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Chairman: Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN
(Netherlands).

AGENDA ITEM 74

Denuclearization of Latin America (A/5415, A/5447
and Add.1, A/C.1/L.329) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT
RESOLUTION A/C.1/L.329 (continued)

1. Mr. Víctor Andrés BELAUNDE (Peru) briefly reviewed the discussions between Latin American States that had led to the submission of draft resolution A/C.1/L.329. That draft resolution was of a procedural or operational rather than substantive nature, for the General Assembly did not have the power to order the denuclearization of Latin America, and the conclusion of a treaty establishing legal obligations to that effect was within the sovereignty of the Latin American States, whose legal relationships were regulated by the charter and other instruments of the Organization of American States, a regional arrangement fully consistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The draft resolution was an expression of hope and of encouragement to the States concerned to work towards an agreement; and as such it was entirely within the competence of the Assembly.

2. But while the denuclearization of Latin America was a matter for the free decision of the States concerned, there was another aspect of the problem which had to be borne in mind; that which affected the United Nations and, in particular, the nuclear Powers.

3. It had rightly been said that the ideal to be aimed at was the denuclearization of the entire globe. That could not be achieved at once, but the present proposal would be a step in the right direction. If a number of denuclearized zones were established in the world, the area of possible nuclear conflict would be reduced and an atmosphere of international co-operation and hope would be created. It went without saying that the generous attitude expressed in the draft resolution

must be matched by a corresponding attitude on the part of the nuclear Powers.

4. The Latin American proposal had the additional merit of giving practical expression to the series of resolutions referred to in the preamble, and making clear the existence of a continuous body of General Assembly resolutions constituting a tradition of moral principles which could grow into juridical principles. The Latin American countries wished to respond, as the African countries had already done, to the General Assembly's appeals to all States to take measures to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Particular importance, however, attached to operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, in which the hope was expressed that after a satisfactory agreement had been reached all States, particularly the nuclear Powers, would lend their full co-operation for the effective realization of the peaceful aims inspiring the resolution.

5. One more aspect of the draft resolution which had to be borne in mind was that it reflected the spirit of Latin America. Ever since the beginnings of their independence and throughout their national struggles, the Latin American States had been inspired by the ideal of a supra-national juridical order applicable to all mankind and based on the common acceptance of norms of law. That was the spirit in which the draft resolution was being submitted.

6. Regional denuclearization, however, must not be regarded as a substitute for or an excuse for delay in the achievement of the fundamental goal: general and complete disarmament. The danger of nuclear war was still a very real one, and it was the duty of the United Nations, and in particular of the First Committee, to do everything in its power to prevent a holocaust and preserve life on earth.

7. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) said that the establishment of denuclearized zones could be one of the most effective collateral measures leading to general and complete disarmament. It was proper that it should be treated as a separate item, since, unlike other collateral measures, the establishment of such zones was a matter calling primarily for action by individual non-nuclear countries rather than agreement between the nuclear Powers.

8. Despite the conclusion on 1 December 1959 of the Antarctic Treaty, the Western Powers had been unreceptive to the early proposals calling for the denuclearization of central Europe and the Balkans. As the non-aligned countries had come to play an increasingly influential role in disarmament negotiations, however, the idea of denuclearization had begun to take hold. In 1961, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1652 (XVI) calling upon Member States to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone, and at the same session a Swedish initiative had resulted in the adoption of reso-

lution 1664 (XVI) calling for an inquiry into the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons. The inquiry conducted under the latter resolution had shown that a substantial majority of Member States favoured the idea outlined in it; and as a result, countries which had originally been inclined to reject the concept of denuclearized zones were now for the first time compelled to take it seriously. Even the comments of those who advocated caution had been helpful. The Australian representative, for example, had made a valuable contribution in his statement at the 1321st meeting describing the difficulties involved in the establishment of denuclearized zones and setting forth the three or four basic conditions which the Western countries apparently regarded as essential if they were to agree to the establishment of any given zone. Whatever might be the practical difficulties in particular cases, however, the inalienable right of States to place themselves beyond the range of a possible nuclear conflict must be borne in mind in any examination of the conditions for the establishment of denuclearized zones.

9. The first condition stressed by critics of the idea of denuclearized zones was that the countries of the area concerned must be unanimous in their desire for denuclearization. No one would challenge that condition, for it was obvious that no group of countries had the right to force another country to accept denuclearization. However, a denuclearized zone did not necessarily have to embrace an entire continent or geographical region; there was no reason why several countries within a region or even individual countries could not constitute themselves a denuclearized zone. He had been pleased to hear the Soviet representative's statement at the 1321st meeting that the Soviet Union was prepared to join with the Western Powers in extending guarantees to such countries.

10. With regard to the crucial question of the balance of power, he agreed with the Australian representative that nuclear weapons were only one factor in the strategic equation and that other weapons of mass destruction should also be banned from denuclearized zones. It should be borne in mind, however, that the countries which were most eager to proclaim themselves denuclearized zones were in most cases politically non-aligned and lacking in nuclear potential, so that their denuclearization would not upset the present balance of power. Although it was unlikely that any of the aligned countries would wish to declare themselves denuclearized, they were entitled to do so if they wished, regardless of the effect that might have on the balance of power. Indeed, action by such countries to denuclearize themselves would provide the greatest possible inducement for the nuclear Powers to reach early agreement on general and complete disarmament.

11. His delegation shared the view that any denuclearization agreement must include provision for verification. However, that should not be too great a problem. Although it had become customary to think of disarmament verification in terms of measures to be imposed on reluctant countries and carried out by outside agencies, countries which established denuclearized zones could be trusted to set up their own system of verification, since it would be in their interest to prevent the nuclear Powers from introducing nuclear weapons into such zones. Indeed, given a genuine desire for peace, self-imposed and self-implemented

verification might well prove one of the most effective and acceptable methods of ensuring compliance with a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

12. The problem of verification would of course be more difficult in the case of politically aligned countries which were to some extent nuclearized, and outside verification would be necessary. Some measure of outside verification might also be necessary for non-aligned, non-nuclear countries, if only as a confidence-building measure. In particular, action would have to be taken to ensure that nuclear reactors were used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The International Atomic Energy Agency might be able to provide the necessary outside verification for that purpose in the case of non-nuclear countries.

13. The question of verification and that of the applicability of the idea of nuclear-free zones to the high seas both required study. The latter was of particular interest to his delegation, which considered that large inland seas should be deemed to be territorial waters and thus included in the nuclear-free zone.

14. His delegation fully supported the suggestion made by a number of representatives that the question of nuclear-free zones should be taken up by the Eighteen-Nation Committee, whose task it would be to give substance to the idea by elaborating general requirements and working out practical procedure for the creation of such zones. In view of the ever-present danger of nuclear conflict, however, the subject should not be put off to the distant future; nor should the fact of its being under study at Geneva be allowed to discourage any initiatives which countries or groups of countries might wish to take towards forming denuclearized zones. As the Ecuadorian representative had pointed out, the creation of a nuclear-free zone, unlike other collateral measures, was a matter for the sovereign States concerned. Some States might not wish to await the recommendations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, while others might wish to depart from them. The Committee's study should therefore be designed to provide material which could assist nations wishing to become nuclear-free, without imposing any obligation on them to accept such assistance; that point should be clearly understood from the outset.

15. With a view to providing nations wishing to take positive action towards becoming nuclear-free in the near future with practical guidance, his delegation had for some time intended to suggest that the Secretariat should set up a small panel of experts for that purpose, and it was pleased to note that operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.329 made provision for measures of that kind. That did not make the suggestion to refer the subject to the Eighteen-Nation Committee redundant, for the work done at Geneva could help to dispel the doubts of hesitant States and provide them with positive inducement to set up nuclear-free zones.

16. Although the hundred and more nations that had acceded to the partial test ban treaty were thereby prevented from becoming nuclear Powers in the foreseeable future, in the long run a test-ban treaty would not be enough, for it did not prohibit countries from manufacturing and stockpiling nuclear weapons. Nor would a treaty or convention prohibiting the transfer of control over such weapons be sufficient; what was needed in addition was positive action by non-nuclear nations to dissociate themselves entirely from any traffic with nuclear weapons. The creation of

nuclear-free zones was thus the logical next step, and the General Assembly should unhesitatingly encourage any move in that direction. Consequently, although it would have preferred a rather stronger text, his delegation welcomed draft resolution A/C.1/L.329 and would vote for it.

17. Mr. BAGHDELLEH (Tanganyika) said that Tanganyika was a peace-loving country and that his delegation would favour any efforts, whether regional or continental, aimed at strengthening world peace. Speaking in the General Assembly on 7 October 1963 (1231st plenary meeting), the Minister for External Affairs and Defence of Tanganyika had confirmed his country's support for any proposals for the denuclearized zones, expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR in his address to the General Assembly on 19 September (1208th plenary meeting), was gratifying, especially in the light of the Cuban crisis of October 1962; if nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union had then broken out, the sufferers would have been not those countries alone but people throughout the world in all areas that were used as military or nuclear bases.

18. It was one thing for the Latin American States to express their justifiable desire for denuclearization, but another for the major Powers to respect that desire. In that connexion he wished to draw attention to recent developments in Africa. In 1961, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1652 (XVI) calling upon Member States to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone. Notwithstanding that declaration, a nuclear missile base was being constructed in South Africa; The New York Times had reported on 28 October 1963 that the South African Government planned to set up a rocket institute near Pretoria to develop a ground-to-air guided missile. A petitioner had stated at the current session in the Fourth Committee (1474th meeting) that the United States and South Africa had entered into an agreement regarding underground nuclear tests. In the Security Council, the United Kingdom had vetoed a draft resolution regarding the transfer to Southern Rhodesia of bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. None of those developments had brought the slightest protest from any of the major Western Powers, which had clearly failed to respect the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI).

19. Nevertheless, his delegation would vote for draft resolution A/C.1/L.329 in the hope that it would help to minimize the danger of nuclear warfare and would favour the creation of nuclear-free zones in other parts of the world.

20. Mr. BOTHA (South Africa) said that he regretted the statement just made by the representative of Tanganyika, to which he would if necessary reply subsequently at greater length. He wished to state emphatically that his country posed no threat to any other country in Africa or elsewhere, although threats had

certainly been directed against it from sources which were well known. It certainly had no territorial or other designs on any other African country. He wondered on what authority the Tanganyikan representative had based his statement that the erection of a nuclear missile base in South Africa was being considered. He rejected that statement emphatically; South Africa was not a nuclear Power and had no intention of entering the nuclear arms race.

AGENDA ITEM 27

Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons: report of the Secretary-General (A/5518, A/C.1/L.330)

GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.1/L.330

21. The CHAIRMAN recalled that, in accordance with the decision taken at the Committee's 1319th meeting, some representatives had expressed their views on agenda item 27 in the course of their statements in the general debate on agenda item 26 (Question of general and complete disarmament).

22. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) introduced a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.330), sponsored by his own and several other countries, on the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. In that draft resolution, which was a sequel to General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, the Assembly would simply request the Eighteen-Nation Committee to consider urgently the question of convening such a conference and to report back at the nineteenth session. The draft did not touch on the substance of the question, which had already been covered in resolution 1653 (XVI). The sponsors consequently hoped that it would receive unanimous support.

23. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) recalled that at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons had been fully debated, and it had been decided that the Secretary-General should consult Member States to ascertain whether they were in favour of such a conference. A number of States had signified their approval; at the current session, therefore, the proponents of the conference had decided that the subject could be referred to the Eighteen-Nation Committee as an urgent item.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.