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*Chairman:* Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 106

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*)  
(A/5976, A/5986-DC/227, A/C.1/L.337)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. MOD (Hungary) said that he agreed with the view expressed in the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned participants in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament<sup>1/</sup> that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was not an end in itself. The very existence of nuclear weapons constituted a threat to all countries, including all the non-nuclear Powers; a mere accident caused by a nuclear weapon, let alone a thermonuclear world war, would bring disaster even to distant peoples, and the consequences would continue to be felt for an indeterminate period, as the tragic experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki showed.

2. At the end of the Second World War the possession of atomic weapons had conferred an enormous advantage. That idea had survived, though the reality had changed; that perhaps partly why the use of atomic weapons had not yet been banned despite the proposal made at the time by the Soviet Union and since repeated by the States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. There was today nothing to justify a negative response to the demand that the nuclear Powers should renounce the use of weapons of mass destruction. In the statement he had made to the First Committee at the 1355th meeting, the representative of the USSR had confirmed the undertaking that if other nuclear Powers did the same, the Soviet Union would pledge itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. At a time when the United Nations was celebrating its twentieth anniversary, it would be encouraging if other great Powers responded to that appeal. To be sure, the supreme goal was the total and final destruction of nuclear weapons; but to prevent any greater spread of those weapons was an urgent step which would bring the attainment of that goal nearer.

<sup>1/</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. E.*

3. The development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, far from strengthening the security of the possessor countries, made it more precarious. For it was a practical impossibility—and the point was one on which countries which coveted such weapons should be clear—to defend frontiers against nuclear weapons. The logical thing would therefore seem to be for all countries—assuming, of course, that their intentions were purely defensive—to put an end to the arms race. In that connexion, he could mention only one country which, in defiance of realities, was obsessed with the desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction: the Federal Republic of Germany.

4. The German Democratic Republic had repeatedly proposed that the two German States should voluntarily pledge themselves to renounce the manufacture, acquisition, testing and use of nuclear weapons, and any form of control over such weapons. However, the Federal Republic of Germany showed no disposition to accept those proposals, and was on the contrary intensifying its efforts in the NATO organs to secure participation in the control of nuclear weapons. The German Democratic Republic, in a statement dated 20 October 1965,<sup>2/</sup> had therefore drawn the attention of the General Assembly to the need, in order to avert the danger of a nuclear war in Europe, for the conclusion of an international agreement to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, so as to ensure that the Federal Republic of Germany was given no opportunity of manufacturing, acquiring, or using such weapons or of receiving any power of joint decision in connexion with such weapons. The proposal was one entirely in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, with the interests of peace and security in the European region in question and with the resolutions adopted at many international meetings, including the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964. Up to the present, however, the reply of the Federal Republic of Germany had always been a negative one.

5. The Federal Republic of Germany was the only State in Europe which maintained territorial claims against its neighbours; despite Germany's unconditional capitulation at the end of the Second World War, the Federal Republic still refused to recognize the Oder-Neisse frontier. The Federal Republic maintained an army of 500,000 men equipped with the most advanced weapons. It cherished the ambition of becoming, once Germany had been reunified, the third world Power after the United States and Russia, and

<sup>2/</sup> Transmitted to the President of the General Assembly by a letter dated 27 October 1965 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic, and communicated to the Members of the United Nations by *note verbale* dated 3 November 1965.

of reconquering its 1938 frontiers—in other words the heritage of Hitler. The German army was fully trained in nuclear and rocket strategy, and between 1960 and 1964 its supplies of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles had been increased by 283 per cent. The danger of allowing the Federal Republic of Germany direct or indirect access to the use of nuclear weapons was clear. By its obstinate drive to take part in a NATO multilateral nuclear force, the Federal Republic of Germany had become the main obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was regrettable that the United States, the leading Power in NATO, should desire a solution of the problem of proliferation which would give that military alliance a loop-hole through which it could act against the provisions of the treaty.

6. The Hungarian delegation, for its part, sought no special advantage; but it demanded that neither East nor West should be able to violate the provisions of the treaty on any pretext whatsoever. The issue was not merely the internal affair of one or the other group of States. A treaty which left the door open to proliferation would be nothing but a trap. The United States draft treaty<sup>3/</sup> was therefore not acceptable in its present form to the Hungarian delegation, since it did not exclude the possibility of the creation of a multilateral nuclear force, the sole beneficiary of which, incidentally, would be the Federal Republic of Germany; no other ally of the United States had displayed any enthusiasm for the project.

7. The Italian proposal<sup>4/</sup> for a moratorium to permit negotiations had some merit, but its value was considerably reduced by the fact that such a moratorium would lay down no contractual obligations. In addition the Italian proposal, like the United States draft treaty, left open a loop-hole for any State which might wish to acquire access to nuclear weapons, since it would not affect any already existing contractual obligations. The Hungarian delegation had therefore come to the conclusion that the only genuinely watertight solution was offered by the USSR draft treaty (A/5976).

8. German militarism was not a purely local problem, having already set off two world wars in less than fifty years. The paramount desire of the Central European countries was to ensure the maintenance of peace, and it was for that reason that they hoped for the acceptance of a text containing no provision which could be used by the signatories as a pretext for individual or collective action to defeat the purposes of the treaty, as the representative of the United Arab Republic had very pertinently said (1359th meeting).

9. The General Assembly should define the measures to be taken by means of a resolution setting forth the fundamental principles on which the treaty on non-proliferation should be based, principles which had been formulated in unambiguous terms in the USSR draft treaty. Unfortunately, the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.337) gave no guidance on that

subject; it simply referred the whole matter to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The Hungarian delegation hoped that other more constructive draft resolutions would be submitted, and might wish to speak again on the subject.

10. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden) said that the statements made in the General Assembly and the First Committee should aid the latter in suggesting new constructive approaches to the item under discussion.

11. The first point she wished to make was that an agreement had to be reached between the nuclear Powers. Despite the differences in the postures of the super-Powers, relating chiefly to the situation in Europe, recent statements seemed to indicate that a convergence of views was in the offing. If the responsibility for nuclear disarmament rested with the nuclear Powers, that was due to a hard set of facts. Her second point was that the non-nuclear Powers were reluctant to be the only ones to assume an obligation in respect of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, it was not in a spirit of bargaining that many of the representatives of non-nuclear nations had stated their desire that nuclear and non-nuclear countries alike should undertake to make sacrifices in the nuclear field. The reason for that was that the threat of existing nuclear strength remained the main concern of world public opinion.

12. Her delegation continued to work for a halt in the production of armaments and for a reduction of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, through international agreements, and had helped in the formulation of certain more general considerations set out in the joint memorandum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee by the eight members that did not belong to alliances. That memorandum did not demand that several measures should be bound up within the confines of one and the same treaty, but that they should be the subject of simultaneous negotiations. Foremost among such measures was a comprehensive test ban. The Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water corresponded exactly to the terms of the eight-Power memorandum. It implied a two-sided and not a one-sided curtailment of the freedom of action of nations, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear. The obligation which the nuclear Powers had laid upon themselves to discontinue their test explosions in three environments had been a truly impressive feature of that agreement. The result had been that the non-nuclear countries had made even more far-reaching pledges: by accepting the terms of the treaty, those countries had drastically reduced their possibilities of manufacturing nuclear weapons. With regard to the dissemination of nuclear weapons, serious concern was felt in connexion with those States which had not acceded to the treaty. The Swedish Government hoped that through sustained negotiations, primarily in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, it would be possible to reach agreements which would gain the support of an overwhelming number of States. In that regard, it was natural for Sweden to follow developments in the countries of

<sup>3/</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex 1, sect. A.

<sup>4/</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. D.

Central Europe with particular interest, inasmuch as they affected the possibility of gaining the firm support of public opinion for accession to a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

13. Without abandoning optimism, but in case it should be impossible to reconcile the positions taken by the nuclear super-Powers, the non-nuclear Powers must consider taking the initiative with a view to concluding agreements among themselves. The most important of the avenues leading to non-proliferation was, of course, the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world; that avenue was being pursued in Africa and Latin America, and her Government had always maintained that that approach was worth exploring side by side with a general treaty to stop nuclear proliferation. Members of the Committee would recall that in 1961 Mr. Undén, the former Swedish Foreign Minister, had introduced a draft resolution to that effect which had been adopted by the General Assembly together with a draft resolution submitted by Ireland (General Assembly resolutions 1664 (XVI) and 1665 (XVI)).

14. A second avenue also open to independent initiative on the part of non-nuclear countries was that indicated in the Italian proposal for simultaneous but unilateral declarations of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, which had originally been put forward in the Eighteen-Nation Committee by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fanfani. Agreement on such a scheme might well provide a "practice period" which would enable certain conclusions to be drawn regarding the formulation and working of a treaty: what prohibitory formulas should be employed, at what stage the line should be drawn and how many nations would be prepared to implement the treaty. Sweden would be willing to accede to some such arrangements as a temporary measure, provided that the moratorium would be fixed at a certain limited duration, perhaps two years. An indeterminate moratorium could not be considered acceptable as it would undermine the negotiations aimed at drafting a treaty. That view had been specially emphasized by representatives of Western Powers in relation to disarmament questions. Mr. Fanfani had explicitly stated that the Italian plan was intended to create an element of pressure on the nuclear countries which would be totally lost if no date for expiration and renewed examination of the situation were fixed in advance. The Italian proposal should be referred to the Eighteen-Nation Committee to be examined together with all other suggestions, whether made in draft form—as were the two treaty texts before the Committee—or submitted in statements made at the current session of the Assembly.

15. With regard to the question of control, it was fortunate that a formula was already generally accepted, namely, the revised safeguards system that had recently been adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at Tokyo. Her delegation recommended that in connexion with the establishment of nuclear-free zones and with any arrangements similar to the unilateral declaration suggested by Italy, just as in connexion with the formulation of an international treaty, participating States should agree to place their nuclear power programme under IAEA control. It was desirable that all States

parties to any bilateral agreements, whether as importers or as suppliers of power plants and fuel elements, should demand that such agreements be submitted to the IAEA safeguards system. The creation of an international system of control of commercial activities in the nuclear power field was becoming a matter of increasing urgency, to ensure that reactors and related installations were utilized for peaceful purposes only.

16. As it had already announced in Tokyo, the Swedish Government had recently taken the decision to seek the application of IAEA safeguards and, thus, of international control, to its bilateral agreements in that field. It was unnecessary to stress that the Swedish nuclear power programme was directed to peaceful purposes only.

17. Her delegation would be able to approve a draft resolution which met certain conditions. In the first place, it should not overlook the fact that, alliances apart, the possibilities of proliferation through the independent manufacture of nuclear weapons were already largely excluded through the partial test ban treaty. A further step of great practical value would be general acceptance of IAEA control. The main purpose of a resolution must be to express the desire of the community of nations that decisive steps towards halting the nuclear arms race and reducing the nuclear threat should be taken in the immediate future. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should proceed along a broad front, seeking a balanced set of partial measures on which progress was possible, including specifically an international treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The political difficulties now existing between the nuclear super-Powers and between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers were, after all, insignificant in comparison with the objective which united, or should unite, the world, namely, to reduce the threat of destruction which hung over mankind.

18. Mr. JAKOBSON (Finland) recalled that in its present form the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had appeared as a separate item in the late 1950's. Since that time, efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons had been pursued along three lines: the halting of nuclear weapon tests, the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, and the creation of denuclearized zones.

19. The first approach had led to the partial test ban treaty signed at Moscow in 1963. That treaty was a significant contributing factor in non-proliferation, but its effectiveness was impaired by the fact that not all States had adhered to it, and also by the fact that it did not cover underground tests.

20. The prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons had first been brought before the United Nations in 1958 by the delegation of Ireland.<sup>5/</sup> The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at consecutive sessions made up a very logical pattern. In its first resolution on the subject, adopted in 1959 (General Assembly resolution 1380 (XIV)), the Assembly had recognized the danger; there

<sup>5/</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 751st meeting, paras. 81-88; and *ibid.*, *Thirteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 64, 70 and 72, document A/C.1/L.206.

followed a recommendation directed exclusively to the then existing nuclear States; and then the Assembly had called for an agreement involving obligations for nuclear as well as non-nuclear States and bearing all the essential characteristics of the agreement which was now sought.

21. No such agreement had thus far been reached, but it was worth recording that the nuclear Powers had in fact acted in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly and that the proliferation of nuclear weapons had not been due to the wider dissemination of such weapons on the part of the original nuclear Powers. In its resolution of 15 June 1965,<sup>6/</sup> the Disarmament Commission had recommended that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The resumption of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had been generally welcomed, among others by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, as an encouraging and significant fact in itself.

22. The First Committee's debate on the two draft treaties had concentrated almost exclusively on the question whether the plans for nuclear sharing within military alliances—specifically for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force or an Atlantic nuclear force within NATO—were compatible with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States took the position that those plans would in fact prevent proliferation. The USSR delegation maintained that they would be in direct contradiction with the aim of preventing the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. It was clear that the question whether the plans for nuclear sharing were compatible with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was not simply a legal or technical question, but a political one. Nuclear sharing might not pass on to participating nations the reality of control over the use of nuclear weapons, but it might well seem to confer upon them at least the status of nuclear Powers. In any event, the political fact was that those plans had become the obstacle to an effective treaty on non-proliferation.

23. With the submission of draft treaties by both the USSR and the United States, the question of non-proliferation could now be negotiated on the basis of specific proposals. The obvious forum for detailed technical negotiations was the Eighteen-Nation Committee. But it was to be hoped that the Powers principally concerned would make an effort forthwith, at the current session of the General Assembly, to reach agreement, if not on a treaty, then at least on a set of basic principles on which such a treaty could be built.

24. The third aspect of the problem, namely, the creation of denuclearized zones, concerned the geographic distribution of nuclear weapons. In 1961, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Undén, had suggested that the non-nuclear Powers should form a "non-nuclear club". That proposal had resulted in the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1664 (XVI), under which the Secretary-General

<sup>6/</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/225.

had in January 1962 requested the States Members of the United Nations to submit their views on the conditions under which they might be willing to enter into specific undertakings. In its reply to the Secretary-General of 3 March 1962,<sup>7/</sup> the Government of Finland had emphasized that it had already undertaken not to possess, construct or experiment with atomic weapons, and that it followed from Finland's policy of neutrality that Finland would not agree to receive on its territory nuclear weapons or any other military equipment on behalf of any other country. In the same letter the Finnish Government had expressed the opinion that the creation of nuclear-free zones would be a significant contribution to the relaxation of international tension. In May 1963, the President of Finland, Mr. Kekkonen, developing those ideas further, had suggested that a Nordic nuclear-free zone would be the best means of ensuring that the Nordic countries remained outside the sphere of international tension. He had used the arguments that the introduction of nuclear weapons into areas where such weapons had not previously existed would be likely to increase international tension, and, moreover, that it would not effectively add to the security of small nations—arguments which had been repeated in the Committee's debate.

25. In view of the complexity of the issue, it was natural that certain partial and even provisional measures of disarmament and arms control had been suggested in order to provide a little more time in which to agree upon a formal treaty. As the Secretary-General had put it, whatever would support restraint and give the countries principally concerned more time to solve the problem was an indispensable minimum at that juncture. Limited steps such as those suggested by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark in his speech to the General Assembly on 1 October 1965 (1345th plenary meeting) would be very significant. The Finnish delegation also supported the memorandum on international co-operation for the detection of underground nuclear explosions submitted by Sweden to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.<sup>8/</sup> International co-operation would greatly facilitate the efforts to reach a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and would also yield valuable experience for the organizing of an international arms control system. At a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden at Oslo in August 1965, the Finnish Government had agreed, together with the other Nordic countries, to study the possibilities of establishing on the territory of Finland stations for the detection of underground seismic events.

26. The task of making a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was certainly the most difficult ever undertaken by multilateral diplomacy and it would not be surprising, therefore, if it proved impossible at the present stage to reach an agreement that would gain the adherence of all the Powers. That, however, must not deter those now engaged in such negotiations. A treaty on non-proliferation, even if imperfect in a technical sense,

<sup>7/</sup> Ibid., Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/201/Add.2.

<sup>8/</sup> Ibid., Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex 1, sect. B.



would help to create the sense of mutual confidence that was necessary for progress in disarmament, and it would strengthen faith in the will of the Powers concerned to work together for the maintenance of peace and security.

27. U TUN SHEIN (Burma) said that he agreed with many of the speakers who had preceded him that halting the spread of nuclear weapons was the most important and urgent task in disarmament. His Government had long considered that in the quest for general and complete disarmament the essential first step must be to contain the problem of disarmament so that, even as attempts were being made to solve it, it did not become more complicated either through the development of more destructive types of weapons or through the transfer of nuclear weapons to States which did not have them. With the increase, both actual and potential, in recent times in the membership of the nuclear club, the danger of a nuclear arms race developing had become a real one. As the Secretary-General had pointed out in the introduction to his annual report (A/6001/Add.1), unless steps were taken quickly to halt the proliferation of nuclear Powers and weapons, the problem might reach the point where it could not be brought under control.

28. The two main nuclear Powers had now submitted draft treaties on non-proliferation, and it was to be hoped that they would conduct negotiations on the basis of those instruments in a spirit of accommodation. Since all countries, particularly the large ones, viewed problems from a national standpoint, they could hardly be criticized for being cautious in considering global agreements which involved a vital undertaking on their part not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. Several delegations had, in fact, suggested that other measures should be linked to an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The question was whether the linking of two or more measures would serve to facilitate the solution of the problem as a whole or to make an agreement once reached a more meaningful one, or whether, on the other hand, negotiation had more chance of success if it proceeded on a step-by-step basis, the linking of related measures merely constituting an impediment. In his delegation's opinion, the solution of a problem which had already been dealt with separately in the discussion ought not to await solutions to other problems which had not received similar attention.

29. In connexion with the concern that was felt that the approach of the nuclear Powers to non-proliferation represented an attempt to freeze the membership of the nuclear club and thus to maintain a monopoly over weapons of mass destruction, his delegation had been comforted by the assurance given by some of the Nuclear Powers that that was not the case. The eight neutral members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had stated in their joint memorandum that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should be coupled with or followed by other tangible steps. There were, in that connexion, proposals relating to fissionable materials which seemed to open the way to the destruction of some nuclear weapons, and also proposals for prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. In his delegation's view, it would be extremely de-

sirable if, as the delegation of Nigeria had proposed, the nuclear Powers would give an undertaking not to use, or to threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Powers. It was also imperative not to let the efforts to negotiate a treaty on non-proliferation be hampered by any actions that might be taken by any nuclear or non-nuclear Powers. It might be in order for the Assembly to seek a solution which, as the Secretary-General had said (1355th meeting), would preserve the present spirit of restraint and give the countries principally concerned more time to solve the problem.

30. The question of underground testing was directly related to the question of non-proliferation. The nuclear Powers might well consider what effect a suspension of underground tests would have on the future restraint that was expected of the non-nuclear Powers. It would likewise be a step forward if, in the course of the negotiations on the prohibition of underground tests, the nuclear Powers would in the meantime agree to stop tests above the threshold susceptible of detection and identification by national control systems. The neutral countries had stated their position on that point in the last two paragraphs of the joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty which they had submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.<sup>2/</sup>

31. His delegation realized that the establishment of nuclear-free zones was an important step in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; it therefore welcomed the steps already taken in that regard by the countries of Latin America and Africa and hoped that their efforts would be crowned with success. It also hoped that the principal Powers would reconcile their differences regarding the proposal for the destruction of bomber aircraft, for that would help not only to reduce certain types of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles but also to prevent the spread of bombers as conventional weapons. A great step forward would likewise be made if the nuclear Powers could agree to begin the destruction of weapons such as bombers, rockets and tanks. It was to be hoped that when the Eighteen-Nation Committee resumed its work, the nuclear Powers would explore every possibility in that direction. His delegation hoped also that, in connexion with the efforts to achieve general disarmament, the Eighteen-Nation Committee would look into the possibility of establishing a working group to consider the "nuclear umbrella".

32. His country, as one of the sponsors of the resolution relating to a world disarmament conference adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 11 June 1965,<sup>10/</sup> would support any resolution by the General Assembly aimed at the convening of such a conference. It would regard it as essential for the success of the conference that all the major Powers, including the People's Republic of China, should participate. The proposal for the holding of a world disarmament conference and the preparations for it should not prevent the Eighteen-Nation Committee from resuming its activities. In fact, it would be desirable for that Committee to speed up its work in order to

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., sect. F.

<sup>10/</sup> Ibid., Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/224.

reach some additional agreements by the time a world disarmament conference took place.

33. Mr. PONNAMBALAM (Ceylon) said he was pleased that the discussion had revealed not only a feeling of unanimity on the principle of general and complete disarmament, and more particularly nuclear disarmament, but also a growing sense of urgency that some positive steps must be taken. That sense of urgency had already been manifested by the non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in their joint memorandum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and had been reaffirmed by the Secretary-General when he had opened the First Committee's debate (1355th meeting). It was a matter of gratification to the small countries that the two principal nuclear Powers appeared in all sincerity to have appreciated the urgency of concluding a treaty on non-proliferation. In his opinion, an analysis of the two draft treaties would be inappropriate because it would only underline the differences between them. Furthermore, the two countries themselves had said, either directly or by implication, that their drafts were to be merely a basis for negotiation.

34. One question, however, emerged from the discussion by reason of the views expressed by the Central European countries. It was logical for those countries to remember an experience that had only recently occurred. If, therefore, their support for a non-proliferation treaty was dependent upon a sine qua non, namely, that West Germany should not be allowed, either directly or indirectly, to have access to nuclear weapons, and if they were unable to accept the assurance given in that regard by the United States and the United Kingdom, then his delegation could only suggest that an appeal should be made to West

Germany itself to abjure voluntarily and unilaterally its desire to enter the nuclear arms race. That would be the greatest possible contribution to the international community that Germany could make, and it would lay the foundations for the people of Germany to live in unity within themselves and in amity with their neighbours. He sincerely trusted that that suggestion would not be considered unrealistic.

35. It was also realized that the number of Powers with a nuclear capability was increasing, as a result of the advance of science and technology. The nations must ask themselves whether the possession of a small quantity of nuclear weapons would appreciably increase their chances of survival. He would commend the example of India as a country which had a nuclear capability and had renounced all intention of exploiting it. If the medium-sized industrialized countries would temporarily abjure the manufacture of nuclear weapons, they would have made a very valuable contribution to non-dissemination. In that connexion, the representative of Malta, speaking at the 1362nd meeting, had made an apt distinction between non-dissemination and non-proliferation. After a treaty on non-dissemination had been entered into, the next step would be a treaty on non-proliferation binding on the restricted number of nuclear countries. He recalled that both the United States and the Soviet Union had committed themselves unreservedly not merely to a freezing of production but also to the reduction, the destruction and the conversion of nuclear weapons. It should not therefore be impossible for the medium-sized countries with a nuclear capability to renounce forthwith the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.