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Chairman: Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN
(Netherlands).

AGENDA ITEM 74

Denuclearization of Latin America (A/5415/Rev.1,
A/5447 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.329) (continued)*

GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT
RESOLUTION A/C.1/L.329 (continued)

1. Mr. LECHUGA (Cuba) said that his Government sympathized with the intentions of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.329, even though it felt that the conditions necessary to their fulfilment were lacking. Cuba, which believed that peace was indivisible, favoured the establishment of denuclearized zones throughout the world. The Committee's debate had shown, however, that certain delegations favoured the draft resolution under discussion but were opposed to the idea of denuclearization; they advocated bogus denuclearization which they could use for propaganda purposes to conceal their aggressive designs and justify their strategic position. The sponsors of the draft resolution believed that they were on the right road; Cuba did not agree, for it felt that denuclearization must contribute to the relaxation of international tension, to nuclear disarmament and to the decontamination of the atmosphere. A crucial point was missing from the draft resolution, which did not state clearly that there could be no denuclearization of Latin America without a formal commitment by the only nuclear Power on the continent to apply that measure in the territories under its jurisdiction in Latin America and to the military bases which it possessed in Latin America. Cuba could not accept any denuclearization agreement that did not entail the denuclearization of the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico and the various United States bases on the territory of other countries, and the return to

Cuba of the portion of Cuban territory usurped by the United States, i.e. the naval base at Guantánamo.

2. The sponsors' expressed desire to prevent the countries of the region from becoming involved in a nuclear arms race was quite proper. It should however be borne in mind that there was only one nuclear Power which possessed military installations in the region. A decision not to accept or stockpile nuclear weapons was one which sovereign States were free to take, and while it could be said that denuclearization was desirable because the great Powers would be bound to respect it, it should also be pointed out that they would not employ nuclear weapons against countries which could not strike back. In point of fact, the only nuclear objectives in Latin America were the United States bases; it might be possible through mutual undertakings to reduce the area of a possible conflict but not to eliminate the threat altogether: in the case of Cuba, which was situated in close proximity to United States bases and even had one on its own soil, the danger would remain.

3. There would be no lessening of international tension if the territories dominated by the United States in Latin America remained outside the scope of a denuclearization agreement and if its military bases were not eliminated. What had brought the cold war to Latin America was not Cuba's right to defend its sovereignty but the aggressive, interventionist policy of the only atomic Power on the continent. He wondered how the Latin American countries could initiate the studies referred to in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution in the case of territories or bases over which they had no jurisdiction, such as Puerto Rico, the Panama Canal Zone or Guantánamo. The result would be to denuclearize what was already denuclearized and to maintain the atomic bases where they now were. Some speakers, including the representative of the United States, had said that the existence of machinery for on-site inspection was one of the prerequisites of any denuclearization agreement. He wondered who would carry out such inspection, particularly in Cuba. Presumably international inspection would apply to all countries but not to the United States bases, which would not be covered by the agreement. The primary need therefore was obviously not inspection but the liquidation of the foreign military bases in Latin America.

4. It had been said that the denuclearization of Latin America would not alter the balance of power and that that was an argument in favour of the adoption of the draft resolution. However, those who advanced that argument had in mind the confrontation of the two great Powers but were not taking account of the regional balance of power. Since the contemplated denuclearization arrangement would not affect established privileges, it would merely aggravate the existing imbalance by giving free rein to the only nuclear Power that maintained military bases in the region. Great impor-

*Resumed from the 1337th meeting.

tance was being attached to the maintenance of the present balance of power; however, it surely could not be argued that in the era of intercontinental missiles that balance would be upset if Puerto Rico was denuclearized and the United States bases in the region were liquidated. Such action obviously would not have that effect; on the contrary, it would have the effect of reducing international tension.

5. In the light of all those considerations, his delegation found the draft resolution unsatisfactory. It was, however, prepared to consider the question at any time on the basis of the conditions he had set forth, which could alone ensure peace in Latin America.

6. Mr. STELLE (United States of America), exercising his right of reply, expressed regret that a constructive debate had been interrupted by the Cuban representative's intemperate statement. Nothing could hide the fact that the present Cuban régime had broken its pledges to the Cuban people, betrayed the revolution and replaced one tyranny by another. Everyone was familiar with the programme of infiltration, subversion and terrorism which that régime was carrying out against the Latin American Republics; the Prime Minister of Cuba, Fidel Castro, who in July 1963 had called for an uprising in nine of those countries, boasted of those efforts. The United States had joined with other Republics under the Charter of the Organization of American States to resist such threats to the common security; at the same time, it did not condone the use of its territory for launching attacks against Cuba. The Cuban delegation had excused itself from supporting the draft resolution, which was broadly supported by the other Latin American States, by enumerating conditions which it knew to be unacceptable. He hoped that the Committee could now return to a constructive discussion of the matter.

7. Mr. LECHUGA (Cuba), in turn exercising his right of reply, said that the United States representative had avoided the issue by repeating the familiar United States propaganda thesis that the revolution had been betrayed. It was unnecessary to reply to that charge, since for the past five years the Cuban people had been defending its revolution with arms in hand against the counter-revolutionary forces launched against it by the United States. Even if the revolution had been betrayed, moreover, that would be the domestic concern of a sovereign country and not the business of the United States representative. His delegation sincerely regretted the latter's view that its conditions were unacceptable. It had of course suspected that the United States would not readily abandon its bases at Guantánamo, in Puerto Rico and in the Panama Canal Zone. However, only if its conditions were met would Cuba support the projected denuclearization of Latin America.

8. Mr. RICHARDSON (Jamaica) welcomed draft resolution A/C.1/L.329, for which his delegation intended to vote. The attempt to denuclearize Latin America was consistent with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI), and its success would help to reduce international tension and lend impetus to the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Hence, regardless of where the geographical boundaries of the zone were eventually drawn, whether north or south of Jamaica, his country would support it. The difficulty of demarcating the area to be denuclearized should not, however, be underestimated. It had been stated that that responsibility rested with the States concerned and that the United Nations should

confine itself to backing their endeavours. But that was only a first step. The agreement must be made legally binding on the parties with regard to boundaries, the types of weapons prohibited, the procedures for verification and the collective action to be taken in the event that an outside Power attempted to violate the denuclearized zone. The co-operation of the major nuclear Powers, without which any intraregional agreement would be meaningless, must also be secured, and the nuclear Powers would appear to be requiring assurances that means were provided for effectively detecting any violation of the proposed agreement.

9. Reference had been made to the conditions which must be fulfilled before a zone could be regarded as effectively denuclearized. It had been said, for example, that the zone must contain no nuclear targets; however, it was difficult to define that term, whose interpretation might vary according to the state of relations between the nuclear Powers and their assessment of the military advantages or disadvantages of attacking a particular objective. Surely denuclearization was not to depend on the changing ideas that such outside Powers might hold as to what constituted a nuclear target. It would be preferable to express that essential condition in terms of nuclear installations and weapons rather than in terms of targets; nevertheless, due account would have to be taken of the views of extra-regional States, especially the nuclear Powers, whose support was essential to the success of the project.

10. The sponsors of the draft resolution apparently intended that Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago should be included in the denuclearized zone. His country hoped, however, that the zone would also embrace all the Caribbean islands, i.e. both the Greater and the Lesser Antilles, since that would erase the last traces of a military confrontation in the Caribbean and also promote stability in the region. He recalled in that connexion that his country's trade had suffered because of events for which Jamaica was not responsible. The denuclearized zone should at least include the two neighbouring islands to the north and east of Jamaica. Regardless of whether or not Jamaica might be threatened by nuclear weapons installed in Cuba, Haiti or the Dominican Republic, it would unquestionably suffer the consequences of nuclear fall-out if one of those countries was subjected to a nuclear attack. In that connexion, his delegation had listened to the Haitian representative's statement with interest and to the Cuban representative's with concern. If it proved impossible to include Cuba within the limits of the denuclearized zone, Jamaica might find itself obliged to reconsider its position. His country was aware of the problems created by that situation and was prepared to offer its full co-operation in the search for a solution.

11. In view of those difficulties, it might be wondered why the United Nations was being asked to adopt the draft resolution at so early a stage. In his view, the resolution had the advantage of serving formal notice of the intention to create a denuclearized zone, of inviting the nuclear Powers and other States to adopt a co-operative attitude, i.e. to enter into consultations if necessary on the details of a denuclearization agreement, and of preventing States from making any changes in the status quo which might delay or complicate the task of denuclearization and disarmament in that part of the world.

12. Mr. QUAO (Ghana) congratulated the Latin American States on the initiative they had taken and recalled that as long ago as 1960 the President of Ghana had called on the United Nations to encourage the establishment of denuclearized zones, beginning with Africa.^{1/} Although some delegations, particularly those of Latin America, had questioned the wisdom of confining such an initial proposal to Africa, the General Assembly had finally adopted resolution 1652 (XVI) concerning the consideration of Africa as a denuclearized zone. His delegation would have liked to see a reference to resolution 1652 (XVI), the first concrete measure along those lines, in draft resolution A/C.1/L.329. It would nevertheless give its whole-hearted support to the draft resolution and hoped that if it was adopted, immediate steps would be taken to initiate studies leading to the actual denuclearization of Latin America.

13. Mr. BYELOUSOV (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that since in his view the creation of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world would contribute to a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, he was pleased to note that other countries had joined the socialist countries in urging such action.

14. Unfortunately, certain nuclear Powers, without whose co-operation any decision on denuclearized zones would remain a dead letter, were opposed to the establishment of such zones. The latter would constitute a major barrier to the spread of nuclear arms and would consequently reduce the danger of a nuclear war. The establishment of denuclearized zones would be particularly beneficial in areas where the nuclear weapons of the two sides were only a short distance apart—particularly in Europe, where the West German revenge-seekers were trying to obtain nuclear weapons. Those who contended that the establishment of denuclearized zones might destroy the balance of power seemed to forget that it was a question of reciprocal measures which would not place the West at a disadvantage in relation to the East. That argument was simply an attempt to delay the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

15. His delegation had favoured the denuclearization of Latin America from the very start and would accordingly support the draft resolution. He wished to emphasize that all the nuclear Powers should not only co-operate in the establishment of denuclearized zones but also enter into undertakings and give assurances that they would respect such zones. The exact nature such obligations should assume was set forth in the Rapacki plan of February 1958, under which the nuclear Powers would undertake not to use nuclear weapons against the territory of countries forming part of a denuclearized zone. Although operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution called upon the nuclear Powers to co-operate in the establishment of denuclearized zones, such co-operation would obviously fall short of the undertakings and guarantees to which he had referred. It was, however, essential to define the obligations of the nuclear Powers, particularly in view of the hostile attitude of the United States towards Cuba. The Cuban Government clearly could not enter into an undertaking unless the United States Government did likewise, but there was nothing in the United States representative's statements to suggest that the United States was willing to provide such guarantees.

It was truly regrettable that the United States refused to give concrete expression to the "spirit of Moscow" by sincerely supporting the establishment of denuclearized zones, particularly in Latin America. His delegation was confident, however, that the desire to eliminate armaments from international life would prove stronger than the tension which still prevailed, as was shown by the substantial support now being given to the many proposals made by the socialist and other peace-loving countries.

AGENDA ITEM 27

Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons: report of the Secretary-General (A/5518, A/C.1/L.330 and Add.1) (continued)*

GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.1/L.330 AND ADD.1 (continued)

16. Mr. STELLE (United States of America) said that his Government's letter of 30 June 1962 in answer to the Secretary-General's inquiry on the question under consideration^{2/} had made clear that the United States, in seeking an alternative to the dangers of the arms race, had committed itself to the goal of general and complete disarmament. He read from that letter, in which the Secretary of State had declared that the United States, while deploring the need to retain weapons of mass destruction in order to safeguard its security, was convinced that a ban on the use of such weapons which was not accompanied by measures leading to general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world could not afford any real or lasting protection to potential victims of nuclear attack. The cause of disarmament could not be advanced by propagation of the illusion that disarmament could be accomplished by declaration without regard to the security concerns of States. Hence, so long as conditions for a successful conference did not exist, there was no point in holding it.

17. The defence system of the United States and its allies would have to include nuclear weapons as long as it was impossible to make certain, through measures of verification, that other States, which could use such weapons for aggressive purposes, did not retain similar weapons in their national arsenals. The United States Government was prepared to offer assurances that it would never use any weapon whatever with aggressive intent. However, it had to be prepared to exercise effectively the right of self-defence provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

18. The United States firmly believed that the only way to eliminate the threat to mankind posed by nuclear weapons was to remove those weapons from the arsenals of all nations through a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In its outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world,^{3/} the United States had presented at Geneva realistic measures for the progressive elimination of armaments until States retained only those

*Resumed from the 1337th meeting.

^{2/} Ibid., Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 26, document A/5174, annex II.

^{3/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex I, sect. F (ENDC/30 and Corr.1).

^{1/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 869th meeting, para. 69.

forces and agreed types of non-nuclear armaments required for the maintenance of internal order.

19. In draft resolution A/C.1/L.330 and Add.1, the Eighteen-Nation Committee was requested to study a proposal to which the United States Government was firmly opposed. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should concentrate on the many practical proposals now before it rather than on ideas which could not contribute to the achievement of the essential objective of disarmament. Inasmuch as the First Committee had adopted a resolution on general and complete disarmament which omitted any reference to specific collateral measures which would be of real value, it would be peculiar to emphasize an idea which, as the report of the Secretary-General showed, gave rise to a wide divergence of views and could not make a practical contribution to disarmament. For those reasons, his delegation would vote against the draft resolution if it was pressed to a vote.

20. Mr. PRANDLER (Hungary) said that under present conditions the proposed conference would be particularly timely. In that connexion, he wished to stress the importance of resolution 1653 (XVI), in which the General Assembly had declared that the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons was contrary to the United Nations Charter, the rules of international law and the laws of humanity. The nuclear arms race exposed humanity to a growing danger. That was why, after the signing of the partial test ban treaty, which was the first step towards general and complete disarmament, ever-increasing importance was being attached to such collateral measures as the convening of the proposed conference.

21. Of those countries which had stated their views pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI), a majority—thirty-one—had declared themselves in favour of the conference. There had since been a considerable increase in the number of countries which favoured the convening of a conference, as shown by the Secretary-General's report on his consultation of Governments pursuant to resolution 1801 (XVII) (A/5518). It should be noted that the socialist countries and most of the non-aligned countries had expressed support for the proposal, the adoption of which would be in the interest of all peoples and would serve the cause of peace and security.

22. A convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would greatly help to lessen international tension and the nuclear threat. International agreements such as the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868, the Declaration of the Brussels Conference of 1874, the Conventions of The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and

the Geneva Protocol of 1925 had been concluded in the past to prohibit the use of weapons of mass destruction. Surely, therefore, no one could deny the importance of concluding a legally binding convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. It was to be regretted that some countries were opposed to the signing of such a convention, which would be far more reassuring to the peoples of the world than were the statements of those who, like the United States, contended that nuclear weapons were essential to their security.

23. The most effective way to establish a lasting peace was, of course, to bring about general and complete disarmament. In the meantime, however, it was the duty of the countries of the world to take collateral measures which would hasten the achievement of disarmament. His delegation therefore hoped that the First Committee would do its best to fulfil the desire expressed by the General Assembly. It would, for its part vote for the draft resolution.

24. Mr. RAJAOBELINA (Madagascar) recalled that his Government had been among the first to sign the partial test ban treaty and had also supported the resolution on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (General Assembly resolution 1910 (XVIII)). However, it had certain reservations regarding the convening of a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. In pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI), the Secretary-General had invited Governments to indicate their views in that regard. In its reply,^{4/} Madagascar had made clear its view that the question of nuclear disarmament could be considered only within the framework of general disarmament and that, in view of the existence of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the convening of a special conference on nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons could only introduce an unfortunate element of confusion into the negotiations. His delegation still took that position. The problem of disarmament would not be solved by creating new committees. He cited in support of his viewpoint a number of the replies to the Secretary-General's letter. For all the reasons he had indicated, his delegation would be unable to vote for the draft resolution. It trusted, however, that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would take advantage of the suggestions contained in the draft resolution and would give them priority when it drew up its agenda.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

^{4/} See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 26, document A/5174, annex II.