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Chairman: Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 106

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*)
(A/5976, A/5986-DC/227, A/C.1/L.337, A/C.1/
L.338)

1. Mr. FARAH (Somalia) said that unless the United Nations succeeded in preventing the creation of additional nuclear Powers, there was little hope for success in the larger task of bringing about complete disarmament.

2. The discussions on a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had brought out several important principles with which his delegation was in full agreement. First, the nuclear Powers must agree not to transfer nuclear weapons to other nations. In that connexion, he wished to express his delegation's concern over the possibility that existed of the non-nuclear Powers obtaining nuclear weapons through military alliances such as NATO or the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The suspicions arising from that situation were a serious obstacle to agreement on non-proliferation, and must be removed by frank discussion and the exchange of unqualified assurances between the Soviet Union and the United States.

3. Secondly, the non-nuclear Powers must agree not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. The acquisition of such weapons by rival countries would not only add to the already high tension that existed in many areas of the world; it would also pose the danger of a small-scale nuclear conflict expanding into a world-wide conflict involving the major nuclear Powers. Unilateral declarations of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, along the lines suggested by the Italian draft,^{1/} could help by providing evidence of the good will of non-nuclear States, and could serve to contain the dangers of proliferation until a binding treaty could be agreed upon. He welcomed the recent announcement of the Prime Minister of India that although that country had the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, the Indian Government did not intend to enter the nuclear arms race; he hoped that

other non-nuclear States would follow that example. Somalia, as a member of the Organization of African Unity, was participating in current efforts to make Africa a nuclear-free zone, and he welcomed the similar efforts being made by the Latin American countries.

4. The third principle, which followed from the second, was that the United Nations should guarantee the security of States which had abjured the use of nuclear weapons. It was true that the peace-keeping powers of the United Nations were still in a formative stage, but it was nevertheless advisable that such guarantees should have the backing of an impartial organization.

5. His delegation supported the suggestion in the joint memorandum on non-proliferation submitted by the eight non-aligned countries participating in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament^{2/} that a treaty on non-proliferation should be regarded not as an end in itself but as a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament, and that it should be followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race. It was important that the non-nuclear States should have confidence in the intention of the great Powers to play their part in bringing about world peace; an extension of the partial test-ban treaty to include underground tests would be a practical step in creating a climate of confidence. International co-operation in the work of seismic detection, as suggested by the eight non-aligned countries in their joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty^{3/} would make it easier to put an end to all testing of nuclear weapons.

6. Although the road to a final solution to the problem of nuclear disarmament would be long and difficult, three important milestones had been passed. First, all nations, large and small, recognized the futility and danger of the armaments race; secondly, a joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations had been made by the Soviet Union and the United States^{4/} and had been endorsed by the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI)); thirdly, in 1963 the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water had been signed at Moscow, and work was going on to extend it to all environments. The fourth milestone must be a treaty to end the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and he hoped that the General Assembly's present deliberations would pro-

^{2/} *Ibid.*, sect. E.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, sect. F.

^{4/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex 1, sect. D.

duce a workable and generally acceptable plan for such a treaty; failing that, the Assembly could at least provide the Eighteen-Nation Committee with a good basis for further discussion.

7. The major problems of general and complete disarmament—the creation of inspection machinery and of a United Nations force to stabilize a disarmed world—still remained to be solved. Somalia joined other countries in supporting the proposal for convening a world disarmament conference, which could be of some help in that task. Such a conference would be meaningless, however, unless all the nuclear Powers were represented; there could be no complete disarmament without the People's Republic of China.

8. Mr. QUAO (Ghana) said that the urgency of concluding an international agreement to halt the spread of nuclear weapons had been conceded by a large number of States, both nuclear and non-nuclear. The solution of that problem and of other disarmament questions depended largely upon the willingness and ability of the Members of the United Nations to undertake long and arduous negotiations. It was a healthy sign that the problem of proliferation was being approached realistically; it was widely recognized that a treaty on non-proliferation, while it would definitely constitute a positive step, would not bring any final solution and should be followed by agreement on the total destruction of all nuclear weapons.

9. It was the nuclear rather than the non-nuclear States which were responsible for the increased danger facing the world. As had been repeatedly proposed by the Soviet Union, each nuclear Power should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It was true that several non-nuclear countries were experimenting in the peaceful use of atomic energy, but the risk of their knowledge being diverted to military purposes was minimized by certain factors. The first was the declared intention of some potential nuclear Powers, such as Canada and India, not to manufacture nuclear weapons. Secondly, the enormous cost involved in the manufacture of nuclear weapons would certainly deter many developing countries whose main preoccupation was economic development. Thirdly, the inspection procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency, improved and more effectively applied, would reduce the risk of some non-nuclear States producing nuclear weapons without assistance from nuclear Powers. The other possible sources of the proliferation of nuclear weapons were the transfer of such weapons to non-nuclear States and their use by allied or unified forces even without any transfer. Therein lay the real danger.

10. The Ghanaian delegation believed that any international agreement on non-proliferation should be comprehensive and contain no loop-holes. It was from that standpoint that it had studied the draft treaties submitted by the United States^{5/} and the Soviet Union (A/5976); the two texts showed an encouraging similarity of intent and frequently of wording. The main difference was to be found in the first article

of the two drafts, dealing with the projected undertaking not to transfer nuclear weapons, which reflected a basic divergence in attitudes towards the role of third States in the sharing of nuclear responsibility. Ghana had frequently expressed misgivings about the creation of a multilateral or Atlantic nuclear force, which could not help to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and might constitute an obstacle to agreement on general and complete disarmament. In addition, as the Soviet Union had stated, it would "increase imperialist and neo-colonialist pressure on the liberated countries and on the countries which are fighting for their independence" (A/5976, para. 5).

11. Ghana was alarmed at the prospect that Portugal, which was waging a ruthless colonial war in Africa with the help of its NATO allies, was to be associated with the use of nuclear weapons through the creation of a NATO multilateral force. There was no guarantee against the repetition of international escapades such as the so-called Stanleyville mercy mission to bolster the imperialist interests of a NATO ally in Africa or elsewhere.

12. All efforts to achieve agreement would fail in the absence of a spirit of compromise and willingness to negotiate in an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding. As Joseph C. Harsch had observed in his column in *The Christian Science Monitor* of 22 October 1965, the desire of the United States for a NATO nuclear force was incompatible with its search for new agreement with Moscow on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

13. His delegation noted with satisfaction that article III of the United States draft treaty contained provision for co-operation by the parties in the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities. It hoped that that provision would be included in any final instrument drawn up.

14. The two draft agreements should be studied dispassionately by the Eighteen-Nation Committee with a view to reaching an agreement acceptable to the entire international community. In the same spirit, all the negotiating Powers should give serious consideration to the recent far-reaching proposals made by the United States, particularly the proposal to cut off the production of fissionable materials for weapons use and transfer stocks of those materials to peaceful purposes. There was a promising new element in the proposal to take fissionable material from existing weapons and destroy the weapons. A treaty on non-proliferation should not lead to a situation in which the nuclear Powers increased their stockpiles while the rest of the world was placed in a position of perpetual vassalage. Unless the agreement was totally effective, it would disappoint the hopes of mankind and be a travesty of the aims of the United Nations.

15. Although the Italian draft unilateral declaration of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons was not intended as a substitute for a treaty on non-proliferation, it might distract attention from the main problem; furthermore, if any declaration of good faith was needed, it should come from the nuclear Powers. The non-nuclear States had amply demonstrated their good faith and their eagerness to halt the nuclear arms

^{5/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex 1, sect. A.

race by their support of the 1963 test ban treaty. In addition, the Declaration adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Cairo in October 1964 had underlined the grave danger of the dissemination of nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear countries in Africa and Latin America had also been working on the proposal to declare their regions nuclear-free zones. The existence of foreign military bases, which Ghana had always opposed, made it difficult for certain interested Powers to consider that question objectively. The attitude of some States was reflected in the three principles the Canadian representative had enunciated in his statement on 19 October (1356th meeting), which would require the agreement of South Africa and Portugal to be obtained before Africa could be declared a nuclear-free zone. The question should not become an issue in the cold war or the game of power politics; the desire of a region to insulate itself from the nuclear threat should be respected by all nuclear Powers.

16. The proposal that the nuclear Powers should guarantee the defence of non-nuclear countries against nuclear blackmail was fraught with many difficulties, especially for countries like Ghana which pursued a policy of non-alignment and positive neutralism. Such an arrangement would tend to perpetuate the unfortunate division of the world into East and West; he wondered whether the guarantee should not be given collectively by all the nuclear Powers, under the auspices of the United Nations. Many non-aligned countries would be unwilling to be drawn into the orbits of rival military blocs. The nuclear Powers should assure the safety of the world by agreeing to abjure the use of nuclear weapons, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive disarmament agreement with international safeguards and controls.

17. An agreement on non-proliferation which did not bind all the nuclear Powers would be, to say the least, frustrating and misleading. Every effort should therefore be made to secure the co-operation and participation of the five nuclear Powers in the negotiation and implementation of such an agreement. Ghana had always supported the idea of enlarging the forum of disarmament negotiations, so that any decisions taken would receive the fullest support of all whose co-operation would give them meaning and effect.

18. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America) said he wished first of all to reply to the Libyan representative's request (1356th meeting) for further explanation of article VI, paragraph 1, of the United States draft treaty, relating to withdrawal from the treaty. The United States delegation fully shared the views expressed by the representative of the United Arab Republic (1359th meeting) that an agreement on non-proliferation should be a permanent international obligation to end the proliferation of nuclear weapons for all time; but it nevertheless recognized that Governments must reserve the right to assess engagements of that nature in the light of circumstances which might vitally affect their continued adherence to the treaty—for instance, the extent to which the other parties were complying with it. A withdrawal clause had been

included in the Moscow treaty for the same reason. The withdrawal clause proposed in the United States draft treaty on non-proliferation was based on that provision but contained two important additions. First, a party wishing to withdraw under the limited conditions described would have to give three months' notice of its intention to the Security Council, as well as to all other signatory and acceding States. That requirement would provide an additional deterrent to hasty or unfounded withdrawal, without limiting the right of withdrawal itself; it would also afford an opportunity for consultations to avoid the withdrawal, and would provide an explicit role for the United Nations, as urged by the Peruvian representative (1361st meeting). Secondly, article VI, paragraph 2, of the United States draft treaty provided for a review of the treaty after a specified period, with the agreement of two-thirds of the parties. That provision had been included partly because of the feeling expressed by many representatives at the recent meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the Disarmament Commission that the treaty should be accompanied by measures to halt the increase in nuclear stockpiles and to begin to reduce them. The review provision would enable the parties, should they find it necessary, to assess the progress made in the reduction of nuclear arsenals.

19. His own country, for its part, was prepared to agree to measures to reduce nuclear stockpiles even before a treaty on non-proliferation had been agreed upon and signed, though the treaty should have special priority at Geneva. The new United States proposal for the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons should dispel the doubts of those who had alleged that the standing United States offer to cease production of fissionable material for weapons, and to convert agreed quantities to peaceful uses, was not disarmament. If the new proposal were accepted, the fissionable material to be converted to peaceful uses would be removed from actual weapons, and the weapons themselves—the casings and internal mechanisms—would be destroyed. The number of weapons to be destroyed would depend firstly on the agreed quantities of fissionable materials which each side was to transfer to peaceful uses, and secondly on the size and nature of the actual weapons which each side offered for destruction. But in order to obtain the proposed illustrative amounts of fissionable material to be transferred to peaceful uses—60,000 kg by the United States and 40,000 kg by the Soviet Union—the United States would have to destroy several thousand weapons and the Soviet Union thousands of its weapons. These would include weapons of the fusion and fission types which could have yields extending into the megaton range. In short, the proposal represented a substantial measure of real disarmament; and the large amount of fissionable material contained in the weapons would become available for peaceful uses under safeguards which would prevent its future diversion to weapons use.

20. Another promising feature of the proposal was that verification would be simple, because in essence it would involve nothing more than observation on the spot. Each country would establish a depot on its own territory, and the destruction of weapons would be

carried out there under its own supervision. Observers from the other country would be present to see that weapons were actually taken into the depot to be destroyed, and that the agreed quantities of fissionable material were removed for transfer to peaceful uses. For its part, the United States would welcome the presence of additional observers from other countries wishing to witness the procedure. The demonstration procedure could be devised in such a way that secret design features of the weapons were not revealed to observers of any country. His delegation would be glad to describe the technical features of the proposal in greater detail to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, in order to dispel any fears that the procedure could be used for espionage or any other undesirable purpose, or that it might facilitate the proliferation of nuclear weapons by revealing weapons design information. If it were to be a meaningful disarmament measure, the proposal would of course have to be accompanied by a verified halt in the production of fissionable material for weapons use. His delegation had already submitted a proposal to that effect in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and had outlined a workable procedure for verifying the cut-off, with intrusiveness of the inspection limited to the barest essentials. The new proposal for weapons destruction was directly relevant to non-proliferation and could be negotiated promptly. The implementation of the proposal would undoubtedly help to reduce international tension; and it would also provide an example for future measures to reduce conventional, as well as nuclear, armaments.

21. One of the most encouraging aspects of the Committee's discussions on non-proliferation had been the growing support displayed for the adoption of international safeguards as part of any treaty on the subject. A safeguards provision was a key element in the treaty; and the absence of such a provision in the USSR draft was one of its main defects. The many nuclear power plants to be built during the next ten years all over the world would unavoidably produce thousands of kilogrammes of plutonium as a by-product of the generation of electric power. If individual States alone were allowed to account for the disposition of that substantial quantity of plutonium, suspicions would inevitably arise that some of it might be used for making nuclear weapons.

22. Fortunately, the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, improved and simplified by the IAEA General Conference in September 1965, offered a practical and reliable means of demonstrating to anyone concerned that nuclear material was not being secretly diverted to some military use; and the time had come for broad acceptance of IAEA or equivalent international safeguards on all civil uses of atomic energy.

23. With respect to countries already possessing nuclear weapons, the full value of safeguards would not be achieved until those countries agreed to discontinue all production of fissionable materials for weapons, as his own country had proposed. But for countries not possessing nuclear weapons, acceptance of international safeguards on all their nuclear activities would constitute a major step towards curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

One of the main incentives for proliferation was suspicion that neighbouring States planned to develop nuclear weapons; and if those suspicions could be dispelled by international safeguards, the incentives for proliferation would clearly be reduced. His own country believed that international safeguards should be extended without even awaiting the conclusion of a formal treaty on non-proliferation, and it had adopted a policy of transferring to IAEA, as rapidly as practicable, the administration of safeguards on bilateral atomic energy agreements concluded between the United States and other countries. It was to be hoped that other supplier countries would adopt a similar policy, and that all States would invite IAEA inspection of all their peaceful nuclear facilities. More than a year's practical experience with IAEA inspection of a large power reactor in his country had strengthened his Government's conviction that IAEA procedures were not costly or burdensome, that they did not jeopardize the privacy of commercial design information, and that they did not in any way interfere with peaceful nuclear activities. He was encouraged to note that the Latin American States had included IAEA safeguards in their draft proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Latin America.

24. On the immediate problem of the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation, which was now within reach, his Government would spare no effort to achieve a treaty with the least possible delay. He could not agree with the representatives of Poland and the USSR that there was need to make some progress at the current session at least on the basic principles for a treaty, for it was not principles that were lacking but rather translation of those principles into effective, mutually acceptable and legally binding treaty provisions. Everyone recognized that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would endanger the security of all States and that it should be prevented for all time; and the guiding principles for the conclusion of an agreement on non-proliferation were clearly expressed in General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI).

25. Difficulty arose in passing from such principles to concrete treaty provisions. That was the real problem, and it was well illustrated by the controversy over the question of access to nuclear weapons.

26. Contrary to what the USSR representative had once again alleged, under the United States draft treaty no non-nuclear country could acquire nuclear weapons, national control over nuclear weapons, the power itself to fire nuclear weapons, or access to information on manufacture of nuclear weapons. The United States was opposed to the dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form, direct or indirect. No proposal which it had put forward for the nuclear defence of NATO nations would enable any non-nuclear country to obtain access to nuclear weapons, or to information required for manufacturing nuclear weapons; indeed, that had been prohibited by the fundamental atomic energy legislation of the United States since 1946. Certain countries had been less careful than his own in avoiding any action which might increase the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons, and it ill behoved them now to criticize

the proposals and policies of the United States, which had consistently been opposed to any proliferation. His Government had made it quite clear that it sought no exceptions and was not trying to make any arrangements within NATO which would permit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, he would point out that it was not his country which had created and sought to perpetuate an unsound, unsafe and unjust situation in Central Europe, or which had selected the countries of Western Europe—especially the Federal Republic of Germany—as aiming points for hundreds of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. That was what distinguished those countries from others, and explained why they sought effective arrangements for common defence.

27. Any attempt to press for further agreement in the First Committee on principles or guidelines was bound to result in the reiteration of known positions; and efforts should now be directed away from generalities and towards detailed negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Accordingly, his delegation had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.337) suggesting that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should be reconvened as early as possible to give special priority to continue efforts to reach agreement on a treaty on non-proliferation and to agree on related steps for halting and turning back the nuclear arms race. He denied the Soviet charge that his Government was seeking merely to bounce the problem back and forth between the General Assembly and the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Some progress had undoubtedly been made at the most recent meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, following the submission of the United States draft treaty and the clarification of views which it had provoked. Discussions in the First Committee had further clarified the view of many Governments. The submission of a Soviet draft treaty had been a further step forward; but the text of the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.338), setting forth for approval by the First Committee the substance of the articles of the Soviet draft treaty, was not likely to facilitate agreement on non-proliferation. A more useful, and less one-sided, approach would be to ask the Eighteen-Nation Committee to find an agreed method by which the proliferation of nuclear weapons could finally be halted.

28. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) said that the urgent need for concluding an agreement on non-proliferation had been agreed upon by all, and that the Committee's principal task now was to determine the ways and means by which a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could be made effective, so as to lead with the least possible delay to the goal of general and complete disarmament.

29. His Government had always held that nuclear and thermonuclear weapons should be eliminated outright from the arsenals of war. If early agreement was to be reached on a treaty on non-proliferation, the subject must be given high priority and kept apart from the much more complex question of general disarmament; however, such a treaty must be immediately followed or accompanied by the adoption of a series of collateral measures such as a comprehensive test ban agreement and an international

convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons for war purposes.

30. To be significant and effective, a treaty on non-proliferation must contain positive provisions laying down obligations not only for the non-nuclear but also for the nuclear Powers. Although the representative of the USSR had stated at the 1355th meeting that it was not his Government's intention to perpetuate the present nuclear Powers' monopoly of nuclear weapons, the fact was that that monopoly would inevitably be a source of anxiety to the non-nuclear States until nuclear and thermonuclear weapons were completely eliminated. In their present form, the United States and USSR draft treaties both failed to deal with the problem of existing nuclear weapons. The provisions of a treaty should include an undertaking by the nuclear Powers to reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear stockpiles; otherwise the treaty might create the dangerous illusion that the problem of nuclear weapons had been solved, whereas it would actually be perpetuated. It was obvious, moreover, that an agreement on non-proliferation would be illusory unless all nuclear Powers were parties to it.

31. The dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons were clearly illustrated in the case of India, where growing pressure was being exerted on the Government to manufacture nuclear weapons, out of fear that other nations either had acquired them or would soon acquire them. It was to the great credit of the Prime Minister of India that his Government had decided against the production of nuclear weapons; nevertheless, similar pressures could soon lead to the establishment of nuclear plants all around the globe unless the United Nations took speedy and effective measures to halt the process.

32. So long as the insecurity and legitimate fears of the non-nuclear States were not allayed, so long as they remained exposed to the threat of nuclear blackmail, and so long as the nuclear Powers continued the present nuclear arms race, self-denial on the part of the non-nuclear States alone would be no guarantee of the effectiveness of an agreement on non-proliferation.

33. In entrusting the negotiation of a treaty on non-proliferation to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the General Assembly could not prescribe in a detailed resolution all the provisions which such a treaty should contain. At the same time, the Eighteen-Nation Committee's task would be made more difficult, if not impossible, if the Assembly did not provide it with guidelines embodying the principles upon which there seemed to be general agreement.

34. First, the treaty must not only prevent the nuclear States from transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States but also prohibit States from producing nuclear weapons. Secondly, no loop-holes or exceptions of any kind should be allowed, for even one exception could make the treaty unacceptable to the great majority of Member States. Thirdly, the treaty must include a firm commitment on the part of the nuclear Powers to do away with

existing nuclear weapons within a definite period of time, if not immediately. Fourthly, the nuclear Powers must undertake to respect all denuclearized zones; indeed, they should do everything in their power to bring about treaties establishing denuclearized zones in Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America. Lastly, the idea of suspending all underground tests must be accepted as a first step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

35. Mr. PATRICIO (Portugal), replying to the Ghanaian representative, categorically denied the insinuation that Portugal could receive atomic weapons through NATO for use in Africa. His Government opposed the dissemination of nuclear weapons; it had never sought to receive such weapons and it had no intention of doing so.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.