. Its purpose was to subject those regions to a system of dictatorship that disregarded human rights and fundamental freedoms in the name of the sacrosanct principle of revolution. He recalled the references to subversive activities made by the representatives of Mexico, Mali, Czechoslovakia, India and Ghana, all of which added weight to the stand taken in the Latin American draft resolution with regard to the dangers of indirect intervention. It should also be noted that the Latin American draft took into account the views already expressed on that subject by the General Assembly, in particular, in resolutions 290 (IV) and 380 (V).

29. Recalling the fact that the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 had marked the beginning of modern attempts at peaceful coexistence, he expressed the hope that, in spite of the new wave of fanaticism, agreement would be reached on the need to arrive at civilized solutions. The United Nations was the only forum which provided an atmosphere conducive to agreement between States espousing ideologies which had thus far proved to be irreconcilable. The purpose of the Latin American draft resolution was to open the way towards a common and constructive effort in which all could co-operate for the progress and development of mankind. He hoped that it would receive wide support.

30. Mr. BENITES (Ecuador) said that as a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.349/Rev.1 and Add.1, his delegation supported it in all points. He nevertheless wished to explain briefly the reasons which had led his delegation to join the sponsors of the draft resolution. The principle of non-intervention was an integral part of the most treasured juridical traditions of the Latin American countries. They regarded it as an expression of respect for the sovereignty and independence of States which constituted the foundation of the international community and the law by which it was governed. It was solely as a result of special historical circumstances that the principle of non-intervention had been developed in Latin America, and the Latin American countries wished to reaffirm it within the context of the progressive development of the principles on which the United Nations Charter was based — the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, in particular.

31. Reviewing the history of intervention in Latin America, he said that the first case of intervention, in the modern sense of the term, had been organized by the Holy Alliance against the peoples of the Americas and of Europe and had taken the form of reactionary multilateral intervention designed to check the popular movements for independence and liberation and, at the same time, to suppress ferociously all liberal movements, particularly Spanish liberalism. The policy of the Holy Alliance had provoked two reactions in the Western hemisphere: the affirmation of the principle of non-intervention by extra-continental Powers known as the Monroe Doctrine,

^{1/} Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, signed at Warsaw on 14 May 1955 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 219 (1955), No. 2962).

^{2/} Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.X.1); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 64.X.1).

and the affirmation of the general principle of non-intervention, rejecting even intercontinental intervention, which had originated in the brilliant mind of Simón Bolívar. Those two interpretations of the principle of non-intervention had given rise to two conflicting doctrines: pan-Americanism and Hispano-Americanism. After a regrettably long eclipse, the principle of non-intervention found a new expression in inter-Americanism, which aimed at achieving unity through co-operation on a basis of equality, common respect for fundamental freedoms and good-neighbourly relations. It was that interpretation of the principle of non-intervention which had been reaffirmed at the Seventh International Conference of American States, held at Montevideo in 1933, at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, held at Buenos Aires in 1936, and at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, held at Mexico City in 1945, which had been convened to study the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Lastly, the San Francisco Charter, which had given birth to the United Nations, had included among the Purposes and Principles of the Organization the sovereign equality of States, the prohibition of the use of force against the territorial integrity or independence of States, and the prohibition of intervention in matters which were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States. The Charter of the Organization of American States, adopted in 1948, had reaffirmed and developed the principles of the United Nations Charter.

32. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.349/Rev.1 and Add.1, submitted by eighteen Latin American States, contained nothing that conflicted with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or those of the Charter of the Organization of American States. Operative paragraph 5 was particularly important, for by providing that measures taken by competent international organs in accordance with the United Nations Charter did not constitute intervention, it safeguarded the provisions relating to the competence of United Nations organs and their relations with other bodies which might be called upon to take special measures. In addition, the principles proclaimed in the draft resolution were incorporated in the fundamental instruments of other regional organizations besides the Organization of American States, including the Pact of the League of Arab States and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. By combining the principles contained in the regional agreements and the positive elements of the draft resolutions before the Committee, including the Latin American draft, it might be possible to frame a single text which would be adopted unanimously.

33. He wished to stress that the adoption of such a resolution would in no way have the effect of removing the question of non-intervention from the list of principles of international law which had been assigned for study to the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States under General Assembly resolutions 1815 (XVII) and 1966 (XVIII).

34. Lastly, he emphasized that the principle of non-intervention did not apply to matters which had been freely and voluntarily placed under international

jurisdiction by the States signatories to the Charter, and that consequently no objection of lack of jurisdiction could be raised on the basis of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter in the case of flagrant violations of the principles proclaimed in the Charter or of action taken by the competent United Nations organs to maintain international peace and security.

35. Mr. ARNAUD (France), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that his delegation was not in the habit of allowing itself to be drawn into sterile polemics on any subject, and would not do so in the present case, although the representative of Guinea had criticized the attitude of the French Government in connexion with recent events in his country. While categorically rejecting the slander just levelled at France, which would convince no one, he pointed out that statements such as that made by the representative of Guinea did not contribute to creating the atmosphere of sincere co-operation on which the effectiveness of the Committee's work depended.

36. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea), also speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he was not naïve enough to expect the ministers implicated in the recent plot against Guinea to admit their guilt. Already in April 1960 Guinea had been the victim of external intervention organized from two former French colonies—which at that time were still colonies—and funds amounting to \$4 million had been brought into Guinea to foment a rebellion there. Since that time a permanent plot against Guinea, in forms of varying degrees of subtlety, had been in process. Those were not mere allegations: the Government of Guinea possessed irrefutable evidence regarding the latest plot, which it intended to produce before the competent organ of the Organization of African Unity. The denials were not surprising, but neither could they conceal the active co-operation of Mr. Triboulet and Mr. Jacquinet, who had not only initiated but also financed a plot to overthrow the present régime in order to replace it by a neo-colonialist government; no denial could alter the fact, of which proof existed, that a plot had been hatched against the sovereignty of the State of Guinea. In any case, those who were responsible for that plot were wasting their time, for the present régime was based upon the will of the people, and to liquidate it it would be necessary to liquidate the Guinean people.

37. Mr. IDZUMBUIR (Democratic Republic of the Congo) paid tribute to the USSR delegation for having requested the inclusion in the agenda of the question of the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty. That step was the more encouraging because it came from a permanent member of the Security Council, whose membership included the countries which were powerful enough to violate the sovereignty of small States or, on the contrary, to protect it. The Democratic Republic of the Congo attached the more importance to the question because since its attainment of independence its sovereignty and territorial integrity had been violated by armed intervention, political pressure, subversive activities and other acts of aggression; for the struggle between

anti-communism and anti-capitalism was in fact taking place within the smaller countries, which so urgently needed the co-operation of all if they were to overcome under-development.

38. He expressed surprise that at the 1399th meeting, the Cuban representative, after condemning intervention in the domestic affairs of States, should have criticized certain political events which had taken place in the Congo and interpreted them in a tendentious manner. Cuba was not in a very good position to criticize others, considering that one of its information centres in Africa had just been expelled for engaging in subversive activities, that an African country had recently categorically refused to accept Cuban agricultural experts, that Havana trained young Africans in subversion techniques in order to send them as subversive agents to their own countries, and, moreover, that Cuba's subversive activities had been denounced by the Latin American countries. Cuba would therefore be well advised to draw the appropriate conclusions from the crisis which it had itself undergone.

39. The draft resolution submitted by eighteen Latin American countries was an almost completely comprehensive and very well balanced document. He would therefore merely suggest the insertion, between the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, of a paragraph reading:

"Noting the concrete expression of that principle in the declaration on the problem of subversion adopted on 24 October 1965 at Accra by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity,".

On the other hand, his delegation noted an inconsistency between the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.343/Rev.1) and the explanatory memorandum attached to the request for the inclusion of the item in the agenda (A/5977). In paragraph 4 of the explanatory memorandum all forms of intervention were condemned, whereas the declaration seemed to refer only to armed intervention, thus creating the impression that there was no other form of intervention which was at present a threat to international peace. The text of the declaration would accordingly be improved by being brought into line with the explanatory memorandum. In addition, again, some reference to the declaration on the problem of subversion adopted at Accra in 1965 would be useful. Lastly, the reference in paragraph 3 to "the just struggle of peoples for national independence and freedom" should be made more specific, for in some quarters those words were interpreted in a sense favourable to rebels who sought to overthrow legitimate governments. A clear distinction should therefore be drawn between independent and sovereign States and non-independent States.

40. He reserved the right to return on a later occasion to the draft resolution submitted by the United Arab Republic (A/C.1/L.353); he regretted, however, that that draft, submitted by an African country, omitted any reference to the declaration on the problem of subversion adopted at Accra, and noted also that it mentioned causes of international tension which did not necessarily constitute forms

of intervention. The amendments (A/C.1/L.350 and Corr.1, A/C.1/L.351 and A/C.1/L.352) submitted to the Soviet draft all appeared to be intended to define in more specific terms certain forms of intervention which had to be opposed. He hoped that on the basis of those amendments it would prove possible to draft a single text which could be adopted unanimously. His country, for its part, would not support a declaration which omitted to mention the Accra declaration; which failed to distinguish between intervention and the right of any State to appeal for external assistance in order to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity; which condemned assistance to colonial peoples struggling for their independence; or which did not denounce acts that gave material, political or moral encouragement to subversive movements designed to overthrow legitimate governments by means condemned by international law.

41. Mr. ALARCON QUESADA (Cuba), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he did not feel it necessary to dwell on the somewhat unconvincing arguments put forward against his country by the representatives of Brazil and Honduras, but he wished to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that two of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.349/Rev.1 and Add.1, in which the principle of non-intervention was reaffirmed, represented countries which had sent occupation troops to the Dominican Republic. Moreover the Brazilian representative, at the 1399th meeting, had made clear his Government's intention to persist in that particular form of intervention.

42. With regard to the observations of the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, he thought it regrettable that the latter had attacked Cuba, as if that country were responsible for foreign intervention in Africa, without finding a single word to condemn the imperialist Powers. That was hardly surprising, however, coming as it did from a régime which had resorted to the use of white mercenaries — nationals of racist régimes — to restore order in its country.

43. Mr. SETTE CAMARA (Brazil), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he would not reiterate the views he had already expressed on the establishment of a Latin American peace force. However, he could not accept any lessons from Cuba on the subject of non-intervention, considering the many subversive activities organized by that country in Latin America. The idea of a Latin American peace force was being formally discussed by the Organization of American States, and those Latin American countries which supported it were hoping that the remaining countries of the continent would soon come over to their point of view.

44. Mr. IDZUMBUIR (Democratic Republic of the Congo), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, invited the Cuban representative to read the declaration on the problem of subversion adopted at Accra on 24 October 1965 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its second session, and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity — to both of which his

country had subscribed— if he wished to be convinced that the Democratic Republic of the Congo condemned foreign intervention of any kind. On the question of mercenaries, concerning which he had already explained his Government's position, the fact that the Cuban representative had mentioned it made it clear that Cuba had not learned the lesson of the Cuban crisis, although the facts which had caused that crisis were well known to everyone.

45. Mr. LOPEZ VILLAMIL (Honduras), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that his country felt great admiration for the Cuban people, whose first President had married a Honduran girl, and for the Cuban liberators and thinkers who had helped to enrich the culture of the Latin American continent. He would not engage in polemics, out of respect for the Cuban people, who were passing through tragic days, and thousands of whom were fleeing persecution in their homeland only to shipwreck in the Caribbean Sea.

46. Mr. ALARCON QUESADA (Cuba) said that the facts as to shipwrecks in the Caribbean Sea had been exaggerated by Cuba's detractors; but it was well known that those who did not wish to live in Cuba had always been able to leave by air; flights to the American continent had never been interrupted, apart from those to the United States of America,

which had been stopped by unilateral decision of the latter country and not by Cuba. Moreover, an agreement had just been reached between the United States and Cuba to restore the air link.

47. Mr. BURNS (Canada) asked the Chairman whether the working group proposed by the representative of Afghanistan to draft a single text on the basis of the different draft resolutions and amendments submitted had been established, and if not, what procedure would be followed to expedite the Committee's work.

48. The CHAIRMAN replied that the consultations held between delegations, and between himself, the various groups represented in the Committee and the sponsors, had produced no common denominator on the basis of which the working group might be set up. He therefore proposed that informal contacts should continue, in the hope that the sponsors of the various drafts might reach agreement not only among themselves but also with the representatives of the different groups of countries. If those efforts failed, a further effort might be made to set up a working group, in spite of the difficulties involved. He for one would spare no endeavour to bring the Committee's work to a successful conclusion.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.