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CONTENTS

Agenda item 106:

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (<i>continued</i>)	
General debate (<i>continued</i>)	43

Chairman: Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 106

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*)
(A/5976, A/5986-DC/227)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. KAYUKWA (Democratic Republic of the Congo) said that at the dawn of the atomic age his country had unwittingly been one of the suppliers of the raw materials for manufacturing the weapons of the modern atomic arsenal. At that time it had been impossible to foresee the tragic proportions which modern atomic science had now assumed, or the calamitous events of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Today the whole planet was living in fear of destruction, and his own country—more than any other—was deeply disturbed by that fear. After the competition between the atomic Powers to obtain ever more numerous and more destructive nuclear weapons, it was a relief to see that mankind was now expressing its indignation at that trend towards disaster. To recreate an atmosphere of peace and security in the world, the most authoritative spokesmen of human wisdom had called for an end to the nuclear armaments race, the non-expansion of the "nuclear club" and the general and complete destruction of existing stockpiles. In the end, the nuclear Powers themselves had, with a greater or lesser degree of sincerity, also accepted the arguments of the pacifists.

2. The First Committee was called upon to study vast and complex problems, such as disarmament, the convening of a world disarmament conference and the prospects for an international agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. His delegation reserved the right to express its views on each of those problems at the appropriate time.

3. In the opinion of the vast majority of countries represented in the Committee, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was a fundamental question; and his delegation shared that view. But it would be wrong to stress the importance of the question to such an extent as to divert attention from another problem which was no less vital—the problem of general and complete disarmament, which concerned only the

atomic Powers, and especially the two super-Powers. In his delegation's view, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would not be a fully significant measure unless it was a *sine qua non* of general and complete disarmament. Unfortunately the close link between those two problems had not been clearly understood by all delegations. It was essential to know precisely what would follow an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Some members of the "nuclear club" believed that they had been obliged to manufacture their own nuclear weapons; and a similar reasoning might be advanced *mutatis mutandis* by all countries, including those of the "third world". That was precisely the vicious circle which had to be broken, and the world would never live again in an atmosphere of peace and security unless nuclear weapons were banned and destroyed. The problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was of much greater concern to the two great Powers, and to countries which already possessed atomic weapons, than it was to countries which were not yet even intending to acquire them. The danger facing mankind was not merely that of the many fingers which might be able to press the trigger, but also that by some miscalculation the fingers that remained on the trigger might cause a holocaust. The disconcerting element of the problem was that, while countries were making statements indicating their firm intention of reaching agreement on non-proliferation as quickly as possible, the whole question at the practical level was still bogged down in lengthy discussions. But there were still grounds for hoping that the problem might be solved in a positive manner in the First Committee.

4. The draft treaties submitted by the Soviet Union (A/5976) and the United States^{1/} respectively gave grounds both for hope and for disappointment. While his delegation was in favour of putting an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, and of prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons to countries not already possessing them, it was not prepared to accept the underlying concept of the Soviet draft, which was that the non-nuclear countries should undertake to renounce any form of possession, control or acquisition of nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear countries did not represent a source of anxiety for mankind or a constant threat to peace, and the main emphasis in the draft should be placed rather on an undertaking by the nuclear countries not only to refrain from disseminating the nuclear weapons which they already possessed, but also to destroy existing stockpiles and to dismantle

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. A.

the producing industries. Furthermore, his delegation could not subscribe to certain provisions in the United States draft which tended to separate the question of non-proliferation from that of general and complete disarmament. Subject to those reservations, his delegation was ready to make its modest contribution to the search for any possible solution which would safeguard mankind from the danger of nuclear destruction; and it hoped that—in spite of their differences of opinion—all countries would do their utmost to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to bring about the reduction of international tension and the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that the basic conclusion which emerged from the discussions in the General Assembly over the past few years on the item at present before the Committee was that nuclear proliferation was tantamount to nuclear anarchy; and it was understandable therefore that priority had been given to the question of non-proliferation. For reasons of legal logic, he proposed first to consider the draft agreements within the general framework of disarmament.

6. It should be recognized in all frankness that a simple agreement, unaccompanied by additional measures, could not constitute, directly or indirectly, a solution to the problem. At the most it could only be a partial solution, only a beginning, however generous and sincere it might be. A genuine solution, on the other hand, would call for the greatest possible efforts, and even the greatest possible sacrifices, not only by small countries, but above all by the nuclear Powers which had a special responsibility in the matter. The United States was fully aware of that; and in the Assembly's general debate (1334th plenary meeting) the United States representative had suggested as a practical measure that a first step should be taken by destroying nuclear weapons and converting to peaceful uses the fissionable materials so obtained. That was exactly what the whole of mankind was demanding. Without discussing the substance of the proposal, he said that it showed that the United States was fully aware that the signature of a non-proliferation treaty would not solve the problem of general and complete disarmament. In the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, attention had already been drawn to that point by the eight non-aligned members of the Committee, who had stated in a joint memorandum^{2/} that a treaty on non-proliferation should only be regarded as a means to an end. If the problem were to be solved by treaties only, some countries might cherish the illusion that it would still be possible to maintain the nuclear balance. But the nuclear balance was very difficult to maintain in the arms race. At the most it could be described as a balance of terror.

7. It was essential therefore to stop the arms race, and that could not be achieved by a treaty alone. A treaty might indirectly create some psychological factors, but it did not constitute a specific legal obstacle to the arms race—and that was what was

required. Neither the terrible prospect of nuclear destruction nor the danger that nuclear weapons might be used against those who possessed them were enough to prevent men from succumbing to the attraction of nuclear weapons. But there was something even more serious. There was the proposal made by Italy^{3/}—to which he paid tribute for its generous initiative—that the non-nuclear countries should renounce the use of that dreadful weapon, even as a means of defence or deterrence. But, legally speaking, it was impossible to ask those countries to renounce a possible right which other countries were exercising as a result of their material power—and their material power alone—without offering the former some compensation or some rights in exchange for the obligations which they might assume. Was the atomic age disrupting all moral and legal concepts? Had anyone ever offered an undertaking without obtaining any rights in return, or received rights without assuming any responsibilities? If the non-nuclear countries were to offer undertakings of that kind, the countries which possessed all the rights should also assume some responsibilities.

8. The draft treaties on non-proliferation which were before the Committee had certain weaknesses. He noted with regret that they contained no reference, direct or indirect, to the United Nations Charter, or to the Organization itself, or to possible action by the United Nations. What was the reason for that omission? There was indeed a reference in the United States draft to the application of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and the possibility of the contracting parties holding a conference to review the operation of the treaty. But there was no reference to the Charter or to possible action by the United Nations. The USSR draft, for its part, gave the contracting parties the right to propose amendments to the agreement; but, as the amendments would have to be approved by the nuclear Powers, they might be blocked by the right of veto.

9. The basic differences between the two draft treaties before the Committee were, of course, determined by the nature of the alliances headed by their sponsors. The United States draft reflected the participation by NATO countries in certain decisions concerning the use of nuclear weapons. The same did not apply to the USSR draft, which appeared to exclude such participation in the case of the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The representative of Canada had already shown (1356th meeting) that the United States draft treaty was compatible with the policy of the Atlantic alliance, which was that nuclear weapons might not be transferred to member countries. Consequently two possibilities existed: on the one hand, nuclear weapons were not transferable but could be used by decision of the Council of an alliance; on the other hand, the use of nuclear weapons depended exclusively on the decision of the country possessing them. The United States draft contained a limitation and a juridical control, at least with regard to the decision by the countries concerned to use nuclear weapons on their own territory or to settle their disputes. That

^{2/} *Ibid.*, sect. E.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, sect. D.

juridical factor was absent from the USSR draft. In his view, both drafts should be modified and given a more pronounced juridical character, since the juridical order was fundamental to the life of any human society. It had been thought that in the present era the balance of power would be sufficient to create an international order. That balance had been possible while there were no atomic weapons and, hence, while international order coincided with juridical order. Today, with the development of nuclear weapons, might was right. The United Nations had been set up to restore the juridical order in its entirety and not to indulge in dreams of hypothetical balances. It should insist that every treaty and every measure be placed within the juridical framework of the United Nations. The small Powers could accept no less.

10. Nevertheless, it seemed that an agreement, albeit imperfect, was in sight. Either in New York or before long in Geneva, the opportunity should be seized to conclude the best possible treaty. The representative of the United Kingdom had expressed the view that the draft treaties before the Committee contained the seeds of compromise. The seeds were not visible and it was questionable whether there would be time to let them grow. For its part, the Peruvian delegation would do everything in its power to bring about a rapprochement, but there must be negotiation.

11. The nuclear Powers would have grounds for satisfaction if the General Assembly were to suggest, in a resolution supported by them, certain amendments to their draft treaties. Since the General Assembly had never failed to co-operate with the great Powers, it was there that a solution should be sought. The General Assembly had been the first to persuade the great Powers to accept the idea of disarmament and, following that understanding, it had set up the Disarmament Commission, which had later been constituted on the basis of parity membership so that the member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization might be equitably represented, as the Soviet Union had requested. However, the Commission as thus constituted had not succeeded. Then, again at the request of the Soviet Union, the Disarmament Commission had been reconstituted with the same membership as the General Assembly. However, the need for a negotiating body had been felt, and the Eighteen-Nation Committee had been set up; in that Committee the element of parity between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization had been retained, but eight non-aligned countries had been added. He paid a tribute to the non-aligned countries concerned for the valuable work they had already performed, and expressed the hope that in the future work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee they would endeavour to reflect the majority view as it would emerge in the First Committee.

12. If a treaty were to be constructive, it should contain both a ban on the dissemination of nuclear weapons and a ban on the acquisition and manufacture of such weapons; that would complete the work of the General Assembly, which could already claim credit for having obtained a partial cessation of nuclear weapon testing. The Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and

under water was, of course, incomplete but, as the memoranda of Sweden^{4/} and the United Kingdom^{5/} showed, technical progress now made it possible to conclude a treaty on the total cessation of nuclear tests. A treaty of that kind, backed up by a treaty on non-proliferation, would definitely put an end to the nuclear arms race. By itself a treaty on non-proliferation would be insufficient. Of course, any cessation of testing would have to be controlled, but the Soviet Union should have no difficulty in agreeing to accept controls, since recent technical advances reduced them to a minimum. If the non-nuclear Powers were ready to make immense sacrifices, the nuclear Powers could surely relinquish some of their demands.

13. The General Assembly had never failed in its duty to admonish the great Powers in the most solemn terms. After the launching of the first sputnik in 1957, it had expressed concern over the tragic future facing mankind. Many delegations, including his own, had deplored the fact that the increasing pace of scientific progress, instead of creating greater trust, was leading to mistrust, thus bringing about an atmosphere conducive to the use of nuclear weapons. The notion of atomic protection was an illusion: what the world faced was atomic tragedy. The Assembly had anxiously sought a way out of the impasse into which the negotiations had fallen and had attempted to persuade the parties concerned that disarmament without control was impossible and that controls, to be effective, must be unrestricted. It was now scientifically possible to subject even nuclear production to a control which would cover everything but nuclear stockpiles. However, it was not enough to consider only military and scientific techniques; the legal aspects must also be taken into account. In a disarmament treaty, controls were a means of application, subordinated to the purposes of the treaty and not affecting its substance. At the same time, they were also its essence, since without controls there could be no disarmament. Their scope was not a matter for decision by each individual State, since that would imply a legal recognition of the State's unlimited supremacy, allowing it to evade certain juridical obligations. That could not be accepted. The General Assembly was therefore acting in accordance with an immutable principle and it should appeal once more to the great Powers to resume negotiations.

14. Since the negotiations for the control of disarmament were making no progress, proposals had been made for the setting up of denuclearized zones. It had not been possible to apply the Rapacki plan in Europe, but the countries of Africa, and soon after the countries of Latin America, had taken up the idea. Once again, the question arose of the guarantees that should be given to countries which agreed to remain non-nuclear. On that point the draft treaties should contain a clear provision, which would refer to the United Nations Charter and lay down precise and categorical obligations. A provision of that kind would give the drafts a certain juridical character

^{4/} *Ibid.*, sect. B.

^{5/} *Ibid.*, sect. C.

which they now lacked. A text backed by the United Nations, particularly in the year of its twentieth anniversary, could do much to improve the situation. It should also be possible to introduce certain effective guarantees. In 1955, to counter the danger of surprise attacks, President Eisenhower had proposed the "open skies" policy, and in return Marshal Bulganin had proposed ground inspections at strategic communications centres. Unfortunately, no action had been taken on those proposals, but it would be useful to study the possibility of using them as a basis for deciding what guarantees should be given to the non-nuclear countries. It was a task for jurists to prepare a suitable text and for technicians to submit a draft on guarantees to the Disarmament Commission when it next met.

15. In order to fulfil its responsibilities, the Committee should adopt a resolution based on the views expressed not only by the delegation of Peru but by several other delegations before it. He was confident that the Committee would not fail in its task and would succeed in reopening the dialogue between the great Powers for the greater good of mankind.

16. Sir James PLIMSOLL (Australia) said that the debate had shown almost complete unanimity on the urgency of agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The greater the number of countries having nuclear weapons, the greater was the risk of nuclear war; and the greater the difficulty in reaching agreement among the countries possessing nuclear weapons, the greater would be the difficulties of verifying and controlling the existing weapons. Moreover, if the number of nuclear Powers grew, the pressure on other countries to acquire such weapons for themselves, despite the burden of the costs involved, would grow likewise. Control of proliferation was one element in the total approach to disarmament, which must be reached by stages, each aspect of the problem being taken up when it seemed susceptible of progress. There was, for example, the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and there were concrete proposals for a treaty on non-proliferation. Those, however, were only intermediate and unstable steps. Two nuclear countries had not signed the partial test ban treaty and were continuing their tests, while at least one country which was a signatory had publicly stated its intention to obtain and possibly to manufacture nuclear weapons. In the light of that unstable situation, it was all the more necessary to make as much progress as possible with regard to the other aspects of disarmament, including disarmament in conventional weapons.

17. It would seem that the differences between the draft treaties submitted, respectively, by the United States and the Soviet Union could be reconciled, except for the first two articles. In those articles the differences were of substance; they were political differences which would have to be settled by direct negotiations between the Powers concerned, outside the context of disarmament and taking into account the situation in the various regions. In that connexion he welcomed the progress made in Europe, but wondered whether there was not too great a tendency to concentrate on the problem of the security of

Central Europe. On the other hand, some of the discussion had ranged far beyond the context of Europe. Representatives had spoken of nuclear-free zones outside Europe, reflecting the quite natural desire on the part of the non-nuclear Powers to remain aloof from the nuclear quarrels of the great Powers. The question was not as easy as that, for any nuclear conflict, wherever it broke out and however limited it might be, was likely to have consequences which would be felt in other regions. Moreover, while the establishment of a nuclear-free zone depended on good relations among the countries directly concerned, it also depended on the attitude of the neighbouring countries. The problem would therefore differ from one region to another. Countries situated alongside a great Power which they might regard as a potential aggressor would be in a position different from that of countries which were more remote or which had less cause to fear their neighbours; a nuclear-free zone was conceivable in the latter case but not in the former. In any case, the establishment of nuclear-free zones was only a step on the road to general and complete disarmament, a way of purchasing time. Besides, the control of nuclear weapons was in a sense easier in Europe than elsewhere, since there existed in Europe, despite all the complexities of the situation, a certain *de facto* equilibrium—even if only tacitly accepted—both as between the nuclear Powers themselves and as between the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers.

18. The same could not be said of Asia. Communist China, which was becoming a nuclear Power, was not a signatory to the partial test ban treaty; it flaunted its nuclear capacity and refused to accept the very concept of an agreement on non-proliferation. That was a situation which the countries of the region had to take into account. It had been said that the nuclear Powers had a special role to play, and it was true that the realities of power must be accepted. However, Australia, reflecting what it believed were the views of most of the countries of Asia and the Pacific, could not concede to Peking the role of spokesman for Asia. Other countries in that region had a nuclear potential but had decided not to exploit it. Care must be taken that in any arrangements for nuclear disarmament and nuclear control the countries which chose to embark on nuclear armament were not given an advantage and those which refrained from doing so were not penalized.

19. Two questions arose in that connexion. The first concerned assurances given to non-nuclear countries. There, too, account must be taken of differing situations. Australia, for example, was a committed country, a member of defence alliances, and it could not accept any arrangement which would prevent it from joining collective security alliances. However, there were also the non-aligned countries, and it was to be asked how they would protect themselves from an attack by a nuclear or non-nuclear Power. There had been talk of guarantees by the nuclear Powers, but that suggestion raised almost as many questions as the one it purported to answer: would the guarantees be joint or several; how would they be made effective; would there be advance planning, access to facilities by the guaranteeing Power and training of military personnel in the

countries guaranteed; would the guarantees be implemented in all circumstances or only in certain cases; and would the nuclear Powers bound by the guarantees allow one of their number to assume responsibility for the implementation of the guarantee? The complexity of those questions explained why, in certain countries capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons, voices were being raised in favour of a system of national defence relying on nuclear weapons.

20. Then there was the great problem of the control of conventional weapons, for a non-nuclear country must protect itself against the danger not only from nuclear weapons but also from others, particularly if it was situated alongside nations with large armies. Nuclear defence by the country itself or by its allies must be taken into account because that deterrent element was one of the facts of the modern world, and it could not be ignored. In other words, progress in nuclear disarmament and nuclear control was closely linked to progress in conventional disarmament and control of conventional weapons.

21. His Government therefore strongly supported the efforts being made for the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but it was still aware that that was only one element of a wider problem. Until agreement was reached on a wide range of disarmament matters, any agreement reached in the nuclear field would be unstable, and the countries with a nuclear potential might be pushed by the pressure of their own public opinion or by the realities of the situation into embarking on the path of nuclear power. His Government hoped that that would not happen; it had frequently stated its desire to see the number of nuclear Powers limited and to avoid becoming involved itself in the nuclear race. He had mentioned some of the pre-occupations of Asian countries and some of the practical difficulties, not as an argument either against action or against the concern for concluding a non-proliferation treaty at the earliest possible date, but in order to spur progress in other aspects of disarmament—nuclear disarmament, and disarmament in conventional weapons.

22. Mr. LEKIC (Yugoslavia) said that man was confronted today with a tragic situation: his most ambitious aspirations had produced results contrary to the goals envisaged, results which might make him the victim of his own power. The arsenals of the world already contained the means to wipe out life on the entire planet. It was therefore imperative to bring that accumulated power under control and to use it for the benefit of all mankind, and that could be done only within a new international framework. It would be absurd to follow the methods of the past, which were based on the concept that individual and international relations were determined by might. Reality dictated the need to take a firm decision to eliminate war as an instrument of policy and to lay a foundation for general co-operation among peoples based on the principles of active and peaceful coexistence. The efforts made so far had clearly shown that a problem of world importance, such as general and complete disarmament, could be solved

only within a global framework; a world disarmament conference was therefore an imperative of the epoch.

23. Priority should be given to nuclear disarmament in order to avoid increasing not only the danger of a holocaust but also inequality and mistrust among States, the non-productive use of vast material resources and the difficulty of reaching a solution. In the memorandum which it had submitted to the Disarmament Commission,^{6/} his Government had proposed that the further spread of nuclear weapons in any form should be prevented, with an agreement to begin solving the problem of denuclearization of the nuclear Powers themselves; that all nuclear weapons tests should be banned; and that the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited. The prohibition of nuclear weapons depended exclusively on the political will to undertake it, for there was no nation on earth which did not support it. The General Assembly, in 1961, had adopted resolution 1653 (XVI) on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. That declaration, which was one of the most important documents of the United Nations, should be given the force of a legally binding instrument. The partial test ban treaty was a step towards the banning of nuclear weapons tests, but it was neither complete nor universal, and it had not been followed, as expected, by steps conducive to the cessation of the arms race and the banning of nuclear weapons.

24. Within the framework of disarmament, priority had been given to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons because the danger of their further spread was becoming increasingly more obvious and imminent, and the possibilities for preventing it were becoming increasingly limited. It was that feeling of urgency which had prompted the submission of suggestions and concrete proposals on that subject. A declaration of principle in favour of general and complete disarmament was not enough—particularly when accompanied by the stockpiling of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of military groupings—to prevent an increase in the number of nuclear Powers. Political readiness, together with practical steps, was the precondition of success. An agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be concluded immediately, for the measures proposed with a view to "gaining time" served only to defer a solution which was becoming more and more difficult with the passage of time.

25. Nuclear weapon tests had thus far been the principal means of acquiring a nuclear arsenal and of further improving nuclear weapons. Technological progress and the reduction in costs of manufacture had increased the danger of a further spread of those weapons, and that was an additional reason for an immediate ban on all nuclear tests. Proliferation, however, also assumed other forms. Nuclear weapons could be stationed in foreign territories or on floating bases, and no country or group of countries could remain indifferent when such concentrations of weapons were nearby. There could also be transfers of nuclear weapons or of control over them. His delegation believed that the creation of a multilateral nuclear force or of a nuclear fleet within NATO was

^{6/} Ibid., Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/216.

incompatible with the professed readiness to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, halt the arms race and bring about disarmament. It was even more difficult to understand the reasoning behind attempts to prove that such plans were specifically designed to prevent other countries from exercising national control over nuclear weapons. The choice was not between national and multilateral possession of the weapons, but between possession and non-possession, and that was why there was such strong opposition to those plans throughout the world and why their implementation constituted a very serious stumbling-block to a non-proliferation agreement.

26. The General Assembly, in its resolution 1884 (XVIII), had welcomed the expression of intention by the Soviet Union and the United States not to station objects carrying nuclear weapons in outer space. Yugoslavia considered that it was both feasible and essential to translate that statement of intention into a treaty obligation as soon as possible and thus eliminate another potential form of dissemination of nuclear weapons.

27. Lastly, nuclear weapons could be spread by the transfer of technological and scientific data, personnel or plans, and though that method had been used to a limited extent, it should be taken into account as well as that of distributing nuclear weapons for so-called tactical purposes, even to small military units within the national armies of the nuclear Powers or armies established under military alliances, a practice which also created the danger of the unauthorized use of those weapons.

28. The discussions in the Disarmament Commission, at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly and the First Committee at the current session of the Assembly, demonstrated the comprehensive nature of the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the avenues to be explored with a view to a satisfactory solution. One point in particular had emerged from the discussions, namely, that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was an integral part of the efforts to halt the arms race, to ease international tensions and to strengthen peace, and that an agreement on non-proliferation would facilitate and accelerate the adoption of other concrete measures in the field of disarmament. In their joint memorandum,^{2/} the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had stated that a treaty on non-proliferation was not an end in itself but only a means towards achieving general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. They had therefore expressed the belief that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, in his statement in the Assembly's general debate (1335th plenary meeting), had also said that an agreement on non-proliferation would be a major step towards the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.

^{2/} Ibid., document DC/227, annex I, sect. E.

Similarly, the Chairman of the United States delegation, at the 1334th plenary meeting, while recognizing that non-proliferation should be given the highest priority, had spoken out in favour of the immediate adoption of concrete measures likely to reduce the dangers stemming from the existing high level of nuclear capabilities. Consequently, the Yugoslav delegation considered that after the inertia which had followed the conclusion of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, it was imperative for means of concluding new agreements to be sought more boldly and with a greater sense of urgency. The concrete results which the General Assembly might achieve in the field of disarmament during its current session would thus demonstrate the readiness and will to resolve, through the United Nations, a political crisis directly related, as the Secretary-General had emphasized, to the problem of disarmament.

29. His delegation, guided by the spirit and letter of the Programme for Peace and International Co-operation adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, was prepared to support any efforts likely to lead to the effective prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

30. Mr. VERGIN (Turkey) associated himself with all the previous speakers in stressing the urgency of an early solution to the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As the Secretary-General had said, that problem, if not resolved, would confront the world with the terrible prospect of a nuclear holocaust.

31. The position of Turkey with regard to the general problem of disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was well known, and his delegation reserved the right to speak again, if necessary, during the discussion on problems of disarmament. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey had pointed out in his statement in the General Assembly on 30 September 1965 (1343rd plenary meeting), the world was witnessing a frantic arms race rather than any reduction in either nuclear or conventional weapons. The danger inherent in such an arms race was real and much more imminent than anyone would like to believe. There was no point, however, in yielding to fatalistic defeatism; on the contrary, every means should be employed to achieve concrete results. His delegation believed that only general and complete disarmament, accompanied by indispensable measures for inspection and control, could preserve mankind from the most horrible catastrophe.

32. The position of Turkey with regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had been clearly stated by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had said, in particular, that however important it was that an agreement should be reached on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, that measure could not be considered separately but must be followed by parallel steps that would make it possible for the arms race to be effectively halted. A treaty on non-proliferation would be meaningless if the nuclear Powers were to continue to increase their atomic

arsenals and the non-nuclear countries were the only ones to agree not to acquire or manufacture those weapons. Consequently, such a treaty should be complemented by a treaty—to which all countries would accede—on the total prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests, a halt in the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, and a reduction in existing stocks. Moreover, measures for nuclear disarmament would be inadequate so long as no progress was made towards a reduction in conventional armaments.

33. History proved that when two nations or two groups of nations embarked on preparations for war, an outbreak of war was bound to occur sooner or later. It was there that the greatest danger of an arms race lay. Turkey sincerely hoped that it would be possible for an agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear weapons, and above all an understanding among the countries now manufacturing those weapons, to be reached. Unfortunately, certain Powers were unwilling to commit themselves in that respect; other Powers were feverishly seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, and a few were presumably on the verge of succeeding in doing so.

34. There were three proposals before the First Committee: the draft treaty submitted by the United States to the Eighteen-Nation Committee at Geneva, the draft treaty presented by the Soviet Union, and the draft declaration submitted by Italy. The Turkish delegation did not intend at that stage to embark upon a detailed analysis of the United States and USSR drafts; a first reading sufficed to reveal the divergencies between them. In its opinion, the problem should be approached differently from the outset. The mere fact that the two super-Powers had submitted to the United Nations two draft treaties aimed at halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons was in itself a hopeful sign. With good will on both sides, any differences of opinion could be ironed out by direct contacts and by proceeding in stages. In particular, his delegation had been gratified by the United States proposal for the transfer by the United States and the Soviet Union of 60,000 and 40,000 kilogrammes, respectively, of U-235 to peaceful purposes.

35. His delegation considered that propaganda should be restricted to an absolute minimum in dealing with problems of cardinal importance to the survival of mankind. Agreement could only be reached when the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was examined in itself, independently of other subsidiary matters, and when it was detached from political considerations. Furthermore, none of the parties concerned should attempt to gain any superiority over another by devious means or by means of a general agreement. With those considerations as a point of departure, areas of agreement could easily be found in the two drafts submitted, provided there was a determination to discuss them in a spirit of understanding and co-operation.

36. Turkey was against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It did not possess any, and it sincerely hoped that it would not be forced to try to acquire them at some future date. It was prepared, on the contrary, to support any draft aimed at prohibiting such weapons, and it considered the draft unilateral declaration of non-acquisition submitted by the Italian delegation to have great merit, provided the Powers manufacturing nuclear weapons also assumed certain obligations in that connexion. It nevertheless shared the view expressed by several other delegations that that should not be the ultimate objective.

37. The practice of deferring consideration of problems of such major importance to the whole world from one General Assembly session to another was not designed to foster the hopes placed in the United Nations by most nations, including Turkey. Even if the First Committee felt unable to draw up in specific terms a general draft treaty for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, even an interim agreement which Member States could unanimously support would be a great comfort for the future. It was the responsibility of States to do everything in their power to lead the world towards a less anguished era, and the task of the States Members of the United Nations should be realistically evaluated.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.