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Chairman: Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN
(Netherlands).

AGENDA ITEM 26

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/5408-DC/207, A/5488-DC/208, A/C.1/891 and Corr.1, A/C.1/L.328) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded) AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.1/L.328 (continued)

1. Mr. BUDO (Albania) said it was regrettable that no real progress had been made towards general and complete disarmament owing to the obstacles created by the imperialist Powers, such as their demand for control over armaments without disarmament and their insistence on the prior settlement of certain political questions. They thereby demonstrated their opposition to disarmament, and particularly to the banning and elimination of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. The United States and its NATO allies were spreading the illusion that the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, had brought about a relaxation of international tension and at the same time, thinking that they had succeeded in lulling the vigilance of the peoples, were pressing forward all the more vigorously with the arms race. It should be pointed out, therefore, that even in that sense the Moscow treaty represented a danger. The United States Government's so-called peace strategy was actually aimed at the achievement of world domination, and in pursuit of that dangerous policy the United States had, with its allies, established aggressive military blocs like NATO and was constantly intensifying its war preparations. The United States had thus created breeding grounds of war in many areas—particularly in Europe, where it was now engaged in equipping the revenge-seeking militarists of West Germany with nuclear weapons—and the setting up of a multilateral nuclear force had the same object. It had also established a vast network of military bases, especially around the socialist countries, against which it was constantly committing hostile acts. That aggressive policy had been

manifested not only with regard to the People's Republic of China and Cuba but also in the Congo, the Near East, Laos and elsewhere.

2. The fact that the United States opposed the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations was further evidence of the policy of obstruction it was pursuing with regard to the problem of disarmament. For that problem could not possibly be solved without the participation of the People's Republic of China, whose Government, incidentally, had made some important proposals regarding disarmament. It must also be borne in mind that the Government of the People's Republic of China had stated that it would not recognize any international agreement which it had not helped to draw up, and which it had not signed.

3. Since the basic task of the United Nations was to keep the peace, it must take effective action to solve the problem of general disarmament, eliminate nuclear weapons, ban all tests and banish the threat of nuclear war. In keeping with its policy of peace, Albania would continue, as in the past, to support any constructive proposal designed to promote that objective. With regard to collateral measures, it favoured the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world, including the Balkans and the Adriatic. With regard to the denuclearization of Latin America, his delegation firmly supported the position taken by the Cuban Government, as stated in the General Assembly on 7 October 1963 (1231st plenary meeting).

4. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) paid a tribute to the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, especially the non-aligned countries, whose efforts had greatly contributed to the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty; by bringing about a relaxation of tension, that treaty had paved the way to other important steps as well. The compromise proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and the United States respectively, one providing for the maintenance of a small nuclear force throughout the entire disarmament process and the other for the transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful uses at rates which differed for the Soviet Union and the United States, should help to narrow the differences between the two sides in balance-of-power problems and further the aim of halting the arms race. He hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would carefully study those suggestions.

5. Among the collateral measures which could be carried out prior to the first stage of disarmament, consideration should be given in the first instance, as the Swedish representative had suggested, to the halting of arms production and the freezing of existing levels of armaments. Far from strengthening the security of States, the arms race, in an age of nuclear weapons, was an astonishing manifestation of illogicality which could lead only to nuclear annihilation. The General Assembly must use its influence to put an end to the arms race if general and complete dis-

armament was not to become a meaningless cliché. Moreover, the huge resources now being squandered in the production of armaments were needed in order to bridge the widening gap between the developed and the under-developed countries. That problem could be solved immediately, without awaiting the conclusion of an actual disarmament agreement; the necessary resources could be released forthwith simply by halting arms production and military spending. If those concerned were really determined to reach agreement, it should be possible to solve the problem of maintaining the balance of power.

6. The other collateral measures that deserved attention were the prevention of surprise attack and action to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. He hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would consider, in that connexion, the proposals put forward at the eleventh in the series of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs regarding, firstly, the establishment of control posts in central Europe and the exchange of military observers between the two sides and, secondly, the transfer of fissionable materials through the International Atomic Energy Agency.

7. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should also give immediate consideration to the question of setting up an international disarmament organization, provision for which was made in both the United States and the Soviet plans. The organization could be established without awaiting the conclusion of a disarmament treaty and could become a specialized agency. It could supervise the implementation of certain partial disarmament measures, gain experience in the problems of control and inspection, and possibly deal with the question of underground testing.

8. Another important question which the Eighteen-Nation Committee should take up without delay was that of measures for safeguarding the security of States. It was essential to strengthen collective security in order to create the atmosphere of trust without which a disarmament agreement would not be possible; it was encouraging to note that many delegations had drawn attention to the need for such action and that the World Veterans Federation, at its Tenth General Assembly, held at Copenhagen in May 1963, and the eleventh Pugwash Conference, held at Dubrovnik in September 1963, had taken a similar stand. Consideration must therefore be given to the possibility of expanding the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations and establishing a United Nations peace force. He would have liked to see a reference to that matter in operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.328, together with some mention in the preamble of the present relaxation of tension. However, he would vote for the draft resolution.

9. Mr. AL-RASHID (Kuwait) said that his country wished to aid in creating an atmosphere favourable to a rapprochement between the great Powers. Kuwait believed that all nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons should be destroyed, that general and complete disarmament was the ultimate goal towards which all Member States must work, and that disarmament would have no real meaning without a comprehensive and reasonable system of control and inspection that was acceptable to all concerned. Although those objectives could not all be achieved at a single stroke, the signing of the partial test ban treaty showed that things were moving in the right direction. The proper course was to proceed by stages with the negotiation of contro-

versial issues. The statements made in the General Assembly by the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy (1209th plenary meeting), and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Gromyko (1208th plenary meeting), were encouraging in that regard, for they showed that the two great Powers sincerely wished to negotiate and were aware that an intensified arms race would have disastrous consequences. His delegation welcomed the measures already taken and hoped that they would make it possible for the disarmament negotiations to continue in an atmosphere of greater confidence. It seemed realistic to make a beginning with what were referred to as collateral measures. Another approach was to hold periodic summit meetings to deal with disputed issues. In that connexion, he whole-heartedly supported the proposal to convene a top-level meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in 1964, which would give the Committee fresh impetus if the groundwork for the meeting was carefully laid.

10. In conclusion, he wished to emphasize the important part which the non-aligned countries had played in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, even though the great Powers had shown a tendency to by-pass them. The work of the Committee must be revitalized either by modifying its present procedure or by increasing its membership from eighteen to twenty-five so that it would more accurately reflect world public opinion. His country, for its part, would do everything it could to make a constructive contribution to the cause of world peace, the preservation of which was the task of the United Nations.

11. Mr. CARVALHO SILOS (Brazil) said that on the subject of general and complete disarmament the First Committee could provide the Eighteen-Nation Committee with guidance, such as might enable it to break the existing stalemate. Agreement on disarmament was at present being hampered by two different sets of difficulties, the first arising from the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and the United States, and the second relating to the way the negotiations were being conducted. The proposals of the two Governments were unsatisfactory on a number of points. In consequence, it was not enough to try to draw the two positions nearer; it was also necessary to seek to fill the gaps in those proposals, to correct their inadequacies and to envisage alternative solutions.

12. A satisfactory agreement on general and complete disarmament ought to include three logically separate but interrelated steps: a set of phased and balanced disarmament measures, a system of inspection or control to ensure the execution of the measures agreed upon, and a system of responses to possible violations of the agreement. As to the actual measures of disarmament set up in the proposals, discussion had centred not on the measures themselves, since everyone agreed on what they should be, but on the manner in which they should be phased and balanced so as not to permit any Power to obtain even a fleeting advantage over other Powers. The Soviet agreement to the retention of a "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the third stage of disarmament was an invaluable contribution to progress in the negotiations. The concern for striking a global balance should not, however, obscure the need for arriving at regional disarmament balances as well. Potentially explosive situations existed in several areas of the world; if a disarmament agreement was to have any meaning and obtain the adherence of the non-nuclear Powers, it

must provide for regional balances integrated within a globally balanced disarmament process.

13. With regard to the system of controls, his delegation would favour a mixed and flexible system which need not confine itself to territorial inspection but might also use alternative forms—extra-territorial inspection, inspection by means of satellites and psychological inspection. Those forms could be combined or used separately, depending on the circumstances. The tremendous pace of technological development was a guarantee of the viability of such a system; already, the ideas of progressive zonal inspection and "graduated-access inspection" represented important steps in the creation of a comprehensive inspection system.

14. Lastly, the Soviet and United States proposals did not establish a system of responses in case of violation. In the absence of an effective system, the slightest violation would give every State the opportunity to consider itself free of its commitments and to start rearming; that would be most demoralizing and might convince the world of the practical impossibility of disarmament. The response system should be graduated, providing adequate answers to every possible kind of violation. Some responses should aim at eliminating the violation and re-establishing the *status quo ante*, while others might be limited to compensating for the violation; different responses might be provided, depending on whether the agreement was violated by States or by individuals or groups of individuals. In some cases the responses might be applied by States authorized under the treaty to act unilaterally and in other cases by an international organization; some cases would require both unilateral and international responses. As to the kind of responses to be applied against a State guilty of a violation, international practice and the Charter of the United Nations already contained a rich repertoire of political, economic and military sanctions.

15. Turning to the difficulties resulting from the way the negotiations were being conducted, he said that the methods used and the organization of the negotiations had been far from satisfactory. It was not enough to find out what the two proposals had in common and try to reconcile them. Priority had not always been given to the most deserving items. Moreover, the Eighteen-Nation Committee was not qualified to study the technical aspects of certain problems. A technical sub-committee should be created to deal with the necessarily technical aspects of disarmament and report to the Eighteen-Nation Committee. It was undeniable that the establishment of a technical sub-committee of disarmament specialists—a step which the First Committee could recommend to the Eighteen-Nation Committee—would be an important step forward and could yield positive results.

16. The Brazilian delegation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee had already declared itself in favour of the adoption of a number of collateral measures, and had asked that priority be given to the question of a ban on nuclear tests and to the prevention of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications; it had also aired the idea of a multilateral non-aggression pact binding all nations of the world. It would support the adoption of a draft resolution recommending to the Eighteen-Nation Committee the study of a repertoire of such measures, provided that agreement could be reached on what they should be. Thus, the Eighteen-Nation Committee could complete the

denuclearization of outer space by considering the possibility of demilitarizing outer space and closing it to any but peaceful experiments. There was a precedent in the Antarctic Treaty, signed at Washington on 1 December 1959. It could also examine the idea of the complete or partial destruction of the existing stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological weapons, or, if the great Powers preferred not to tackle that question at present, it could examine the question of destroying the stockpiles of conventional weapons already made obsolete by the tremendous advances in arms technology. When one considered that after so many years of talks not even a grenade had been subtracted from the arsenals of the world, one realized the importance of achieving immediate progress in that area. No matter how limited an agreement on the destruction of obsolete weapons might be, it would have a beneficial psychological effect and provide an opportunity for experiment with inspection techniques. As the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary had told the General Assembly (1222nd plenary meeting), a beginning in that direction would turn the rising graph of armaments downwards.

17. The Brazilian delegation would deal at length with the problem of the dissemination of nuclear weapons when the First Committee took up the question of the denuclearization of Latin America. Generally speaking, his Government's approach to the whole question of collateral measures was pragmatic and flexible. The measures mentioned by Brazil were not the only ones that ought to be discussed at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and his delegation was ready to agree to priority being given to the discussion of any measures that commanded the sympathy of the great Powers or that had a good chance of becoming the core of a new agreement.

18. Mr. BOSSAY (Chile) said that small nations like Chile, however limited their military strength and however modest their ambitions, had the duty to express their views on a question decisive for the fate of civilization and had the responsibility, as Members of the United Nations, to make their contribution to the work of the international Organization. Side by side with international action, many things could be achieved at the regional level. Latin American countries should pursue the goal of checking the armaments race and balancing their military budgets, denuclearizing Latin America and improving their legal system for the peaceful settlement of disputes. But the success of their efforts did not depend on them alone; the great Powers dominated the scene, and the balance of forces had to be taken into account. However, the dizzying advances of technology were bringing about a rapid change in strategic concepts, and the so-called security of the great Powers were already a thing of the past. In reality, the risk of nuclear disaster had improved the prospects of a forced peace and had made inevitable the acceptance of the principles of the coexistence of countries of different political, economic or religious outlook. Coexistence, however, could not be passive; it must be active and must lead to general and universal disarmament and to the new institutions which, in a disarmed world, would replace the present institutions based on the balance of forces.

19. His delegation welcomed the encouraging signs that had recently appeared; he listed the results already achieved, stressing the part played by the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the smaller Powers represented in it. It was important that a distinction

had been drawn between the study of the problems of disarmament on the basis of the proposals made by the Soviet Union and the United States and the study of partial and collateral measures. The first category involved fundamental questions which could be settled only through patient effort; the important thing was that negotiations were being continued. As to collateral measures, he mentioned those which he considered important: the creation of denuclearized zones, the cessation of underground tests, the establishment of observation posts on a reciprocal basis, the United States proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union should transfer a quantity of weapons-grade uranium-235 to peaceful uses, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, the limitation of the sale of armaments to the sale of armaments to the developing countries, the reduction and dismantling of military bases in foreign territory, the creation of political, legal and technical-assistance institutions to facilitate the conversion to peaceful purposes of the industrial resources progressively released by disarmament, the strengthening of the peace-keeping activities of the United Nations and the prohibition of all war propaganda.

20. That list was only partial; in any event, such measures could not be adopted without an atmosphere of confidence, in which large and small nations would all have a role to play. The days when the large nations could wrap themselves in splendid isolation and the smaller nations could take refuge in passive resignation were over. The world's centre of gravity now was the United Nations, and not a confrontation of Powers threatening to destroy the world in a nuclear holocaust. He hoped that the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee would advance more rapidly, that the United Nations would play an important role in the disarmament process and that the regional groups would make up their minds to act more effectively. Chile, for its part, would co-operate to the full extent of its ability.

21. As one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.328, the adoption of which would help to speed the process of disarmament, his delegation hoped that the draft resolution would receive the unanimous support of the First Committee.

22. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) welcomed the improvement brought about by the Moscow treaty in the atmosphere surrounding the discussion. Heartened by that significant step forward, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1884 (XVIII) calling upon all States to refrain from placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space. In order to prevent a thermo-nuclear world war, however, the most drastic means—namely, general and complete disarmament—would have to be used. That noble task had been entrusted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Unfortunately, after discussions at Geneva lasting more than a year, that Committee's efforts had remained fruitless. As the Brazilian representative had just pointed out, the negotiations were still centred on the origins of the disarmament problem; moreover France was still refusing to participate in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The reason for that lack of success was obviously to be found in the somewhat sharp divergence of views between, on the one hand, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and, on the other hand, the United States of America and its Western partners. The socialist countries, and many other countries, believed that the idea of dis-

armament could be translated into reality forthwith; that conviction underlay the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union, which contained practical and radical proposals towards that end. The Western Powers, in contrast, displayed a dangerous pessimism which made it seem doubtful that they really wanted disarmament at all. As the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had commented to the editor of an Italian newspaper, in April 1963, the United States and its NATO allies were in reality directing their main efforts towards intensifying the arms race and setting up nuclear forces within NATO. That explained why the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee were at a standstill.

23. There was no ignoring the danger which the multilateral NATO forces represented; they were being strengthened year by year, as the member countries of that military bloc increased their military expenditures.

24. The fact that NATO maintained military bases on foreign soil and stocks of strategic nuclear weapons merely emphasized the aggressive and offensive nature of that alliance, which existed for the sole purpose of striking an anticipatory blow at the socialist countries.

25. It was obvious that the existence of two powerful military groups, face to face with each other, represented a potential source of thermo-nuclear conflict, and that the preservation of peace chiefly depended on the relations between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. The Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between those two groups had been endorsed by many countries, but the attitude of the Western Powers unfortunately stood in the way of an examination of the Soviet Union's new proposals for peace.

26. A new feature of NATO military strategy was to equip merchant vessels with Polaris missiles so as to form a "multilateral" nuclear fleet. The Federal Republic of Germany warmly supported that plan and proposed to bear 35 to 40 per cent of the expenditure involved, which was estimated at \$5,000 million. The Times of London had reported on 1 June 1963 that a fleet of missile-carrying surface vessels would cost \$400 million a year to maintain. West Germany would play a leading part in the plans to establish NATO nuclear forces, the preparations for which were far advanced. As the United Kingdom newspaper Daily Mail had rightly stated, West Germany would become a nuclear Power behind the facade of NATO. The Byelorussian people knew from experience that there could be no peace until the virus of militarism and revanchism, especially in West Germany, was stamped out. The dangerous game France was playing with the West German revanchists was not calculated to slow down the arms race in Europe, much less the world at large. France had reacted to the historic Moscow treaty by building a nuclear test site in Tahiti which threatened the population of dozens of countries with radio-active contamination.

27. There had been no change in the attitude of the Western Powers towards the disarmament problem, despite the many constructive proposals made by the USSR. A particularly noteworthy development was the Soviet Union's agreement that the USSR and the United States might retain a strictly limited number of missiles and nuclear warheads in their respective territories until the end of the third stage of the dis-

armament process. It was significant that the Swedish representative had stressed the vital importance of that Soviet concession, which attested a sincere desire to get the disarmament negotiations under way and a sincere willingness to compromise, with the overriding interests of mankind in view. Unfortunately it was difficult to break the deadlock because the West, as in the past, wanted the compromise to be all on one side.

28. The second important step taken by the Soviet Union, which had won the support of a great many delegations, was the proposal to convene a conference of the Heads of Government of States members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee during the first half of 1964. It was to be hoped that that proposal would be adopted in due course.

29. As everyone knew, control over armaments was the linchpin of all Western proposals for disarmament. What the Western countries really wanted was the organization of control without disarmament. He need hardly point out that such proposals afforded no basis for negotiations, and that what was needed was an all-out effort to prevent war. The socialist countries favoured the adoption of measures which would contribute to the relaxation of international tension, such as the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries, the renunciation of the use of foreign territory for military bases, the establishment of denuclearized zones in Europe and other parts of the world, the reduction of military budgets, and agreement not to disseminate nuclear weapons; unfortunately, however, those proposals had not been accepted by the Western countries.

30. To make general and complete disarmament a practical reality it was necessary to create favourable conditions and to eliminate the most dangerous sources of friction which presented a threat of nuclear conflict. First of all, the German question must be resolved. As Mr. Khrushchev, speaking at Berlin on 16 January 1963, had stressed, until a German peace treaty was signed it would be idle to expect any serious progress towards a disarmament agreement. The Head of the Soviet Government had vividly described the frightful consequences of a nuclear war, which would be felt for many generations. The main task of the United Nations was to prevent such a disaster by achieving general and complete disarmament, which would bring with it countless benefits for mankind. The Byelorussian Government, for its part, was ready now to sign a treaty on general and complete disarmament which would guarantee lasting peace. Since general and complete disarmament could be achieved only in a climate of peaceful coexistence, his delegation hoped that progress would be made in 1964 towards more effective East-West co-operation on disarmament.

31. The proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones in Europe and elsewhere enjoyed wide support, and it was disturbing to see the Western countries persist in their negative attitude in the matter. The United States representative had merely said that such zones would disrupt the military balance. It was to be hoped that mankind's insistent appeals for realism and common sense would ultimately compel the Governments of the Western countries to consent to disarmament. It was essential that all efforts should be concentrated on solving the main problem of the century—that of general and complete disarmament.

32. Mr. NOVIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, took

issue with the statement which the United States representative had made at the 1322nd meeting about the Soviet Union and Poland. The Soviet delegation, heedful of the appeal made by many members, had avoided polemics in order not to impair the "spirit of Moscow". The United States representative, however, in his desire to justify the establishment of the NATO multilateral nuclear force, had sprung to the defence of the West German revanchists and militarists, claiming that the facts were on his side but neglecting to substantiate them.

33. It was therefore necessary to go over the facts: in 1945, at the Berlin Conference, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had solemnly undertaken to see to it that German militarism and Nazism were extirpated and that the necessary measures were taken to assure that Germany would never again threaten its neighbours or the peace of the world. Yet it was now clear that West Germany had been transformed into a military camp equipped with ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. The Bundeswehr, with 415,000 men, was one of the most powerful armies in Europe, and early in 1963 the Bonn Government had announced that it would be prepared to increase that total to 750,000 men. West Germany had had a military budget of 15,000 million marks in 1962 and, according to official but incomplete figures, had spent for military purposes in the past eight years as much as Hitler had spent between 1933 and the outbreak of the Second World War. It was now apparent that the Bundeswehr was beginning to feel cramped in NATO, and the Federal Republic's new Defence Minister had announced that from 1964 onwards his country no longer intended to place its whole army under NATO command. Territorial forces which might number 2 million men by 1966 would be under the Bonn Government's exclusive control. Moreover, on the NATO general staff—on which fourteen countries were represented—one post in eight was occupied by a West German.

34. The United States representative had said that the Federal Republic of Germany had pledged itself to abstain from producing atomic, bacteriological or chemical weapons. In that connexion, it should be noted that in his declaration made in London on 3 October 1954, Chancellor Adenauer had limited himself to saying that the Federal Republic would not manufacture such weapons "in its own territory". The London and Paris agreements of 1954, modifying the Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948, had simply recorded that statement and, consequently, did not prevent the Federal Republic from importing nuclear weapons or from manufacturing them in the territory or through the agency of other States. It was useful to recall that in accordance with the treaty of military co-operation of January 1963 between France and West Germany, an agreement had been concluded in September 1963 between the French Atomic Energy Commissariat and the Siemens-Schuckertwerke providing for co-operation in the construction of powerful nuclear reactors. The object of that co-operation was to produce plutonium, one of the basic materials in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

35. Moreover the 1954 agreements had been revised each year so as gradually to increase West Germany's capacity to manufacture the most up-to-date weapons. West Germany had thus been successively enabled to manufacture short-range anti-tank rockets and ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles. Moreover in 1960 the Bundeswehr had obtained Honest John and

Matador missiles which could be fitted with nuclear warheads. Some time later it had been supplied with Sergeant and Pershing missiles, and with Mace missiles with a range of over 1,000 kilometres. In 1961 and 1962, the Western European Union had approved a partial modification of the restrictions on the composition of the West German Navy, and West Germany had been authorized to build several warships including 1,000-ton submarines. Lastly, the body appointed by the Western European Union to enforce the restrictions on arms production in West Germany had not done its duty. Thus even the inadequate limitations imposed in 1954 had been removed one after the other in order to satisfy the constantly increasing demands of the militarists in the Federal Republic of Germany.

36. The most alarming aspect of the present situation, however, was presented by that country's nuclear ambitions. In February 1958 General Norstad, then Supreme Commander of NATO forces in Europe, had declared that it was essential to place tactical nuclear weapons at the disposal of West Germany. Shortly afterwards, following a debate in the Bundestag, the Adenauer Government had obtained majority support for proposals to equip the German Army with nuclear weapons. Since then not a month had passed without one of the leaders of the Federal Republic making demands for nuclear armaments. Units of the Bundeswehr were already equipped with delivery vehicles for tactical nuclear weapons. German officers and non-commissioned officers received much of their training from United States instructors, who initiated them in the techniques of atomic warfare. But the West German leaders were also demanding strategic nuclear weapons, and the Western Powers were planning to meet that demand, for they had created a multilateral nuclear force for that purpose. The assurances given in that regard by the representative of the United States were belied by the facts.

37. The reason why West Germany was prepared to pay 40 per cent of the total cost, or \$4,000 million, towards the establishment of the NATO multilateral nuclear fleet was to secure one-third of the posts in command. The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk had said at Frankfurt only recently that the non-nuclear Powers would be able to share in the ownership, manning and control of major nuclear forces on the same footing as the nuclear Powers. As Mr. Khrushchev had stressed, the establishment of the NATO multilateral nuclear force would inevitably increase the danger of thermo-nuclear war because whatever the reasons advanced, it would give West Germany—an aggressive Power thirsting for revenge—access to nuclear weapons.

38. The fact that Bonn had revenge in mind was undeniable. The Federal Government—especially its Ministries of Defence and the Interior, which were in the hands of fascists and former SS men—was constantly striking at the forces of progress and at democratic institutions in the country. It did not recognize the existing frontiers and wished to change the political map of Europe. Even upon the signing of the Moscow treaty, which for the other countries had represented some hope of an improvement in international relations, the Government of West Germany had given out that it had the right to act on behalf of the territory which had constituted the German Reich in 1937. For a long time now that Government had shown itself the enemy of peace and disarmament. It

had successively opposed the proposal for the withdrawal or reduction of foreign armed forces in central Europe, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the members of NATO and the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the proposal to establish a denuclearized zone in central Europe. But when it came to measures that would increase tension, or the establishment of a NATO "multilateral" or "multinational" force which would give it access to nuclear weapons, the Government of the Federal Republic was the first to come forward in support.

39. History showed that German militarism had always used concessions as a starting-point for fresh and bigger demands. He need hardly point out how the danger of conflict in Europe and throughout the world would be increased if the most fearsome weapon ever devised fell into the hands of the West German revanchists. In February 1963 the Soviet Government had stated that, whatever means was used to place nuclear weapons at the disposal of the Bundeswehr, it would consider such action as a direct threat to its vital interests and would be compelled to take the necessary measures immediately.

40. His statement had been made, not by any means to increase tension, but to show that, whatever certain people might say, the attitude of West Germany and the possibility of its possessing nuclear weapons created a grave and real danger.

41. Mr. STELLE (United States of America) deplored the violent and unwarranted accusations which the Soviet delegation and other Communist delegations had directed against the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany which the United States had made clear were unfounded. He hoped that those delegations would not persist in hindering the constructive work of the Committee by continued repetition of those attacks, and that it would be possible to maintain the tone of moderation which had characterized the recent discussions and which had certainly facilitated the Committee's work.

42. Mr. DORIN (France) expressed regret that the representative of the Soviet Union had found it necessary to take issue with France over the Franco-German treaty of friendship. His delegation reserved the right to answer those allegations in due course.

43. Mr. NOVIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), replying to the statement by the United Kingdom representative at the 1327th meeting, read a communication which he had received from Moscow concerning the events that had taken place on 4 November 1963 on the road linking Berlin to the territory of West Germany. The note in question showed beyond doubt that the United States convoy had refused to allow Soviet check-point personnel to carry out the routine check. At the meeting of Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied Powers on 29 June 1945 it had been clearly laid down that security, administration and traffic control services on the routes in question would be entrusted to Soviet troops. Moreover, when the United States military personnel had at last observed the proper formalities, the convoy had gone on its way. That showed how the facts had been distorted by the United States Press.

44. Mr. STELLE (United States of America) said that the facts of the case had been made public in identical notes from the United States, the United Kingdom and France, delivered in Moscow on 6 November 1963,

which called upon the Soviet Union to end its harassment of military convoys to Berlin. The notes had been made available and all members of the Committee could read them. It was clear that the aggregate of such

incidents did not contribute to the progress of work towards disarmament.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.