

United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

EIGHTEENTH SESSION

Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1351st
MEETING**
(Closing meeting)

Wednesday, 11 December 1963
at 3.5 p.m.

NEW YORK

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Chairman: Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN
(Netherlands).

AGENDA ITEM 29

The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/5512 and Corr.1, A/5512/Add.1, A/C.1/887, A/C.1/889, A/C.1/892, A/C.1/893, A/C.1/894, A/C.1/L.335) (concluded)

1. Mr. GALLIN-DOUATHE (Central African Republic) associated himself with those who had expressed their gratitude to UNCURK, which, despite the difficulties facing it, was carrying out its mission with a sense of deep conviction. From the various statements made and from the report of UNCURK (A/5512 and Corr.1 and Add.1), it had been established both that the United Nations had always shown a sincere desire to achieve a peaceful settlement through negotiation and that one of the parties concerned was pursuing a policy of systematic obstruction, dangerously aggravated by armed opposition. After briefly reviewing the events which had led to the division of Korea, the advent of a Communist régime in North Korea and its aggression against the Republic of Korea and later against the United Nations, he pointed out that United Nations policy in regard to the Korean question remained based on the following principles adopted at the Korean Political Conference held at Geneva in 1954: first, that a peaceful solution in line with the provisions of the United Nations Charter must be found; second, that free elections under international supervision should be held, with a view to ensuring proportional representation in the legislature; and third, that United Nations forces should be maintained in Korea until the main objectives had been achieved: unification, democratization and independence.

2. A number of serious charges could be levelled at the Communist régime of North Korea. By increasing its military potential and forces, North Korea had in effect violated the armistice. With the support of Soviet and Communist Chinese troops, North Korea had started a war against the Republic of Korea. The elections in North Korea had followed no freely accepted rule of democratic procedure. The North Korean régime had been set up in defiance of the United Nations resolution recognizing the Government of the Republic of Korea as the only lawful Government in Korea (General Assembly resolution 195 (III)).

North Korea had not only refused to accept the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea but had declined to have anything to do with UNCURK, whose dissolution it had repeatedly requested. North Korea and its allies had sabotaged the Political Conference. The North Korean leaders had openly declared that their régime would never recognize, and would resolutely reject, all United Nations resolutions on Korea. In so doing, the North Korean régime was challenging the competence and authority of the United Nations. What was more, the North Korean régime had started a war against the United Nations, the symbol of international peace and security.

3. Such was the factual situation facing the United Nations. Despite the seeming impotence to which the Organization had been reduced because of the attitude of the North Korean Government, there could be no question of capitulation. The General Assembly must remain true to its principles and protect the Republic of Korea against any possible aggression, while at the same time helping it to recover its national unity by peaceful means. By asking for the withdrawal of United Nations forces from South Korea, the Communists were seeking to make the Republic of Korea vulnerable to a new aggression. Those forces should therefore continue their mission in Korea until the objectives laid down by the United Nations had been achieved.

4. The Republic of Korea had established diplomatic relations with a great many countries; it had signed numerous international conventions; it was a member of a large number of specialized agencies and took part in the work of many inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations. Strengthening its democratic foundations, it had set about the task of free and competitive economic reconstruction. The United Nations was therefore in duty bound to continue its efforts for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea, an achievement which would contribute to the maintenance of peace and security not only in the Far East but in the rest of the world. Consequently, the work of UNCURK should be encouraged.

5. Mr. PRUSA (Czechoslovakia) regretted that the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had not been invited to take part in the discussion of the Korean question, for no positive results could be achieved without their participation. In the circumstances, it was perfectly clear that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could not recognize any resolution adopted by any organ of the United Nations, and that no such resolution could therefore be implemented.

6. UNCURK, whose activities constituted a violation of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter, was the symbol of those forces which had taken part in the war against the Korean people. If the Commission were an impartial organ, it would oppose the presence of the United States army in

South Korea, because that was the major obstacle to the peaceful unification of the country. While, in accordance with the provisions of the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953,^{1/} not a single foreign soldier remained on the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States army continued to occupy South Korea, which had in fact become a United States military base. The unification of Korea could be attained only after foreign armed forces had been withdrawn from the country. It was therefore impossible to justify the presence of United States armed forces, despite the incidents which had apparently been fabricated for the purpose of such justification. Those armed forces, double the size of the forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, were directed against that country. On the other hand, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had no aggressive designs whatever; even the Commanding General of the United States Army in the Pacific had said, during an inspection tour, that there were no facts available to indicate the possibility of aggression by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Accordingly, if the United Nations really desired the peaceful unification of Korea, it should recommend that foreign armed forces be immediately withdrawn from South Korea. That would enable the Korean people itself to solve, independently and peacefully, the question of the unification of the country, through free and democratic general elections held both in the North and in the South.

7. In its report, UNCURK tried to give the impression that the South Korean régime was democratic; but everyone knew that the elections held in South Korea had been very anti-democratic, as was evident from various articles published in the United States Press. Moreover, while UNCURK concealed the anti-popular character of the South Korean régime and the misery and poverty prevailing among the people in the southern part of the country, it avoided any mention of the economic and social achievements of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, of which he quoted the most striking examples. That progress, which had been recognized even by the United States Press, had been achieved thanks to the socialist system obtaining in the country and to the generous assistance furnished by the other socialist States. Those great strides forward contrasted with the economic and social stagnation of South Korea.

8. The report of UNCURK also failed to do justice to the proposals that had been presented by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with a view to the country's peaceful unification, which were set out in the memorandum of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic dated 22 November 1963 (A/C.1/893). It was regrettable that the South Korean authorities refused to establish, between the two parts of the country, the contacts suggested in those proposals. His delegation, for its part, believed that those proposals should be examined with the greatest attention. Unification could be achieved only through negotiations between the two parts of Korea.

9. If the United Nations sincerely wished to solve the problem, it must make a new approach to it, based on the following principles: first, that there were two parties to the so-called Korean question; second, that the unification of Korea was a domestic question which could be settled only by the Koreans themselves; third,

that UNCURK had proved to be unable to contribute to the unification of Korea, and should therefore be dissolved; and fourth, that foreign armed forces must be withdrawn from Korean territory.

10. Mr. ASTAPENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) wished first to refer to the statement made by the representative of the Central African Republic. He emphasized that the Soviet Union had withdrawn its troops from Korea as early as 1948. As for the Chinese volunteers, who had gone to the aid of their Korean brothers when the United States troops had been directly threatening the People's Republic of China, they also had been withdrawn from Korea.

11. The discussions conducted for many years on the so-called Korean question had yielded no positive result and had only made the country's unification more difficult. UNCURK had not contributed to the settlement of the question and could not in fact do so, since it had been created illegally. In reality, as the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had pointed out in its memorandum of 22 November 1963 (A/C.1/893), the United Nations was not under the Charter empowered to deal with the Korean question. The solution—which was indicated by the Korean people itself—consisted in the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from South Korea and in the termination of all foreign interference in the country's affairs. The South Koreans were opposed to such interference, as was proved by the many tragic conflicts between them and the so-called United Nations forces.

12. The maintenance of UNCURK was harmful to the prestige of the United Nations and constituted a burden on its finances. Several countries, including the Byelorussian SSR, had declared that they would not accept any liability for expenses in respect of that Commission. Neither the Organization nor the Korean people had any need of it. The consultations held by UNCURK concerning the development of representative government were nothing but a deception. Everyone knew that there was no democratic representative government in South Korea and that the military junta in power was not accepted by the people.

13. Those who used South Korea as a military base were preventing the peaceful unification of the country. The national interests of the Korean people continued to be defended by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That Government had repeatedly proposed to the South Korean régime concrete measures aimed at unifying the country through the efforts of the Koreans themselves, on a democratic basis and without foreign intervention. Those proposals had on each occasion been rejected by the Seoul authorities.

14. No satisfactory solution would be possible until all foreign troops had been withdrawn from South Korea so that the Governments of both parts of the country could seek freely, without external pressure and on a basis of equality, mutually acceptable methods of unifying the country on a democratic basis. For all those reasons, the Byelorussian delegation would vote against the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.335), which was contrary to the interests of the Korean people.

15. Mr. SOW (Chad), after reviewing the origins and development of the Korean question, said that the intransigence displayed by the North Korean authorities prevented any negotiation, despite the efforts

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079, appendix A.

exerted over a long period of years by the United Nations commissions and by all countries devoted to independence and freedom. The question could not be approached objectively unless the two sides accepted, in the first place, the authority of the United Nations to settle the dispute. For that reason, the Chad delegation favoured the fourteen-Power draft resolution. It was beyond doubt that acceptance by the parties concerned of the objectives recalled in the draft resolution would supply good ground for understanding, on which the foundations of an independent and unified Korea could readily be laid.

16. Mr. ARCHIBALD (Trinidad and Tobago) said that the Korean problem, which had been so long and so fruitlessly studied by the United Nations, could not be left alone; the prestige of the Organization was at stake, for Korea, like Germany and Viet-Nam, was one of the ultimate tests which would determine whether the Organization's vision of the world could actually be realized. The delegation of Trinidad and Tobago would support the fourteen-Power draft resolution, because it believed that the position taken by the United Nations was correct and should be maintained. What, after all, was the United Nations? For Trinidad and Tobago, it was by no means just a group of nations meeting to discuss isolated matters, but an organization which strove to protect the larger interests of humanity through the establishment of a genuine international code of conduct. Accordingly it could not operate effectively unless its regulations and decisions were respected. It had been argued that the United Nations action in Korea constituted interference. The very existence of the Organization constituted interference in the individual affairs of States, but there was already widespread agreement on the value of such interference. Of course, the solution of the Korean problem lay, in the final analysis, with the Korean people; self-determination was not a one-way street, and must arise from the will of a country—in the present case, from the will of all Koreans. So far, only one of the two Governments had recognized the value of United Nations help and had decided to call on it. The delegation of Trinidad and Tobago hoped that the efforts to establish co-operation between the two sides would be increasingly fruitful, and that the resulting rapprochement would enable all Koreans to work together for the welfare and prosperity of their country.

17. Mr. NEPIYVODA (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said he believed that the reason why the position had remained unchanged for years was that the method adopted was wrong. Under the Charter, the United Nations had no legal or moral right to interfere and try to impose its will. It was said that when a person suffered from a tumour the best course of action was to perform a surgical operation as soon as possible. The presence of foreign troops in South Korea constituted a tumour in the Korean organism. The Armistice Agreement had been signed ten years previously, the Chinese volunteers had departed in 1958, and the United States troops had no more business in an area thousands of kilometres away from their country. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had officially declared its willingness to sign a non-aggression pact and agree to the armed forces on each side being reduced to 100,000 men or even less. The withdrawal of United States troops would be the first measure required to extricate the Korean question from the existing impasse; conversely, the maintenance of those troops consti-

tuted the chief obstacle to the country's unification, and the General Assembly should therefore concern itself first of all with that matter.

18. There had been a great deal of talk about UNCURK and its report; but it sufficed to read the Press of the United States in order to realize the terror reigning in South Korea and the despotism that was installed there under the protection of foreign bayonets. In earlier years, some speakers in the Committee had praised the régime of Syngman Rhee; that régime had been expelled by the country itself and replaced by a series of ephemeral Governments, all of which had one thing in common—their subservience to the occupation forces, and their scorn for the interests of their own people. The recent elections had brought no change of policy; the draft resolution under consideration was likewise an exact copy of the previous year's resolution, which had proved not only useless but harmful.

19. It had already been pointed out by many delegations that the presence of foreign troops was the main obstacle to the country's unification and represented a source of tension in the Far East; there could be no democratic elections so long as those forces remained in South Korea. In proposing that UNCURK should continue its work, the sponsors of the fourteen-Power draft resolution, using the report as a screen, were continuing to promote a policy of obstructionism and to prevent the withdrawal of the troops and the unification of the country. The Ukrainian delegation could not accept that attitude, or the discriminatory and insulting tone of the draft resolution with respect to a sovereign country, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; it would therefore vote against the draft resolution.

20. Mr. RIBIERE (France) observed that the situation in Korea had not changed for sixteen years, and that the Pyongyang régime was persisting in its refusal to recognize the authority and competence of the United Nations. On the other hand, the Republic of Korea had co-operated fully with the Organization and with the Commission representing it locally. There was certainly some justification for a feeling of weariness at such an impasse, but one must not yield to discouragement; just causes always prevailed in the end. It was appropriate, therefore, to stress the merit of the work accomplished by UNCURK.

21. France, which constituted a homogeneous community, realized the tragedy represented by the fragmentation of a country; it had demonstrated its adherence to the doctrine that unification was a mainstay of peace. In 1950-1951 many of its sons had responded to the United Nations appeal and had fought in Korea. Their sacrifice had not been in vain. For that reason, France condemned the new incidents which had supervened in Korea and wondered how many more deaths would be risked if the Organization abandoned its mission. The adoption of the draft resolution under consideration would prevent that possibility, and the United Nations would continue, despite the attitude of North Korea, to play the positive role required of it.

22. The French delegation wished to express its gratitude to UNCURK for the excellence of its work. It was clear, from the addenda to its report (A/5512/Add.1), that the elections held in 1963 in the Republic of Korea had constituted a genuinely democratic public expression of opinion. Moreover, the honesty of those elections was shown by the distribution of votes; it

was instructive to compare them with those that had been obtained in North Korea, where the majority always won by a vote of 99.97 to 100 per cent. The Committee could feel certain that, in approving the fourteen-Power draft resolution, it would be defending the freedom of peoples against arbitrary rule.

23. Mr. GALLIN-DOUATHE (Central African Republic), exercising his right of reply, noted the statement of the Byelorussian representative that the Chinese volunteers had come to the aid of their Korean brothers. He wished, however, to ask him two questions: first, whether the Communist troops had in fact withdrawn from the territory of North Korea, and, second, why the Chinese volunteers, fighting side by side with the Koreans because they regarded them as brothers, had not also regarded the South Koreans as their brothers. His delegation remained of the opinion that the North Korean régime could not be given a hearing until it recognized the authority and competence of the United Nations.

24. Mr. COOK (United States of America), exercising his right of reply, observed that certain speakers had accused his Government of imperialism and aggressive intentions. Those charges were completely groundless; the facts spoke for themselves. Those few who were attempting to rewrite history so as to suit ideology rather than the facts were more to be pitied than censured, for they were merely isolating themselves even further from the world community.

25. Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea) appealed to the Committee to vote in a manner that would give his country renewed determination to achieve the peaceful unification of Korea and would reaffirm the steadfast resolve of the United Nations to live up to its responsibilities. The Republic of Korea had always accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations and given it the fullest co-operation, whereas North Korea had consistently defied the Organization. His Government would continue in 1964 with its work of national reconstruction and political development. It wished to express gratitude to the United Nations for the latter's tireless efforts to bring about the unification of Korea; the report of UNCURK made it unnecessary to demonstrate the utter groundlessness of the remarks made by certain speakers.

26. Mr. BAYKAN (United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea) said that he felt obliged to make a statement in order to bring out the objectivity of the report submitted by the Commission of which he was Chairman. There was no need to comment on the criticism directed at the Commission's functions, legality and composition, since the Commission had always been firmly supported by the First Committee and the General Assembly. Several representatives had quoted newspaper reports in an effort to prove that the present Government of the Republic of Korea was not a popular Government; however, the popularity of a Government could not be measured by quotations from newspapers published thousands of miles from Korea, but rather by the expression of the free will of the people concerned in a democratic and free election. The United Nations representatives in Korea had travelled widely throughout the country in order to observe the elections and had reported objectively that they had been held in a free atmosphere and in a regular manner. Yet, instead of giving credence to the observations of impartial witnesses, the critics of the report cited newspaper accounts based on interviews with persons who had

not been in Korea; that was a strange way to demonstrate objectivity. The Commission reported the facts, both good and bad, with equal objectivity, as the Australian representative had rightly pointed out. It would continue to discharge its task as long as it was called upon to do so, and it regarded the undeserved remarks of certain representatives as a strong indication of its own objectivity.

27. Mr. DIALLO Telli (Guinea), speaking in explanation of his delegation's vote, said that there had been no major change in the Korean situation since the seventeenth session of the General Assembly. His delegation still felt that the serious problem created for the Korean people by the arbitrary division of their country could not be solved in a partisan manner; hence, it would not support any action which would directly or indirectly exclude one part of Korea from the just solution to the problem of their unification and rehabilitation which the Korean people demanded. His delegation did not take that position simply because the Republic of Guinea maintained normal diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; it did so in the conviction that no settlement inspired by cold-war considerations could provide a solution worthy of the United Nations efforts and in keeping with the interests of the Korean people.

28. His delegation, like those of all the non-aligned States, regretted that the main antagonists in the cold war had not taken advantage of the relaxed atmosphere which had marked the opening of the eighteenth session to avoid an acrimonious and futile debate culminating—as in the past—in the adoption of a resolution which in no sense reflected the true interests of the Korean people.

29. With regard to the fourteen-Power draft resolution, his delegation would support operative paragraphs 1 and 3 if they were voted on separately. It could not, however, vote for operative paragraphs 2 and 4, which would maintain the obstacles that for sixteen years had prevented the United Nations from arriving at the solution required for the unification and rehabilitation of Korea. If those two paragraphs were retained, his delegation would have to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

30. Mr. IDZUMBUIR (Congo, Leopoldville), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had not taken any position on whether the method chosen by the General Assembly for solving the Korean problem was the only possible one, nor had it taken a stand on whether or not the North Korean authorities had any legitimate grievances to bring before the Committee.

31. It was to be hoped that the situation in Korea would ultimately improve and that the Korean people would one day, thanks to the efforts of the United Nations, be able to work in peace and harmony for the country's unification and development. His delegation felt that there was grave danger of further breaches of the peace and that the United Nations was responsible for preventing that danger from becoming a reality; it would therefore vote for the fourteen-Power draft resolution.

32. The CHAIRMAN put the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.335) to the vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Somalia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines.

Against: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania.

Abstaining: Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Portugal, Saudi Arabia.

The draft resolution (A/C.1/L.335) was adopted by 64 votes to 11, with 22 abstentions.^{2/}

Completion of the Committee's work

33. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Committee had completed its consideration of the items allocated to it.

^{2/} The representative of Sierra Leone subsequently informed the Secretariat that if he had been present when the vote was taken he would have voted for the draft resolution.

34. Mr. MATSCH (Austria), speaking on behalf of the Western European delegations, expressed appreciation to the Chairman for the objective and tactful manner in which he had guided the Committee's discussions; the latter had been conducted in an atmosphere of conciliation and co-operation which had contributed to the successful completion of the Committee's work. He also wished to express gratitude to the Committee's officers and the Secretariat.

35. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland), speaking on behalf of the delegations from the socialist countries, MR. ALVAREZ VIDAURRE (El Salvador), speaking on behalf of the Latin American group, Mr. NUGROHO (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the countries of South and South-East Asia and of Yugoslavia, Mr. COOK (United States of America), Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia), speaking on behalf of the African delegations, Mr. LAMANI (Albania), Mr. MATSUI (Japan), speaking on behalf of his own and the Iranian delegation, and Mr. HSUEH (China) associated themselves with the words of the Austrian representative.

36. The CHAIRMAN thanked the members of the Committee for the spirit of co-operation they had shown and for the gracious words they had addressed to the Committee's officers.

37. Although the number of meetings held had been considerably lower than in previous years, the session had yielded important results which were reflected in the resolutions adopted—in a number of cases, by acclamation—on such vital issues as general and complete disarmament and the peaceful use of outer space on the basis of agreed legal principles.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.