

# United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SEVENTEENTH SESSION

Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1302nd  
MEETING**

Friday, 14 December 1962,  
at 3.45 p.m.

**NEW YORK**

## CONTENTS

### Agenda item 28:

#### *The Korean question (continued)*

(a) *Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;*

(b) *The withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea*

*General debate (continued) . . . . . 279*

**Chairman:** Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL  
(Sudan).

## AGENDA ITEM 28

### **The Korean question (continued):**

- (a) **Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/5213 and Add.1, A/C.1/877, A/C.1/882, A/C.1/883, A/C.1/L.322);**
- (b) **The withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea (A/5140, A/C.1/869, A/C.1/877, A/C.1/882, A/C.1/883, A/C.1/884 and Corr.1, A/C.1/L.322, A/C.1/L.323)**

### GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. KIZIA (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the efforts made for many years in the United Nations to settle the Korean question had not helped the Korean people to solve their problems and to reunify their country; on the contrary, they had merely aggravated the situation. The reason why the Korean peninsula had become a dangerous source of international tension was that the Western Powers, concerned as they were, not with the aspirations of the Korean people but with creating a military base in Asia and the Far East, had imposed arbitrary and unilateral decisions on the United Nations.

2. The time had come to consider the question from a completely different point of view. New methods of solving the problem were offered in the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.323), which called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea, since the presence of United States forces in that country was a source of friction in South-East Asia and the main obstacle to the peaceful unification of Korea.

3. Of the two States created on the Korean peninsula after the Second World War, the Republic of Korea had developed along capitalist lines, while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had taken the path of socialism and had now rid itself of exploitation and economic, political and national servitude. From a mere colonial province, it had become a fully developed industrial and agricultural State with a strong and flourishing economy, a democratic State created by the people themselves, who enjoyed both political

freedoms and rights and many material and cultural benefits. On the other hand, South Korea was a land of terror and persecution, fascist military dictatorship and undemocratic practices, all actively supported by the United States. The corrupt rule of the Syngman Rhee clique, kept in power by falsified elections, had been overthrown by a popular uprising, but unfortunately the new Chang Myun régime had not differed from the previous dictatorship: elementary human rights had been violated and police persecution, arrests and repressive measures had continued. In May 1961, the dissatisfaction of the people with the régime having become quite evident, a military coup had been organized, and the country was now completely enslaved.

4. The report of the President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, contained in document A/C.1/869, clearly showed that the cause of the continued partition of Korea was the occupation of South Korea by United States troops. Accordingly, the solution of the Korean question lay simply in the withdrawal of United States forces, which had absolutely no justifiable grounds for remaining in South Korea. Their continued presence in South Korea constituted an act of aggression perpetrated in violation of the generally recognized principles of international law, respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of States and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.

5. United States nationals occupied all key political, economic and military positions in South Korea and were in fact masters of the country. The United States, citing the "United Nations resolutions" and taking cover behind talk of a "Communist threat", was trying to perpetuate its occupation of South Korea. But those resolutions had neither legal force nor moral authority; the very fact that the United States had forced the United Nations to consider the Korean question was a serious violation of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. And to add to that the United States had forced through another decision, whereby the right to speak for the Korean people had been given to representatives of the Seoul fascist régime, while the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been denied the right of representation.

6. There had been many changes in the world since the question of Korea had first been raised in the United Nations, and a new approach should be adopted. It was essential to bear in mind that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was now one of the most advanced countries in Asia, and that power was in the hands of its people, who had freely elected their Government. In South Korea, by contrast, a fascist dictatorship had been established, all political parties had been banned and a state of economic stagnation prevailed. In North Korea there was not a single

foreign soldier; but South Korea was occupied by foreign troops, which must be withdrawn to enable the Korean people to solve their problems for themselves. Korea belonged to the Koreans, and only a solution based on their interests could be conducive to peace. The Ukrainian delegation would therefore vote for the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.323), which provided for such a solution.

7. Sir James PLIMSOLL (Australia) reviewing the history of Korea, an understanding of which was essential for a proper appreciation of the question, said that Korea had been divided in 1945 only for reasons of temporary military convenience. In 1947 the General Assembly had, by its resolution 112 (II), established the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea to help bring into existence an independent and unified Korean State. That Commission had been unable to achieve Korean unity because it had not been allowed to enter North Korea or to arrange talks between the people in North and South Korea. Nevertheless, free elections had been held in South Korea under United Nations supervision, and the Republic of Korea had been established. It was interesting to note that the outcome of the elections had not been the outcome that many people in the United States would have wished. Syngman Rhee, for example, one of the dominating figures in the post-war history of Korea, was by no means the man whom the United States had favoured in many respects. United Nations observers having certified that the elections had been honest and had reflected the wishes of the people, the General Assembly had in 1948, by its resolution 195 (III), declared that the Government of the Republic of Korea was a lawful one and had set up a new United Nations Commission on Korea to continue to try to bring about the unification of the country on a democratic basis and to prevent any aggression or threat to peace.

8. In 1949, therefore, the United States had withdrawn all its forces from South Korea, bringing about a situation similar to that called for by the Soviet draft resolution now before the Committee (A/C.1/L.323). But in 1950, North Korea had attacked South Korea, unexpectedly and without provocation; United Nations military observers had certified that the South Korean forces had made no preparations for any attack on North Korea. The North Korean forces, however, had been fully prepared; in its report to the General Assembly the United Nations Commission on Korea had described the attack as an act of aggression designed to secure control over the whole of Korea.<sup>1/</sup> The Commission had further stated that the conflict could never have taken place if a unified and independent Korea had been established on the basis of internationally supervised elections held in the whole of Korea.<sup>2/</sup>

9. The United Nations had tried to prevent any long-term division of Korea under two antagonistic Governments, but its efforts had been frustrated by the North Korean invasion. The invaders had driven back and scattered the South Korean forces; nevertheless, the latter had continued fighting to maintain their independence and national identity, a fact which was indicative of the popular support enjoyed by the Government of the Republic of Korea.

10. The United Nations had acted to oppose the aggression. Sixteen nations from all continents had sent troops to fight under the United Nations Command, and other nations had sent other forms of aid. The determination of the United Nations to resist armed aggression had been an important factor in the Organization's survival and in the prevention of similar situations since that time.

11. But although the United Nations military effort had achieved the immediate objective of repelling aggression and safeguarding the sovereignty of the victim of aggression, the other United Nations objectives of unification and independent democratic government for all of Korea remained unsolved. The United Nations Commission on Korea, and later the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, had remained in Korea, reporting annually to the General Assembly, and had had a good influence on developments in South Korea; however, they had been prevented from making progress in the major task of unification because they had not been allowed into the North.

12. Although Members of the Committee might not approve of many aspects of the internal situation in the Republic of Korea, it was up to the Korean people to decide for themselves how they should be governed and what action should be taken to meet particular circumstances. UNCURK had criticized or failed to endorse a number of actions taken by the Government of the Republic of Korea, but UNCURK was not an instrument of neo-colonialism designed to impose the wishes of other countries on the Korean people. Events had made it clear that neither the United Nations nor the United States Government dominated the conduct of the Republic of Korea; but the actions and political processes of the Korean people grew out of the people themselves and had to be faced as facts.

13. The Soviet Union and the countries associated with it had tried to draw a completely false contrast between a democratic North Korea and an authoritarian South Korean Government. Yet in spite of the limitations of the existing South Korean régime, opposition groups did exist, opposition opinions were expressed in the Press, there were some pressures on the régime and there was some freedom of movement for the people. Most important of all, representatives of the United Nations had freedom of movement throughout South Korea, whereas North Korea did not admit people from other countries or allow any impact of opinion from the United Nations and the rest of the world. In its report to the General Assembly at its sixth session,<sup>3/</sup> UNCURK had described some of the conditions existing in North Korea. The report showed that a Stalinist Communist régime had been imposed in North Korea and that the Korean cultural tradition had been largely suppressed.

14. Some of the United Nations forces sent to Korea to repel aggression were staying there to discourage further aggression. In view of the North Korean régime's violations of the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953<sup>4/</sup> and its close association with Communist China, which it had supported in the latter's recent attack on India, the Republic of Korea was understandably reluctant to relinquish the protection of the United Nations. However, the United Nations

<sup>1/</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 16*, paras. 202-203.

<sup>2/</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 206.

<sup>3/</sup> *Ibid.*, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 12.

<sup>4/</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953*, document S/3079, appendix A.

forces had been greatly reduced in size and did not affect the political, economic and social life of the Republic of Korea; their presence there was merely a demonstration of the fact that the Republic of Korea had been supported in the past and would be supported again in the face of external aggression. The Soviet draft resolution calling for the withdrawal of United Nations forces from South Korea would not help to solve any of Korea's problems, and could only destroy the confidence of the people of the South. What was, in effect, proposed in that draft resolution was a return to the situation prior to June 1950.

15. On the other hand, the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.322) reaffirmed the approach of the United Nations to the Korean question, which was based on the principles of the Charter; its objectives were to achieve by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. By that draft resolution, the General Assembly would call upon the North Korean authorities to accept those objectives, just as the South Korean authorities had accepted them, and would request UNCURK to continue its work in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. He hoped that the Committee would endorse the fifteen-Power draft resolution.

16. Mr. ANUMAN RAJADHON (Thailand) welcomed the representative of the Republic of Korea to the First Committee. He appreciated his frank and comprehensive statement on the present situation in that country. The Republic of Korea had co-operated fully with UNCURK during the past twelve years and had firmly established itself in the community of nations; he hoped that it would soon take its rightful place as a Member of the United Nations.

17. His delegation had joined in sponsoring the fifteen-Power draft resolution and hoped that it would meet with the Committee's approval. Operative paragraph 4, by which UNCURK would be requested to continue its work, was particularly important, because the continued existence and work of UNCURK was indispensable to the attainment of the United Nations objectives in Korea. The Commission's factual and impartial reports had demonstrated to the world that events in the Republic of Korea were open to scrutiny by the United Nations and all interested parties, whereas neither the United Nations nor the outside world in general had been allowed into North Korea to see the ideal conditions alleged to exist in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government for all of Korea, the objective of the United Nations, was being prevented by the lack of co-operation from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its allies. The dissolution of UNCURK would be contrary to the achievement of that objective; he therefore urged the Committee to adopt the fifteen-Power draft resolution.

18. Turning to the Soviet draft resolution, he said that the continued presence of the United Nations forces still in Korea was clearly desired by the Government of the Republic of Korea, and was needed to prevent renewed aggression by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its allies. The Governments concerned were prepared to withdraw their remaining forces from Korea when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the General Assembly in its resolution 376 (V) had been

fulfilled. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union could help to expedite the withdrawal of United Nations troops from Korea by persuading the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to give up its idea that Korea could be unified by aggression and to accept the competence and authority of the United Nations in the Korean question.

19. Mr. HASEGANU (Romania) said that during the procedural discussion the United States and its allies had made every effort to prevent the presence during the discussion of one of the most important items on the Assembly's agenda of both the parties directly concerned. Nevertheless, he hoped that the General Assembly would subject the Korean question to a thorough analysis and try to solve it in the spirit of the United Nations Charter and in the interests of world peace.

20. Such an analysis would show that the key to the so-called Korean question was the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea. A settlement of that aspect of the question would open the way to a solution of all the other problems involved, including that of the peaceful unification of Korea on a democratic basis. The discussion of "the Korean question" at each session of the General Assembly for fifteen years had produced no constructive solution; indeed, it had only served to aggravate the situation. By placing the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea on the agenda of the current session, the Soviet Union had given the General Assembly an opportunity of adopting a new approach and doing something constructive for world peace in general and the Korean people in particular.

21. Ultimately, the Korean question would have to be solved by the Korean people themselves without any foreign interference; and the indispensable condition for such a solution was the removal of all foreign armed forces from Korean territory. That condition had already been met in North Korea, the part governed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, where there was no longer a single foreign soldier and where the people were engaged in laying the foundations of a stable and prosperous economy.

22. The situation was quite different in South Korea. Immediately after the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, on 27 July 1953, the United States had begun a series of actions that violated both the letter and the spirit of the Agreement. On 1 October 1953 it had concluded with the South Korean régime a Mutual Defense Treaty, under article IV of which the United States had acquired, for an unlimited period, the right to dispose its land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea, despite the provision of the Armistice Agreement calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. Subsequently, in violation of paragraph 13 of the Armistice Agreement, the United States had begun a large-scale reorganization of the South Korean Army, which now had 600,000 men—twice the number at the time of the armistice—while United States forces in Korea had also been strengthened, increasing by 15,000 men in 1961 alone. Since then, military preparations had continued apace: the South Korean Army was being supplied with the most modern weapons; the United States forces in Korea had been given nuclear offensive capacity; more and more military bases, strategic roads and supply installations were being built; and provocative statements made by United States generals visiting the area of

the demarcation line and provocative actions by the occupation forces operating under the United Nations flag were creating a warlike, tense atmosphere which was a danger to Korea and to the entire neighbouring area.

23. In order to justify its military occupation of South Korea, the United States was resorting to all kinds of arguments, including the argument that the United States forces were defending South Korea from the "danger of Communism" and the "danger of aggression from the North". That was a complete distortion of the truth. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had always worked for a peaceful solution of the Korean question: it had repeatedly called for negotiations to achieve the peaceful unification of North and South Korea, to promote economic and cultural exchanges and freedom of movement, to reduce the size of the North and South Korean armies to a minimum, and to bring about the conclusion of an agreement renouncing the use of force by both sides. That policy had been reaffirmed at a recent session of the Supreme People's Assembly at Pyongyang, when the President of the Presidium of the Assembly, Choi Yong Kun, had again proposed such an agreement, which would also provide for the reduction of each army to the level of 100,000 men, or less, provided that United States forces withdrew from South Korea. In his statement on that occasion, which had been distributed in document A/C.1/869, he had declared that the North Koreans had "absolutely no intention to 'invade the south', nor can there be such a thing"; they did "not want to solve the Korean question by armed force". He had gone on to say that North Korea would "never use armed force, unless the South Korean side launches an armed invasion on the northern part of the Republic".

24. Thus, there was no basis for the allegation of a "danger from the North". On the other hand, the occupation of South Korea by United States troops constituted not only a military danger but also a flagrant violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Korean people.

25. The population of South Korea had been deprived of the most elementary rights and democratic liberties. Their economic conditions, which were among the worst in the world, had been vividly described in an article in The New York Times of 11 June 1961. In South Korea, approximately 25 per cent of the labour force could not find work, and the rate of expansion of the economy had fallen from 5.9 per cent in 1959 to 2.3 per cent in 1960, and then to 0.1 per cent in 1961. Inflation had reached astronomical proportions, the price of such basic commodities as rice having risen by 60 per cent in two years. Such was the state of the economy in spite of the \$3,000 million of assistance the United States had poured into South Korea between 1945 and 1961. In 1961 alone, United States aid to South Korea had amounted to \$220 million, a sum equivalent to the economic assistance given by the United States to the whole of Africa.

26. As to the political situation in South Korea, it was only too well known. After the terrible dictatorship of Syngman Rhee, which had enjoyed the support of the United States, a new "dictatorship of generals" had been installed. Newsweek, in its issue of 29 October 1962, had called South Korea an autocracy ruled by General Park, and The New York Times of 28 May 1962 had quoted Colonel Kim, the strong man

of the dictatorship, as saying that even if a country became as dictatorial as that of Hitler—which, he had added, was not so in the case of South Korea—but was still for America and against the Communists, it should still be an ally of the United States. It seemed that such allies were no embarrassment to the "free world". Indeed, they were given all possible assistance; the presence of United States troops in South Korea undoubtedly constituted the main prop of General Park's dictatorship.

27. At the 1300th meeting, the representative of the Soviet Union had spoken of a number of cases of violence and crimes committed by United States soldiers against the South Korean population, according to reports in the South Korean Press. They represented only a few examples of the immense number of atrocities which had been perpetrated, atrocities of which even the Department of State had been compelled to take note in a statement dated 6 June 1962. It was not surprising, therefore, that the whole population of South Korea was taking an increasingly active part in the struggle against the United States forces of occupation, as had been noted by the London periodical Eastern World in its issue of December 1962. It was in that context that the Committee should assess the references of the representative of General Park's junta to the so-called danger of subversion and his request for the retention of foreign troops in South Korea. Those troops were needed by a fascist military dictatorship in order to maintain its régime against its own people. The worst disgrace to the United Nations, however, was the fact that the foreign armed forces in South Korea were committing their provocations and crimes under the flag of the United Nations.

28. By distorting the facts, the United States delegation had again tried to absolve its Government of responsibility for starting the Korean war; but such attempts would never succeed in hiding the truth that the occupation of South Korea by United States armed forces had nothing to do with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. To call such forces United Nations forces would imply the direct support of the United Nations for one of the most reactionary of military dictatorships against its own people, in defiance of the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The fact was, however, that they were not United Nations forces. The Security Council, which was the sole body authorized under the Charter to act in defence of international peace and security, had absolutely no control over the armed forces present in South Korea under the United Nations flag. Those forces were financed, equipped and directly controlled by the Pentagon; but United States generals found it more convenient to pretend, when confronting the Korean people in their courageous demand for the removal of foreign troops from South Korea, that they represented the United Nations.

29. The Romanian delegation accordingly held that the United Nations should insist on the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea, and thereby put an end to the misuse of the Organization's name. It would therefore strongly support the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union.

30. As to the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the Romanian delegation had always been of the opinion that its existence was not justified. The Commission's activities served only to camouflage the interference

of the United States in the internal affairs of the Korean people and to prevent any action likely to lead to the creation of a truly independent, democratic and unified Korea. Its report (A/5213 and Add.1) clearly showed how meaningless its work was. Equally meaningless was the fifteen-Power draft resolution, which, like similar resolutions in the past, aimed only at perpetuating the present situation in Korea as a hot-bed of war in that part of the world.

31. Mr. DADET (Congo, Brazzaville) said that the Korean question had become more and more important to his country with the increasingly close relations that had developed between the Congolese and Korean peoples. The friendship between the two peoples had recently been strengthened by a number of cultural exchanges and by the opening of an Embassy of the Republic of Korea at Brazzaville.

32. His delegation wished to thank UNCURK for its careful report, in which, it was regrettable to note, the Commission had had to confess that no progress had been made in the settlement of the Korean question. As in certain other cases concerned with the right of peoples to self-determination, the Commission had met with total obstruction on the part of one of the interested parties. The *de facto* Government which controlled North Korea had denied the United Nations the right to carry out necessary investigations in a part of Korea. That obstructionism had begun in 1947, when the USSR had prevented the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea from supervising free elections in the part of Korea occupied by Soviet troops. In that way, an allegedly democratic régime had been established north of the 38th parallel with the help of Soviet tanks, a régime based on a political system that had led to the mass flight of Koreans to the southern part of the country. On 25 June 1950, North Korea's refusal to co-operate with the United Nations had been transformed into armed aggression. Its leaders, subsequently assisted by Communist China, had gone to war with the Republic of Korea and the United Nations. Since the armistice which had ended that war, the Government of North Korea had frustrated any solution by repeatedly refusing to co-operate with UNCURK.

33. That was the situation that confronted the Assembly. The work of the United Nations in Korea had been frustrated by brute force. That, however, was no reason for surrender. The General Assembly was in duty bound to remain faithful to its principles and to abide by its decisions. His delegation therefore shared the view of the majority that the United Nations was fully and lawfully competent to protect Korea from any new aggression and to assist it in every way to regain its national unity by peaceful means.

34. The attempt of the Soviet Union at the current session to approach the Korean question from the point of view of the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea should not obscure the purposes and principles which had led to the dispatch of those troops. In his country's view, the United States troops in Korea were there as an instrument of the United Nations; having gone there originally for the purpose of repelling aggression, they must now stay there to prevent its renewal until the question of the unification of Korea found a lasting solution. The attitude of the Soviet and North Korean Governments to the General Assembly's resolutions on Korea offered no ground for assurance that the Republic of Korea was safe from a new attack similar to that launched on

25 June 1950. Moreover, there was nothing to indicate that the so-called Chinese People's Volunteers who had waged war against United Nations troops would not do so again; the sudden invasion of India by the Peking Government had demonstrated that the Chinese Communists struck suddenly and without warning.

35. The representative of the Soviet Union had challenged the legitimacy of the Government at Seoul. He (Mr. Dadet) had visited the Republic of Korea and had seen nothing to indicate that General Park did not enjoy the support of the Korean population. The Government had introduced badly needed reforms and had undertaken to promulgate a new constitution before March 1963. The economic situation had appeared to be improving; in any event, economic prosperity could not be considered a prerequisite for a régime's legitimacy. His delegation therefore considered that the Government of the Republic of Korea was the only authority capable of representing the people of Korea, and it agreed with the terms of General Assembly resolution 195 (III) of 12 December 1948 concerning the status of that Government.

36. It followed that it was for the legitimate Government of Korea to say whether or not foreign troops should remain on its soil. That Government alone was qualified to deal with incidents resulting from the presence of foreign troops and to authorize such troops to engage in military exercises on its territory. His country believed that every people had the right to choose its alliances, so long as that choice was aimed at protecting its territory and not at finding support for a policy of expansion and domination.

37. As to the Soviet representative's attack on the role of the troops stationed in Korea, his delegation considered that if by the presence of those troops the Korean people were being spared the suffering of a new invasion, the soldiers serving under the flag of the United Nations in that part of Asia were performing a noble and useful task which was in perfect harmony with the ideals of the Organization.

38. Mr. BOTHA (South Africa) said that his country, as one of the sixteen Member States which had responded to the Security Council's appeal for help in repelling the aggression against South Korea, had always taken a keen interest in the Korean question. It therefore regretted that UNCURK had made no progress towards the unification of Korea, despite the efforts of General Park Chung Hee's Government to achieve that goal by peaceful and realistic means. That failure seemed the more tragic when it was considered that what the Republic of Korea was proposing was the holding of general elections in North and South Korea under United Nations supervision—the procedure which the overwhelming majority in the General Assembly had advocated for fifteen years. Against that, the North Korean régime took an intransigent attitude; it remained opposed to the established United Nations objectives in Korea and refused to give assurances that the Korean people would be given a genuinely free choice in the unification process. It was gratifying, however, that despite that attitude the Government of the Republic of Korea had repeatedly reaffirmed that unification through the United Nations was the only realistic and acceptable formula.

39. South Africa was also glad to note that the Republic of Korea had been experiencing a period of relative stability and that its Government had made

a systematic effort to reform the country's economic institutions. The Republic of Korea was also to be congratulated on the progress it had made in agriculture, industry and public finance.

40. His delegation was one of the sponsors of the fifteen-Power draft resolution, and commended it to the Committee as a reaffirmation of the Organization's aim of bringing about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the restoration of international peace and security in the area. It was to be hoped that the North Korean régime could be induced also to accept those objectives and thus to open the way to unification.

41. South Africa could not support the Soviet draft resolution, calling for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from South Korea. The troops in question were in fact United Nations forces, sent to Korea at the request of the Government of the Republic of Korea and in accordance with United Nations resolu-

tions; and in the existing circumstances it was unreasonable and unrealistic to demand their withdrawal. Nor could such a demand be made an excuse for refusing to discuss the principles of a solution of the Korean problem. In any event, most of the United Nations forces had already been withdrawn from Korea, and the Governments concerned were prepared to withdraw the remaining troops when the conditions for a lasting settlement, as laid down by the General Assembly, had been fulfilled. To insist on their withdrawal across the Pacific or elsewhere could not conceivably be related to the withdrawal of the so-called Chinese People's Volunteers, who had only moved across the Yalu River.

42. In conclusion, he expressed his delegation's appreciation of the work of UNCURK and its hope that the North Korean authorities would respond to the appeal contained in the fifteen-Power draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.