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Chairman: Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 105

Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa (concluded) (A/5975, A/C.1/L.346/Rev.2)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (concluded) (A/C.1/L.346/REV.2)

1. Mr. LOPEZ (Philippines), speaking in explanation of vote, said that the draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.346/Rev.2) eloquently reflected the profound desire of the African peoples for peace, and in particular their yearning for a system of international security, based on reason, law and justice, in which they could achieve the fulfilment of their national destinies in friendly co-operation with their neighbours and free from the constant threat of nuclear annihilation. The Philippine delegation fully supported the effort to make Africa a nuclear-free zone, and associated itself with the African countries' appeal to the nuclear Powers to commit themselves to that undertaking. Any denuclearization agreement inevitably depended for its effectiveness on the readiness of the nuclear Powers to comply with their moral obligations. The Philippine delegation hoped that in studying the implementation of the denuclearization plan, the African States would take into consideration such fundamental criteria as unanimity, voluntary acceptance and effective methods of verification and control. However, the essential point of a denuclearization plan was to reduce the danger of nuclear war, and even if denuclearization agreements covering Africa, Latin America and, ultimately, Europe and Asia were achieved, the crucial question would still be whether all the nuclear Powers were prepared to respect their commitments. Such agreements acquired value only as part of a system of related measures of general and complete disarmament. The draft resolution was therefore

significant in that it represented the modest beginning of a promising concept in arms control, and it deserved full support.

2. Mr. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had abstained in the vote on General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI) on the ground that denuclearization was a matter for the States making up the zone in question—a view which it still held. At that time there had been no agreement among the African States regarding the denuclearization of Africa. However, the situation was now changed: the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa issued by the Organization of African Unity in July 1964 and endorsed by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Cairo in October of the same year showed that unanimous agreement had been reached by the African States. His delegation was therefore able to give full and enthusiastic support to the draft resolution.

3. Speaking as the representative of one of the countries of Latin America which were seeking similar agreement, he congratulated the African States on their achievement and wished them success in the consultations and decisions which lay ahead.

4. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.346/Rev.2).

A vote was taken by roll call.

Denmark, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Braz-

zaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: France, Portugal, South Africa.

The draft resolution was adopted by 105 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.

5. Mr. ZOLLNER (Dahomey) said that if his delegation had been present at the time of the vote it would have voted for the draft resolution.

6. The CHAIRMAN congratulated the sponsors of the draft resolution and the First Committee on having taken a significant step towards reducing the threat of war. It was particularly significant that the African States had themselves taken the initiative towards keeping their continent free from nuclear weapons, and he wished them further success in the attainment of their goals through international co-operation.

AGENDA ITEM 28

Question of general and complete disarmament: reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/5731-DC/209, A/5986-DC/227, A/C.1/L.347, A/C.1/L.348/Rev.1)

GENERAL DEBATE

7. Mr. PARDO (Malta) said that in 1964, in response to the appeals made in General Assembly resolutions 1767 (XVII) and 1908 (XVIII), several countries had submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee interesting proposals for collateral measures outside the nuclear field. In that Committee, however, priority had been given to the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty, and there had been little discussion of collateral measures to reduce tension and facilitate general and complete disarmament. Yet the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 15 June 1965^{1/} had recommended that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should consider all proposals for measures to relax international tension.

8. The draft resolution submitted by the Maltese delegation (A/C.1/L.347) was limited in scope and could not by itself effect any radical change in the international atmosphere. However, it had the merit of dealing with the problem of the dissemination of non-nuclear weapons, which had received little attention in the United Nations although it was scarcely less serious in its implications than the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The arms races among non-nuclear States affected large areas of the under-developed world; they were dangerous not only because they tended to disturb local balances of power but also because they might result in the direct involvement of major military Powers and even in confrontations between them. In addition, the costs could be very high; the per capita rates of military expenditure of some of the poor countries were among the highest in the world, and much of that expenditure went for arms imports. Such arms

racess were made possible by the provision of arms and/or subsidies from abroad. Malta did not question the right of any country to request arms for the protection of its security or of any State to grant such requests; however, the secrecy surrounding many transactions of that kind exacerbated delicate situations and could endanger world peace which, according to the Charter of the United Nations, was the concern of all Member States.

9. In point of fact, the major Powers were usually aware of arrivals of arms in areas in which they were interested, and were soon informed of the type of arms involved. The neighbours of the importing country, however, might not be so well informed; consequently, they might react by ordering more sophisticated arms or greater quantities of arms than were needed to balance their neighbour's imports, thus accelerating the arms race. An effective system of publicity might help to reduce local tensions and moderate the arms race.

10. The United Nations had no reliable information on the arms traffic; yet the accumulation and transfer of armaments were matters which might threaten the maintenance of international peace and security and should therefore, according to Article 99 of the Charter, be brought to the attention of the Security Council by the Secretary-General. Because the Secretary-General had no reliable information on those matters, the United Nations was repeatedly obliged to take emergency action to deal with armed conflicts which could perhaps have been avoided had the threatening symptoms been brought to the attention of the Security Council.

11. The idea of giving publicity to the transfer of arms was not new. Under Article 8, paragraph 6, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Members of the League undertook to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as were adaptable to warlike purposes. According to the 1923 report of the League's Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments,^{2/} the object of Article 8 was "to improve the political atmosphere by creating confidence". That was precisely the object of the Maltese draft resolution (A/C.1/L.347).

12. For ten years the publication by the League of a statistical yearbook on the trade in arms, ammunition and implements of war had helped to create and maintain an atmosphere of confidence in which it had been possible to stabilize world armaments. The yearbook had originally been published in preparation for the 1925 Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War. Its publication had subsequently been continued as a means of supplementing and co-ordinating the system of publicity established by the Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and in preparation for the disarmament conference. It might be useful if an experimental edition of a similar

^{1/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/225.

^{2/} League of Nations, document A.35 (Part II) 1923.IX (Geneva, August 15th, 1923).

yearbook could be published in advance of the world disarmament conference scheduled for 1967.

13. Malta realized that publicity alone would not solve the urgent problem of the international traffic in armaments; it might, however, mitigate some of the dangerous consequences of that trade by enabling the United Nations to be apprised of and to discuss dangerous situations before armed conflicts erupted.

14. Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) said that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had done most useful work by focusing attention on the main technical and political problems of disarmament, clarifying the different positions and defining the obstacles to be overcome. It should resume work as soon as possible, continuing its study of collateral measures of disarmament while proceeding also with the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament based on past and future proposals. The conclusion which had emerged from the Eighteen-Nation Committee's discussions was that while the main effort should be concentrated on the progressive, rapid and controlled elimination of nuclear weapons, a parallel progressive reduction in conventional armaments was essential to the security of all nations. The difficulties and delays experienced should not discourage further efforts, for only general and complete disarmament could guarantee the peaceful existence and progress of mankind. Disarmament would not only banish the spectre of devastating conflicts but would also enable mankind to devote all its resources to purposes consistent with the dignity of man.

15. His delegation was duly appreciative of the motives which had prompted Malta to submit its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.347). It would support the Cypriot draft resolution (A/C.1/L.348/Rev.1), since it reflected the desire of many delegations for a procedural resolution which, without dealing with the substance of the problem, would encourage the resumption of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. However, the Cypriot draft resolution would perhaps be improved by the insertion of a preambular paragraph stating that the General Assembly was conscious of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations regarding disarmament and the strengthening of peace. There should also be a preambular paragraph recalling some of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly—particularly resolutions 1378 (XIV), 1722 (XVI), 1767 (XVII) and 1908 (XVIII). He also suggested the addition at the end of operative paragraph 1 of the words "and any other collateral measures likely to lessen international tension and reduce the risk of war".

16. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that it would be pointless to reopen the general debate on disarmament; the United Nations policy of placing full confidence in the Eighteen-Nation Committee should be continued. The issue of disarmament had passed from the stage of discussion to that of negotiation, and further debate might lead to a hardening of positions which would jeopardize the atmosphere of friendliness and compromise that should prevail in the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

17. Peru's position in the matter was identical with that outlined by the representative of Italy. It would support the Cypriot draft resolution (A/C.1/L.348/Rev.1), and hoped that the changes suggested by the Italian representative would be accepted. The adoption of the Cypriot draft resolution would constitute a renewed expression of confidence in the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

18. The representative of Malta had rightly pointed out that disarmament was concerned with conventional as well as nuclear armaments. Publicity was undoubtedly a weapon against secrecy, which was one of the causes of mistrust; and disturbances in the balance of conventional weapons in some parts of the world might involve the great Powers. The Peruvian delegation saw no reason why the Eighteen-Nation Committee should not accept the invitation in the Maltese draft resolution to consider the question of establishing a system of giving publicity, through the United Nations, to transfers of arms between States.

Order of discussion of agenda items (continued)*
(A/C.1/896 and Add.1, A/C.1/900)

19. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that it still had to decide on the order in which it would consider the six remaining items on its agenda after it had completed its discussion of the question of general and complete disarmament.

20. Sir Harold BEELEY (United Kingdom) suggested that agenda item 99, (Peaceful settlement of disputes), which his delegation had proposed, should be transferred from the First Committee to the Special Political Committee. He had consulted the Chairmen of the two Committees concerned, and it appeared that the Special Political Committee would find it easier to discuss item 99 within the time remaining before the close of the session.

21. The CHAIRMAN said that if there were no objections, the President of the General Assembly would be informed that the Committee approved the transfer of agenda item 99 to the Special Committee.

It was so decided.

22. The CHAIRMAN said that in the past few weeks he had asked more than seventy delegations for their views on the order in which the remaining items on the agenda should be discussed; and though there had been some differences of opinion on the matter, most delegations seemed to be in favour of taking up the remaining five items in the following order: first, agenda item 107 (The inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty); second, agenda item 93 (Question of Cyprus: (a) Letter dated 13 July 1965 from the representative of Cyprus; (b) Letter dated 21 July 1965 from the representative of Turkey); third, agenda item 33 (Actions on the regional level with a view to improving good neighbourly relations among European States having different social and political systems); fourth, agenda item 31 (International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: reports of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space); and fifth, agenda

*Resumed from the 1381st meeting.

item 32 (The Korean question: reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea).

23. He asked whether the Committee was prepared to discuss the remaining items in that order.

24. Mr. COULIBALY (Mali), Mr. EL-KONY (United Arab Republic), Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan), Mr. TRIVEDI (India), Mr. ALARCON QUESADA (Cuba) and Mr. DIALLO (Guinea) thought that the Committee should consider the five remaining items in the order indicated by the Chairman.

25. Mr. Orhan ERALP (Turkey) said he did not agree. In the first place, his delegation had understood after the discussion at the 1354th meeting on the order of discussion of the items on the Committee's agenda that the question of Cyprus would be considered immediately after the six disarmament items. Secondly, the Asian group had agreed almost unanimously that the question of Cyprus should be given priority, and the Chairman of the Asian group had, he believed, addressed a letter in that sense to the Chairman of the First Committee. Thirdly, the Security Council was to meet on 13 December 1965 to discuss the prolongation of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus; and the question of Cyprus should surely be considered and disposed of by the First Committee before the Security Council began its deliberations. Fourthly, his own country's Foreign Minister and high-ranking officials from other countries had arrived in New York to participate in the Committee's discussion on the question of Cyprus, and he felt that the Committee should as a gesture of courtesy to them begin its consideration of the question of Cyprus as soon as possible.

26. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) pointed out that the Committee would not be able to hold more than twenty to twenty-four meetings before the end of the session. Four or five meetings should suffice for discussing the Korean question and international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, and another two or three meetings would be required for considering actions on the regional level with a view to improving good neighbourly relations among European States having different social and political systems. With regard to agenda items 93 and 107—the question of Cyprus, and the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States—the most important point to decide was how many meetings should be allotted to each of them. It did not greatly matter which of them was considered first, though he himself thought that priority should be given to item 93 and would in fact have preferred that item to have been considered even before item 28. As the Turkish representative had argued, the Committee should show courtesy to the Foreign Ministers of the countries concerned, who had arrived in New York to participate personally in the discussion on the question of Cyprus; and it should arrange to complete its discussion of that question before the Security Council's meeting on 13 December.

27. Mr. REDONDO (Costa Rica) said that while priority should be given to item 107, he did not

think that the Committee would have time for comprehensive study of the item at its present session. After an introductory discussion in the First Committee, the item could perhaps be referred to a smaller, though genuinely representative, committee, which could report to the General Assembly at its next session.

28. Mr. YOST (United States of America) said that, although agenda item 107 was a very important one, it made little difference whether the Committee took it up in two, five or six days' time. On the other hand, consideration of the question of Cyprus was a matter of urgency, partly because the three Foreign Ministers from the countries most directly concerned were waiting in New York to take part in the discussion, and partly because the Secretary-General hoped that the Security Council would be able to meet not later than 13 December to consider the prolongation of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. It would obviously be useful to the Council if the General Assembly could conclude its discussion on the question of Cyprus before the Council took up the matter again; and it would be inconvenient for the delegations concerned if the question of Cyprus were to be discussed simultaneously in two bodies. The simplest course, therefore, would be to discuss agenda item 93 first, and then consider item 107; but, if the Committee preferred to discuss item 107 first, the debate on item 93 should at all costs be started early enough to ensure that it would be completed before 13 December.

29. On the question of Korea, he said that the people of Korea had for many years attached very great importance to United Nations protection; and his delegation feared that if agenda item 32 was postponed until the very end of the session the discussion might have to be unduly curtailed.

30. Mr. CHIMIDDORJ (Mongolia) said that the letter from the Chairman of the Asian group to which the Turkish representative had referred did not accurately reflect the views of the Asian group, and certainly did not reflect the views of his own delegation, which hoped that priority would be given to item 107.

31. Mr. RAMANI (Malaysia) said that at a meeting of the Asian group, at which the Turkish representative had not been present, no objection had been raised to the order outlined by the Chairman of the First Committee for discussing the remaining items on the Committee's agenda. However, at a later meeting of the Asian group, which had been convened at the express request of the Turkish representative and which had not—as far as he recalled—been attended by the Mongolian representative, there had been a general feeling that agenda item 93 should be given priority over agenda item 107 in view of the forthcoming meeting of the Security Council. As Chairman of the Asian group he had written to the Chairman of the Committee in that sense.

32. Mr. LIATIS (Greece) suggested, as a compromise, that the Committee should consider the remaining items in the order indicated by the Chairman, but that a specific date—say, Thursday, 9 December—

should be fixed for starting the discussion on agenda item 93.

33. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) said that the Committee should follow the order of discussion outlined by the Chairman, passing on to agenda item 107 as soon as it had completed its consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament. He agreed with earlier speakers who had suggested that consideration of agenda item 93 should be completed before the Security Council's meeting on the Cyprus question; but the Committee could authorize the Chairman to hold consultations with the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council regarding the exact date of the Security Council's meeting.

34. Mr. MUDENGE (Rwanda) thought that after the question of general and complete disarmament had been disposed of the Committee should begin its consideration of agenda item 107. At the same time, it could agree to suspend the discussion of item 107 on 8 December at the latest and devote all its meetings on 8, 9 and 10 December—and on 11 December also, if necessary—to agenda item 93, so as to ensure that its consideration of that item was completed before the Security Council's meeting in the following week. Then, on 13 December, it could take up item 107 again.

35. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thought that the order of discussion proposed by the Chairman was entirely acceptable, and was glad to note that a majority of delegations were in favour of it.

36. The argument that the Committee should give priority to the question of Cyprus because the Foreign Ministers of the countries concerned had already arrived in New York was unconvincing. In the first place, the Foreign Ministers were in all probability intending to take part in the Security Council's discussions on Cyprus as well; and, secondly, the priorities to be assigned to individual items on the Committee's agenda had to be decided in the light of the nature and the urgency of the items themselves.

37. The question of Cyprus should, of course, be dealt with by the Committee before it was taken up by the Security Council; but the date of the Security Council's meeting on the question of Cyprus had not yet been fixed; it would be decided by the members of the Council in due course in accordance with the normal procedure. The actual timing of the First Committee's discussion of the question of Cyprus in relation to the Security Council's meeting should be settled through consultations between the Chairman of the Committee and the Secretary-General in the light of the opinions expressed in the present discussion.

38. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said he did not ask that the question of Cyprus should be given priority, but merely that sufficient time should be allowed for comprehensive discussion of it before the Security Council was convened. He regarded the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States as a general principle of which the question of Cyprus might be regarded as a particular case; and the

general principle should undoubtedly be examined first.

39. Mr. TINE (France) agreed with the representatives of Greece, Afghanistan, Rwanda and Cyprus that it would be quite possible and reasonable to give priority to agenda item 107, to which his Government attached special importance. The Committee would, of course, have to complete its consideration of the question of Cyprus before the Security Council met, and it should undoubtedly take into account the concerns and particular responsibilities of the Secretary-General, as well as the interests of the Security Council and its members. But even if the Committee adopted the proposal made by the delegations he had mentioned, the dates on which the Cyprus discussion was to begin and end should be fixed very soon, bearing in mind that it would have to be finished before the meeting of the Security Council.

40. Mr. WELLS (Jamaica) thought that the Committee should give priority to item 107 and try to complete the debate on it by, say, 9 December. It should then take up item 93. If the debate on item 107 had not been completed by 9 December, the Committee could revert to that item for a brief period after the consideration of item 93 had been concluded.

41. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq) said that the order of business suggested by the Chairman was not incompatible with the need for full discussion of the question of Cyprus by the Committee before it was taken up by the Security Council. The Chairman of the Committee would, of course, be having consultations with the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, and in a few days' time he might be able to tell the Committee exactly when the Security Council was to be convened. In the light of that information, the Committee could decide when to start its consideration of item 93.

42. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus), speaking on a point of order, said he wished to make it clear that the purpose of the Security Council's meeting was to decide whether or not to renew the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. The question of Cyprus, as such, was before the General Assembly; but it was not tabled for discussion in the Security Council.

43. Sir Harold BEELEY (United Kingdom) and Mr. Vinci (Italy) supported the Greek representative's compromise proposal that the Committee should give priority to item 107, that it should if necessary break off its discussion of item 107 to allow sufficient time for consideration of the question of Cyprus before the meeting of the Security Council, and that in that case consideration of item 107 should be resumed after the debate on item 93 had been concluded. The latter could well begin either on 8 December or on 9 December.

44. Mr. Orhan ERALP (Turkey) said that the sole purpose of his earlier statement had been to remind the Committee of the need for full consideration of the question of Cyprus before the Security Council met. In the light of subsequent statements, he was now prepared to accept the compromise proposal made

by the representatives of Greece and Rwanda and endorsed by the United Kingdom representative.

45. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) moved the closure of the debate.

The motion was adopted.

46. The CHAIRMAN said that he had not provisionally decided on the order of priorities, as the representative of Malaysia had indicated in his statement, but, on the contrary, had left the decision to the members of the Committee. He had held discussions with several members, at the beginning of which he had merely expressed some views. Some members had agreed with those views and some had not. In order to be impartial, he had made known both the opposing viewpoints to other members with whom he had held discussions subsequently. It was for the same reason that he had brought the letter from the representative of Malaysia before the Committee, as requested by the representative of Turkey, feeling that

it might give rise to controversy and dispute, which he had wished to avoid in the Committee.

47. It now appeared to be the general feeling of the Committee that the remaining items on its agenda should be dealt with in the order which he had suggested at the beginning of the discussion. If that was the Committee's intention, agenda item 107 (The inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty) would be discussed immediately after the question of general and complete disarmament; and in view of the need for full consideration of the question of Cyprus before the Security Council's meeting he would try to set a tentative schedule for the consideration of agenda item 93 after consultations with the Secretary-General.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 7.25 p.m.