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CONTENTS

Agenda item 106:

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*)

General debate (*continued*) 91

Chairman: Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 106

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*) (A/5976, A/5986-DC/227, A/C.1/L.337, A/C.1/L.338)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. Taieb SLIM (Tunisia), after citing the position on the question of the nuclear danger adopted in October 1964 by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government Non-Aligned Countries, in which Tunisia had taken part, and stressing that all over the world the achievement of the goal of non-dissemination was now regarded as a matter of urgency, congratulated the countries which had submitted concrete proposals on the item under discussion. All the drafts before the Committee deserved most careful study; at the present stage of the debate, the Tunisian delegation wished merely to raise a few general considerations which should be borne in mind in drafting a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

2. In view of the fears that such a treaty might serve merely to neutralize the non-nuclear countries and strengthen the privileged position of the nuclear Powers, the treaty should be viewed as part of the process of general and complete disarmament and followed immediately by concrete measures which would mark real progress along the road to disarmament, thus giving satisfaction to the non-nuclear countries; that, incidentally, was the view expressed by the eight non-aligned countries participating in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in their joint memorandum on non-proliferation.^{1/} In addition, everything should be done to ensure that the treaty was universal and was adopted by all countries, particularly all the nuclear countries. Of course, there should be no false hopes about the possibilities of agreement on that subject between the five nuclear Powers; but it was not impossible that a better climate of mutual confidence might bring nearer the day when the countries in question would be able to co-operate sincerely and pave the way for an international détente and for the drafting of an agreement

on general and complete disarmament; that should be one of the goals of the world disarmament conference. Because of the direct connexion which existed between nuclear testing and the risk of dissemination, Tunisia believed that it was high time to go a step further than the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and impose a total ban on all nuclear weapon tests. The establishment of denuclearized zones would also do much to hasten the achievement of the desired objective.

3. In conclusion, he emphasized that a treaty on non-dissemination should be followed by a treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons; in that connexion, he reminded the Committee of the declaration adopted by the General Assembly at its sixteenth session, in resolution 1653 (XVI), and expressed the hope that the international situation would shortly make it possible to give that resolution the force of a binding legal instrument.

4. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand) agreed with the Prime Minister of Malta that a distinction should be drawn between "proliferation" and "dissemination" of nuclear weapons; the former meant the acquisition of military nuclear capacity by countries which did not now possess it, while the latter had a more limited meaning, signifying the transfer to a non-nuclear country of nuclear weapons or the power to make them. It was true that there was disagreement about the precise point at which any arrangement would constitute dissemination, but at the present stage he wished simply to underline the difference between the two concepts. The international agreement which was now being sought should cover both elements of the question. It followed also that "further proliferation" meant the same as "proliferation", in the sense just defined, and did not include the expansion of its military nuclear arsenal by any existing nuclear Power, although that was a highly important related question.

5. Turning to the substance of the problem, he said it was generally recognized that in addition to the five nuclear Powers there were other States capable of making nuclear bombs, and their number was likely to grow. In addition, it had often been recognized that nuclear weapons could not be considered in isolation from conventional weapons or from the question of disarmament.

6. Nevertheless, the most serious danger at the present time was proliferation. The danger was that every further addition to the ranks of the nuclear Powers would precipitate others as a result of the heavy pressure it would exert on countries which were on the verge of nuclear status and were legiti-

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. E.

mately concerned for their own security. It was in the immediate future, within the next year, that decisions might be made that could determine the course of history; unless agreement was reached very soon, it would be too late. The full weight of international opinion should therefore be mobilized to urge on those principally concerned the need to accommodate their viewpoints to make an agreement possible. There had been some progress: the Committee had before it two draft treaties, one submitted by the United States,^{2/} the other by the USSR (A/5976), the Italian proposal for a moratorium^{3/}—which would mainly be useful as an interim measure to fall back on should a deadlock be reached—and a memorandum by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

7. The primary goal—the conclusion of a treaty—posed three problems: the differing views of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union on what constituted dissemination of nuclear weapons, and accordingly on the scope of a treaty in relation to the military alliances; the problems and attitudes of the various countries which possessed nuclear capability; and, lastly, the attitude of the Government of Peking towards the whole issue.

8. With regard to the first problem, important as the issues of Western European security and the future of Germany were, New Zealand shared the view expressed by others in the debate that the question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons should not be seen as primarily a European problem. It was a world problem; one had only to think of the instability which existed in Asia and the Pacific, the conflicts of interests, the problem of resources in relation to population growth and, lastly, the intentions of Communist China in order to realize the implications for the entire international community of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In view of those considerations, efforts should be made to negotiate the differences over the scope of a treaty.

9. So far as the second problem was concerned, the overriding factor which should be emphasized was that States with nuclear potential should not assume that they would necessarily add to their security by manufacturing nuclear weapons: other States would do likewise, and the result might well be heightened tension, with the possibility that a clash could get out of the control of Governments. While, therefore, resentment in the face of the five-Power monopoly could be understood, it could not be assumed that the non-nuclear countries would derive less real benefit from a non-proliferation treaty than would the existing nuclear Powers. For that reason, New Zealand would be most reluctant to see a treaty on non-proliferation made contingent on the adoption of what had been termed "related measures". There were certainly measures, such as a comprehensive test ban, which should accompany or follow an agreement on non-proliferation, and he agreed with the representative of Nigeria that such an agreement should not be left to stand on its own for too long; those points would be considered during the negotiations on the problem of

proliferation, in view of the importance of the opinions of the Powers possessing nuclear potential. But New Zealand, which was not in that position, appealed to those countries to continue to give the world more time to reach agreement. Otherwise it was to be feared that by the time the technical and political differences had been resolved and concrete measures of nuclear disarmament could be put into effect, the whole purpose of a treaty on non-proliferation might have been overtaken by events.

10. To start with, therefore, consideration should be given to all the possibilities for effective action, even holding action; it had been observed that four of the five nuclear Powers were in principle opposed to dissemination, despite differences of interpretation as to the precise meaning of that term, while the fifth seemed to favour in some circumstances the development of nuclear weapons by many States provided that it was done by their own efforts. It might be, therefore, that Peking would not be opposed to an agreement on non-dissemination; and consideration should be given to the possibilities of such an agreement, buttressed perhaps by an interim measure of the kind proposed by Italy, if the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation should be delayed.

11. His delegation did not wish to dwell on other measures which had been proposed, especially as there would be opportunities to touch on them during the discussion of the other agenda items concerning disarmament; however, it welcomed the United States proposals for the conversion to peaceful uses of a specific quantity of weapons-grade uranium and the simultaneous destruction of the nuclear weapons from which it was obtained. That proposal represented disarmament proper on a large scale, and not merely arms control, and as such it opened up a welcome prospect. There had also been mention of the nuclear Powers guaranteeing the security of the non-nuclear countries and undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country. Obvious differences of view arose there, some countries foreseeing difficulties in respect of alliances and alignments and others doubting the enduring value of promises by the nuclear Powers. Those questions, which were at the heart of the question of national security, should perhaps be studied during the detailed negotiations on non-proliferation. But one thing was certain: the world could not afford to delay. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should begin detailed negotiations quickly on all aspects of the question, and should report progress as soon as possible.

12. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) said that before taking up the question of non-proliferation in its world-wide context, he would briefly describe the plan for the denuclearization of Latin America. He drew attention to the comments which he had made on that subject at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly,^{4/} at which resolution 1911 (XVIII) on the denuclearization of Latin America had been adopted, and to the final acts of the Preliminary Meeting on the Denuclearization of Latin America and the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Commission

^{2/} *Ibid.*, sect. A.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, sect. D.

^{4/} See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1265th meeting; and *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 1333rd meeting.

for the Denuclearization of Latin America (A/5824, A/5912, A/5985). In document A/5985 there was a declaration of principles adopted by the Preparatory Commission in the form of a preamble to the preliminary draft of a multilateral treaty for the denuclearization of Latin America. That draft preamble, which was superior both in substance and in form to any other similar draft so far prepared, summed up aims and principles similar to those by which the First Committee should be guided in its deliberations. The Preparatory Committee had also drawn up a preliminary draft of fourteen articles, which defined the obligations which the signatory States would assume and provided for a system of verification, inspection and control based on the revised safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. When member States—whose observations were to reach the General Secretary of the Preparatory Commission not later than 15 January 1966—had made any changes which they deemed necessary, those preliminary draft articles would become the substantive part of the treaty. All that would then remain to be done would be to prepare the final clauses, which ought not to give rise to much difficulty since they would follow models that could be said to be generally accepted.

13. It could therefore be hoped that the Preparatory Commission would be able to conclude its work at its third session, which was to begin in Mexico City on 19 April 1966. However, when the preliminary draft of the treaty had been adopted, it would still be necessary to determine the geographical scope of its application and to obtain the necessary assurances or guarantees from the nuclear Powers. It would be logical for the treaty to apply to all the territories of the States which were or could become members of the Preparatory Commission and to all other territories whose Governments were prepared to assume the same obligations as the Latin American countries, as in the case of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. It should also be easy to settle the question of guarantees, since the nuclear Powers were merely being asked to undertake to refrain from any action which might be incompatible with the denuclearization which the Latin American States freely agreed to for their territories. The nuclear Powers, which had so often stressed the urgent need to prevent the dissemination of atomic weapons, could hardly refuse to comply with such a modest request. His delegation was therefore confident that the efforts to that end undertaken by a negotiating committee of the Preparatory Commission would be successful before the end of the current session of the General Assembly. For the countries of Latin America, "denuclearization" meant the total absence in their territories of nuclear weapons and launching devices for such weapons, to whatever State they might belong; in other words, it meant that Latin America would be kept free from nuclear weapons for all time, as it was now. The countries of Latin America fully realized that circumstances in other parts of the world were not always so favourable, and did not set up the Latin American system of denuclearization as a model for universal application. For them, at any rate, it was the only acceptable solution, since it was absolutely clear and could not give rise to false or hair-splitting interpretations. His delegation therefore considered that any draft treaty

on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons drawn up by the United Nations should contain a provision drafted along the following lines: "This treaty shall be without prejudice to the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties designed to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons and launching devices for such weapons in the respective territories of the States members of the group".

14. With regard to the question of non-proliferation as a world problem, his delegation had always supported both general and complete disarmament and collateral measures, such as non-proliferation. In the Eighteen-Nation Committee, in particular, his country, which belonged to the group of eight non-aligned countries, had always endeavoured to reconcile the antagonisms between the two great blocs representing military alliances. He reaffirmed his country's full support of the principles set out in the joint memorandum on non-proliferation submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee by the eight non-aligned countries: that memorandum made it clear that, though a treaty on non-proliferation did not necessarily have to contain provisions for tangible steps to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons, it should be followed by such measures. Consequently, a treaty on non-proliferation could very well be concluded forthwith without need for the adoption of concrete measures to reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons. To facilitate matters, non-nuclear States could indicate their good will by limiting their demands to what they deemed indispensable to protect the security and the vital interests of all the Member States. For example, with regard to the gradual reduction and final elimination of stocks, it would suffice to include express mention in the treaty, even if only in the preamble, of the intention—repeatedly voiced by the nuclear Powers—of renewing efforts to reach effective agreements on the subject without delay. In view of the statements to that effect which had been made by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States of America, the two nuclear Powers should have no great difficulty in agreeing to that. The draft might also include a provision such as the one proposed by the Nigerian representative when he said that an "indispensable element in any non-proliferation measure . . . was a firm undertaking with adequate guarantees by the nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Powers in any circumstances whatsoever, or to threaten to use them" (1356th meeting, para. 19).

15. If the nuclear Powers were sincere—and he was convinced that they were—in affirming that the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation was a matter of urgency, they should be prepared to show the greatest spirit of conciliation, especially in view of the immense responsibility which they bore, since in the last analysis the conclusion of an effective treaty would depend on them. Accordingly, he hoped that, with good will on both sides, it would not be impossible to reconcile the fundamental divergencies between the two draft treaties. His delegation was not unaware of the complexity of the problem and the enormous difficulties which its political aspects involved. However, if it seemed to be impossible to work out a treaty on non-proliferation in the current

year, the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations, the least that world public opinion was entitled to expect, if not to demand, was that the First Committee should adopt, with the support of the nuclear Powers and if possible unanimously, a draft resolution clearly indicating the best path to be followed for the attainment of that objective. Otherwise there would be every justification for describing the deliberations of the First Committee as valueless.

16. His delegation therefore considered that the representatives of the nuclear Powers should have an additional period of two or three weeks in which to continue their negotiations, if possible with the good offices of the Secretary-General or the President of the General Assembly, or both. The eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee might also lend their valuable assistance in reaching agreement on a single text. Consequently, if by the end of the general debate the sponsors of the two draft resolutions at present before the Committee (A/C.1/L.337, A/C.1/L.338) had failed to draft a joint text and no other text meeting with their approval had been submitted, it would be advisable to defer consideration of the two drafts, if necessary until the Committee had completed its work on the other five items relating to disarmament.

17. Mr. INGLES (Philippines) thanked the Chairman for the words of sympathy which he had addressed to his countrymen who had recently suffered the destructive effects of a natural calamity.

18. He drew attention to the recent increase of interest, among large and small Powers alike, in limited measures of arms control. As a result of that change in the approach to the problem of general and complete disarmament, specific measures which were realistically attainable had been proposed. Prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons certainly deserved the priority which it had been given in the agenda; the self-imposed discipline which the main nuclear Powers had shown might not prevail under the tension which would result from the wide dissemination of nuclear weapons; furthermore, that process, once set in motion, would be irreversible. The experience acquired in connexion with the partial test ban treaty indicated that States with a nuclear potential could be expected to resist an agreement on the control of the manufacture, accumulation and dissemination of nuclear weapons; the more widespread the development of nuclear technology, the more difficult it would be to reach agreement on workable safeguards to prevent clandestine violations. It was therefore gratifying to note that the main nuclear Powers had submitted drafts with a view to the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation and had reaffirmed their desire to negotiate in order to arrive at a solution.

19. To reconcile the two drafts of article I of the proposed treaty, an acceptable definition of proliferation must be formulated. But there was disagreement as to whether proliferation occurred in the case of a transfer of nuclear weapons to a group of non-nuclear States bound together in a military alliance. Agreement must, therefore, be reached on the principles governing non-proliferation before new nuclear

arrangements were brought into operation by the major military alliances. When detailed negotiations on the draft treaty were resumed, certain basic facts would have to be considered realistically. One such fact was that it was virtually impossible to freeze the existing military alliances in their present form if any resolute steps toward general and complete disarmament were to be taken. Progress implied change, and the structure of those alliances would probably have to be altered. As a member of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Philippines would not claim, in respect of the control or use of nuclear weapons by or on behalf of SEATO, any rights that Poland, for instance, would not claim for itself as a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Thus, there would be equality of rights and of sacrifices under the proposed treaty, and such equality could be achieved provided that the same words were used in the same sense. The Committee must therefore press on with practical measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons without, however, precipitating an imbalance in the existing international power structure which had so far made it possible to keep the peace, fragile as it might be.

20. Furthermore, the question of guarantees for the non-nuclear States must be taken into account. If those States were to forgo the manufacture of nuclear weapons for purposes of national defence, they must be assured that a reliable security system would protect them from nuclear blackmail and attack. Pending the establishment of effective international peace-keeping machinery within the framework of the United Nations, the principal nuclear Powers themselves, either individually or collectively, must furnish some form of solemn guarantee.

21. Both draft treaties were silent on dissemination among the nuclear Powers themselves. If there was no prohibition on the transfer of weapons and information within the nuclear club, a nuclear State with rudimentary nuclear devices could, in a matter of months, become a super-Power far more easily than it would without outside help. Provision against that eventuality should be included in a treaty of such importance since relationships between countries, including the nuclear Powers, could change radically almost overnight. Moreover, no provision was made for restrictions on a State's continued development of its primitive nuclear capability to a more sophisticated level, with the result that the quantitative and qualitative race among nuclear Powers remained open. The nuclear States should continue to show self-restraint if only to set an example for non-nuclear States.

22. By indicating the gaps in the draft treaties, his delegation sought to underline the need to continue the unremitting search for complementary measures to stop proliferation, including a comprehensive test ban treaty, the conclusion of which had now been brought nearer by recent advances in seismic detection.

23. He hoped that it was not too much to ask the two countries which had submitted draft resolutions to reconcile their differences and, with the assistance of others if necessary, to agree on a joint text.

24. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan) said that no continent had a greater stake in halting the further spread of nuclear weapons than Asia, and no country more than Pakistan. Three years earlier, the President of Pakistan, addressing the General Assembly,^{5/} had said that the mere adoption of resolutions against the dissemination of nuclear weapons and in favour of the establishment of a non-nuclear club would not remove the danger. Unless the United Nations took effective and urgent action the nuclear armaments race was bound to overtake other parts of the world in the immediate future. The conclusion of a treaty to prevent the future spread of nuclear weapons could not wait until agreement was reached on other measures of disarmament.

25. His delegation wished to pay a tribute to Mr. Aiken, the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland, who in 1958 had been the first statesman to point out the urgent need for an international agreement which would have restricted the membership of the nuclear club to three. Many speeches had been made since 1958, but no agreement to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons had yet been signed. It must be acknowledged, however, that the United States and the Soviet Union, in submitting their draft treaties, had demonstrated their anxiety to ensure that in the field of disarmament first priority was accorded to non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Despite world concern, the nuclear arms race continued and had even gathered speed. The secrets of the manufacture of nuclear weapons were fast being discovered by a growing number of States, notably through programmes relating to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The forty-five nuclear reactors located in every continent could be employed in the manufacture of weapons. By 1970, nuclear reactors in the countries outside the present nuclear club would be producing over 25 tons of plutonium every year, and new and cheaper methods of separating U-235 had been discovered.

26. It had been possible so far only to define the essential conditions for the conclusion of an agreement on non-proliferation, concerning which his delegation wished to emphasize particularly the importance of international inspection. During the past ten years, many non-nuclear countries had acquired atomic reactors and most of them had agreed to submit to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It was to be regretted, however, that at least one Member State, India, had refused to open its nuclear establishments to international inspection. India claimed that any international inspection of its nuclear establishments would be incompatible with national sovereignty. If that was so, how could India justify its support for effective international control over general and complete disarmament which must inevitably derogate from the principle of national sovereignty to a far greater extent? Logically India should oppose international control of all disarmament measures and it should have the courage to accept being a minority of one against all the rest of the United Nations membership on that question. India's refusal to submit to international inspection was in sharp contrast to the acceptance of such inspection by the Scandinavian countries and Japan, which had

renounced any intention of launching a programme to attain nuclear capability even though they had all the necessary industrial and technological resources to achieve it.

27. Certain donors and recipients of material and technical assistance in the field of atomic energy claimed that bilateral inspection could be equally effective in preventing the use of nuclear reactors for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. That contention was untenable. In the first place, third parties could have no assurance that in the existing context of international relations and alignments the donor country would enforce rigorous inspection procedures. Clandestine diversion of spent fuel from reactors would thus be perfectly practicable, particularly if the reactors could be inspected only at particular times and after due notice. Moreover, if the plutonium separation plants were excluded from inspection there was nothing to prevent a country from becoming a nuclear Power without violating the letter of the bilateral inspection agreement with the donor country.

28. Such a possibility was not imaginary. About three years ago, the Canadian Government had concluded an agreement with the Indian Government under which Canada undertook to supply a 200-megawatt power reactor for the atomic power project at Rana Pratapsagar in Rajasthan. The agreement failed to provide for international inspection. Canada had given an assurance that the provisions for bilateral inspection in the agreement would prevent the reactor being used for non-peaceful purposes. After studying the provisions of that agreement, the Government of Pakistan had discovered that the conditions under which Canadian inspectors would have access to the reactor and the limits of their inspection of the spent fuel therefrom raised the very questions he had just mentioned concerning the evasion of control and clandestine diversion of that fuel to military purposes. Thus, the agreement between Canada and India gave cause for concern to the countries which had affirmed their faith in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a necessary condition for the maintenance of international peace. Nothing would give his Government greater satisfaction than to be assured by impartial third States possessing the necessary knowledge of nuclear matters that such misuse might not arise under the Canadian-Indian agreement. In addition, could not the agreement be submitted to the scrutiny of the International Atomic Energy Agency for its opinion concerning the adequacy of the safeguards contained in the agreement? In the interests of peace and the security of Asian States, the parties to the agreement might voluntarily have recourse to the Agency's judgement. Admittedly, when the agreement had been concluded, IAEA had not envisaged a system of safeguards for reactors in excess of 100 megawatts. Nevertheless, the Canadian-Indian agreement might have stipulated that as soon as IAEA had devised safeguards for large reactors, bilateral inspection would be replaced by multilateral IAEA inspection.

29. For two years the Pakistan Government had been asking IAEA to devise an effective safeguards system for reactors in excess of 100 megawatts. As soon as that was done, Pakistan hoped that Canada and India would enter into negotiations with a view to concluding

^{5/} Ibid., Seventeenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1133rd meeting.

a revised agreement, voluntarily throwing open the Rana Pratapsager project to inspection by IAEA. Alternatively, Canada could follow the example set by the United States by transferring to IAEA as rapidly as possible the administration of the safeguards according to IAEA standards. Such steps would be a major contribution to peace in Asia and the world. According to one United States expert, the spent fuel from the Canadian reactor would be sufficient to manufacture fifty atomic bombs a year.

30. Those observations were equally applicable to the United States-Indian nuclear power project at Tarapur, and also the Indian Government's plan to establish a third power reactor of 200-megawatt capacity at Kalpakam.

31. It should also be pointed out that nearly ten years ago the Canadian Government had made a gift of a 40-megawatt research reactor to India, within the framework of the Colombo Plan, under an agreement stipulating that it should be used for peaceful purposes. A few years later, the reactor had gone critical and, about a year ago, it had been claimed by newspapers in India that the Indian Atomic Energy Commission would be able to produce an atomic bomb within eighteen months, since a plutonium plant at Trombay was already separating plutonium from the spent fuel from the Canadian-donated reactor. Shortly afterwards the Canadian Government had confirmed that India would be able to produce one atomic bomb a year if the spent fuel from the reactor was used for military purposes. That estimate seemed to be an understatement considering the Indian claim that the Trombay separation plant could extract 10 kilogrammes of plutonium a year. Only 5 kilogrammes were needed to produce an atomic explosion. In response to the Pakistan Government's "démarche", the Canadian Minister for External Affairs had stated on 2 November 1964 that India had given an unconditional undertaking that the Canadian reactor would be used for peaceful purposes only. Furthermore, the Pakistan Government had been assured by Canada that the latter was fully aware of its responsibility to ensure that Canadian equipment and technology served only peaceful purposes. Pakistan had full confidence in Canada's pledge that none of the plutonium separated from the used fuel from the Canadian reactor would be permitted to be used for the manufacture of atomic bombs.

32. The Indian delegation had cited two official statements to the effect that although India had the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons, it had refrained from doing so. At the same time, it was impossible to ignore the fact that India had at considerable cost built a chemical separation plant, the sole purpose of which, at least for the foreseeable future, was to extract plutonium from uranium—an essential process in building bombs from the uranium used in reactors. The natural presumption was that India was committed to making bombs. The test ban treaty would be no insuperable obstacle to India, since it was not necessary for a test to be carried out in the atmosphere before India announced that it had made an atomic bomb. India's present potential to manufacture an atomic bomb derived solely from the accumulation of plutonium separated from the used fuel from the

Canadian reactor. India's future potential to accumulate an atomic arsenal would derive exclusively from the plutonium from Canadian and United States reactors. Consequently, if India claimed membership in the nuclear club, the world should know that it had torn up its 1956 agreement with Canada.

33. Thus India, and members of the Commonwealth and also of the United Nations, bore a heavy responsibility: to ensure that solemn agreements were not violated and that nuclear weapons did not proliferate. The crux of the question of non-proliferation was to prevent, while there was still time, the emergence of a sixth nuclear Power. Whether it was India or Israel, that sixth Power would cast a long shadow over human affairs. The barriers would have been broken and more and more nuclear Powers would come into being. In that context, he fully shared the view of the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland, who had stated (1364th meeting) that the number of nuclear Powers must not exceed five, which was the number of permanent members of the Security Council. The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs had also stated in that connexion (A/5976) that if other States besides the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China were to set about making their own nuclear weapons or acquire the means of owning, controlling and using such weapons, it would no longer be possible to halt their further spread. The Pakistan delegation believed that the same basic proposition also underlay the text of the United States draft treaty. Such unanimity was the outcome of the common concern over the perils of further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

34. He noted with satisfaction that both the United States and the Soviet draft treaties met the two requirements, namely, that the conclusion of a treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons should be accorded priority and that it should not await the adoption of an agreement on other disarmament measures. Although the question of non-proliferation was part of the general problem of universal and complete disarmament, he agreed with the representative of the Soviet Union that it should be considered separately. The representative of the United States had also emphasized that no difference on any other issue should be allowed to bar an agreement on non-proliferation.

35. The Indian approach was in sharp opposition to that of the two nuclear super-Powers. The Foreign Minister of India had said that the only practical way of solving the problem of proliferation was for the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers to undertake simultaneous obligations through an international instrument.

36. The effect of that statement was to make the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation impossible since it imposed conditions and raised a host of problems on which wide differences had existed between East and West for nearly two decades. For instance, how was inspection to be provided to make certain that the nuclear Powers halted further production of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles? If the nuclear Powers did not agree on inspection, then agreement between them would be equally unattainable, since the position of the United States was that there

could be no disarmament without control. Then India imposed the further condition that the nuclear Powers must reach agreement on a reduction of existing stockpiles. Thus the condition imposed by India were tantamount to a demand that a host of problems which had hitherto caused a deadlock between the two principal parties should be resolved before India could agree to accept the obligations of a treaty on a non-proliferation. The Pakistan delegation agreed with the representative of the Soviet Union that the stand taken by countries such as India would complicate the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby creating a danger of failure. Would not failure be to the advantage of India? Would not the Indian Foreign Minister's conditions inevitably delay agreement on non-proliferation and gain for his country time in which to manufacture the atomic bomb secretly and enable the Indian Government to announce to the world, before a treaty had been signed to ban the spread of nuclear weapons, that India, having achieved nuclear status, must thenceforth be classified as a nuclear Power? After that fait accompli, India could reverse its stand and waive the conditions that it now imposed, so that membership of the nuclear club might be limited to six. If events could be moulded in accordance with India's design, a number of States would be bound to refuse to sign any treaty on non-proliferation that might subsequently be concluded because the supreme interest of each country would have been jeopardized.

37. The Indian representative had said (1363rd meeting) that the Indian approach was that a treaty on non-proliferation should deal with the problem of present proliferation as well as future proliferation; and that no rational or balanced treaty should permit any country which would like to call itself a nuclear Power, and which would assume no obligations whatever under the treaty, to commence manufacturing nuclear weapons, build up stockpiles and perfect delivery systems. How was the condition laid down by the Indian representative to be met when the country in question was not seated in the Committee? And until it was seated and agreed to meet India's terms, it was obvious that India had no intention of signing an agreement on non-proliferation. On the other hand, the Indian representative demanded that no non-nuclear State should be given control or possession of nuclear weapons or knowledge of nuclear technology. That demand was perfectly understandable because India had already obtained the benefit of the dissemination of nuclear technology.

38. He had dealt at some length with India's position on the subject of non-proliferation, since that country's ambitions and designs were of the most direct and immediate concern to Pakistan. Pakistan, not being a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, expected that when that Committee met to deliberate further its submissions would be taken fully into account.

39. With regard to the two draft treaties before the Committee, the first main point to note was the divergence between the United States and the Soviet Union on whether there would be a danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons through the NATO military alliance. It was his delegation's view that further discussions were necessary if a compromise was to

be reached. The second point of divergence was on the question of the provisions concerning inspection of peaceful nuclear activities. While his delegation did not take the position that a treaty on non-proliferation without multilateral international safeguards could not be effective, there would be no real assurance for the States which were most directly menaced by the spread of nuclear weapons and no guarantee that their national security could be protected by a treaty on non-proliferation if such treaty did not provide for IAEA or other equivalent international control.

40. The draft unilateral declaration submitted by Italy obviously raised the same question of the acquisition of nuclear weapons through NATO and called for further negotiations. With regard to the entry into force of the declaration, it was manifest that unless the States which were approaching nuclear capability subscribed to it, the declaration would have little practical value.

41. In conclusion, his delegation believed that it was now necessary to focus attention on the concrete political aspects of the problem of proliferation and that it would be small service to the cause of non-proliferation if alignments caused members to refuse to face the facts.

42. Mr. TRIVEDI (India), exercising his right of reply, said that until the present his delegation had never thought that the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could be a cause of dispute between India and Pakistan. There was no doubt that India had made tremendous advances in the field of nuclear energy; the real point, however, was that, despite those advances, India had refrained from producing nuclear weapons. It was not the agreements that mattered; it was India's national will unclouded by hatred and obsession and the decision of a democratic peace-loving country.

43. With regard to the reasons why India had a chemical separation plant, it should be noted that atomic energy was today the most important thing for developing nations in connexion with their energy resources, particularly for large countries where normal fuel, such as coal, was not available. It was for that reason that India had a programme of electricity production by means of atomic reactors. Those reactors required plutonium and in order to treat the deposits it had, India needed a chemical separation plant. The electricity produced in that way was cheaper than conventional electricity.

44. So far as the IAEA safeguards and decisions were concerned, India had always supported them and had taken part in the discussions in the scientific groups. His delegation agreed with what the President had said in 1962: that the availability of nuclear weapons to States which did not yet possess them—that was to say, which had not possessed them in 1962—would be a calamity.

45. As for the "Indian approach", the representatives of some thirty countries had spoken in favour of that approach; he could also refer to the Declaration adopted at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Cairo

in October 1964, and to the joint memorandum on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

46. While it was obviously impossible to erase the passion and hatred from the observations made by the Pakistan representative, he could at least correct the misrepresentations of fact.

47. Mr. BURNS (Canada), exercising his right of reply, said that he would not comment for the moment on the reference by the Pakistan representative to a very important question of policy in regard to the control of the production of fissionable materials. However, he reserved the right of reply or of clarification at a later meeting.

48. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan), exercising his right of reply, assured the Indian representative that his statement had not been inspired by hatred; it was

based on facts and the conclusions to be drawn from it were of great importance for the future of Pakistan.

49. His delegation was gratified that India had refrained from manufacturing nuclear weapons. His delegation's only concern was that India should give categorical assurances in that regard. As for the Indian plutonium separation plant, many experts had questioned the need for such a plant when India's atomic energy programme would not require such a plant for the next five or ten years.

50. Lastly, it was a fact that India's nuclear capability derived exclusively from the Canadian 40-megawatt research reactor and that India had previously had only a small reactor which could not produce sufficient plutonium or spent fuel for the manufacture of a bomb. Evidence in support of that statement could be produced.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.