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## CONTENTS

### Agenda item 26:

*Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued)*

*General debate (continued) . . . . . 63*

*Chairman: Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN  
(Netherlands).*

## AGENDA ITEM 26

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/5408-DC/207, A/5488-DC/208) (continued)

### GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. ALI (Pakistan), tracing the background of the discussion of a nuclear test ban and the question of general disarmament, said that the increase in United Nations membership had gradually brought to the forefront the fears of the non-atomic Powers, particularly the smaller countries situated in areas of tension; the efforts of those countries had subjected the nuclear Powers to constant pressure. The first important step towards a disarmament agreement had been taken on 20 September 1961: the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations issued by the Soviet Union and the United States<sup>1/</sup> had demonstrated the sincere desire of the two major nuclear Powers to disarm and had provided a useful basis for future negotiations. The Eighteen-Nation Committee had been set up and had pursued the recommendations contained in General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI). It had enabled the two major Powers to set forth their views on how to achieve general and complete disarmament and had also made it possible for the other members to enlarge the area of agreement between the major nuclear Powers. The numerous meetings held by that Committee in 1962 and 1963 had dealt with various aspects of the first stage of general disarmament and with the question of nuclear disarmament. Although most of the disagreements between the two sides had remained unresolved, the Soviet Union and the United States had nevertheless signed, on 20 June 1963, an agreement on the establishment of a direct communications link between the two Governments for use in emergencies. Moreover, the movement in favour of setting up denuclearized zones had continued to gain momentum; following the African countries' appeal for the denuclearization of the African continent in 1961, the Soviet Union had proposed the denucleariza-

tion of the Mediterranean area while Brazil and Mexico had urged similar action for Latin America. In addition, Mexico had submitted a draft treaty prohibiting the placing in orbit and the stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons.<sup>2/</sup> Finally, after the conclusion of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, the Eighteen-Nation Committee had turned its attention to the question of collateral measures and the exploration of other matters which might become the subject of negotiation.

2. After outlining the three main nuclear Powers' latest positions on disarmament, which they had reaffirmed in plenary meetings at the current session of the General Assembly, he drew attention to what had been achieved and suggested what could be accomplished in the near future. He was, first of all, gratified at the signing of the Moscow treaty, although he regretted that it was only a partial agreement; he hoped that those concerned would make every effort, at both the technical and the political level, to arrive at a comprehensive agreement. Secondly, the agreement to install a direct communications link between Washington and Moscow provided some assurance against miscalculation resulting from a communications failure; the Eighteen-Nation Committee should now suggest other measures for reducing the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. Thirdly, he welcomed the undertaking by the Soviet Union and the United States not to place nuclear weapons in outer space, which would ensure that space would be free to be used for the advancement of human knowledge.

3. Although it was quite natural that the Eighteen-Nation Committee had considered first of all the problem of nuclear devices, it should not slacken its efforts to achieve a reduction in conventional armaments. A mere glance at the military budgets of the countries of the world showed what huge sums were being spent on conventional armaments. That unproductive expenditure represented a particularly tragic burden for the developing countries, whose resources should be used to raise their peoples' standard of living. An agreement on the reduction of conventional armaments was therefore vital to those countries, for it would put an end to the arms race, which threatened their security and prevented them from progressing.

4. His delegation had already emphasized how important it was for Member States to adhere to the system of safeguards devised by the International Atomic Energy Agency. No Member State should be free to carry out its nuclear programme without inspection by the Agency. It was difficult to see why States which professed peaceful intentions in that regard and

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

<sup>2/</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1963, document DC/208, annex I, sect. N (ENDC/98).

constantly proclaimed their abhorrence of nuclear weapons were unwilling to accept the Agency's system of safeguards; it was to be hoped that they would reconsider their position.

5. Although general and complete disarmament might still be a distant goal, there was an immediate need for constructive suggestions on ways of maintaining peace in a disarmed world. His delegation regarded the establishment of a United Nations force as essential to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. It was, of course, well aware of the political, technical and administrative problems involved and felt that they should be given careful study in the light of the experience gained in the two major United Nations peace-keeping operations. In the meantime, everything possible should be done to strengthen the Organization's capacity to take prompt and effective action in emergencies. He welcomed the decision of the Scandinavian countries and Canada to establish stand-by units for use by the United Nations whenever the need arose.

6. Mankind was today faced with three major problems which called for solution during the current decade. The first was to remove the threat of annihilation, which would wipe out all that science and technology had accomplished for man's benefit. Man himself must save what he had created, and, since he was aware of the gravity of the problem, he must do everything possible to find a solution. The second problem was to bring within the reach of everyone the intellectual and material riches which were today enjoyed by only a tiny minority. The United Nations Development Decade, which was designed to satisfy the aspirations of the under-privileged peoples, could become a reality only if those countries which had power and wealth were prepared to use them in the interests of all mankind. The third problem was more complex, since it involved human emotions. It characterized the final stage of material progress, when even the more privileged peoples experienced a certain feeling of discontent. When all mankind drew nearer to that stage, the United Nations might well help to create a social order that would give life a fuller meaning.

7. From the ninth to the twelfth century, it was the Moslem scientists, philosophers and poets, the heirs of Greek humanism, who had held highest the torch of civilization, spreading the fruits of their research far and wide. After that, scientific progress had come to a halt, and ever since then historians had sought the reason. It might well be that those great Moslem thinkers had foreseen the ultimate outcome of the long quest of material advancement, had perceived the danger to man's spiritual welfare that would result from the unleashing of forces which he could not control, and in their wisdom had preferred not to progress any further. It was their Western successors who had resumed the advance, passing from the pastoral to the industrial stage, substituting the synthetic for the natural and splitting the last unit of old—the atom—into new particles. He wondered whether the world would lose control of events, thus vindicating the fears of the Moslem humanists, or would be able to use its new knowledge to save civilization and bring happiness to all mankind. Those were the questions to be answered and the goals towards which the world was advancing.

8. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) said that four years would soon have passed since the General Assembly had adopted its historic resolution 1378 (XIV) on general and complete disarmament. However, not a

single nuclear rocket had meanwhile been destroyed and not a single nuclear warhead had been dismantled. On the contrary, the implements of destruction had become even more powerful and destructive. Every hour of the day the world spent a further \$14 million on increasing or perfecting armaments. So far, the main efforts of the scientists and the greater proportion of the material resources had been devoted to increasing war potential and not to contributing to the peaceful development of humanity. The armaments race risked making economic expansion impossible and placing such a burden upon the economies of individual countries that even the richest States would not be able to bear it.

9. The armaments race was particularly keen in the field of nuclear armaments and created a far greater danger of the outbreak of war than was the case with other types of armaments. Further, it deepened distrust and increased international tension. It was, therefore, not surprising that world public opinion had welcomed with such relief the signing of the partial test ban treaty, the first treaty in the field of nuclear armaments, concluded after eighteen years of arduous negotiations. But whatever might be the political, psychological or humanitarian value of that treaty, it did not put an end to the arms race. It was but a harbinger of true progress towards further agreements which might bring about a "détente" and the solution of the most urgent problems of the day.

10. So far the chief stumbling-block in the Geneva negotiations on general and complete disarmament had been the divergent approaches, of the parties involved, to nuclear disarmament. The Western Powers, underestimating the immediate danger of a nuclear war, had insisted on retaining throughout the process of disarmament a nuclear striking force sufficient to destroy any opponent. It was difficult to reconcile that concept with the idea of true disarmament: it might indeed set in motion the mechanism of annihilation, by an irreversible process, even as the result of a mere miscalculation. As the outbreak of a nuclear conflict constituted the greatest danger to humanity, the speedy elimination of the nuclear threat, or at least its reduction to a minimum, was the central issue of any disarmament programme.

11. Certainly nuclear disarmament must be accompanied by conventional disarmament and adequate control measures would have to be applied. The disarmament programme proposed by the Soviet Union and supported by the socialist countries took due account of that important requirement. After all, there were no significant divergencies now between the conventional disarmament plans presented by the two sides.

12. However, nuclear disarmament remained the central problem and its solution would enable real progress to be made towards peace. The proposals submitted at the current session of the General Assembly (1208th plenary meeting) by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR might considerably facilitate the attainment of that aim. On the one hand, they met the Western Powers' wish for the maintenance of a certain nuclear capability until the end of the disarmament process and, on the other hand, they aimed at preventing any offensive action involving the use of nuclear weapons.

13. It might be asked what should be the starting-point of the international efforts towards disarmament. In the view of the Polish delegation a start must be made by refraining from any action which might make

disarmament more difficult and might further complicate the situation. That implied that no new factor should be created in the field of armaments. In particular, nothing should be done to foster the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and any political steps which might lead to an increase in the number of those controlling nuclear weapons must likewise be avoided.

14. Unfortunately, the zone of nuclear danger was in fact being steadily extended, the projected "multilateral" NATO force being among the contributing factors. Mr. J. Robert Schaetzel, United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, had recently acknowledged that the Powers taking part in that enterprise would gain knowledge of the nuclear art. It was therefore not impossible that the Federal Republic of Germany might enter the "nuclear club" through the back door. Poland had suffered too much from German militarism to view that prospect with equanimity. Incidentally, it was Bonn that on several occasions had brought about the failure of the East-West attempts at rapprochement. Some time ago the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, in justification of its accession to the Western European Union and NATO, had declared that it had accepted considerable armaments restrictions and that it would submit in that field to the control of its Western allies. In fact it had used its membership of the Western alliance to increase its military potential.

15. The "categorical" bans and limitations imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany had been lifted one after another. At the same time, the nuclear aspirations of that country had gradually become defined. In 1958 the Government of the Federal Republic had asked for rocket armaments, while denying that it wished to possess nuclear warheads. Then, in 1961, it had demanded the right of co-decision in the use of nuclear weapons. There seemed, therefore, to be some justification for the belief that the creation of the multilateral nuclear force would give the Federal Republic not only the right of partnership in the working out of nuclear strategy, but also co-ownership and a share in the control of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Government of the Federal Republic had clearly indicated that the principle of unanimity of members of the multilateral force with regard to the use of nuclear weapons should be revised in the future. Yet to change or weaken that principle was one of the ways of gaining independent control of those weapons. Moreover, Chancellor Adenauer had stated in an interview given before his retirement to the French newspaper *Le Figaro* that his country could participate simultaneously in the multilateral NATO force, as proposed by the United States, and in the European nuclear force, as proposed by France. That showed that the Federal Republic intended to use all possible means of acquiring nuclear weapons. It was difficult to believe, in those circumstances, that it would remain satisfied with a mere observer's role in the nuclear equipment of NATO.

16. The multilateral nuclear force was being presented to public opinion as an effective way of preventing independent control of nuclear weapons by individual Governments not yet possessing them. But according to the Washington correspondent of *The Times* of London, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, had said that the United States was prepared to reconsider the question of control of nuclear weapons when Europe could speak with a collective voice. He wondered what kind of Europe he had in mind—whether it would be a Western Europe in-

fluenced politically, economically and now even militarily by the Federal Republic of Germany, whose role in the Western alliance was steadily growing. In those conditions it must be repeated that the direct or indirect granting of nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic could only produce a corresponding response from the States which felt endangered by it, in spite of their desire to co-operate in further steps towards relaxation of tension and to work out conditions for peaceful coexistence.

17. It was doubtful whether the setting up of the multilateral force could be justified, even in the West, on military grounds. It was no secret that the existing nuclear potential far exceeded the real or imaginary strategic needs of the Western Powers. In the Western Press the multilateral force was generally considered to be a political device. It was also well known that several NATO States had wisely refused to participate in that force, and that some Western military experts had pointed out the danger of the multilateral force as giving provocation.

18. It seemed evident that the new formula of nuclear ownership was tending to weaken the constructive trend which the Moscow treaty had created. The reduction, and even more the elimination, of the projected multilateral force could be effectively blocked by each of the participants. Even at the present time the leaders of the Federal Republic were reserving for themselves the right to veto decisions on the removal of the military units and nuclear and missile installations in their territory.

19. It was surely paradoxical that the concept of a multilateral force should be developed at a time when so many countries, in various regions of the world, were renouncing nuclear weapons and calling for an end to the nuclear race. The international situation of today was no worse than it had been at the time when the Federal Republic of Germany had agreed to limit its armaments. There was no evidence that Western Germany was threatened with attack. The reverse was true: it was precisely that country's policy, particularly its territorial claims, that gave rise to concern. Nuclear weapons in one form or another could only assist the implementation of Bonn's political goals. In any event, it was to the advantage of no one to plant atomic seeds in central Europe, an area burdened with so many serious political problems.

20. It was in that spirit that in 1958 the Polish Government had put forward the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe, known as the Rapacki plan. The proposal had been endorsed by a number of States, and the Soviet Union had expressed its readiness to provide appropriate safeguards for the denuclearized zone, but the Federal Republic of Germany had opposed the Polish initiative. He was certain, however, that the implementation of the Rapacki plan would bring about a lessening of tension, strengthen security and help to solve the German problem peacefully. In addition, the idea of denuclearization had become more and more popular, and proposals for denuclearized zones had been put forward in different regions of the world. It was an area such as central Europe, however, that the creation of a nuclear-free zone would be of the most significant importance in averting the nuclear danger and helping to bring about agreement on general and complete disarmament. He recalled the main features of the memorandum submitted by Poland to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarma-

ment on 28 March 1962, calling in particular for implementation of the plan in two stages: first, freezing of all nuclear armaments and rockets and prohibition of the establishment of new bases; second, elimination of nuclear armaments and rockets and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. The measures would include effective control and would take into account the need for maintenance of the military balance. In view of the growing interest in the matter, it would be useful to work out general principles upon which the creation of denuclearized zones could be based. The Polish delegation reserved the right to return to the problem at a later time.

21. The Eighteen-Nation Committee could also examine other collateral measures, such as reducing the risk of war by accident or surprise attack, thinning out military units and reducing military budgets. A measure of special importance would be the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. Such a pact would strengthen mutual trust and create conditions for negotiations on the reduction and later on the elimination of material possibilities of waging war.

22. Since disarmament negotiations were being conducted in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and since relatively little result had been achieved up to the present time, it might be useful to hold a meeting of the Heads of States represented in the Committee. Such a meeting might become a turning-point in the history of disarmament. Advantage should be taken of the favourable atmosphere, conducive to the conclusion of further agreements, that had been created by the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty, and anything likely to be prejudicial to what had already been achieved should be avoided. The Polish delegation would spare no effort to attain those goals.

*Mr. Csatorday (Hungary), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

23. Mr. DE BEUS (Netherlands) said he was gratified to note the explicit declaration made by the nuclear Powers in the preamble to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, that their principal aim was the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. Regardless of the attention currently devoted to collateral measures, only general and complete disarmament could make war impossible in the physical sense.

24. Although no agreement on general disarmament had yet been achieved during the Geneva negotiations, it could be stated nevertheless that the parties had made mutual concessions leading to some rapprochement and improving the chances of success. The parties had agreed to retain nuclear weapons until the end of the third stage—according to the principle of the "nuclear umbrella" or "minimum deterrent"—to guarantee their security during disarmament in the absence of an international peace force; that fact opened up new prospects for a constructive continuance of negotiations. If the Soviet Union accepted the principle of progressive reduction not only for conventional weapons but also for nuclear arms, new possibilities might also emerge to help in solving the problem of international control, particularly with regard to the first phase.

25. A number of difficulties still remained. Although the Soviet Union had subscribed to the princi-

ple of an international peace force, that force was not mentioned in its plan for general and complete disarmament. Furthermore, it seemed to pay little attention to a progressive expansion of the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and security, as if disarmament would automatically ensure peace. The Netherlands delegation therefore hoped that with the resumption of negotiations, positive developments would be forthcoming not only in the domain of nuclear disarmament and international verification but also with regard to arrangements for strengthening peace during and after disarmament.

26. While recent developments had given a new momentum to consultations about collateral disarmament measures, not every one of the measures proposed so far seemed to constitute a suitable basis for negotiation. Some of them would legalize the partition of Germany; other aimed at a premature disbanding of the North Atlantic Treaty alliance; and still others would disrupt the balance of power and could find their place only within the framework of general disarmament.

27. The present time might perhaps be propitious for adopting the draft declaration against war propaganda, which had been unanimously approved on 25 May 1962 by the Committee of the Whole of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament but which had subsequently failed to be adopted owing to the opposition of the Soviet Union. In spite of its limited scope, such a declaration might promote confidence between East and West. It was more important, however, to adopt concrete measures in the field of disarmament, such as the establishment of a system of fixed observation posts to prevent surprise attacks. His Government hoped that agreement on such a system would be reached and that its attainment would not be endangered by combining such a proposal with measures of regional disarmament. It should also be possible to agree on international measures to prevent the increased dissemination of nuclear weapons, in keeping with the resolution on the subject adopted by the General Assembly during its sixteenth session (resolution 1665 (XVI)). Moreover, he hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would once again consider measures against the dangers of unintended war, to complement the arrangement for the direct communications link between Washington and Moscow. Lastly, the recent General Assembly resolution calling upon all States to refrain from placing in orbit any weapons of mass destruction (resolution 1884 (XVIII)) seemed, for the present, to mark the limits of a realistic international agreement. If, in addition, the parties could agree on the legal principles for peaceful co-operation in outer space, such an agreement might create a new political régime for outer space somewhat analogous to the existing régime for Antarctica.

28. In view of the complexity of the problems remaining to be solved, any exaggerated optimism based on the recent agreements between East and West should be avoided. Nevertheless, those arrangements did mark the beginning of a period of "détente" which should encourage countries to tackle with new enthusiasm the many difficulties that still lay ahead.

29. Mr. STELLE (United States of America), exercising his right of reply, expressed regret that whenever the question of disarmament was discussed the Communist delegations used the occasion to launch accusations against so-called militarist policies of

the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, and NATO defence policies. He wished in particular to correct certain false allegations which had been made by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland concerning the Federal Republic of Germany, which was a truly democratic State, firmly committed to the maintenance of peace in Europe and in the world. It was a loyal member of the NATO defence structure, which protected the integrity of the free world, and it had gone further than any other State in demonstrating the peaceful intentions of its foreign policy. In 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany had pledged itself to abstain from producing atomic, bacteriological or chemical weapons. Furthermore, it had unilaterally renounced the power to dispose of its own combat forces by placing all its armed forces under international NATO command. It had also declared that it would not use force to attain political aims and had been a consistent advocate of controlled disarmament. It was therefore difficult to understand how anyone could accuse the Federal Republic of Germany of pursuing a militarist policy.

30. Allegations had been made to the effect that the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force would make nuclear weapons more widely available; actually, such a measure would not transfer the control over nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany or any other country.

31. It was regrettable that, by their unwarranted accusations, the Communist delegations reintroduced the climate of the cold war, which distracted the Committee's attention from its constructive work. He therefore wished to echo the plea of the Soviet Union representative, Mr. Fedorenko, that the icy blasts of the cold war should not be allowed to chill the warm current arising out of the Moscow treaty.

32. Mr. NOVIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) reserved the right to make an appropriate reply to the United States representative, who had undertaken to defend the fascist and militaristic revanchists of the Federal Republic of Germany.

33. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) reserved the right to reply to the United States representative later and expressed regret that the latter had not studied the Polish delegation's statement more carefully before making his comments. He wished to emphasize, first, that the Polish delegation had not identified the policy of the United States Government with that of the Bonn Government, and secondly, that the United States representative's argument had in no way dispelled the fears regarding the introduction of nuclear arms into central Europe.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.