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*Chairman: Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN
(Netherlands).*

AGENDA ITEM 73

*Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-
nuclear tests (A/5428 and Add.1) (continued)*

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. MATSUI (Japan) said that after years of frustration and disillusionment the effort to ban nuclear weapon tests had achieved partial success in the signing at Moscow, on 5 August 1963, of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and there was a renewed feeling of confidence among nations. The people of Japan, who had suffered from both atomic bombing and atomic radiation, were particularly happy to see the danger of radio-active fall-out largely eliminated. His delegation had consistently urged the conclusion of a test ban agreement as the first step towards general and complete disarmament, and wished to express its deep appreciation to the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, which had demonstrated that with patience and courage even the greatest difficulties could be overcome. He also wished to pay a tribute to the other countries participating in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which had played an important part in helping to bring about the test ban agreement.

2. But the partial test ban, while he did not wish to underestimate its value, had not fully met the world's aspirations. The nuclear arms race had not ended, since the signatories could continue to develop nuclear weapons through underground testing. Furthermore, any one of the parties could withdraw from the treaty, under article IV, if it decided that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the treaty, had jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. The treaty represented only a first stone in the foundations of world peace; an immediate effort must be made to consolidate those foundations, taking advantage of the favourable atmosphere created by the signing of the treaty.

3. One urgent task was that of prevailing upon all non-signatory States to accede to the treaty. So long as any country remained outside, a nuclear test con-

ducted by a non-signatory might be used by one or more signatories as a pretext for withdrawing from the treaty. Equally urgent was the need to make the treaty comprehensive by extending its application to underground testing. He was pleased to note, in that connexion, that the treaty itself proclaimed the determination of the three original signatories to continue their efforts in that direction. He recognized that the question of controls was a serious obstacle to agreement on the banning of underground tests; however, the effort to bring about an underground test ban with effective control measures must continue until there was convincing scientific evidence that such control measures were unnecessary. The many useful proposals put forward in that connexion in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the General Assembly should be urgently re-examined.

4. He hoped that all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee would make a determined effort to ensure that the first success resulting from their endeavours was soon followed by others. He also hoped that the nuclear Powers would remain mindful of the heavy responsibility still resting upon them and that the sincerity and determination which had led them to agreement at Moscow would prove to be not temporary but lasting.

5. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary) said that the treaty banning nuclear tests in three environments, which his country had recently ratified, was a good start on the road to general and complete disarmament and should be followed by further steps in that direction. The resolution recently adopted by a unanimous vote in the General Assembly (resolution 1884 (XVIII)), which had been based on the pledge given by the Soviet Union and the United States not to station nuclear weapons in outer space, was additional evidence that willingness on both sides to make reasonable concessions could bring about agreement. Hence, efforts should be concentrated on those areas of common interest where conditions were favourable to agreement.

6. The banning of underground tests would be a logical sequel to the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty. The assumption underlying the signing of the treaty was that its implementation could be ensured with the scientific and technical means available to the three original signatories; the same approach should be taken to the problem of underground testing. As far as the scientific aspect of the problem was concerned, it was agreed by many experts in both East and West that any atomic explosion could be identified by the national detection systems now in existence. The editor of the British magazine *New Scientist* had recently stated that only an occasional minor underground test of no practical importance might possibly escape detection, while the scientists at the tenth in that series of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, held at London in 1962, and the earthquake specialists taking part in the

General Assembly of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, held at Berkeley, California, in August 1963, had agreed that modern instruments made it possible to distinguish underground explosions from earthquakes. With regard to the political aspect of the problem of banning underground tests, the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty showed that international confidence was increasing and further progress was possible. He wished to point out in that connexion that the position on general and complete disarmament adopted by the Summit Conference of Independent African States, held at Addis Ababa in May 1963, had had a beneficial effect on the subsequent test ban negotiations.

7. His delegation was prepared to support any measures designed to reduce tension on either a regional or a world-wide scale and thus promote the cause of peace and disarmament.

8. Mr. JAYANAMA (Thailand) said that the agreement to establish direct communications between the seats of government in Washington and Moscow, the signing of the partial nuclear test ban treaty, and the General Assembly resolution based on the pledge given by the United States and the Soviet Union not to place weapons of mass destruction in outer space represented tangible steps towards general and complete disarmament. While it was true that the treaty permitted further underground testing, did not provide for the destruction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and did not reduce the risk of nuclear war, it could serve as a first step towards agreement on disarmament, provided that an effort was made to concentrate on areas of agreement and defer consideration of controversial issues. His delegation supported the approach adopted by the major nuclear Powers and reiterated by the representative of the United States in his statement at the 1311th meeting; that is, that the nuclear Powers, while working towards the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament, should constantly direct their attention to less ambitious measures—the so-called "collateral measures"—which could help to reduce international tension.

9. He wished to express his delegation's appreciation to the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union for the statesmanship, goodwill, sense of responsibility and spirit of accommodation they had shown in the negotiations for a partial test ban treaty. He would also like to pay a tribute to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, particularly its non-aligned members, and to the Secretary-General and other members of the Secretariat for the contribution they had made. His delegation joined in urging the few remaining non-signatories of the treaty to reconsider their position. The accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, which was not a Member of the United Nations, refuted the allegation that that country had aggressive designs. It should also be noted that the People's Republic of China, which had described the treaty as a "fraud" designed to deceive the peoples of the world, was pursuing a policy of subversion and expansionism which threatened the security and independence of the small countries of South-East Asia. The United Nations should bring the moral weight of world opinion to bear on the non-signatory countries, which owed it to mankind and civilization to support the nuclear test ban. His delegation firmly believed that disarmament, particularly the prohibition of the production, testing and use of nuclear weapons, was essential for world peace.

10. He shared the view of other representatives concerning the need for a comprehensive nuclear test ban, covering underground tests as well, as a further step towards general and complete disarmament. He recognized the difficulties and patience required to bridge the gap between the Soviet Union, which held that underground explosions could be identified by national detection systems without the necessity of international inspection, and the United States, which did not accept that conclusion and was concerned with safeguarding its national security.

11. With regard to the general question of disarmament, it was argued by some that agreement on nuclear disarmament was a prerequisite to a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. It must be borne in mind, however, that the possibility of war would exist so long as even conventional weapons remained. In particular, as the representative of India had pointed out (1310th meeting), the destruction of nuclear weapons unaccompanied by conventional disarmament would unquestionably make China the mightiest Power on earth. Accordingly, an agreement on general and complete disarmament must provide for simultaneous nuclear and conventional disarmament and must apply to all countries without exception.

12. Mr. RANA (Nepal) said that the new spirit of optimism generated by the partial test ban treaty was manifest. Apart from the immediate benefits which it had conferred on mankind by saving succeeding generations from the scourge of radio-active fall-out, the treaty was important in its political and psychological impact on the relaxation of cold-war tensions. In that connexion, his delegation shared the view expressed by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report (A/5501/Add.1) that the treaty, if followed by agreement on other measures aimed at lessening international tension and establishing confidence among States, could be the beginning of a new era of better understanding between nations and create a more favourable international climate that would facilitate progress towards general and complete disarmament and the goal of stable international peace and security.

13. While it was gratifying that more than 100 countries, including Nepal, had already signed the treaty, it was a matter for deep regret that France and the People's Republic of China should have held back, since France had the capacity to test nuclear weapons and the People's Republic of China was believed to be potentially capable of doing so. Both were militarily significant countries, both had contributed much to the evolution of civilization and both were destined to play a decisive role in the preservation of peace and security. Because of that responsibility his delegation hoped that those two countries, and others which had not yet signed the treaty, would heed the appeals that had been made to them by all other delegations.

14. Although the Moscow agreement had been reached outside the United Nations, it was for all the small countries a vindication of their belief in the moral pressure which world public opinion expressed in the United Nations could ultimately exert on world events. The years of labour that had preceded the signing of the treaty, particularly in the various organs of the United Nations, and more recently in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, should not be overlooked. The important lesson to be learned was that it was essential not to give up hope but to seize every opportunity

to work for the ultimate goal—the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

15. In that connexion the Nepalese delegation paid tribute to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for the excellent work it had already done, and hoped that it would return to its task with greater faith and vigour. For agreement on the banning of underground tests was urgently needed. Negotiations were now deadlocked over the problem of control and verification, but his delegation was not convinced that mutually satisfactory methods of detection and verification of underground tests could not be devised if the nuclear Powers were willing to co-operate with each other. However, what was really needed was a desire on the part of those Powers to stop the further improvement of nuclear weapons, for without that no truly fruitful negotiations on general and complete disarmament would be possible.

16. His delegation believed that an agreement on the banning of underground nuclear explosions could be reached, and that high-level talks on the question could be started immediately, since the climate of mutual understanding between the two great Powers was now very favourable. They should therefore not let the opportunity slip by.

17. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) said that gratitude was due to the three authors of the nuclear test ban treaty, who had presented their work to the Committee in a spirit of sober realism, neither overrating their achievement nor underestimating the actual or potential gains inherent in it. The Government of Israel regarded the treaty, which it had signed on the day it was opened for signature, as an important step towards the relaxation of international tension, and hoped that it would be followed by further concrete endeavours to attain complete and general disarmament.

18. In the debate on the cessation of nuclear testing held in the Committee at the seventeenth session, the Israel delegation had listed ten issues on which general agreement prevailed. Those points provided the rationale for the conclusion of the nuclear test ban treaty and indicated which new initiative should be taken now.

19. The representatives of the three original signatories had confirmed Israel's assumption that common interest and a desire to achieve agreement had been the decisive factors in the conclusion of the treaty. The desire to achieve agreement had been influenced to no small extent by the expressed desire of the world community that agreement should be reached. The fact that the General Assembly and the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had kept the issue under constant review and had persistently demanded and worked for the cessation of nuclear testing had certainly contributed greatly to the conclusion of the treaty. The fact that it had been signed by more than 100 States showed clearly its world-wide appeal and universal importance.

20. The treaty was the first measure to subject the threat of nuclear power to the rule of law. To make the atom serve man's life and not threaten his existence, a number of interrelated steps must be taken to build international confidence. Dangers to international peace would not subside as long as sensitive areas of tension remained excluded from the trend of international "détente". The amassing of arma-

ments in one area, accompanied by a refusal to settle disputes by peaceful means, created tensions whose repercussions were felt beyond the confines of the area itself.

21. While agreement on underground testing was still outstanding, the three Powers had expressed a wish to reach such an agreement. That meant finding a solution to the remaining difficulty, which was the problem of verification; and there the differences appeared to have narrowed over the past year. It appeared from the statements made by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union that what remained to be clarified was the necessary amount and type of inspection. While that was something which could not be determined during the present debate, the Committee could recommend, in any resolution it adopted, that the negotiating Powers should agree on measures of verification, in so far as such measures were necessary to provide adequate assurance of compliance with the provisions of an underground nuclear test ban treaty.

22. It could surely be said that over the past twelve months, beginning with the momentous Caribbean crisis, reason and responsibility had triumphed. Definite entries on the credit side of the balance sheet included an emergency communications link between Washington and Moscow, a nuclear test ban treaty for three environments, a new momentum to West-East trade, some defrosting of the cold war, and a unanimous resolution not to orbit or station weapons of mass destruction in outer space. The latter was a peace pledge of mankind for the universe which would become truly universal when it was extended to the earth, too.

23. Although the shadows had receded, they had not vanished; too many conflicts were still in active eruption and too many disputes had not yet yielded to peaceful settlement. The goals for the coming year should therefore be bold and realistic. They should include the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty for all environments, an agreement on collateral measures in the field of disarmament, the expansion and intensification of world trade relations, and the forthright application of methods for the peaceful settlement of new as well as long-standing disputes. If those goals were pursued with courage and determination, it would be possible to build a peaceful world ruled not by force but by law.

24. Mr. BENITES (Ecuador) said that the partial test ban treaty had freed mankind from one of its most horrible nightmares by eliminating the danger of radio-active fall-out. The treaty, however, was far from perfect, since it was not binding on all the nuclear Powers, it could be denounced easily, and it still permitted underground testing and hence the development of new types of nuclear weapons or the perfecting of existing ones. It was therefore in the interest of all States, great and small, to extend the prohibition to cover underground tests in order to stop the nuclear arms race.

25. The duty of the United Nations in that regard was urgent and inescapable. Eighteen years had elapsed since the foundation of the United Nations and the explosion of the first atomic bombs, yet the world's sole defence was still the mutual terror of the atomic Powers in the face of the destructive forces they possessed. Bombs with a total yield of no less than 390 megatons had been exploded in tests between the start of atmospheric testing in 1948 and the end of

1961, and that had led to an increase in radiation in places far distant from the sites of the tests. At the same time, a close relationship between certain mortal diseases and doses of radiation or the absorption of radio-active isotopes had been clearly established.

26. As a result of world-wide alarm at the danger resulting from radio-active fall-out, nearly 10,000 scientists from more than forty countries had presented a petition to the Secretary-General in 1958 requesting that nuclear tests should be declared illegal. Since then, the subject had been included in the agenda of the General Assembly every year. The partial test ban treaty, for all its imperfections, was thus an important step towards the liberation of mankind from the atomic terror.

27. In summing up the views of the Ecuadorian delegation he would say, firstly, that the problem of agreement among the nuclear Powers on the prohibition of underground tests was largely a matter of confidence, without which inspection was difficult. The Soviet Union at present seemed unable to accept the idea of inspection, but it was to be hoped that new proposals which could lead to a modification of that attitude would be forthcoming. The United Nations, as the organ of world public opinion, had to continue its efforts in that direction. Secondly, the problem of

prohibition was intimately linked to that of detection. However, it appeared from papers read by Soviet and British earthquake specialists at the recent General Assembly of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, that there was now some possibility of distinguishing at long range between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions. Everything possible must therefore be done to encourage international exchanges of scientific information with a view to reaching agreement on accurate means of detecting underground tests, so that inspection would be rendered unnecessary. Thirdly, the delegation of Ecuador was ready to support any draft resolution designed to strengthen the present understanding between the great Powers on the prohibition of nuclear tests by extending that prohibition to underground tests, and it believed that conversations to that end should be continued in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Finally, his delegation felt that the partial test ban treaty, while it had no great significance for the problem of general and complete disarmament—since underground tests could still be conducted—had been a great factor in relaxing tension and, above all, did free humanity from the very grave danger of radio-active fall-out.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.