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Chairman: Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 28

Question of general and complete disarmament: reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/5731-DC/209, A/5986-DC/227, A/C.1/L.347, A/C.1/L.348/Rev.1)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that in considering the reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the First Committee was faced with a practically impossible task—that of assessing the activities of that special body. For there was no balance-sheet and nothing to analyse, since so far the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had not succeeded in reaching agreement on how to solve the problems of disarmament.

2. The arms race was accelerating and international tension was increasing. The United States and its allies, for instance, were strengthening their military potential day by day. For 1966, the United States budget for direct or indirect military expenditure amounted to about \$60,000 million. Over the past four years, the strategic nuclear forces of the United States had tripled. Its special units, trained to wage undeclared wars, had been increased eight-fold; the number of divisions on a war footing had increased by 45 per cent; the marines had been reinforced by 15,000 men; troop air transport capacity had doubled, as had the firepower of the tactical air forces. The United States now had more men under arms than at any time since the end of the Second World War. It had over a million men overseas—or more than a third of its armed forces—and was trying to perfect new weapons and use outer space for military purposes.

3. Those military preparations could not be dissociated from the aggressive tendencies displayed for some time by leading circles in the United States,

which took the form of interference in the internal affairs of States and the forcible suppression of popular movements for freedom and independence. No secret was made of the fact that the upsurge in military preparations was directly connected with the intensification of the war being waged in Viet-Nam, a war for which the United States was spending thousands of millions of dollars, calling up reservists and accelerating its production of aircraft, aircraft carriers and other implements of war. The number of United States troops in Viet-Nam was to be increased to 300,000 in a few months' time and would reach the half million mark next summer.

4. The United States was at present carrying out a huge programme for the modernization of its armed forces—a step necessitated by the war it was waging in Viet-Nam. There was a five-year plan for the manufacture of new types of tanks, helicopters and aircraft, munitions and other equipment, the whole representing an outlay of \$16,000 million, or an annual outlay of more than double the corresponding expenditure for the previous year. In January 1966 Congress was to be asked for an additional military appropriation of \$7,000 million, although the Pentagon had already received additional funds totalling \$700 million in 1964 and \$1,700 million in 1965. In July 1965 it had been decided to increase the armed forces by 340,000 men.

5. That example was being followed by the partners of the United States, in particular by the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus the formation of the Bundeswehr had been completed by the beginning of 1965. It comprised 7 motorized infantry divisions, 3 armoured divisions, 1 division of mountain troops and 1 airborne division. West Germany already possessed supersonic military aircraft; its air force comprised 5 heavy bomber squadrons, 3 light bomber squadrons, 2 fighter squadrons, 3 transport squadrons and 3 reconnaissance squadrons. It was constantly strengthening its naval forces. Two units of the West German army were already equipped with medium-range Pershing rockets capable of carrying nuclear warheads, while 6 artillery units were equipped with Nike rockets and 9 with Hawk rockets. The total strength of the Bundeswehr was 500,000 men and direct military expenditure amounted to 21,000 million marks for 1965.

6. During the debate on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the USSR delegation had already spoken of the plans to give the German revanchists access to such weapons and the dangers that raised. The situation was serious, for according to the latest information the Federal Republic of Germany was persisting in its demands and wanted its own

nuclear weapons within NATO. The fact that all the agitation over that issue was taking place at a time when the General Assembly was considering the question of the non-proliferation of such weapons exposed the double game being played by the United States and showed that there was a wide gulf between the statements made by the representatives of that country and the actions of their Government.

7. The negative position of the United States and some of its allies, which was the product of an aggressive foreign policy, was the cause of the deadlock reached in the deliberations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, which had been able neither to draw up a programme of general and complete disarmament nor even to reach agreement on partial measures of disarmament or arms limitation. The United States verbally acknowledged the need for agreement on disarmament, but was in fact obstructing the formulation of an effective programme. The real aim of its proposals was to bring about a form of disarmament which enable it to preserve intact its enormous war machine and the existing structure of the Western armed forces, to maintain its bases and troops abroad, to keep a completely free hand so far as concerned the use of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and, lastly, to increase its military expenditure if it so desired. In other words, the United States wanted to be able to set off a nuclear missile war at any time during the process of disarmament.

8. It would be naïve to believe that the lack of progress in disarmament was due to differences over the question of control; the only reason was the refusal of the United States to disarm.

9. The economic history of the United States over the past fifty years showed that the country's periods of prosperity had always coincided with wars in which it had been involved; the First and Second World Wars, the Korean war and the present United States war in Viet-Nam were cases in point. United States financiers gleefully hoped that the intensification of the war in Viet-Nam would stimulate the economy and put more millions in their pockets. It would be recalled that in 1960 President Eisenhower had warned his country against the dangers raised by the increasing influence of the military-industrial complex. It might well be asked whether the United States economy needed war to function smoothly.

10. At the current session of the General Assembly, Mr. Gromyko, the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, had said (1335th plenary meeting) that it was the conflict of political goals, not the technical difficulties involved in achieving disarmament, that was paralysing the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The aggressive foreign policy of the United States and the resulting negative attitude of its representatives were making it impossible to follow up the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963.^{1/}

11. The Soviet position, on the other hand, was based on the principle that the very first step towards disarmament must be an agreement on

measures to eliminate or at least reduce the risks of nuclear war. For that reason it proposed the destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, with the exception of a strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and "ground-to-air" anti-aircraft missiles with their nuclear warheads, which the Soviet Union and the United States would retain until the third and last stage of disarmament.

12. That Soviet proposal, called the "nuclear umbrella" for the sake of simplicity, represented a concession to the Western Powers, which had expressed fear that if all nuclear weapon vehicles were destroyed at the very first stage, as had been proposed by the Soviet Union, their security would be endangered. In order to show its good will the Soviet Union had heeded the misgivings voiced by the other side, although it considered that complete disarmament and the total destruction of nuclear weapons were the best guarantee of security. While agreeing to the retention of a nuclear umbrella, the Soviet Union had felt that the number of nuclear weapons should be limited, so that they would in future no longer constitute a threat to any State, but merely be a deterrent. That attitude had been supported by the non-aligned countries in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. So far, the United States had not said whether it accepted that compromise solution as a general basis for negotiation to settle the problem of the elimination of delivery vehicles with a view to reducing the risk of nuclear war. He did not think that that was because the United States had not understood the Soviet position, which had been explained in detail on several occasions. As a result of its imperialist and aggressive policy, the United States had no stake in the achievement of agreement on general disarmament but rather in the arms race and the aggravation of international tension, and that was the reason for its negative attitude.

13. The Soviet Union was prepared to accept any realistic approach which would permit further discussion of a programme for general and complete disarmament. If certain States felt that it would be best to postpone discussion of the first stage of disarmament, the Soviet Union was ready to take part in drawing up a programme of general disarmament, starting, as the Swedish delegation had proposed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, not with the first, but with the third stage, on which the positions of the parties were closer. It would welcome any constructive ideas or proposals, and was in favour of partial measures being put into effect as soon as possible to check the arms race, reduce international tension and prepare the ground for more radical disarmament measures. The proposals which the Soviet Union had made in that connexion would be found in the memorandum submitted on 7 December 1964 to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5827).^{2/} Those proposals took into account the comments made by various States both in and outside the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Some of them, particularly those concerning the

^{1/} United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

^{2/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 9.

non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the suspension of underground tests, had already been discussed by the First Committee. The question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons had been referred by the Committee, at the request of Ethiopia, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for further study. The Soviet Union, which had been in favour of that measure from the very earliest days of the atomic age, believed that it would be a first step towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons; and it also supported the proposals made by other countries, including Ethiopia and the People's Republic of China. The Soviet delegation believed that the General Assembly could contribute to the progress of negotiations by inviting all States, particularly the atomic Powers, to conclude an international agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. To smooth the way to such an agreement the Soviet Union was prepared to pledge itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, provided that the other nuclear Powers undertook the same obligation.

14. The maintenance of armed forces and military bases on foreign territory endangered international peace. The acts of aggression committed by the United States in Viet-Nam and elsewhere were bound up with the use of United States armed forces and military bases on foreign territory, particularly in South Viet-Nam, Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea and Okinawa. Furthermore, the maintenance of the United States base at Guantanamo was a source of tension in the Caribbean. In Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe, foreign military bases were bastions of neo-colonialism. In that connexion, he quoted an extract from the Declaration issued by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Cairo in October 1964, which stated that foreign military bases were in practice a means of bringing pressure on nations on whose territory they were situated and retarding their emancipation and development, based on their own ideological, political, economic and cultural ideas.

15. The United States bases, which were the most numerous, extended throughout the world, at distances of thousands of miles from the national territory of the United States. They included launching facilities for rockets with nuclear warheads, strategic air bases, naval bases, conventional submarine bases and bases for atomic submarines equipped with Polaris missiles, and also military stores depots and large numbers of hangars and testing sites. According to information published in the United States Press, the United States had more than 2,000 bases or military installations in foreign countries, of which about 150 were especially important. Between 1953 and 1963 the United States had spent \$99,000 million for their maintenance and operation. Those bases, which were equipped with nuclear weapons and missiles, were at present being expanded and modernized. Thus on 6 August 1965 the House of Representatives had approved an appropriation of \$58 million to equip United States bases situated in the Far East and other areas.

16. The United States had also intensified the construction of submarines equipped with Polaris missiles, which were in fact mobile bases, and their

number was to reach forty-one units in 1967. Two bases had already been established for such submarines, one in Scotland and one in Spain. Another was under construction on the island of Guam. The recent announcement that the United States and the United Kingdom were preparing to establish a base on the atoll of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean had led to a protest by India.

17. The Soviet Union supported the demands of the peoples of the former colonies for the immediate elimination of military bases on their territory, in particular the Aden base, which the colonial Powers were using to strengthen their domination and suppress national liberation movements. The Soviet delegation considered that the presence in Western Europe of United States military bases equipped with nuclear weapons was a serious threat to peace and security. The United States had 5,000 nuclear warheads deployed in Europe, and was preparing to increase their number to 6,000. The presence of United States troops in Japan and South Korea was also a threat. The Soviet Union called for the evacuation of all military bases on foreign territory, including bases for submarines equipped with Polaris missiles, and the withdrawal of all armed forces within their own national frontiers.

18. Another important question was the reduction of military budgets. The Soviet Union had set an example in that field by reducing its budget from 600 million roubles in 1964 to 500 million in 1965. An agreement to reduce military budgets would be particularly desirable and valuable, and would help to limit the arms race, to slow down the pace at which weapons of mass destruction were being accumulated, and to bring about a considerable improvement in the international climate. A reduction in military budgets would be an earnest of the sincere desire of States to choose the path of disarmament. Some years ago the United States had contemplated measures of that kind, but it had subsequently dropped them.

19. There were other considerations which made a reduction of military budgets desirable. The measure was one which could be comparatively easily put into effect. The conclusion of an agreement to that end would not necessitate the solution of a host of problems or the disclosure by each side of its defence system. It would not upset the existing balance of forces, and would not give any military advantage to either side or endanger its security. Furthermore, it would permit the diversion of some military expenditure, at least, to peaceful purposes. A reduction of military expenditure would benefit all countries; the only losers would be those whom the peoples called the merchants of death.

20. The proposals for a reduction in military expenditure made during the discussions in the General Assembly and the Eighteen-Nation Committee had aroused great interest. Thus, circumstances were favourable for a settlement of the problem.

21. The Soviet Government proposed to the great Powers that they should reduce their military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent, or by any other agreed percentage, and that in the event of agreement on that point

of the resources freed should be used to assist the developing countries.

22. The Soviet delegation regarded disarmament as one of the fundamental problems of the age and one which affected the vital interests of all peoples. At a time when millions of human beings were suffering hunger, poverty and disease, enormous material resources were being wasted on an arms race which could logically end only in war. Any delay in solving the problem still further increased the danger of a global conflict. Practical measures in that field would free considerable resources which could be used to hasten economic development in all countries, to further scientific and technological progress in the interests of all and to raise standards of living in both the industrialized and the developing countries.

23. According to authoritative estimates, world military expenditure had recently stood at \$120,000 million a year. An agreement providing for a reduction of only 10 per cent in military budgets would therefore be of enormous benefit to economic development. The sum released would be sufficient to abolish hunger, disease and illiteracy in the poor regions of the world in twenty years. It would suffice for the construction of forty-eight industrial complexes such as the metallurgical plant which had been built in India, or eight more giant electric power plants such as the Aswan Dam. It would be enough to finance fifteen to twenty power plants of world importance, particularly in the basins of the great rivers of Asia and Africa, in the Andes range and on the great rivers of Latin America. According to a Swedish economist, world military expenditure now amounted to \$200,000 million a year. In those circumstances, disarmament ideas and plans must no longer be a matter for endless discussion but must lead to specific measures. The Soviet delegation paid tribute to the non-aligned countries, in particular those which were members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, for the valuable comments they had put forward, which would be a stimulus to progress in the disarmament negotiations. It welcomed the unanimous support given to the idea of convening a world disarmament conference, which would undoubtedly help to find new ways of solving the problem, and it hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would draw the necessary conclusions from the discussion in the General Assembly.

24. The Soviet Union was resolved to do everything in its power to achieve general disarmament, and so long as that vital problem was not solved it would work for the adoption of measures to slow down the armaments race and reduce international tension.

25. Mr. OBI (Nigeria) said that the principal task assigned to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It was now generally agreed that, at the present stage of advanced technology, not only in the field of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons but even in the field of conventional weapons, the only hope for true peace and security lay in a fully disarmed world. General and complete disarmament had become an absolute necessity for the future of the world. Nigeria, mindful of its responsibility to the United

Nations and to humanity as a whole, would remain unflinching in its efforts to move negotiations towards that goal.

26. At the 78th meeting of the Disarmament Commission, on 11 May 1965, the Nigerian delegation had expressed the opinion that any solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament should be based on two cardinal principles. Firstly, no agreement, once it was in force, should result in such a disruption of the balance of power as to prejudice the very world security it sought to achieve. That applied not only to the elimination of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them, but also to the reduction of conventional armaments and other components of military power, for it was quite obvious that any agreement which allowed a Power to retain the possibility of using conventional weapons would not only fall short of its goal but could lead to a nuclear conflict, even with the elimination of nuclear weapons well under way. There was therefore a direct link between the elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the reduction and subsequent elimination of conventional weapons, the converse being equally true. The two elements of military power, nuclear and non-nuclear, were therefore inextricably linked to each other and to the establishment of appropriate peace-keeping machinery, the nature of which would vary as disarmament proceeded. Secondly, the problem of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery not only deserved priority but belonged to a special category. For that reason Nigeria had always favoured any move aimed at bridging the gap between the two sides, and warmly welcomed, as it had at Geneva, the two changes introduced by Mr. Gromyko^{3/} in the Soviet programme for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. It was also willing to support an even more radical plan, provided that such a plan would rid the world of the nuclear nightmare without dangerously upsetting the balance of power during the process of general and complete disarmament.

27. In seeking a solution to the problems of general and complete disarmament, particularly the elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, it was absolutely necessary for the United Nations to be accurately informed of the technical aspects of the question so as to be able to evaluate properly the various proposals before it and to find the most effective solution. Any disarmament negotiations must take into account the views and fears of all concerned, and at the same time every possibility must be explored of bridging the gap between the two sides or facilitating the search for a compromise by making the picture clearer. At the meetings of the Disarmament Commission held earlier in 1965, there had been indications that a detailed consideration in depth of the various problems connected with the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would at last be undertaken by an appropriate organ. The Nigerian delegation had then proposed a formula regarding

^{3/} See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1127th meeting, paras. 75-77; and ibid., Eighteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1208th meeting, para. 137.*

the terms of reference of that organ^{4/} for in its view the task of that organ should be clearly defined in order to avoid simply transferring the discussions from one forum to the other.

28. The Eighteen-Nation Committee, which had, from the very outset of the negotiations, recognized that partial or collateral measures would assist in relaxing international tension and would facilitate the attainment of the goal of general and complete disarmament, had had before it nine USSR proposals and five United States proposals. The Nigerian view was that those measures which could be easily agreed on should be taken up without delay in the hope that such agreements, if realized, would generate sufficient psychological and political effects to make it easier to tackle the more difficult collateral measures and the principal objective—general and complete disarmament. The agreements must, however, be meaningful and the impression should not be created that they had been arrived at simply because they were convenient for the super-Powers.

29. Taking all those factors into consideration, the Nigerian delegation viewed with warmth and favour those measures which offered the best prospects of halting the armaments race and which would lead to the destruction of some armaments. It therefore strongly supported the Soviet proposal to reduce military expenditures, a measure for which Nigeria had been calling for a long time, not only because the considerable savings thus realized could be put to better use, but because it was a courageous and realistic means of slowing down the arms race. A verified reduction in military expenditures would appear to be particularly appropriate at the present stage, since it would leave the Powers concerned the choice of deciding where to make the cut, and the indispensable balance of power need not be disturbed. Furthermore, the Nigerian delegation considered the United States proposal for a verified freeze on the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles to be one of the boldest and most radical proposals thus far put forward as a collateral measure. It was to be hoped that that proposal would be given prompt and serious consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee, for, if agreed upon, it would greatly facilitate the implementation of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, if and when one was concluded. His delegation regretted that an agreement on a cut-back in production and the reduction and transfer to peaceful purposes of fissionable materials had not yet been concluded, contrary to the hopes which the attitude of the nuclear Powers early in 1964 had raised.

30. It was now over three years since serious efforts had been begun in the Eighteen-Nation Committee to curb the armaments race, but in spite of the efforts of all the participants, the pressure

exerted by the United Nations and other bodies such as the Organization of African Unity, and by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, and the pious avowals of the great Powers, no destruction of arms had taken place as the result of an agreement. The situation was a disquieting one and raised doubts about the good will of the great Powers. It was necessary for those Powers to convince the sceptics by putting their good intentions into practice and concluding without delay an agreement for the destruction of armaments. The Nigerian delegation had already had occasion to express the view that the two proposals for the partial or complete destruction of bomber aircraft, submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively, were not mutually exclusive but could, in fact, complement each other. Even the destruction of obsolete weapons would be of great value, for they were only obsolete as far as the great Powers were concerned, and in the hands of other Powers they remained formidable engines of war which could upset the balance that existed at present, at least in some regions of the world. Nevertheless, any agreement on the matter should also provide for the destruction of modern weapons, such as missiles. The Nigerian delegation, for its part, would spare no effort to bring about a meeting of minds between the two super-Powers on all questions of disarmament. It reserved the right to speak again later on the draft resolutions before the Committee.

31. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) congratulated the Eighteen-Nation Committee on its genuine efforts as attested to by its report of 22 September 1965 (A/5986-DC/227). In the past few years, the great Powers had repeatedly professed their desire for peace while at the same time increasing their armaments—as, indeed, was also true of lesser Powers. He traced a parallel between the period between the two world wars, i.e., the era of the League of Nations, and the period after 1945, which might be called the era of the United Nations. In spite of all the good will and all the conferences, men had gone on inventing ever more destructive weapons and, as soon as the wars were over, countries had resumed the arms race. The way in which the question of general and complete disarmament was being dealt with was unfortunately in contradiction with the facts of life today. General disarmament could not be achieved if attention was concentrated only on certain weapons, such as atomic weapons, nor could disarmament be complete if two major Powers were not participating in the discussions. The continuation of talks in the Eighteen-Nation Committee was to be welcomed, but the conference projected for 1967 had not had a very auspicious start, since efforts were being made to nip it in the bud. In spite of everything, however, it was good that the discussions should continue and that, apart from considerations of a technical nature, which were largely the prerogative of the great Powers, the small countries should raise their voices in moral protest, even if only in the hope of stirring the conscience of humanity and of convincing that great country in the Far East that man no longer had any alternative to reaching agreement.

^{4/} See the working paper submitted by Nigeria to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 14 July 1964 (ENDC/136, mimeographed); see also Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1964, document DC/209, annex I, sect. N (ENDC/144).

32. Turning to the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee of 17 September 1964 (A/5731-DC/209), he noted that there seemed to be general agreement that the withdrawal of troops from the territory of other countries might contribute to world disarmament, although he himself considered that non-intervention in the affairs of other States would merely be a prelude to disarmament. With regard to the reduction of military budgets, it was also essential to ascertain the cost of maintaining the army without arms and ammunition, and to take into account the price index, not on the basis of funds spent but in terms of labour costs, which varied from one country to another; that aspect of the question had been sadly neglected, yet should not be lost sight of, for a mere comparison of figures gave a very incomplete picture of the situation. Moreover, the reduction of military budgets was no yardstick by which to measure what a country was doing surreptitiously, or even openly, to build up its arsenal; it was conceivable, for example, that a country might manufacture diabolical weapons costing next to nothing—perhaps a supersonic wave, or materials for bacteriological or chemical warfare. A reduction of military budgets was not therefore a conclusive step towards complete disarmament.

33. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States members of NATO and the States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization had also been suggested, and that, in the circumstances, would be one of the most hopeful factors making for disarmament—not general and complete disarmament, but as complete as it could be within a given area. There was also the question of the spread of nuclear weapons; the partial test ban treaty was certainly a step forward but it merely scratched the surface since two great Powers were still engaged in tests, and underground testing was also continuing—as if the existing stocks of armaments were not enough to destroy the whole world. It was essential to speak frankly: since 1945, the United Nations had been supposed to be an open forum for the exchange of candid views and ideas, and not an instrument of deceit, which had been characteristic of wars of the past. There was an Arab proverb which said that war was the art of deception; that proverb still applied, for even in the era of the United Nations, undeclared wars were being waged and the secrecy surrounding the hatching out of new and diabolical engines of war accorded well with the Arab proverb. Where were the hopes that the United Nations had aroused in 1945 in San Francisco? When would that art of deception cease to be practised? Death was indivisible, and it could mean the extinction of mankind.

34. As to the reasons why the question of general and complete disarmament had reached an impasse, there were three relevant factors. The first was that all the major Powers were feverishly working to attain what they believed to be parity with their rivals—and the lack of parity was one of the primary obstacles to progress towards general and complete disarmament. The second factor was that the policies of major States and small countries alike were still based systematically on the balance of power, a concept that had been adopted since the sixteenth

century as one of the best means for avoiding war. Lastly, the United Nations had not so far managed to supplant the balance-of-power system any more than had the League of Nations, and for no other reason than that so many undeveloped countries changed their positions from one day to the next under pressure from one major Power or another. Yet when the day came that the great Powers agreed to make the Security Council the place where decisions of war or peace would be taken, the small countries would have to resign themselves to the idea of a world divided into two or three spheres of influence, to which they would be subjected. The problems were therefore not easy to solve: there was a lack of sincerity and good will, not because the great Powers wished it so but because they could not free themselves from the shackles of the old diplomacy of the balance of power and the pursuit of parity. There was, however, no alternative but to continue with discussions, in the hope that reasoning would make the danger more apparent and that the major Powers would allow themselves to be guided by a new spirit, which would pave the way for world peace.

35. Turning to consideration of the Maltese resolution (A/C.1/L.347), he expressed the view that the sponsor was unwittingly suggesting that general and complete disarmament should start by prohibiting the small nations from acquiring arms and ammunition, doubtless in the hope that they would set themselves as peace-loving models for the arms-producing States. That was a most optimistic expectation. He recalled that the League of Nations had indeed published a yearbook on the trade in arms, ammunition and implements of war, to prevent countries then still under the colonial yoke from secretly obtaining arms from the surpluses of the First World War victors. It had been a useless exercise, for, on the one hand, so long as oppressed nations existed, they would try to obtain arms to free themselves, and on the other hand, the clandestine traffic respected no alliance and always had the tacit approval of the countries that produced arms and wanted to find markets for them. It was the root of the evil that must be destroyed if its effects were to be eliminated. Accordingly he suggested that the operative part of draft resolution A/C.1/L.347 should be replaced by two paragraphs, the first of which would read as follows: "Urges all States manufacturing arms and ammunition to submit to the Secretary-General a full report about the arms production in their countries, including a list of quantities intended for export." It was unlikely that the major arms-producing Powers would agree to such a suggestion, but it was the only way to tie their hands. The second paragraph would request the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly a report on the information requested in the previous paragraph. The Maltese delegation might perhaps reconsider its draft resolution in the light of the history of the League of Nations yearbook on the trade in arms.

36. His delegation approved the general content of the Cypriot draft resolution (A/C.1/L.348/Rev.1), and in particular appreciated operative paragraph 3, which preserved the dignity of the General Assembly

by requesting the Eighteen-Nation Committee to report to it on the progress achieved.

37. Mr. PACHARIYANGKUN (Thailand), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, wished to make it

clear that there was no foreign military base whatsoever in the territory of Thailand, contrary to what the representative of the Soviet Union had stated.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.