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Chairman: Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 106

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*)
(A/5976, A/5986-DC/227)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. MATSUI (Japan) said that the draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons submitted by the United States,^{1/} with the support of Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom, at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union (A/5976) could provide a basis for negotiation. The joint memorandum submitted by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee^{2/} and the draft declaration submitted by Italy^{3/} were also of value.

2. It was quite possible that a good many countries would soon be seeking admission to the "nuclear club", which until recently had been so exclusive. If that trend was not promptly halted and reversed, the time might well come when nuclear weapons would be used to settle local disputes, creating a danger of regional or even world-wide nuclear conflict. Japan, mindful of its dreadful experience twenty years earlier, strongly supported the frequently expressed view that the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was of the utmost urgency.

3. As the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs had said in the General Assembly, the security of every nation must be taken fully into account in dealing with that question, and the sacrifices to be made must be shared equally by the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers. In particular, the co-operation and participation of non-nuclear countries having a nuclear capability were essential to the conclusion and effective implementation of a treaty on non-proliferation. It was regrettable, in that connexion, that nuclear weapons were regarded by some as a status symbol.

4. A treaty on non-proliferation should therefore be drawn up within the framework of nuclear disarmament,

with the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers sharing equally the sacrifices and the responsibilities arising from such a treaty. Japan fully supported the view expressed in the joint memorandum of eight members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee that "measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should . . . be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race".

5. His delegation could not stress too strongly the importance of a total ban on nuclear weapon tests in halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, since it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for non-nuclear Powers to develop their own nuclear weapons without carrying out nuclear explosions. A comprehensive test ban treaty would also help to prevent the present nuclear Powers from further developing such weapons.

6. Furthermore, a treaty on non-proliferation which was not accompanied by positive measures of actual disarmament would merely maintain the present position of the nuclear Powers. On the other hand, such a treaty would profoundly affect the national security of the non-nuclear Powers. Workable guarantees against any attempted nuclear threat or attack might be regarded by some non-nuclear countries as an essential condition for their accession to a treaty on non-proliferation. At the very least, if the complexity of the problem made it impossible to adopt specific provisions along those lines, the treaty should make it clear that non-nuclear parties would be free to make bilateral or collective defensive arrangements for protection against a nuclear threat or attack.

7. With regard to the draft treaties submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States draft came closer to meeting the needs and requirements of the non-nuclear countries than did the Soviet draft, which did not take sufficient account of the need to balance the interests of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. Article III of the United States draft was obviously in the interest of all countries; article VI, paragraph 2, would afford the non-nuclear countries an opportunity to judge the sincerity of the efforts made by the nuclear Powers. While the fifth preambular paragraph was useful, the idea expressed in it should also appear in one of the articles, even if only in broad terms. In that connexion, his delegation wished to indicate its support for the various proposals for nuclear disarmament made by the head of the United States delegation in the Assembly's general debate (1334th plenary meeting), particularly the proposal involving the transfer to peaceful purposes by the United States and the Soviet Union of 60,000 and 40,000 kilogrammes, respectively, of weapons-grade U-235.

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. A.

^{2/} *Ibid.*, sect. E.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, sect. D.

8. The fact that the Committee had two draft treaties before it as a basis for discussion and negotiation was a tribute not only to their sponsors but also to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

9. Since self-restraint on the part of the non-nuclear countries having a nuclear capability was of the utmost importance, it was essential that their views should be fully reflected in the final provisions of a treaty on non-proliferation. In that regard, Japan was prepared to contribute to the negotiations.

10. Mr. FUENTEALBA (Chile) said that the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons had been made even more difficult by the fact that the People's Republic of China could now manufacture bombs and that at least twenty-one other countries were also technically and economically capable of doing so. The number of such countries would in all probability continue to increase, quite apart from the fact that many countries might also obtain those weapons of mass destruction from a nuclear Power. It was not only considerations of prestige and national power but also a genuine need for security that made countries seek to acquire atomic weapons. Nevertheless, it was foolish for those countries to spend vast sums for that purpose at the expense of their economic and social development, and thereby risk becoming targets in any nuclear war; for the world community as a whole, moreover, the emergence of new nuclear Powers meant that the possibility of an outbreak of war resulting from an accident, miscalculation or sheer madness had increased in geometric progression.

11. It was therefore a matter of the utmost urgency to find a formula whereby the countries which did not yet have atomic weapons would collectively undertake not to acquire them, for, as the Secretary-General had stated in the introduction to his annual report (A/6001/Add.1) the world would find within a very few years that its survival was threatened unless steps were taken quickly to halt the proliferation of nuclear Powers and weapons. At the recent series of meetings of the Disarmament Commission, his delegation had given voice to that concern and had joined in sponsoring a draft resolution recommending that priority be given to the question of non-proliferation, which had been adopted by an overwhelming majority.^{4/} The drafts now before the First Committee should provide a basis for action to avert disaster.

12. His delegation was prepared to co-operate fully in the efforts of the United Nations, in which the small and medium-sized countries voiced the hopes of mankind for a resumption of the disarmament negotiations. As the eight non-aligned countries in the Eighteen-Nation Committee had rightly stated, a treaty on non-proliferation was not an end in itself: measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons. That belief was shared by all the non-nuclear countries, whose willingness to renounce the acquisition of atomic weapons should not constitute a permanent

and arbitrary loss of their sovereignty while the great Powers retained a monopoly of such weapons. That did not mean, however, that an agreement on such measures should precede or be an essential condition for the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation. The two endeavours should proceed simultaneously. A solution would perhaps be to provide in the treaty on non-proliferation that the parties to the treaty would meet in a world conference after a certain interval to determine what progress had been made towards nuclear disarmament. In that way the nuclear Powers would have a certain length of time in which to take concrete measures and the non-nuclear Powers would enjoy a sort of right of review.

13. The draft treaties submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union deserved very close study, but the discussion had already made it clear that they were separated by so great a difference of basic approach that it would be impossible to formulate a satisfactory text until that difference had been removed. It seemed plain, however, that the two parties were sincerely seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Without wishing to pronounce on the substance of the controversy, his delegation considered that if the problem of the multilateral force was really the only obstacle, all the parties concerned should make the greatest sacrifices in order to surmount it.

14. With regard to the draft unilateral declaration of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons proposed by Italy, that proposal might come to play an important and constructive role if it should not prove possible to arrive at a general agreement on non-proliferation in the near future.

15. Not to be forgotten among the means of preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons was the cessation, once for all, of all nuclear tests, in particular underground tests. The United Nations had made repeated statements to that effect in the strongest terms and it would be altogether fitting, at the time when the United Nations was celebrating its twentieth anniversary and the International Co-operation Year, if the First Committee could open the way for a definitive agreement on the subject.

16. The Latin American countries were determined to protect their continent against the nuclear danger. Chile had been one of the countries whose efforts had led to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1911 (XVIII). It had always co-operated in regional efforts to bring about the denuclearization of Latin America and it hoped that that example would lead to the creation of similar zones in other continents, as was proposed for Africa. Unfortunately, it did not seem possible that a treaty applicable to all the countries and territories of Latin America could be concluded in the near future or that all the nuclear Powers would agree to furnish the necessary guarantees. That should not prevent the countries which were determined to sign a treaty on denuclearization from doing so. It must be hoped that the pressure of world public opinion and the advantages to be derived from such a measure would encourage other countries and territories of the region to accede to the treaty later on. His delegation urged all the

^{4/} *Ibid.*, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/225.

parties concerned to do everything in their power to enable the Latin American countries to achieve a result which would benefit the entire world.

17. Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia) said he was gratified to find that the overwhelming majority of speakers were agreed that non-proliferation was one of the most urgent aspects of disarmament. The most effective way of avoiding the danger of a nuclear war was obviously to take radical measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. However, everyone was aware of the obstacles that had been placed in the way of such a solution. The United States and some of its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) refused to agree to decisive measures, since they were unwilling to renounce the possibility of waging nuclear war as an instrument of their foreign policy.

18. At the present time, the world was faced more and more with the danger that the risk of a nuclear war might become more serious, the problem of disarmament might grow more complicated and the atomic armaments race might escalate and spread to other States. There were five nuclear Powers: the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of China. Recognition of that plain fact in all its aspects and of the conclusions to be drawn from it might facilitate the adoption of a realistic approach to and solution of many problems. At the same time a number of States were so advanced in the use of atomic energy that it was within their power to develop their own nuclear weapons. In some countries, moreover, those who calculated that the possession of nuclear weapons would enable them to enforce their political claims and interests were gaining ground. In reality, access to nuclear weapons by additional States, far from increasing their security and contributing to the solution of outstanding problems of foreign policy, would merely lead to further dissemination of nuclear weapons, with dangerous consequences.

19. What was most disturbing was the fact that certain Powers regarded the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an instrument for the solution of contradictions within their military blocs, satisfying the claims of certain aggressive circles regardless of the dangers that such a course would create. In view of all those circumstances, it was important and urgently necessary to take consistent measures to prevent any further dissemination of nuclear weapons. Such measures would at least limit the intensification of the threat of nuclear war. Without them, steps could be taken in the field of dissemination of nuclear weapons which would make the solution of the problem of disarmament more difficult and lead to additional States being drawn into the nuclear arms race. The speedy adoption of consistent measures to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons would exercise a positive influence on the world situation as a whole and help to create more favourable conditions in which an agreement on radical measures to achieve nuclear disarmament could more easily be reached.

20. His delegation associated itself with the view stated by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in their joint memorandum, to the effect that an agreement on non-prolifera-

tion of nuclear weapons was not an end in itself but only a means of achieving general and complete disarmament. However, the adoption of consistent measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons would play an important role and for that reason the problem should be given primary attention.

21. In talks on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, as in the case of a number of other disarmament problems, the primary factor was the political decision by States to reach an agreement, in other words, the willingness to adopt measures which would not admit of any exceptions or contain any loop-holes that would permit the further dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form and under any pretext. Only consistent and uncompromising measures would have practical meaning and could provide a basis for agreement. That was the basic idea of the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the USSR; that draft (A/5976) contained a clear statement of the obligations which should be assumed by nuclear and non-nuclear States alike and which would make any further dissemination of nuclear weapons impossible.

22. However, the talks which had taken place on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, as well as the situation at the General Assembly's current session, indicated that certain States were not yet ready to adopt such an unequivocal political decision. The United States of America and some other members of NATO recognized in words the necessity and urgency of measures to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons; but in practical negotiations they were opposed to the adoption of consistent measures which would place all States on an equal footing and which would admit of no exceptions whatsoever. They were trying to secure acceptance of a peculiar definition of "non-dissemination" which was arbitrary and one-sided, since it related only to those actions under which nuclear weapons would pass into the independent national control of individual States or which would increase the number of States or other organizations having an independent authority to use nuclear weapons. Measures taken under other guises—such as "participation in control" and "nuclear partnership"—had been defined by NATO member States as not constituting dissemination of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the same States were attempting to justify, and even legalize, such measures. They were planning, for instance, to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force with the participation of non-nuclear States—in particular, the Federal Republic of Germany. Even measures of that kind, in consequence of which the United States Government, pursuant to certain arrangements within the framework of NATO, would release nuclear weapons from its custody and pass them on for use by countries not possessing nuclear weapons, were regarded by those NATO States as non-dissemination, as was clear from the Canadian representative's statement at the Committee's 1356th meeting.

23. The United States Government's attitude to non-dissemination had been clearly formulated, particularly in a statement at the 228th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, on 31 August 1965, by the United States

representative, who had said, *inter alia*, that his Government did not want to preclude for all time any new collective political and defence entity which might be created in Western Europe, and that it did not want to preclude such an entity from possessing and controlling nuclear weapons, if it should in fact develop the capability to assume the nuclear defence responsibilities of its formerly separate national components. That statement meant that the only treaty on non-dissemination which the United States was willing to adopt was a treaty that would prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons by every State in the world except member States of NATO, in order that the pursuit of political plans which had nothing to do with disarmament should not be precluded.

24. In that connexion, it should be pointed out that the danger of the dissemination of nuclear weapons through the creation of common nuclear forces within the framework of military groupings was not confined to Europe. The same development might occur in other regions also, within the framework of groupings that already existed or might be established. The reality of such a danger had been confirmed by the reports published in the Western Press to the effect that consideration had been given to the possibilities of integrating nuclear armaments in a similar manner within the framework of those groupings. All those forms of nuclear dissemination by the United States would be permitted under the United States concept of a treaty on non-dissemination; and States members of pro-United States military alliances would, apparently, acquire a privileged position compared with other States, particularly the non-aligned countries. In his delegation's view, such an attitude was incompatible with the principle of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and it could not be used as a basis for fruitful negotiations. But the same attitude also underlay the Italian proposal for a moratorium.^{5/} A moratorium would not be an effective way of putting an end to nuclear dissemination, as it would in no way affect the dissemination of nuclear weapons within and through military groupings.

25. The objective of an agreement on non-dissemination should be the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form, even within the framework of military groupings which already existed or might be created in the future.

26. At the Committee's 1358th meeting, the United Kingdom representative had said very emphatically that the Western countries were not prepared to negotiate on the internal arrangements of NATO. No one was asking him to negotiate on them. But if, with regard to the discussion on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the NATO Powers intended to declare that measures on nuclear dissemination within their alliance were merely "internal arrangements" of no concern to the United Nations or to the other States with which they were negotiating, one could not help wondering whether those Powers really wished to have an agreement on the subject at all.

27. It was no secret that the purpose of all the plans for a NATO nuclear force was to satisfy certain

ambitions of the Federal Republic of Germany. As his country's Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated in the Assembly's general debate (1337th plenary meeting), a multilateral nuclear force would enable circles which had not recognized the consequences of the defeat of Hitlerite fascism, and which were making territorial claims against other States, to obtain access to atomic weapons. The acquisition of atomic weapons by those circles would produce the gravest consequences for the situation in Europe and for world development in general. Access by the Federal Republic of Germany to nuclear weapons would also constitute a serious threat to the reunification of Germany; and Germany's neighbours would then assume that the Federal Republic of Germany, with the assistance of its allies and above all of the United States, preferred the prospect of war to the unification of Germany by peaceful means.

28. In view of the dangerous consequences of the creation of multilateral nuclear forces, the States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization had stated quite clearly that if those plans were implemented, they would be obliged to take the necessary steps to safeguard their security. It was in the interests of all European nations, including the Germans, that developments in that part of the world should follow a course which excluded the creation of multilateral nuclear forces. A much more satisfactory solution would be to adopt measures such as the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, the freezing of nuclear armaments in that region, the renunciation of nuclear armaments by both German States and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the States members of NATO. Measures of that kind had been strongly supported by the German Democratic Republic, which had transmitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee a memorandum^{6/} restating its proposal that the two German States should renounce nuclear armaments. The attitude of the Government of the German Democratic Republic was in sharp contrast to the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, which appeared systematically to oppose any relaxation of tension or any improvement in relations between European States. Furthermore, the plans for a NATO multilateral nuclear force had been vigorously opposed even by States members of NATO itself; but the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany nevertheless persisted in their intentions.

29. The problem of preventing the further dissemination of nuclear weapons could be solved only by a complete and unconditional ban on further dissemination, which would not leave open any possibility of circumvention or permit any exceptions. That principle should be confirmed by the General Assembly at its twentieth session as a basis for solving the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. In accordance with that principle, the Soviet draft treaty did not claim any exceptions for the socialist countries, and did not permit any exceptions for other States either. If certain Western States tried to reject the Soviet proposal just because it prevented the dissemination of nuclear

^{5/} See footnote 3.

^{6/} See Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, document ENDC/151, dated 10 August 1965 (mimeographed).

weapons within the framework of NATO, that was merely another indication that the Soviet proposal was really comprehensive and effective.

30. The United States and its allies in NATO must now decide which alternative to choose: they must either adopt effective measures against the dissemination of nuclear weapons or accept the responsibility for the further escalation of nuclear armaments that would result if they insisted on plans for nuclear

integration within NATO. If those States indicated that they were willing to agree to measures to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons, the Soviet proposal would provide a suitable basis for fruitful talks and negotiations, and a successful outcome to the negotiations would help to reduce the danger of nuclear war and to improve the world situation as a whole.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.