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Chairman: Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN
(Netherlands).

AGENDA ITEM 29

The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/5512 and Corr.1, A/5512/Add.1, A/C.1/887, A/C.1/889, A/C.1/892, A/C.1/893, A/C.1/894, A/C.1/L.335) (continued)

1. Mr. KASSE (Mali) said that in spite of the efforts made by the United Nations to secure the unity and prosperity of Korea, he did not feel that any real progress had been made towards a solution. Unification had not been achieved, and there was little likelihood that it would be achieved in the near future; the economic and social situation gave no grounds for confidence, so contradictory were the various evaluations of it. Such a situation precluded any objective analysis with a view to the effective solution of the problem.

2. The Malian delegation firmly believed that the unification of Korea was an essentially Korean question and, as such, should be settled by the Korean people alone. The existing difficulties and the impasse in which the United Nations found itself resulted from the pressure exerted on the two sides by the rivalry of two blocs seeking zones of influence. Mali believed that the peaceful settlement of that question did not depend solely on the will of the Korean people; that was a fact which delegations must have the courage to acknowledge. It was therefore with no marked enthusiasm that the Malian delegation was participating in the debate, since it did not expect any spectacular results from it.

3. It was known that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not recognize the competence of the United Nations in the matter. While he did not wish to interpret that sentiment or to investigate the reasons for it, it was self-evident that the presence of a representative of that Government would have helped to clarify the situation and would have made possible a better evaluation of that Government's position vis-à-vis the Organization. It was a fact, however, that as a result of a United Nations decision, certain Member States had sent troops to Korea; Mali could therefore understand that the consequences of that intervention should have left certain resentments among the leaders of North Korea. But whatever reservations the North Korean Government might have regarding the compet-

ence of the United Nations, the Malian delegation remained convinced that any problem affecting peace was of direct concern to the Organization. It had therefore examined the various solutions that had been proposed but, to its regret, had found that, owing to the nature of the problem, none of them seemed capable of bringing an immediate and final settlement.

4. For Mali, the fact of the matter was that there were two Korean Governments. Any solution must take account of that fact; any partisan adherence to the point of view of either Government made it impossible to solve the problem. The United Nations should therefore re-examine its position and recognize that the Commission it had appointed had not succeeded in its mission. The Government of North Korea stipulated as a condition the withdrawal of foreign forces from South Korea. Mali, for its part, was basically opposed to the maintenance of a military occupation that perpetuated the division of the country, delayed the solution of problems and sustained international tension. Nevertheless, a simple decision of the United Nations ordering the withdrawal of the troops was not enough to settle the Korean problem. Such a decision must, in addition, be accompanied by measures to initiate national reconciliation and promote negotiations between the parties concerned; in that case, it would constitute a positive factor, provided that the withdrawal of the troops was accepted by the authorities that had invited them to South Korea. In addition, South Korea proposed general elections under United Nations supervision. But that proposal, however democratic it might appear, failed to take into account the reasons underlying the conflict between the two sides; moreover, it was considered unacceptable by the Government of North Korea and was, therefore, impracticable. For those reasons his delegation believed that none of the conditions at present laid down by the two Governments permitted an immediate and peaceful solution.

5. A solution did exist, however, but it required an effort on the part of the great Powers which had an indisputable influence over one or the other of the two Korean Governments; the United Nations should spare no effort to translate into deeds the ideal of generosity and co-operation among nations, particularly in the interest of the Korean people, and should help to create the conditions favourable to its unification. Mali considered that the two Governments of Korea should agree to meet and seek together the means for ending the division of their people. Nowhere better than in Korea could the United Nations demonstrate its dynamic character and its constant concern to secure the implementation of the principles of the Charter. Mali remained firmly convinced that the wisdom finally dawning on the political horizon would enable the Organization to find a prompt solution for the problems presented by the peoples that were still divided. However, it was incumbent upon the United Nations to take decisions that could be implemented, for otherwise it would be regarded as an idealistic but abstract Organ-

ization, content to proclaim principles and to see them flouted with impunity. The Malian delegation would therefore support any proposal which would permit direct negotiations between the representatives of the two Korean Governments.

6. Mr. CAYCO (Philippines) said that since his country was a member of UNCURK and had sent troops to Korea, it was particularly interested in the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations in Korea, which was one of the keys to peace and stability in the Far East. According to the report of UNCURK (A/5512 and Corr.1 and Add.1) while the outlook for unification continued to be dim, it appeared, on the other hand, that rehabilitation, both political and economic, was progressing at a satisfactory pace, especially having regard to the obstacles the Republic of Korea had had to overcome in the past few years. In the economic sphere, efforts had been made to overhaul economic institutions in order to achieve the rate of growth envisioned in the five-year plan. In the political sphere, the revision had been much more thorough, involving a series of constitutional amendments and changes in the laws governing the formation and conduct of political parties. From the point of view of democratic growth, the most noteworthy changes were the amendments enlarging the bill of rights, those which guaranteed the independence of the judiciary and those which ensured free and fair elections. In addition, the presidential system had been adopted as the form of government. The referendum on the constitutional amendments had been conducted in a calm and orderly atmosphere, as had also been the case with the recent national elections which had resulted in the election of General Park to the presidency.

7. Encouraging though those advances were, it was clear that the full development of Korea and the establishment of peace in the area would be possible only when the two parts of the country were finally united into a democratic whole. There were, unfortunately, no indications that the Government of North Korea had changed its attitude on that question. It stood by the proposals it had made in August 1960, and in 1962 it had added the demand for the withdrawal of United Nations forces from the Republic of Korea as a prerequisite for negotiations on unification. That condition which was reiterated in the memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 25 July 1963 (A/C.1/887), was manifestly unacceptable, for its realization would place Korea at the mercy of the military forces of North Korea and Communist China. The Republic of Korea was aware of that danger and had stated in a memorandum distributed to the members of the Committee at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly (A/C.1/877) that the presence of United Nations forces was necessary to defend the country against renewed communist aggression and to achieve a just solution of the Korean question. In point of fact, the bulk of the United Nations forces had already been withdrawn from Korea, and the remaining forces were to be withdrawn as soon as the conditions for a settlement had been established. However, the attitude recently displayed by the North Korean authorities was hardly encouraging. In at least six major instances, they had flagrantly violated the terms of the Armistice Agreement and caused the death of a number of members of the United Nations Command.

8. The North Korean formula for elections, according to which the North and the South would have equal representation despite the great disparity in popula-

tion, would serve not to unify the country but to perpetuate its division. Moreover, the acceptance of that proposal would in effect legitimize the Government of North Korea and give communism an opportunity to establish itself throughout the peninsula.

9. The only just and lasting basis for the unification of Korea lay in the United Nations programme, and for that reason the Philippine delegation had joined in sponsoring the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.335), which reaffirmed the objectives of the United Nations in Korea.

10. Mr. KOVALENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that no progress had been achieved on the so-called Korean question because in that matter the United Nations was interfering in the domestic affairs of a State. The Organization should now recognize, therefore, that the unification of Korea was an internal problem of the Korean people. On the other hand, the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea was an international problem, which clearly concerned the United Nations. The presence of those forces was, in fact, the chief obstacle to the peaceful and democratic unification of Korea, for it was impossible to hold free and democratic elections throughout the country so long as there were foreign troops in its territory. For that reason the Soviet Union fully supported the proposals of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea regarding the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of the foreign troops stationed in the southern part of the country.

11. Besides hindering the peaceful unification of the country, the presence of foreign troops in South Korea constituted a constant source of tension and posed a grave threat to international peace and security. Contrary to what was asserted in some quarters, the troops in question were armed forces not of the United Nations but of the United States. In fact, those armed forces had been sent to Korea illegally—since the decision had been taken without the assent of one of the permanent members of the Security Council—and it was not the United Nations that was commanding or maintaining them. As for the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, it must be dissolved in the interest of the Korean people and of the United Nations itself.

12. Mr. BARROS (Chile) said that his country was a member of UNCURK and, as such, had actively co-operated in the Commission's work in the conviction that Korea must recover its national unity.

13. The Chilean delegation had noted with satisfaction the information given by UNCURK in the addenda to its report (A/5512/Add.1) on the elections held in October and November 1963 in the Republic of Korea. The results of those elections showed clearly that democracy was making progress in that country. If the authorities now controlling North Korea really wanted reunification, they should hold free elections.

14. It was unfortunate that in a debate on a question affecting two parts of a single country, only one of those parts should be represented; but the Committee could scarcely invite representatives of the North Korean authorities, if the latter disputed in advance the competence of the United Nations.

15. In contrast to the hopes encouraged by the atmosphere of détente in which the first part of the session had proceeded, several speakers at the beginning of the current discussion had again begun to speak of a

state of cold war. Chile had always taken an independent stand in international affairs, and its vote on the question under consideration would be based solely on its conviction that the reunification and rehabilitation of Korea must be achieved as soon as possible on the basis laid down by the United Nations. The division of a country into two parts—a measure which might perhaps have been necessary at a given moment in order to bring about a cease-fire—could not be justified as a permanent solution.

16. Mr. KURAL (Turkey) said that the objectives of the United Nations in Korea remained the same as in the past, namely, unification by peaceful means and the welfare of the Korean people. While the collective action undertaken by the United Nations to counter the North Korean aggression had been one of the most striking demonstrations of the Organization's effectiveness, it had to be recognized that the United Nations, despite all its efforts, had been unable to unify Korea and that the peace there was no more than a prolonged armistice. That situation was due to the obstinacy of North Korea in refusing to submit to the resolutions of the United Nations and to co-operate with the Organization. Turkey fervently hoped that the Government of North Korea would change its attitude.

17. Yet despite the existing impasse, the presence of the United Nations in Korea was a guarantee against a new attack, and the Republic of Korea had taken a number of political and economic measures which gave cause for satisfaction. As a result of those measures it had been possible to install a democratic system in the country; the elections had been observed by UNCURK, whose work the Government of the Republic of Korea had always endeavoured to facilitate; and, finally, the extent of the economic progress made in the Republic of Korea was also worthy of note.

18. The Turkish delegation hoped that the First Committee would give its support to the fourteen-Power draft resolution, of which it was a sponsor.

19. Mr. GOLEMANOV (Bulgaria) said it was unfortunate for a number of reasons that the question of Korea had been included in the agenda. Firstly, consideration of the question was contrary to the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter. Secondly, the reunification of Korea could not be achieved without direct negotiations and agreements between the representatives of the two parties concerned. Thirdly, it was inadmissible that the question should be considered in the absence of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Fourthly, the inclusion of the item in the agenda would

only provide an excuse for some people to revive the spirit of the cold war. Consequently, the decision taken in that connexion by the General Assembly ran counter to the efforts made at the current session to reduce tension in the relations between States and to encourage international co-operation.

20. The sole purpose of the report of UNCURK seemed to be to present the South Korean régime as a democratic and representative one, whereas everyone knew that the fascist régime there kept itself in power only thanks to the foreign army, whose presence was the greatest obstacle to the peaceful reunification of the country. In point of fact, the anti-democratic policy of the South Korean Government had brought the people only political chaos, economic collapse and misery, not to mention the persecutions and arrests which UNCURK carefully passed over in silence. At the same time the Commission was distorting the facts and slandering the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its peaceful policy by suggesting that there was a threat of invasion from North Korea. In fact, UNCURK was merely aggravating still further the situation in South Korea.

21. The peaceful unification of Korea would be impossible until the foreign forces stationed in the South of the country had been evacuated. It was for the Korean people themselves to settle the question without any outside interference. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had put forward many proposals to that end, which he briefly reviewed. Yet those proposals were deliberately ignored by UNCURK and systematically rejected by the Government of South Korea. The latter, indeed, was opposed to any contact between the North and the South of the country, through fear that the people of South Korea might learn of the successes achieved by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Yet the constructive proposals of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea provided for free elections on a democratic basis throughout Korea, and were fully in accord with the national interests of all the Korean people and with the interest of peace in Asia. The Bulgarian Government gave its full support to those proposals.

22. His delegation considered that the efforts of the United Nations should be directed towards a solution providing for the withdrawal of foreign forces from South Korea, the dissolution of UNCURK and the establishment of direct contacts between the two parts of the country. It would therefore vote for any resolution drafted along those lines.

The meeting rose at 4.5 p.m.