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Chairman: Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

## AGENDA ITEM 30

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/5731-DC/209, A/5986-DC/227, A/C.1/L.345 and Add.1)

### GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico) said that the various aspects of disarmament on the Committee's agenda were hard to separate, and that to treat them in isolation might give an incomplete and therefore dangerous idea of the way in which they should be approached. The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, in whatever physical environment they were conducted, was a case in point, since the continuation of such tests was one of the most definite forms of nuclear proliferation, which occurred not only when nuclear weapons—which could better be described as genocidal than homicidal—were transferred directly or indirectly from one country to another but also when their numbers were multiplied in one territory. It would therefore be illogical to stop half way and tolerate one form of proliferation after so forcefully condemning another; furthermore, there was no hope of preventing one form of proliferation if the other was allowed to remain, since the temptation to evade any treaty on non-proliferation that might be concluded would grow in direct ratio to the quantity of nuclear weapons held by the nuclear States; any brimming vessel inevitably overflowed sooner or later. The General Assembly itself had recognized that the suspension of nuclear weapon tests and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were interdependent when it had stated in resolution 1649 (XVI) that an agreement prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests would inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. The First Committee should therefore take forthwith the radical measures needed to achieve both those goals together and avert a catastrophe.

2. The most urgent need was to ensure that the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was made universal as soon as possible both by inducing States which were not yet parties to accede to it, and by extending its provisions to underground tests. That was the aim of the non-aligned countries, including Mexico, represented at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and it was also the aim of the sponsors of the draft resolution before the First Committee (A/C.1/L.345 and Add.1) of which Mexico was a sponsor.

3. The draft resolution would call upon all countries to respect the spirit and provisions of the partial test ban treaty—in other words, to cease all nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water once and for all. It was certainly no threat to sovereignty to call—as did the average citizen in all countries—for liberation not only from the threat of nuclear war but even before that, and without further delay, from the dangers of radioactive contamination to which man and his descendants were exposed as a result of nuclear explosions in the environments covered by the partial test ban treaty. There again, as in all other matters, humanitarian considerations should prevail.

4. It was useless to say that underground explosions did not necessarily produce radio-active fall-out; the knowledge that the "clean bomb" would give mankind a "clean" death was not exactly reassuring. Such picayune distinctions would not deprive nuclear weapons of their power of mass destruction and would not prevent them from raining death on soldiers and civilians, the innocent and the guilty alike. All bombs, whether they were "clean" or "dirty", "tactical" or "strategic", were to be condemned equally, and experiments with them in any environment whatsoever should therefore cease entirely and for ever.

5. The fact that it was difficult to distinguish infallibly between underground explosions and natural earthquakes should not be so great an obstacle as to prevent the conclusion of an agreement which was of crucial importance to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In any event, it was clear from the memorandum submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee by Sweden<sup>1/</sup> and the United Kingdom<sup>2/</sup> that modern detection and identification techniques had reached such a degree of accuracy that it was now possible to detect and identify the vast majority of natural and artificial movements of the earth's crust and interior. Such scientific advances as the vast seismological

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. B.

<sup>2/</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. C.

array in the State of Montana gave grounds for hope that it would soon be possible to eliminate the residue of unidentifiable seismic occurrences.

6. Meanwhile, since time was of the essence, all countries, and particularly the nuclear Powers, should seek possibilities of agreement; for example, if no inspection procedure met with the approval of all parties, the old idea of a threshold could be revived, in other words, a start could be made by immediately banning underground tests which could be easily detected by national seismological stations. Of course, the ideal would be to be able to adopt a final solution and ban all underground tests; but since the obstacles of identification and inspection had not yet been eliminated, the only way to achieve a total ban would be for the two parties principally concerned to make a reasonable bargain by which each would sacrifice to the cause of world peace and tranquillity part of what it considered to be its security. That was what the representative of Nigeria had meant when he had stated, both in the First Committee and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, that the real threat to the security of either Power was not an occasional explosion or sporadic inspection. If each side maintained its position it was impossible to see how the problem could be resolved; a solution could be reached only through agreement between the parties concerned, which would not be achieved unless they were sincerely motivated by a desire for peace.

7. Like every stage in a process, the partial test ban treaty would not continue a separate existence indefinitely but would ultimately collapse unless the final goal of a ban on underground tests, which was specifically mentioned in its preamble, was attained and unless the treaty was integrated at the proper time into the whole of which it was a part: the process of disarmament properly so called. As the Mexican delegation had already said in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, that treaty was only a prologue; it should therefore be completed and, together with a treaty on non-proliferation, added to other disarmament measures to be taken subsequently—it was to be hoped without delay. There was no comfort to be derived from the fact that Powers which in any case no longer derived much benefit from nuclear experiments because they already possessed arsenals large enough to blow up the earth had given up such experiments. Efforts must be continued to do away with that "nuclear plenty" whose very existence was enough to envenom international relations. Since the existence of stocks of devices whose testing was prohibited could not in simple logic be regarded as good or legitimate, it was obvious that the nations should first ban nuclear weapons by treaty and then decree their total destruction.

8. His delegation reserved the right to speak again on the use and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. It joined all those men and women, famous and obscure, who had spoken out on behalf of mankind against the nuclear peril and in defence of reverence for life. It was in that spirit that the General Assembly had adopted its resolutions on the subject, including resolution 1762 (XVII) in which it had condemned all nuclear weapon tests. Mexico hoped that the draft resolution before the Committee would receive the unanimous support of all Member States.

9. Mr. FAHMY (United Arab Republic) said that his Government's position on the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests could be stated very clearly and without ambiguity: the Government of the United Arab Republic was against all nuclear tests under all circumstances and for all time, whether in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water or underground. The question was one of life or death which left no room for compromise. There could be no hesitation between life and health, on the one hand, and the dangers resulting from the use of those lethal weapons, on the other. World public opinion could therefore not be expected to keep silent and refrain from condemning a situation which would perpetuate nuclear testing. The contention that for scientific or political reasons it was impossible to end nuclear testing was tantamount to a confession of lack of faith in mankind's ability to meet the most serious challenge it would be forced to face for many generations—a challenge resulting from the insane arms race and the allegation that testing had to be continued in order to perfect weapons for the security of one or another Power. There was a danger that in the end, either by mistake or miscalculation, nuclear weapons would bring eternal sorrow and unlimited damage to the very people who were manufacturing them. That was why the United Arab Republic, like all those who shared its feelings, would seize every opportunity forcefully to condemn all nuclear weapon tests.

10. The memorandum of the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee<sup>3/</sup> could in its opinion serve as a practical basis for further negotiations; his delegation hoped that joint agreement would be forthcoming on the cessation of underground tests. It would be pointless for the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and particularly the eight non-aligned countries, to continue discussing the issue unless the two super-Powers were prepared to reconsider their positions in the near future and adopt a less intransigent approach, so that agreement could be reached, with or without the help of the eight non-aligned countries, on extending the partial test ban treaty to underground tests. Without such agreement the treaty would gradually lose its momentum, and the political atmosphere, which had seemed to be improving, would deteriorate. However, the present political atmosphere gave some grounds for hope.

11. The General Assembly should at its current session reaffirm its previous position and call upon all States to refrain from further testing, should urge those Powers which had not yet signed the partial test ban treaty to do so in the immediate future, so that the treaty might enjoy universal acceptance, and should ask the Eighteen-Nation Committee to do all in its power to bring its work on the remaining issues to a successful conclusion and to report to the General Assembly, either at the next regular session or at a special session, to be convened immediately if it proved possible to reach agreement much earlier than expected. The draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.345 and Add.1) made the same appeal which had been made at Cairo in October 1964 by the Second Conference of

<sup>3/</sup> Ibid., sect. F.

Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, who had called on all States to accede to the partial test ban treaty and to abide by its provisions, for the sake of peace and the welfare of mankind, and had appealed for the extension of the treaty to underground tests and the discontinuance of such tests pending the conclusion of an agreement. For that reason, his Government had joined the sponsors of the draft resolution, in the hope that the two super-Powers would tackle the problem seriously and end the scientific and political dilemma which was interfering with the solution of other equally important issues.

12. He said that the words "and to report to the General Assembly" should be added at the end of operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution.<sup>4/</sup>

13. The CHAIRMAN called on the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in exercise of the right of reply.

14. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), replying to the statement made by the United States representative at the 1385th meeting, said that on 23 November his delegation had defined the Soviet Union's position on the banning of all tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. He noted with satisfaction that most representatives who had participated in the debate had stressed the need for such a ban, which would serve the cause of peace and halt the arms race.

15. His Government had stated its position on the matter repeatedly and clearly. It proposed a ban on underground tests of nuclear weapons and the use of national means of detection for monitoring the ban. The effectiveness of national means of detection had been demonstrated since the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty. Unfortunately the attitude of the United States and other Western Powers was preventing a settlement of that question.

16. In order to eliminate any possibility of agreement on underground testing, Mr. Foster, the United States representative, had rejected out of hand the proposal of the non-aligned countries for the immediate suspension of all nuclear weapon tests, on the pretext that such a suspension would be equivalent to a moratorium on underground tests, which the United States could not accept. In objecting to the proposal the United States representative had said: "We have already had one understanding regarding the suspension of underground testing, and the Soviet Union started testing again in spite of official statements that it would not be the first to do so. We are not inclined to repeat that unfortunate experience."

17. But there had been no formal agreement on that subject between the Soviet Union and the United States. At different times during the autumn of 1958 the Governments of the two countries had made unilateral declarations concerning the suspension of, or in other words a moratorium on, nuclear tests. Those declarations were, of course, interdependent, and one party's

refusal to abide by the moratorium released the other party from its obligations.

18. Scarcely three or four months after the United States announcement of a moratorium, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved plans for nuclear weapon tests at the Nevada and South Pacific test sites. That decision was obviously contrary to the letter and the spirit of the United States Government's moratorium declaration.

19. In February 1959, at the 61st meeting of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, the Soviet representative had raised that point. Six months later, at the 120th meeting, the Soviet delegation had drawn the attention of the other two participants—the United Kingdom and the United States—to the statements of Mr. McCone, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, and Senator Anderson, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee, to the effect that the United States intended to conduct nuclear tests underground, in outer space and in the atmosphere.

20. Those statements, made by authorized governmental and congressional spokesmen, clearly indicated that the United States moratorium declaration was in fact no more than a manoeuvre intended not to end nuclear testing but solely to gain time for preparing a new and larger series of tests; that was proved by the fact that immediately after the declaration of a moratorium on nuclear explosions and at the very moment when the United States representatives at Geneva were negotiating a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the United States Atomic Energy Commission received special appropriations of tens of millions of dollars for the preparation of nuclear test sites in the Pacific—at Eniwetok, Bikini and elsewhere. Finally, on 29 December 1959, a little more than one year after the United States announcement of a moratorium, President Eisenhower had declared that after 31 December 1959 his country would consider itself no longer bound by the moratorium. In short, the United States had merely waited for the favourable moment to resume its tests. The Soviet Union, therefore, could not be held responsible for the failure of the moratorium.

21. The United States representative's statement that his Government was not inclined to repeat the unfortunate experience of a moratorium was completely irrelevant and could not justify the United States rejection of the proposal for an immediate cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests.

22. However, the representative of the United States had also advanced other equally strange arguments. He had said that the proposal was unacceptable to his Government because it constituted what he had called a short cut to a comprehensive test ban treaty. But if a proposal offered the shortest way to the desired goal, that was an advantage, not a drawback.

23. As to the United States representative's third argument, that the proposal "might diminish pressure for the stable and permanent comprehensive test ban we all seek", he believed that on the contrary the adoption of the proposal would help to hasten the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, since it

<sup>4/</sup> The revised draft resolution incorporating this change was subsequently distributed as document A/C.1/L.345/Rev.1.

would eliminate the main obstacle, which was the desire of the United States to perfect nuclear weapons through underground testing.

24. The United States representative had offered no serious arguments in his statement at the preceding meeting. He had simply said, as his United Kingdom colleague had said the day before, that in exchange for its assent the United States Government demanded the right to send inspection teams to any area of the USSR where there had been an event that might be regarded as a nuclear explosion. The Soviet Union totally rejected any idea of inspection without disarmament, which in the case in point would be equivalent to espionage.

25. The United States stubbornly refused to see that today, when it was resorting to arms and violence in its relations with other States, when there was increasing tension in international relations and a growing threat of nuclear war, the only way to reach an agreement on the cessation of underground tests was to use national means to supervise its implementation. That was how the problem had been solved in the partial test ban treaty with regard to inspection in the other three environments, i.e. in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

26. The use of national means of detection and identification was the more rational in view of the fact that during the past few years such means had proved themselves effective at long distances. Moreover, that solution gave no military advantage to any of the parties concerned and posed no threat to their security. It was not only a sensible solution but the only possible one.

27. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America), exercising his right of reply, said that on 14 January 1960, less than three weeks after the statement of President Eisenhower which had been mentioned by the representative of the USSR, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union had again declared that the Soviet Government intended to abide by its promise not to be the first to resume nuclear tests; everyone would remember that the Western Powers had resumed their tests only after the Soviet Union began a prolonged series of nuclear weapon tests on 1 September 1961. The Soviet tests had been resumed at the very moment when the Soviet representative at a disarmament conference had been arguing in favour of a threshold treaty and a moratorium.

28. Certain statements by military and other individuals in the United States mentioned by the Soviet representative had been quoted out of context; while it was true that in today's world the United States and the Soviet Union had to maintain defence preparations for security purposes, only the President of the United States had the authority to call for tests or the use of nuclear weapons, and he had given no order for such tests until after the Soviet Union had resumed its own tests.

29. Lastly, the Soviet representative had said that the United States was determined to avoid short cuts; in fact, the United States was quite prepared to use short cuts if they were on sound ground. However, if an agreement overlooked the difficulties of not being able to determine whether clandestine tests were

taking place, the short cut was not on sound ground but on treacherous footing. That was the point he had wished to make clear in his statement of the day before.

#### CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.1/L.345 AND ADD.1)

30. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), after referring to the efforts which the non-aligned countries had been making for several years to secure the cessation of nuclear tests, noted that those efforts coincided with those of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to have the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water extended to cover underground tests as well. It was regrettable that the United States was still obstinately refusing to accept a ban on the one remaining type of tests not covered by that treaty—namely, underground tests. His delegation therefore supported operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, though it regretted that the word "immediately" had not been included. It did, however, welcome the assurances provided in that connexion by the representatives of Sweden and the United Arab Republic. It also supported operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, calling upon all countries to respect the spirit and provisions of the partial test ban treaty. That paragraph seemed, incidentally, to imply the use of national means of detection as laid down in the treaty, i.e., without international inspection or control.

31. On the other hand, he had some reservations regarding operative paragraph 3, which did not say that all the provisions of the partial test ban treaty should be extended to underground tests but instead suggested that a new treaty should be drafted and that arrangements "effectively" banning all nuclear weapon tests should be made. For the United States and its Western allies, that would mean a ban accompanied by international inspection and control. As it was at present worded, operative paragraph 3 would allow the Western Powers to continue to sabotage any settlement of the question of underground tests, as they could regard it as an argument in support of their demand for outside inspection and control. They could make use of it in order to prolong the discussion indefinitely, as they had successfully done in the past. His delegation therefore regarded operative paragraph 3 as superfluous, or even detrimental to the cause which the draft resolution claimed to promote; and he was therefore unable to support it.

32. He could not, therefore, vote for the draft resolution.

33. In order to save time, his delegation had said that it was prepared to solve the question on the basis of the proposal by the United Arab Republic; and it was a pity that, owing to the indifference displayed by the United States and other Western Powers, that proposal had not been further developed.

34. The United States was responsible for the difficulties encountered in drafting specific proposals. It insisted on retaining a certain freedom of action to perfect its nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and to develop new prototypes, and for that purpose it was

obliged to continue its tests. If it really wanted a comprehensive test ban treaty, all it had to do was to try out the proposed solution.

35. In 1963, the Western Powers, particularly the United States, had been able to overcome their doubts and fears and abandon their demand for international control and inspection of the ban on nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; and they had signed the partial test ban treaty which provided that control should be effected by national means of detection and identification alone. Experience showed that national means of control were perfectly adequate for a mutual check in compliance with the terms of the treaty. The same practice should be followed in regard to underground tests. It was possible to conclude an agreement with a certain element of doubt, and then let time, experience and practice decide whether or not the agreement was effective or applicable. It would be much better to conclude a treaty of that kind, whatever its alleged defects might be, than to reject the proposal altogether, as the United States was doing.

36. His delegation therefore appealed to the United States to reconsider its unrealistic attitude and to abandon its demand for international inspection and control; and it asked the United States to demonstrate its good will by accepting the proposal for an immediate suspension of underground nuclear weapon tests, under the same conditions as those on which tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water had been banned in 1963. His delegation hoped that the United States would respond to that appeal, and thereby help to slow down the nuclear arms race.

37. Mr. MATSUI (Japan) recalled that Japan had been the only country to experience the horrors of nuclear bombing. In mentioning that, he had no intention of reopening old wounds or of indulging in self-pity; he wished merely to emphasize the great importance which his people attached to the total suspension of all testing of nuclear weapons, in all environments, by all countries.

38. At the time when it had been concluded, the partial test ban treaty had undoubtedly helped considerably to reduce international tension, and had contributed to progress towards general and complete disarmament. Unfortunately, the champions of disarmament had lost ground during the past two years, mainly because of the test explosions conducted by the People's Republic of China for the purpose of nuclear weapons development, and because France was intending to explode thermonuclear weapons in the South Pacific region.

39. Was it too optimistic to hope that the People's Republic of China and France would listen to the voice of reason and accede to the partial test ban treaty which more than 100 countries had already signed? Was it too much to hope that those two Powers would join in the universal effort to achieve a total ban on the testing of nuclear weapons? The conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty would consolidate and extend the gains made by the partial treaty, and facilitate progress towards complete disarmament. There was a very close relationship between a total ban and the non-proliferation of

nuclear weapons. Obviously, nations with a potential nuclear capability could not very well develop and manufacture nuclear weapons if they had renounced the right to test them; and the nuclear Powers could not develop further the weapons which they already possessed.

40. He was glad to note that increased attention had recently been given to the question of improving techniques for detecting and identifying underground tests. His country supported the idea of international co-operation between countries which were particularly advanced in seismological research. It welcomed the Swedish proposal for the establishment of a world-wide surveillance system involving the creation of a network of technologically advanced seismological stations;<sup>5/</sup> and it would be prepared to take part in discussions on the establishment of such a system under United Nations auspices. It was also willing to send experts to any meeting which might be convened to study the various technical problems mentioned in the Swedish memorandum, such as those relating to standards for instrumentation and the exchange of data.

41. He thought that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should be reconvened at the earliest possible moment to conclude its work on a truly comprehensive test ban treaty. Accordingly, his delegation had joined the sponsors of the draft resolution and earnestly hoped that it would be adopted unanimously.

42. Mr. Amjad ALI (Pakistan) regretted that the hopes aroused by the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty had not yet been fulfilled. The drafting of a comprehensive test ban treaty did undoubtedly give rise to both political and technical problems. On the technical aspect—whether there was any foolproof system of detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests—the USSR and the United States disagreed. To end the deadlock, it would seem logical to invite the two sides to organize—either bilaterally or under United Nations auspices—a meeting of experts to consider the solutions advocated by each side. He would also like to see operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution amended to include a specific request that experts from the two sides should meet to consider the technical questions which were holding up agreement, and should submit their conclusions to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

43. His delegation had noted with great interest the memorandum submitted by Sweden to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.<sup>5/</sup> The proposal for establishing a "detection club" was a constructive one; and indeed all the proposals contained in the memorandum could very well be used as a basis for a possible solution to the problem of detecting and identifying underground nuclear weapon tests.

44. On the political aspects of the problem agreement should not be too difficult to achieve, since the tremendous technological advances made by the three nuclear signatories to the partial test ban treaty had proved that the qualitative improvement of nuclear explosives was no longer a crucial factor in the arms race. The emphasis had shifted away from the deve-

<sup>5/</sup> See footnote 1.

lopment and stockpiling of nuclear explosives to the development of delivery systems, their accuracy, their speed, the construction of their warheads and their invulnerability to surprise destruction. It was true that there might be some advantage in testing lighter and cheaper nuclear weapons which were relatively free from radio-active fall-out and which would be used against armed forces rather than civilian populations. But weapons of that kind could not achieve any decisive military results. They only tended to widen the scope of the use of nuclear weapons, and thereby increased the terrible danger facing mankind.

45. A comprehensive test ban treaty, if universally accepted, would provide an effective deterrent against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But that in itself would not altogether suffice to lock the door of the nuclear club against countries which might like to join it. The representative of India had stated in the First Committee that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be facilitated by a comprehensive test ban treaty and he had suggested, to that end, first, that the partial test ban treaty should be extended to all countries; secondly, that all tests in all environments should be suspended; and, thirdly, that negotiations should be undertaken urgently for the conclusion of a formal, comprehensive test ban treaty. He had said that progress in those fields was essential not only to safeguard the health of humanity but also to reduce international tension and facilitate the adoption of measures of arms control and limitation.

46. That was an admirable programme, but incomplete, since—and that was an extremely important point—the possibility of a nuclear holocaust could be increased by the acquisition of atomic reactors ostensibly for peaceful purposes.

47. The Pakistan delegation believed that no aspect of the problem under discussion should be disregarded. Consequently, in addition to the three points mentioned by the Indian representative, the ways and means of preventing the acquisition of the ability to carry out nuclear weapon tests must be taken into consideration. That objective could be attained only through international guarantees and the impartial inspection of nuclear establishments by non-nuclear Powers.

48. At the 1370th meeting, the Canadian representative had assured the Committee that the Indian Government had undertaken to use the reactor which it had received for peaceful purposes only. On 17 November, however, only a few days after that assurance had been given, reports had appeared in *The Times* of London and the *New York Herald Tribune* that the Indian Prime Minister had stated that India would reconsider its policy of not building an atomic bomb if China, which already possessed one or two bombs, devised a method of delivering them. That proved that bilateral safeguards were ineffective. In those circumstances, it would hardly be satisfactory to see India sign a comprehensive test ban treaty after it had stockpiled a number of nuclear weapons. A comprehensive test ban treaty would not be a panacea, but only one of the steps towards nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although the Committee's attention was now focused on that aspect, it was important not to

lose sight of the other basic problem, which was that of the first step leading to nuclear capability.

49. It was with that understanding that the Pakistan delegation supported the draft resolution before the Committee and expected that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would approach the problem in the same spirit.

50. Mr. COULIBALY (Mali) said that being opposed to any nuclear weapons monopoly he could not associate himself with any scheme aimed at legalizing or authorizing underground nuclear tests. To ban only tests carried out in the atmosphere would amount to permitting the nuclear Powers which had completed that series of tests to continue underground testing. What the whole world wanted, however, was the cessation, once for all, of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests, followed by the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

51. The Malian Government's position on the whole problem of nuclear weapons was well known. In its view, all States should act with a deep sense of responsibility in order to permit the holding of a world disarmament conference. Until such a world conference was held and achieved agreements on the question as a whole, no progress would be made.

52. The danger of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons needed no further demonstration. The Eighteen-Nation Committee had been discussing that problem for so many years that all Governments were aware of the urgent need to put a final halt to all nuclear weapon tests. That was why the pressure brought to bear on the nuclear Powers by the non-nuclear Powers must be more dynamic and must be exerted consistently and convincingly.

53. Mali had expressed its profound aspirations and manifested its will to co-operate by ratifying the partial test ban treaty. Unfortunately, that treaty was becoming less effective daily. Not only had it not been ratified by all the nuclear Powers, but no progress had been made towards extending it to underground tests. The situation was becoming increasingly disturbing, since recent press reports suggested that attempts were being made to attack the treaty. The Malian delegation therefore believed that every effort must be made to convene a world disarmament conference, at which the whole problem of general and complete disarmament could be approached in a better climate. In accordance with those views, and to demonstrate its desire for the cessation of all nuclear tests, it would vote in favour of the draft resolution.

54. Mr. DEVENDRA (Nepal) recalled that at the series of meetings held by the Disarmament Commission in 1965, his delegation had suggested that a way out of the current impasse was for the United States to accept the offer made by the Soviet Union in 1962 of two or three on-site inspections a year. It was true that the Soviet Union had since withdrawn that offer, claiming that all underground events could be monitored by national means and that the on-site inspections demanded by the United States would be used for the purpose of espionage. But when the Soviet Union had agreed to two or three on-site inspections a year, it had pointed out that it was doing so solely



as an act of compromise and that it was still convinced that on-site inspection was unnecessary. If at that time the Soviet Union had had no reason to doubt the motive of the United States, why should it have reason to doubt it now? Although the Nepalese delegation failed to understand the explanations given by the USSR, that did not mean that it was convinced by the arguments of the United States regarding the need for on-site inspections. The Soviet Union should explain in detail, preferably in a technical paper, why recent developments in detection and identification techniques had made on-site inspection unnecessary.

55. To circumvent the difficulty raised by the United States demand for on-site inspection, the majority of the non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had proposed as an interim measure the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting tests above a given threshold. Unfortunately, the great Powers had refused for different reasons to entertain the idea of fixing a specific threshold.

56. At the recent series of meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the United States representative had stated that in spite of recent technical progress 20 per cent of seismic events could not be identified by national means alone. He had added, however, that the use of ocean-bottom seismometers would reduce the number of such unidentifiable events. At that time, the large aperture seismic array in the State of Montana had not yet been operational. Now that it was in operation, the number of unidentifiable events must have been still further reduced. His delegation submitted that for the negligible number of residual events that might still not be identifiable, inspection requirements could be dispensed with.

57. It could not believe that the Soviet Union would undertake the risk of testing under such difficult conditions as a threshold treaty would impose and it hoped that the United States would not ignore the significant progress made in the preceding two months, not the least of which was the coming into operation of the Montana array. Not to be overlooked was the "detection club" established by the Scandinavian countries at the initiative of Sweden; it would doubtless facilitate the detection and identification of underground events. Unless the United States wanted to be a perfectionist in its approach, it could accept a phased treaty without any qualms. On 11 February 1960, at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, it had itself proposed the conclusion of a phased treaty.

58. The Nepalese delegation would prefer a treaty prohibiting all underground tests, both above and below the seismic magnitude of 4.75. It realized, however, that the great Powers were not ready to demonstrate the political will required for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement.

59. In operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution under discussion, the Eighteen-Nation Committee was requested to continue with a sense of urgency its work on a comprehensive test ban treaty. That goal could be brought nearer if the great Powers could agree on a threshold treaty which would involve no inspection and would provide for a gradual lowering of the threshold taking into account the

improvement in detection and identification techniques and the improved possibilities for international co-operation in the field of seismic detection.

60. The draft resolution accurately reflected the concern of the world community at the undermining of the spirit of the partial test ban treaty by the great Powers through their reluctance to fulfil their undertaking to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time. He therefore recommended its unanimous adoption.

61. Mr. BURNS (Canada) said that the draft resolution provided for measures that were in accordance with his Government's policy and he would therefore vote for it. The Canadian delegation attached particular importance to operative paragraph 3, and especially to the words "arrangements to ban effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, taking into account the improved possibilities for international co-operation in the field of seismic detection". For it was essential that the parties to the treaty should have confidence that the obligations undertaken by the signatories were being complied with and that tests would not be carried out in secret. On that indeed depended the element of confidence which was essential if an international treaty, on a matter affecting the security of States and even the balance of power underpinning world security and stability, was to be accepted as a part of international law. In short, there must be effective means of verifying that all nations subscribing to the treaty would honour their obligations.

62. The difficulties in the detection of underground tests were well known. The statements of representatives of certain countries at the Eighteen-Nation Committee's recent meetings and the documents contained in its most recent report indicated that, while some progress had been made, there were still a number of events which could not be identified by remote seismic observations alone and which could be suspected as possible violations of a test ban unless they could be eliminated by some supplementary means. It would be disastrous if, after the conclusion of an agreement to ban underground testing which relied upon the good faith of the participants alone, events should then cause a breakdown of the agreement. If a suspicious event should occur in one country, and another country should consider it a nuclear explosion on the basis of seismic observations, the second country might declare that it was no longer bound by the treaty in the absence of concrete proof by the first country. That lead might be followed by other countries and the whole arrangement might break down, bringing into question the treaty banning tests in the other environments. Because of the political and scientific problems which would have to be overcome before a completely effective system of detecting and identifying underground tests could be established, Canada believed that a start should be made by attacking those problems and in that process the smaller nations had a part to play. It was for that reason that Canada had noted with interest the suggestion of Sweden and other countries for international co-operation in the search for effective methods of verification. Progress in that direction could be made by stepping up the exchange

of seismic data on underground events among countries interested in contributing to a solution of the problem. The purpose of the exchange would be to develop criteria for establishing precisely what kinds of data were significant; to evolve a standard format for the exchange of relevant data among the authorities of the various countries; and to work out procedures which would enable data to be exchanged with sufficient speed to be of use in effective verification of a comprehensive test ban.

63. Once some of those practical problems had been solved on the basis of experience and the habit of exchanging seismic information had been established, the time would have come to consider the second aspect of the problem. That would be the conclusion of some international arrangement for a clearing-house for exchange of seismic data. The Canadian delegation had no firm view on where or how such a central unit might be established. It did, however, consider that the centre's main function should be to collect and distribute scientific and other information of significance. It should not have any responsibility for interpreting the data it received or for passing judgement on the information it provided. That political function would rest with Governments, which would have to make their own determination of the significance of the information provided and of the question whether an underground nuclear explosion had taken place. They could make whatever use they wished of the information received and consult with other Governments if they so desired.

64. The Canadian delegation had outlined in very general form some ideas on ways of co-operation and how such efforts might be organized. It hoped that the Governments of other countries would study the matter and make suggestions which would contribute constructively to a solution of the problem of effective verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

65. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) emphasized how important it was to stop all nuclear weapon tests, especially in so far as they affected the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He regretted the omission of the word "immediately" from operative paragraph 1. That was no doubt due to the objections of the United States, which did not intend to give up underground nuclear testing except at the price of conditions it wanted to impose on other Powers. However, some of the sponsors of the draft resolution had stated that the paragraph should be interpreted as urging the immediate suspension of tests, and Bulgaria accepted that interpretation. Moreover, operative paragraph 3 noted the improved possibilities of

international co-operation in seismic detection; that was a concession to those who refused to admit that the present state of scientific progress made it possible there and then to detect and identify underground nuclear tests by national scientific methods. What was really needed to reach agreement on the banning of tests was the will to take a political decision.

66. Bulgaria appreciated the efforts which the sponsors of the draft resolution had made to reach a compromise solution, but could not pass over in silence the categorical refusal of the United States to reply to the urgent appeal of the majority of representatives for an immediate cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The United States was still demanding the establishment of international control, although it had been understood that no control measure of any kind would be applied until there was effective disarmament. The cessation of nuclear weapon tests was not a disarmament measure. Some of the allies of the United States had pointed out that the Soviet Union had stated in the Eighteen-Nation Committee that it would accept two or three verifications a year. But it must not be forgotten that the United States had rejected the Soviet concession because it had not been ready at that time—nor was it yet ready—to give up testing.

67. It had also been said that Soviet and other scientists should provide proof that national methods of detection were practicable. On that point the United Kingdom representative had even recalled the old dispute over the question of whether the earth was flat or round. But in fact the earth was round, as scientists had maintained in face of the efforts of other and official scientists. There was no one more deaf than he who did not want to hear and in the present case the United States was refusing to accept scientific arguments. The Bulgarian delegation, however, would emphasize once more that in present conditions the cessation of nuclear tests depended on a political decision and not on scientific or technical data on the identification of seismic events; those data had been available for a long time.

68. The Bulgarian delegation considered that it was high time that the partial test ban treaty was extended to cover underground tests. It supported the United Arab Republic's proposal for the prohibition of underground tests above a certain threshold and for the nuclear Powers to agree on moratorium on other underground tests pending agreement on a comprehensive treaty.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.