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Chairman: Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

Tribute to the memory of Mr. I. M. Pedanyuk, member of the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

1. The CHAIRMAN said he was sure that the First Committee would wish to record its deep regret at the untimely death of Ivan M. Pedanyuk, a representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic at the General Assembly's twentieth session, a member of the Ukrainian Government and a deputy in the Supreme Soviet of the Republic.
2. He asked the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to convey the Committee's sincere condolences to the Ukrainian Government and to the family of the deceased.
3. Mr. TRONKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) thanked the Chairman for his expression of sympathy at the death of Mr. Pedanyuk, and said that he would convey the Committee's condolences to his country's Government and to Mr. Pedanyuk's family.

AGENDA ITEM 106

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (continued)
(A/5976, A/5986-DC/227, A/C.1/L.337, A/C.1/L.338)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

4. Mr. GRANADO (Trinidad and Tobago) said it was clear from the discussion which had taken place on the item before the Committee, first, that anxiety regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons was world-wide, and secondly, that there was now a genuine opportunity—though it might perhaps be the last one—of turning back the nuclear arms tide once and for all.
5. In regard to the possession of nuclear weapons, his delegation distinguished between four categories of nations. The first comprised the countries already possessing nuclear weapons; secondly, there were countries which already had a nuclear arms potential; thirdly, there were those which might acquire a

nuclear arms potential in the near future; and, fourthly, there were countries which were not likely to develop a nuclear arms potential at any time. His own country, like several others represented in the Committee, belonged to the fourth category; but it was just as deeply involved in the issue of non-proliferation as any other country. Indeed, the countries in the fourth category might together claim to speak for the great unprotected mass of humanity which could not directly decide whether nuclear weapons should be used or not, although it would inevitably bear the brunt of a nuclear holocaust. But his delegation did not intend to appeal to any country for kindness or forbearance; it wished to ask whether the proliferation of nuclear weapons would contribute to the security of nations. If the answer to that question was in the negative, why should the proliferation of nuclear weapons be allowed to continue?

6. The principal nuclear Powers had submitted draft treaties seeking to ensure non-proliferation because—as he understood their motives—they were both convinced that a large-scale nuclear war would mean the end of the civilized world. They had accordingly agreed between themselves that no nuclear war should take place, but they feared that a match lit by some other hand might precipitate a general catastrophe.

7. That being so, the non-nuclear Powers which already possessed a nuclear arms potential were in a strong bargaining position, and should use their bargaining strength. If the nuclear Powers which were Members of the United Nations could not reach agreement among themselves on a treaty on non-proliferation, they could not expect non-nuclear Powers to abstain indefinitely from acquiring nuclear weapons. But it was also true that even if agreement was reached by the nuclear Powers, a comprehensive treaty would only be obtainable with the fullest possible co-operation of countries already possessing a nuclear arms potential; and those countries should make their own conditions for accession to the treaty.

8. His delegation had studied with great care the draft resolutions submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.338) and the United States (A/C.1/L.337). It appreciated the United States argument that the First Committee was too large a body for delicate and detailed negotiations, and that the drafting of a treaty on non-proliferation should therefore be referred to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. But if the course suggested in the United States draft resolution was approved, the First Committee should consider,

first, whether a time-limit should be placed on the deliberations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and, secondly, what steps could be taken to ensure a moratorium on the proliferation of nuclear weapons while the Eighteen-Nation Committee was discussing the problem. There seemed to be general agreement that all Member States should refrain from any action which might exacerbate existing difficulties. The non-nuclear nations might, as proposed by Italy, consider an interim commitment to refrain from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons. But the nuclear Powers should also refrain from action which might stimulate further controversy or increase the possibilities of proliferation. His delegation agreed with the Swedish representative that an indeterminate moratorium could not be regarded as acceptable; and it supported the argument that unlimited moratoria pending the conclusion of negotiations would be detrimental to the negotiations themselves.

9. India, which was one of the non-nuclear Powers with a nuclear arms potential, had already set a praiseworthy example by declaring that it had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons; and the declaration adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, which showed that the non-aligned countries were not only opposed to proliferation, but were ready to play a positive role in preventing it, was equally encouraging.

10. If the issue was to be referred back to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the First Committee should try to formulate principles which the negotiators could use as the basis for a treaty on non-proliferation; and any resolution which it adopted should convey the necessary sense of urgency.

11. Finally, he endorsed the statement contained in the joint memorandum on non-proliferation submitted by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee^{1/} that a treaty on non-proliferation would only be a means to an end. The next stage would be the dismantling of nuclear arsenals and, after that, general and complete disarmament.

12. Mr. COULIBALY (Mali) said that the danger created by the existence of nuclear weapons was a real and not a psychological one. The solution to the problem before the Committee did not therefore lie in a compromise enabling the nuclear Powers to retain their monopoly of the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons; the fundamental objective should be the conclusion of a treaty not only preventing the dissemination of such weapons but guaranteeing the destruction of all existing stockpiles.

13. The two draft treaties that had been submitted both had certain merits. Both aimed at preventing any transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries. Since, however, it had been generally recognized that a treaty on non-proliferation was not an end in itself, the two drafts should have given some indication of the measures which should accompany or follow the adoption of such a treaty if the true end

of general and complete disarmament was to be attained. His delegation was glad that its general position on the matter was shared by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. It hoped that, because of their special responsibilities, the Soviet Union and the United States would take into account the opinions expressed in the First Committee and would revise their draft treaties to meet the legitimate aspirations of all peoples for a world without nuclear weapons.

14. The Italian draft unilateral declaration of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons^{2/} been inspired by a sincere desire to promote the cause of general and complete disarmament. But such a declaration, even if it was accepted by all non-nuclear States, could be only an interim measure. States with nuclear potential could hardly be asked to renounce the development of nuclear weapons for a considerable period, unless the nuclear Powers gave them adequate guarantees. The United States had offered strong support to all non-nuclear Powers wanting such protection. However, it would be difficult for a non-aligned country to entrust its defence to a great Power, since that would inevitably imply a form of military alliance involving obligations incompatible with the policy of non-alignment. Such a development might well make the non-nuclear countries satellites of the nuclear Powers and ultimately divide the world into rival or distrustful military groups. Moreover, it might in fact result in the dissemination of nuclear weapons, which would be difficult to reconcile with the increasing determination of the non-aligned countries to create denuclearized zones.

15. It would be a grave error to believe that no danger existed so long as the nuclear Powers retained their monopoly of nuclear weapons; military might did not always bring wisdom or respect for the rights of other peoples. Mali believed that every effort should be made to achieve nuclear disarmament, on which the survival of mankind depended. International opinion should be mobilized against the reactionary theory that the destruction of nuclear weapons would leave the People's Republic of China the greatest military Power in the world. That was a diversionary argument, for no realistic solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament was conceivable without the restoration to the People's Republic of China of its legitimate rights in the United Nations, and without associating that country, as a great Power, in the search for solutions to the various problems of peace-keeping. General and complete disarmament could be achieved only if the five nuclear Powers acted in concert and in co-operation with the non-nuclear Powers. The absence of the People's Republic of China from the United Nations was a permanent veto imposed on the achievement of the fundamental objectives of the Charter.

16. The CHAIRMAN said that the list of speakers in the general debate on agenda item 106 had been exhausted. He would now call on those representatives who had asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

^{1/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. E.

^{2/} *Ibid.*, sect. D.

17. Mr. BURNS (Canada) said that he wished to deal with the two principal points raised in the statement made at the previous meeting by the representative of Pakistan that the bilateral safeguards arrangements for the Rajasthan power station were inadequate and that there was a serious risk of the diversion of nuclear material for atomic weapons.

18. Canada had been one of the pioneers of the development of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system. During the period when those safeguards had not applied to large reactors, Canada had concluded a number of bilateral agreements embodying strict safeguards. Now that large reactors could be covered by the IAEA system, Canada had started to transfer to IAEA the administration of safeguards under the bilateral agreements. Those facts sufficed to show Canada's abiding concern about safeguards and its intention to meet all its responsibilities under its bilateral atomic energy agreements.

19. The agreement concluded in December 1963 between Canada and India contained an unequivocal undertaking that the Rajasthan reactor would be used for peaceful purposes only. That agreement had been registered with the United Nations and had presumably been studied by IAEA. It granted the designated technical representatives access to all parts of the station and all other places where fuel or fissionable material used in or produced by the station was being used, stored or located. In other words, Canadian inspectors could enter the station upon request at any time and without prior notice. When the station became operational, in 1968 or 1969, they would be able to go anywhere else where the fissionable material was located in order to assure themselves that the plutonium produced in the reactor and processed in the separation plant was not diverted to military use. Moreover, Canadian inspectors could examine all the products of the reactor, regardless of the source of the fuel. Inspectors from IAEA could do no more.

20. All agreements concluded by Canada since 1957, including the Rajasthan agreement, contemplated the transfer of the administration of safeguards to IAEA. Canada hoped and expected that all its bilateral partners would co-operate to achieve that aim. It had been agreed in principle that IAEA safeguards would apply to the Karachi nuclear power project which was being

negotiated between Canada and Pakistan. As the negotiations approached their completion, the two countries had an opportunity to reinforce the position of the IAEA safeguards system and set an example to other countries.

21. The agreement under which the experimental reactor known as the "Canada-India reactor" had been provided to India under the Colombo Plan had been concluded before the creation of IAEA, at a time when the concept of safeguards had been much less highly developed. Nevertheless, the Indian Government had undertaken to use the reactor for peaceful purposes only. The Canadian Government had welcomed the assurances—only recently renewed—that India was not planning to manufacture nuclear weapons.

22. Canada was convinced that the production of cheap atomic power would be a great boon to all mankind, and not least to the developing countries. Since every peaceful release of atomic energy also produced material for weapons, both the dictates of reason and the interests of survival required all countries to give their full support to the IAEA safeguards system.

23. Mr. TRIVEDI (India) said that he had nothing to add to the lucid and convincing remarks of the Canadian representative.

24. He thanked those delegations which, in the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission, had spoken in favourable terms of India's policy of peaceful utilization of atomic energy.

25. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan) said it was reassuring to learn that the Canadian Government hoped and expected that all countries with which it had bilateral agreements on the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes would agree to IAEA safeguards. If that agreement was secured, a number of countries would be reassured and there would be real prospects for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

26. He requested the Eighteen-Nation Committee to take fully into account the views he had expressed on behalf of his delegation.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.