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*Chairman: Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL
(Sudan).*

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Enckell (Fin-
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AGENDA ITEM 28

The Korean question (continued):

- (a) **Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and rehabilitation of Korea (A/5213 and Add.1, A/C.1/877, A/C.1/882, A/C.1/883, A/C.1/L.322);**
- (b) **The withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea (A/5140, A/C.1/869, A/C.1/877, A/C.1/882, A/C.1/883, A/C.1/884 and Corr.1, A/C.1/L.322, A/C.1/L.323)**

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. ASTAPENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) pointed out that the decisions imposed by the United States and its allies at previous sessions of the General Assembly corresponded not to the aspirations of the Korean people but to the selfish interests of the United States. It was for that reason that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in its statement of 8 December 1962 (A/C.1/883), had declared that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic would "never recognize, but categorically reject, any resolution to be manufactured arbitrarily against the will and interests of the Korean people without the participation of its representative". That attitude was perfectly legitimate: no sovereign State could authorize the United Nations to settle questions affecting it without being invited to take part in debating them. The Korean question could be solved only by the Koreans themselves, and it was the duty of the General Assembly to help them by bringing about conditions favourable for a settlement. The USSR proposal for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea opened up the only practical way to a solution of the problem that was in the interests of the Korean people. The United States had flagrantly violated the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953^{1/} by sending

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079, appendix A.

reinforcements and military equipment to Korea. It was equipping South Korea with ultra-modern arms of an offensive nature and covering its territory with a network of military bases with a view to carrying out their plans of aggression. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had on many occasions proposed to the South Korean authorities the initiation of negotiations for the peaceful unification of the country and the adoption of partial measures such as could help the North and South to come together. During the current year, it had proposed the withdrawal of the United States troops from South Korea and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, followed by a reduction in Korean military forces in both parts of the country. But the South Korean régime, under the orders of the United States, had rejected all those peaceful proposals.

2. Despite the assertions of some representatives, in particular those of Greece and the United Kingdom, the so-called "United Nations forces" stationed in South Korea were United States troops, and the United Nations flag served merely to mask that fact. The United States had concluded with South Korea a whole series of bilateral agreements, arrangements and treaties, including a Mutual Defense Treaty which gave them the right to maintain air, sea and land forces in the country. The foreign policy of South Korea was determined not at Seoul, but at Washington. As for the South Korean people, it did not have the slightest opportunity to express its will freely. The principal means used by the United States to ensure its economic and political domination was so-called "assistance", the bulk of which was of a military character. Economically, South Korea had moved backwards. The population lived in poverty, unemployment was rife throughout the country and the volume of industrial production had sharply decreased. South Korea, which in the past had been a large exporter of rice, now had to import millions of tons of grain every year. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on the other hand, had achieved remarkable economic progress. The standard of living of the population was rising rapidly, the incomes of the workers and peasants had doubled in five years, and in 1961 total industrial output had exceeded the output for the ten years following the liberation of the country. A large number of Koreans who had been obliged to leave their native land because of economic difficulties now wanted to return to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

3. His delegation deeply regretted that the United States was pursuing a policy in Korea which was dangerous for world peace. If the problem was to be solved once and for all, it was essential that all foreign forces should be withdrawn from Korea and that favourable conditions for a rapprochement between North and South should be established in the country.

4. The United States and its allies still contended that the military occupation of South Korea was essential to protect the country against aggression from the North. Such statements were without any foundation. The President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had himself stated on 20 June 1962, in a report circulated in document A/C.1/869, that North Korea had no intention of invading the South and that it had no wish to solve the Korean question by force.

5. In its report (A/5213), the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, set up in violation of the United Nations Charter, was still describing the situation in Korea without any regard to reality. Its attitude was modelled on that of the United States, and it whitewashed the present military régime just as in the past it had defended the fascist régime of Syngman Rhee, then that of Chang Myun. It said nothing about the proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the peaceful reunification of the country and the creation of conditions favourable to achieving that end. It did not mention the wanton behaviour of the occupation forces in South Korea or any of the irrefutable facts set forth in document A/C.1/884 and Corr.1. Nor did it study the causes of the economic recession in South Korea and the discontent of its population. Finally, it gave no details about the tens of thousands of Koreans put in prison for having demonstrated in favour of the peaceful unification of the country and against the presence of the Americans. That attitude, admittedly, was understandable, given the fact that six of the seven members of UNCURK belonged to NATO or SEATO.

6. His delegation was convinced that if the Korean problem was to be solved an end must be put to the useless and dangerous activity of UNCURK, which, though under the flag of the United Nations, was nothing but an instrument in the cold war. The unification of Korea was a domestic problem which concerned only the Korean people. Any interference in it was contrary to the Charter. The military occupation of South Korea was not only an obstacle to the unification of the country but also a constant source of tension in the Far East. For those reasons, his delegation supported the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.323) without reservation.

7. Mr. OKAZAKI (Japan) expressed satisfaction at the participation of the representative of the Republic of Korea in the discussion. He would also like to have been able to welcome a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had a part to play in the question of the unification of the country; but unfortunately the North Korean authorities, instead of showing the spirit of conciliation and co-operation needed for the solution of such a complex problem, had always categorically denied the competence of the United Nations and were manifestly hostile to its attempts at a peaceful settlement. On the other hand, the co-operative attitude of the Government of the Republic of Korea—which was attested by the report of UNCURK (A/5213) and which had been reaffirmed in the statement made by that Government's representative (1300th meeting)—was very encouraging.

8. He stressed the fact that the report of UNCURK dealt almost exclusively—and, moreover, very objectively—with developments in the situation in the Republic of Korea. That was so because the members of

the Commission were able to go in complete freedom to every part of South Korea and confer individually and collectively with South Korean leaders. That had not been possible in North Korea, because the authorities had continued to deny access to the Commission. He had been glad to note from the report that substantial economic and political progress had been made in the Republic of Korea during the past year and that the Commission had been able to follow political events and the development of representative government. In that respect, it had been particularly heartening to learn, from the statement of the representative of the Republic of Korea, that a national referendum was to take place on 17 December 1962 to decide on amendments to be made to the constitution, and that free elections had been organized for early 1963, under the observation of the Commission and of any representatives of the world Press who might wish to attend. It would be most valuable if the North Korean authorities would allow the world to observe political developments in the northern part of the country: such an attitude would help the United Nations in its efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Korean question, and it would also be conducive to the eventual withdrawal of the United Nations forces.

9. Despite the frustrations experienced so far, his delegation believed that the best way to achieve the objectives which the United Nations had set itself in Korea was to continue the task undertaken, with patience and determination, through the intermediary of the Commission and in every other appropriate way. The presence of the United Nations in Korea was essential, since the Organization was the guardian of the fundamental rights of the Korean people. His delegation believed that UNCURK should be asked to continue its work in Korea in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly: the work it had done was very useful, despite some discouraging features.

10. The other aspect of the United Nations presence in Korea concerned the United Nations forces in the area. Some delegations claimed that those forces were a source of tension and should be withdrawn so that peace and security could be established in the region. That argument was not new, and it should be noted that it had been repeatedly advanced by the countries which had supported the authorities of North Korea and Communist China in their aggression against the Republic of Korea, as a result of which the United Nations had been obliged to decide to send troops to Korea. The countries in question claimed that the units of Chinese People's Volunteers had been withdrawn, and that consequently foreign troops should likewise be withdrawn from South Korea. However, it had to be remembered that the units of Chinese People's Volunteers had entered Korea in violation of United Nations resolutions and that they had been found by the United Nations to have engaged in aggression, while the armed forces stationed in the Republic of Korea had been sent there in accordance with United Nations decisions. Therefore those two kinds of forces could not be equated with each other. The United Nations forces were not foreign troops in the ordinary sense of the term and the use of the words "foreign troops" appeared to be part of a propaganda campaign to discredit the United Nations forces and the entire United Nations presence in Korea. Those forces were not in Korea for pleasure or for any other unjustifiable reasons; they had had to go to Korea, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, to

help a small country defend itself against aggression. They had remained there and they must remain there, in accordance with United Nations resolutions, until the objectives of the United Nations had been achieved. In fact, the greater part of the United Nations forces in Korea had already been withdrawn, and the remaining forces were prepared to withdraw—as had been repeatedly affirmed in General Assembly resolutions (including resolution 1740 (XVI))—when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the Assembly had been fulfilled. Until such conditions were fulfilled, the United Nations forces had full authority and legitimate grounds to be stationed in Korea.

11. He expressed the hope that the North Korean régime and the countries which called for the immediate withdrawal of the United Nations forces—without regard to the serious consequences that might flow from such action—would modify their present attitude towards the activities of the United Nations, inasmuch as what was really needed for the removal of tension in that area was such a modification of attitude on their part. That would open the way for a peaceful solution of the Korean question and the early withdrawal of the United Nations forces.

12. Mr. SULAIMAN (Iraq) said he regretted that no progress had been made towards settling the question of the unification of Korea, as UNCURK itself admitted in its report (A/5213, para. 19). The resolutions adopted year after year by the General Assembly could not, by themselves, promote the achievement of the desired objectives, which were the unification of Korea by peaceful means and the establishment of an independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government. If that was to be done it was essential to take into account the realities of the situation and recognize the fact that there were two authorities involved, namely, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea.

13. Both sides had, in principle, endorsed the objectives referred to; however, they proposed different means. The North Korean Government's position was that the first step must be the withdrawal of foreign troops, and that that should be followed by the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between North and South Korea, the reduction of the armed forces of each side to not more than 100,000 men, the establishment of economic and cultural co-operation as a step towards final unification, the establishment of a Supreme National Committee made up of representatives of both Governments to solve matters of common concern, and, finally, the establishment through free all-Korean elections of a unified central Government. The position of the Republic of Korea, on the other hand, was that unification could be brought about only through general elections supervised by the United Nations and based on the principle of proportional representation.

14. The North Korean Government thus considered that the question of unification should be settled by means of negotiations between the two sides, whereas the South Korean authorities called for general elections, regardless of the presence of the North Korean Government, and had declared that they wanted to liberate North Korea from Communist tyranny and oppression. Furthermore, the North Korean Government, unlike the South Korean Government, favoured a gradual process of unification, and it also regarded the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea as an essential prerequisite for a solution, whereas the South Korean Government considered that such with-

drawal should take place after unification. Finally, the North Korean Government had stated that it could not accept elections based on the principle of proportional representation and supervised by the United Nations because of the unequal distribution of population between North and South Korea and because of the attitude embodied in the United Nations resolutions up to the present. Such were the reasons for the present impasse.

15. The delegation of Iraq considered that a peaceful settlement of the problem of Korea would be impossible without the co-operation of the two existing Governments; for that reason, the fact that the participation of the representatives of the North Korean Government in the Committee's discussion had been made subject to certain conditions had hampered the search for a peaceful solution. In order to solve the problem, the two Governments should begin negotiations with the assistance of an international body acceptable to both parties. Free elections could be conducted under international supervision, but that could only be done with the consent of both sides. As to the problem of the withdrawal of troops, it had to be noted that the Chinese People's Volunteers had been withdrawn from North Korea since 1958, and that the forces in South Korea had been reduced. It was therefore to be hoped that the remaining forces would soon be withdrawn; that would facilitate the settlement of the political problem.

16. His delegation did not think that the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.322) would help in achieving the desired settlement. The time had come to start a more positive and realistic attempt to solve the problem; that might be done by holding a special conference attended by representatives of the two Korean Governments, the major Powers concerned—particularly the United States and the Soviet Union—and certain non-aligned countries, preferably from the region involved, with the Powers mainly concerned pledging themselves to see that any commitments were faithfully observed. It was true that the Korean Political Conference held at Geneva in 1954 had failed, but changes had taken place in the international situation since then, and it had to be admitted that the methods adopted up to the present had not given the results which had been hoped for. There were therefore grounds for making a new attempt to reach a final settlement of the question. The delegation of Iraq would cast its vote on the draft resolutions in the light of the remarks which it had made.

17. Mr. TCHOBANOV (Bulgaria) took exception to the usual procedure adopted by the Committee in deciding not even to invite the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to put forward its point of view. Such a procedure violated all the traditions of the United Nations and flouted the most elementary common sense. To justify it, it had been asserted that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had had no wish to take part in the work of the Committee; but that was untrue. It had also been alleged that there could be no question of inviting a Government which did not recognize the competence of the United Nations in the matter under consideration. The United Nations was thus condemning one of the parties without having given it a hearing, which was something that even the Nazi courts, whose judgements had been anything but impartial, had never dared to do. That anomaly was the result of pressure brought to bear by the United States in order to impose its will on the United Nations. It

was encouraging, however, to note that only half the Member States had supported the United States manoeuvres, and there were reasons to hope that Member States would resist the despotism of the United States more and more vigorously. Among those playing the United States game, South Africa seemed to be singularly poorly placed to demand general elections and the establishment of a representative Government in Korea and to accuse the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of carrying out policies contrary to the purposes of the United Nations. Everyone knew that 80 per cent of South Africa's population was not allowed to vote, that 10 million of its 13 million people were never consulted about the formation of the Government, and that South Africa had refused on many occasions to co-operate with the United Nations and respect the General Assembly's resolutions.

18. The withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea was essential, if only to put an end to the atrocities which United States troops were committing every day, as shown by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in a paper circulated in document A/C.1/884. It was the duty of the United States delegation, incidentally, to offer some explanation of that situation, but it had taken good care not to do so up to the present. What was still more saddening was that the atrocities in question were being committed under the flag of the United Nations, which was thus being besmirched by the American soldiery. The fact that the United States forces were ostensibly United Nations forces was no reason for prolonging the occupation of South Korea; even laws could be abrogated when they no longer answered the needs of life. Moreover, the forces in question, which had been supposed to bring about the democratization of Korean institutions and the peaceful reunification of the two parts of Korea, had contributed to neither of those ends, but had merely served to keep in power for fifteen years a bloodthirsty tyrant who had committed veritable genocide against his own people and who had been determined to bring about unification by brutal force. Only when that tyrant had been overthrown by a spontaneous movement of the people had the United States admitted that Syngman Rhee's régime had not been as democratic as they had formerly professed. The world would no doubt have to wait for the men at present in power in South Korea to be overthrown in the same way for the United States to admit the undemocratic nature of the régime they were now supporting. If the only purpose served by the United States army in South Korea was to keep such régimes in power, then it should be withdrawn immediately at all costs. The Bulgarian delegation would therefore support the Soviet draft resolution.

19. Little comment was needed on the report of UNCURK, for the Commission had long been discredited in the eyes of world public opinion. It was sufficient to recall that in its report to the General Assembly in 1956^{2/} it had stated that the Republic of Korea was developing the representative character of its Government and had held free elections, whereas in 1960 the President of the United States himself had been obliged to admit that that was false. All the Commission did was to reflect in its reports the attitude adopted at any given moment by the State Department of the United States. Its conclusions were thus so biased as to be devoid of any value.

^{2/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 13.

20. Mr. KURAL (Turkey) said that all the efforts of the United Nations to settle the Korean problem had been rendered futile by the attitude of North Korea, which defied both the United Nations and the Charter and its principles. In a new effort, fifteen delegations, among them the Turkish delegation, had put forward draft resolution A/C.1/L.322. The Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.323) was unacceptable to the Turkish delegation.

21. The reasons for the fifteen-Power draft resolution were to be found in the recent history of Korea and in the principles of the United Nations. He reviewed the main events which had led up to the present situation. The Soviet Union had turned a mere military demarcation line, established for convenience, into a political frontier, and had then promoted the establishment of a Communist dictatorship in North Korea, whereas in South Korea a democratic régime had been set up, and after free elections a Government had been formed which the General Assembly itself had recognized as the only lawful Government. In 1950, a year after the withdrawal of the United States occupation forces, North Korea had committed unprovoked aggression, which had been recognized as such by the United Nations, against South Korea. The Government and the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea had then appealed to the world and to the United Nations for the assistance necessary to repel that aggression. To those who asserted that the United Nations had had no right to intervene, it was sufficient answer to point out that under the terms of Article 1, paragraph 1, of its Charter the United Nations was specifically enjoined to maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression. Any country which was the victim of aggression had the right to resort to suitable means of self-defence, and one of the most legitimate means of self-defence was to call on the United Nations for assistance. That was why the Security Council, on 27 June 1950,^{3/} had asked Member States to give assistance in repelling the North Korean aggression and restoring peace and security in Korea. Sixteen countries, including Turkey, had sent military units, and many others had given material assistance to the victim of aggression. In spite of the intervention of Communist China, which had been declared guilty by the General Assembly of committing aggression in Korea (resolution 498 (V)), the United Nations forces had succeeded in driving back the aggressor, and after lengthy negotiations an Armistice Agreement had been signed on 27 July 1953.

22. The intervention of the United Nations had been just and necessary; it had been carried out under the auspices of the Organization and in accordance with the Charter. It had been the duty of the United Nations to defend the victim of aggression and to prevent a free people from being subjected to the domination of a régime which it did not want. Moreover, all successive Governments in the Republic of Korea had requested the assistance of the United Nations to ensure their freedom and their national survival. The people of North Korea would probably request such assistance too if they could express their wishes freely, seeing that 4 million of them had left everything behind to escape from the Communist régime and settle in South Korea. If the United Nations had shown weakness and failed to come to the aid of the Republic of Korea, it

^{3/} See Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 16, 474th meeting.

would have been inviting the fate of the League of Nations, and possible aggressors would have been given a free hand.

23. In spite of all the efforts exerted by the United Nations since the end of the Korean war, the situation remained precarious, since North Korea refused to accept the General Assembly's resolutions. The goal had remained unchanged from the outset: the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative Government and the restoration of peace and security in the region. But unification could be achieved only through a genuinely free consultation, under United Nations supervision, of the will of the people in the two Koreas, to which North Korea did not agree. With regard to the withdrawal of foreign troops, it should be recalled that those troops were United Nations forces, and that they had in great part already been withdrawn. Moreover, the Governments concerned were prepared to withdraw their remaining forces when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the General Assembly had been fulfilled. The United Nations forces still in Korea were very small compared to those concentrated by South Korea along the 38th parallel, and smaller still compared to those maintained by Communist China along the Korean frontier. But they provided the Republic of Korea with a guarantee, constituting as it were the symbol of the United Nations presence. They were there in pursuance of a United Nations decision and at the express request of the Government of the Republic of Korea. The experience of the still recent past and the efforts exerted by North Korea to deprive South Korea of the effective support of United Nations forces, in other words of one of its most legitimate means of self-defence, fully justified the fears of the Government of the Republic of Korea.

24. Mr. SARKANY (Hungary) said that the situation prevailing in the Korean peninsula was a constant threat to world peace. The moderate policy of the socialist countries was not enough to avert the danger. The situation was due to the division of Korea into two States which had developed socially, politically and culturally in different directions. Furthermore, South Korea served as a military base for foreign troops. The division of Korea and the occupation of South Korea by United States forces were the result of the policy of the aggressive imperialistic forces.

25. The United Nations had concerned itself for a number of years with the peaceful unification of the two Korean States, but it had thereby exceeded its powers and violated the principles of the Charter. In his delegation's view, the solution of Korean internal problems and the unification of Korea were matters for the Korean people alone, and all foreign interference must be eliminated. The unification of Korea, which would make possible the material and cultural rehabilitation of the country and would remove a threat to world peace, would benefit the Korean people and all other peoples of the world; but the developments which had taken place since the war had to be taken into account.

26. The fact was that the situation had developed in very different ways in the two Korean States. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had steadily developed its industry and agriculture, and its people's standard of living was constantly improving. In contrast, in South Korea there was greater misery than during the time of Japanese domination. Those essential differences had to be kept in mind in considering

the unification of the two States: the imperialists asserted that the occupation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the Republic of Korea was the only means of ensuring the unification of the country because they hoped in that manner to raise the standard of living of South Korea at the expense of North Korea.

27. Allowing for those circumstances, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had drawn up a unification programme and a programme for economic and cultural co-operation between the two States. All those problems could be settled by the Korean people itself, through negotiations, without external intervention. Unfortunately, Korea was occupied by foreign troops, and the interference of those troops in the life of the country was certainly a matter within the competence of the United Nations.

28. In South Korea there was at present an army of 700,000 men trained and commanded by the staff of the military bases occupied by foreign, chiefly United States, troops. That army was equipped with the most modern offensive weapons. The territory of Korea was to be used as a jumping-off ground for imperialist aggression in the Far East and as a means of making the South Korean régime fall in with those aggressive plans; and the presence of the foreign troops was a standing provocation. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had repeatedly been compelled to protest against violations of its territory, its air space and its territorial waters. The fact was that, to the detriment of the cause of unification, those in command of the foreign troops were endeavouring to create an atmosphere favourable to the use of the South Korean people against the North Koreans, despite their common history. Moreover, so long as the foreign troops remained in South Korea, all that unification would offer the North would be occupation, in other words, poverty and the suppression of all democratic liberties. Accordingly, the experience of recent years had shown that the presence of foreign troops in Korea made a lessening of tension and the peaceful unification of the country absolutely impossible. That was the only aspect of the Korean question whose solution did not depend on the Korean people alone; that problem required international co-operation and United Nations intervention and constructive action.

29. Mr. COULIBALY (Mali) said that unfortunately the peaceful settlement of the Korean question did not depend solely on the will of the Korean people, and was subject to the contingencies of the race between the Eastern and Western blocs for the acquisition of new spheres of influence. He therefore expected no spectacular results in that regard. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not recognize the competence of the United Nations in the matter, which was perhaps due to the circumstances in which certain Member States had sent troops to Korea under cover of a United Nations decision. His delegation was convinced, however, that all problems affecting peace were of concern to the United Nations, and it had therefore studied the various solutions proposed to the Committee. None of them, unfortunately, was of a nature which would make an immediate and lasting settlement possible. The fact was that there were two Governments in Korea, and regardless of any friendly feelings which might be felt for one or the other, it had to be recognized that a partisan attitude to them could not help to bring about a solution of the problem.

30. His delegation was fundamentally opposed to the presence of foreign troops in other countries, and therefore favoured the evacuation of the foreign troops stationed in Korean territory, regardless of their origin. However, a mere decision of the United Nations to order the withdrawal of troops would not be enough to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The withdrawal must be accompanied by measures which could foster national reconciliation; it must also be accepted by the authorities which had invited the foreign troops into South Korea and by the countries which had sent them. On the other hand, the South Korean authorities' proposal that general elections should be held under United Nations supervision failed to take account of the original causes of the dispute and was unacceptable to the North Korean Government. Thus, none of the conditions at present laid down by the Governments of the two Koreas permitted an immediate and peaceful solution of the problem.

31. The only way to settle the matter was to encourage understanding between the two Korean Governments. His delegation therefore appealed to the great Powers to use their influence in persuading the two Korean Governments to agree to meet and make a joint effort to find ways in which they could end the division of the country. It was consequently prepared to support any proposal which would facilitate the direct exchange of ideas between the representatives of the two sides, and it would vote on the draft resolutions on the basis of that position.

32. Mr. BORJA (Philippines) reminded the Committee that the Philippines was one of the countries which had sent troops to Korea and that it was a member of UNCURK. It was vitally concerned in the Korean problem, which directly affected the maintenance of peace and security in its own region.

33. The United Nations had to find a solution to the Korean problem, which was bound up with the very purpose of the Organization. If the situation were to continue, the prestige and moral authority of the United Nations would suffer. If the situation was viewed in its true light, it would be seen that the Soviet proposal was not acceptable. In answer to an appeal from the Republic of Korea, the United Nations had sent troops to Korea to repel aggression. The United Nations Command had had the task of helping to establish the conditions necessary for a lasting settlement. The United Nations objectives had been the establishment by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. Those objectives had not been achieved, and the United Nations Command had therefore remained in Korea in accordance with its original mandate. Thus there could be no question of withdrawing troops from Korea and dissolving UNCURK or of holding elections based on the principle of equal representation for North and South Korea under the supervision of neutral countries. The representative of the Republic of Korea had rightly said that the withdrawal of United Nations troops would leave his country at the mercy of the Communist army massed just beyond its frontiers. As for the principle of equal representation, it could not be accepted, in view of the fact that South Korea had 24 million inhabitants whilst North Korea had only 9 million. That idea was worth no more than the North Korean Government's incredible statement that 100 per cent of the electorate had taken part in the recent elections. The system of equal representation would make it impossible to set up a represen-

tative Government and would not help the cause of unification. It would merely perpetuate the present tragic division.

34. His delegation was convinced that Korea could be reunited only on the basis of the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. That was the idea of draft resolution A/C.1/L.322, of which his delegation was a sponsor.

35. Mr. ZOUHIR (Tunisia) said that the United Nations had been considering the Korean question ever since 1947. At each session the General Assembly had laboured over the problem, but it could not be said that the aims of the United Nations had been achieved or that a solution was in sight. The Korean problem far transcended the frontiers of Korea; from the outset it had been caught up in the vortex of the cold war between two great Powers. He reviewed the history of the Korean question, which had passed through several psychological stages: the euphoria of 1945 had been succeeded by anxiety, which had gradually been transformed into scepticism, which, in its turn, had given rise to armed conflict, leading finally to a political and ideological confrontation between East and West.

36. The General Assembly, which had voted to take up the Korean problem on 23 September 1947, had been concerned with it ever since. The 1953 Armistice Agreement, recognizing the *de facto* division of Korea, had given birth to two States oriented in different ideological directions.

37. The General Assembly, concerned for the future of Korea and aware of the dangers of division, had set up a United Nations Commission with the task of establishing a unified, independent and democratic Korea and restoring international peace and security in the area. The resolutions of the General Assembly had unfortunately not achieved the desired results, and the hopes that the world had placed in the United Nations in that respect had not been realized, the Organization having shown itself powerless and ineffective in the matter.

38. The Korean problem was still before the General Assembly, however, and it must be settled on a permanent basis. His delegation considered that the Assembly should recognize the fact that Korea was now divided into two States, which had been recognized by several Governments, which were developing politically and economically in accordance with differing standards and criteria and each of which was supported by a great Power. That was why it was necessary to turn aside from the political implications of the question and think of the Korean people—the main party concerned and the victim of war and partition. His delegation appealed to the great Powers to rise above their differences and their ideological quarrels in order to find a solution to the Korean problem.

39. The United Nations, for its part, realizing that the measures taken so far had not yielded any results, should reconsider its methods. UNCURK could be used more effectively; it should try to promote direct contact between representatives of the two Korean Republics and invite them to seek practical solutions to their problems under the auspices of the United Nations. In that way it could help to improve the situation in a part of the world which remained a permanent source of friction.

40. His delegation, therefore, felt itself unable to support either of the two draft resolutions, which, in

its opinion, would not promote the achievement of the United Nations objectives. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.322 merely requested UNCURK to continue its work although it had not so far succeeded in persuading the Democratic People's Republic to co-operate, and draft resolution A/C.1/L.323 seemed invalid, because it treated the troops in Korea as foreign troops although they represented the United Nations and because a mere recommendation to the Governments of North and South Korea would be ineffective if it was not followed up by UNCURK. His delegation would therefore abstain in the vote on the two draft resolutions.

41. Mr. NORRISH (New Zealand) said that his country had given a clear indication of its position on the Korean problem when it had joined with fifteen other nations in providing military forces for an operation which the United Nations had been obliged to undertake in order to repel aggression from the North. At the current session his delegation had associated itself with the sponsors of the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.322), by which the General Assembly would again call for the unification of Korea in accordance with principles which it had always supported as reasonable, objective and just.

42. He paid a tribute to the work of UNCURK, whose objective reports were most valuable. It was regrettable that the same accuracy and objectivity were not to be found in certain documents submitted by the North Korean authorities and in certain official statements originating from Pyongyang. He wondered how the North Korean authorities could hope to persuade anyone that 100 per cent of the electorate had gone to the polls in October 1962 to elect 383 unopposed candidates, and whether that was the kind of elections they would demand in a reunited Korea.

43. Each of the parties to the Korean dispute set its own conditions for the unification of the country. North Korea, backed by the Soviet Union and its allies, demanded the withdrawal of what it called "foreign troops" from South Korea. The Republic of Korea and the General Assembly called upon North Korea to accept certain principles and objectives laid down by the United Nations. The question was to decide which of those preliminary conditions were acceptable. As far as the North Korean and Soviet conditions were concerned, it should be noted first of all that there

were no "foreign troops" in Korea, but merely United Nations troops. The presence of those troops, moreover, was not an obstacle to unification, since the moment an agreed arrangement for unification was reached, South Korea would no longer feel itself threatened and would no longer need military aid from the United Nations. As the fifteen-Power draft resolution indicated, the objective of the United Nations was to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. The United Nations insisted that there must be elections which would enable the people to express their wishes, under international supervision, but there was no need to fix the method to be adopted in advance of the negotiations on the problem of unification as a whole. An agreement should be reached both on the preliminaries and the elections themselves through negotiation. It was obvious that the withdrawal of troops would find its place in any arrangement for unification. If an agreement was genuinely desired, it should not be too difficult to work out arrangements which were consistent with the principles advanced by the United Nations and were acceptable to both parties. Unfortunately, it seemed that the North Korean authorities were not yet ready to collaborate towards that end.

44. His delegation would vote against the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.323), which should be rejected in whole and in part; first, because it called for the withdrawal of what it called "foreign troops" and, secondly, because it implicitly cast doubt on the competence of the United Nations in the Korean problem. The draft resolution, submitted under sub-item (b) of agenda item 28, contained no explicit reference to the problem of unification, but did contain passages which had no connexion with that part of the item. In resorting to that device, the USSR delegation was trying to gain a propaganda advantage and to strengthen its hand in attempting to deny the undeniable, namely, the fact that the United Nations was competent in the matter and was even under an obligation to work for the re-establishment of a united, independent and democratic Korea.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.