

# United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SEVENTEENTH SESSION

Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 1301st  
MEETING

Thursday, 13 December 1962,  
at 3 p.m.

NEW YORK

## CONTENTS

### Agenda item 28:

#### *The Korean question (continued):*

(a) *Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;*

(b) *The withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea*

*General debate (continued) . . . . . 273*

**Chairman:** Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL  
(Sudan).

## AGENDA ITEM 28

### *The Korean question (continued):*

(a) *Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and rehabilitation of Korea (A/5213 and Add.1, A/C.1/877, A/C.1/882, A/C.1/883, A/C.1/L.322);*

(b) *The withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea (A/5140, A/C.1/869, A/C.1/877, A/C.1/882, A/C.1/883, A/C.1/884 and Corr.1, A/C.1/L.322, A/C.1/L.323)*

### GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. ALLOTT (United States of America) said that the statement made by the representative of the USSR at the previous meeting had contained three main elements. First, he had painted a picture of the South Koreans' sufferings under the oppression of United States troops, and had quoted many alleged instances of misdeeds by those troops. It was not worth discussing those allegations in detail, based as they were largely on North Korean versions of South Korean sources, since immediately afterwards the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea had made it clear that his people considered their security and well-being to depend upon the presence of the United Nations forces, including those of the United States.

2. Secondly, the Soviet representative had given a highly imaginative account of conditions in North and South Korea, for which he had in many cases given no sources and which conflicted with information available elsewhere. The report of UNCURK (A/5213 and Add.1), for example, showed that, contrary to what he had said, there had been substantial gains in recent years in land utilization and grain production in South Korea. Rice production in 1961 had been 18.9 million suk, an all-time record. The Soviet representative had alleged that North Korea had not imported grain for the past two or three years; in fact, in 1961 North Korea had imported some 400,000 metric tons of grain from various countries—including the Soviet Union, as was attested by a Soviet Government publication entitled "Foreign Trade of the

USSR for 1961". The fact that North Korea refused to allow UNCURK to investigate its agricultural and other progress raised doubts as to the reality of its alleged achievements. The flight of 4 million people from North Korea since the Second World War spoke louder than any words.

3. Thirdly, the Soviet representative had argued that the United Nations had no part to play in efforts to bring about the unification of Korea. That assertion was completely fallacious. The Korean question had been brought before the General Assembly. The aim of the United Nations was to restore peace and security in the area and to achieve by peaceful means a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government. The formula for unification which the United Nations had been advocating for many years was sound and reasonable; it could work, if the other side really wanted to solve the problem. The Soviet Union, however, had introduced an extraneous issue, the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea, a fact which did not augur well for an easy solution. The fundamental issue was unification. Like many of the countries which had won independence since the Second World War, Korea had a history going back many centuries, in the course of which it had known colonial rule. During the Second World War, the Allied Powers had included the liberation of Korea among the war aims set forth in the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, a pledge in which the Soviet Union had joined. It had been agreed that the surrender of enemy forces would be accepted by the Soviet Union north of the 38th parallel and by the United States south of that line, which, it should be noted, had no political, social or economic significance. The Soviet Union had seized the opportunity to convert an arrangement made for military convenience into a political and economic division of the country which it still enforced.

4. While paying lip-service to the objective of unification, the Soviet Union and North Korea had constantly insisted upon conditions that would prevent the unification of Korea except as a communist-dominated country. It had originally been agreed, for instance, that a provisional government should be formed in consultation with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. But while the United States had maintained that all political groups should be consulted, the USSR had insisted on restricting consultations to communist groups only, thereby excluding the parties which represented the vast majority of the people. The deadlock on that point had prevented any progress in the Joint Commission. The United States had therefore proposed a four-Power conference to be held in September 1947, but that proposal, which had been accepted by the United Kingdom and China, had been rejected by the Soviet Union. Then the United States had raised the Korean question in the United Nations, at the second session of the

General Assembly, and it had been at that point that the Soviet Union, adopting a new tactic designed to block unification, had begun to insist on the withdrawal of foreign troops.

5. The United States position, in 1962 as in 1947, was that the withdrawal of troops was an integral part of the Korean question as a whole; if the United Nations withdrew its forces before a general settlement, South Korea would be left exposed to aggression of the kind it had already experienced.

6. In 1947, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 112 (II), recommending that a Korean National Government should be elected by free nation-wide elections under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. In North Korea, that plan had been boycotted by the Soviet occupation authorities. In South Korea, the Communists had attempted by violence to prevent the resolution from being carried out, but they had been unsuccessful. In 1948, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 195 (III), recognizing the Government which had resulted from the elections held in South Korea as the lawful and effective Government of the Republic of Korea, and as the only such Government in Korea. Since then, the United Nations Commission on Korea set up by that resolution, and later the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), set up in 1950 by General Assembly resolution 376 (V), had continued to observe the development of representative government in South Korea, noting good and bad with complete objectivity. They had had unrestricted access to all parts of South Korea, whereas the Communists had continued to exclude them from North Korea.

7. In June 1950, North Korea had invaded the Republic of Korea, and sixteen nations had contributed units to a United Nations Command set up to assist the Republic in accordance with Security Council resolutions. After a bitter struggle, an Armistice Agreement<sup>1/</sup> had been concluded on 27 July 1953. In his statement at the previous meeting, the Soviet representative had alleged that paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. That was not the case; paragraph 60 called for a political conference at which such matters as the withdrawal of foreign forces and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question were to be negotiated. The Korean Political Conference had actually taken place, a fact which the Soviet representative had failed to mention. From April to June 1954, in Geneva, it had debated every aspect of the Korean question; but it had ended without agreement because of Communist intransigence. The role of the United Nations had been a key issue. The Member States represented at Geneva which had participated in the action in Korea had laid down two fundamental principles as the basis for a solution of the problem, principles which were set forth in their report to the General Assembly at its ninth session: <sup>2/</sup> first, the United Nations, under its Charter, was fully empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea; and second, free elections on a basis of proportional representation should be held under United Nations

supervision in order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea. At the Political Conference the principal Communist representatives had flatly rejected the first principle. As for the second, they had failed to provide any guarantee that elections would be carried out in genuine freedom and they had insisted that in the "all-Korean Commission" North Korea should have the same number of representatives as South Korea, which contained the overwhelming majority of the Korean population. That would have given the North Korean representatives a veto over any proposal with which they did not agree. North Korea still advanced those same proposals as a basis for unification. The disagreement on the competence of the United Nations and on the unification proposals remained fundamental to the discussion of the question.

8. The United Nations was the principal world forum, in which small as well as great nations could defend their interests. The Charter gave it a special role in the maintenance of international security and the settlement of disputes. The argument that the United Nations was not competent in the Korean question could not be accepted, and the Assembly would do well to consider whether those who advanced it were sincere or were merely seeking to impose their own solution. The Soviet Union asserted that the withdrawal of foreign forces was a necessary first step towards unification. No amount of distortion, however, could conceal the fact that those "foreign" forces were United Nations forces sent to assist the Republic of Korea against Communist aggression. Moreover, the non-Korean forces in Korea had been reduced to a little more than two divisions, so that they could not possibly be called a threat to the security of the area. But they did constitute a significant deterrent to aggression, and their presence was necessary until Korean unification was achieved. As had been pointed out in the report on the Korean Political Conference submitted by the countries which had participated in the United Nations action in Korea, if all foreign forces had been withdrawn before the elections, as the Communists had wished, Korea would have been left a divided country without a Government and with no immediate prospect of obtaining one. The aggressors would have been placed on a footing of equality with the United Nations forces which had gone to Korea to repel aggression. The report had rightly said, however, that as soon as peace and security had been restored, and Korea had been unified, the United Nations forces should be withdrawn.<sup>3/</sup> That report had been approved by the General Assembly on 11 December 1954, by its resolution 811 (IX).

9. Past experience revealed the cynicism of the Soviet proposal for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. In 1948 the USSR had unilaterally withdrawn its forces from Korea. By June of 1949, the United States had done the same; only a small training and advisory group had remained, at the request of the Government. One year later, the North Korean forces had launched a massive invasion of the territory controlled by the Republic of Korea. The Soviet representative had again tried to persuade the First Committee that the South had been the aggressor, forgetting that in a report to the Assembly at its fifth session the United Nations Commission on Korea had described the invasion by North Korean troops as an act of aggression initiated without warning and without

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953 document S/3079, appendix A.

<sup>2/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 17, document A/2786.

<sup>3/</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 9-10.

provocation in execution of a carefully prepared plan, the object of which was to secure control over the whole of Korea.<sup>4/</sup> From the practical point of view, it should be noted that the withdrawal of United Nations forces would mean their return to points thousands of miles from Korea, so that they would not be in a position to return promptly in the event of renewed aggression. North of the Korean border with China and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, there were massive foreign forces which could easily cross into Korea.

10. The report of UNCURK to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session (A/5213 and Add.1), like the preceding reports, was a reliable study of political and economic developments in Korea bearing on the problem of unification. Although the North Korean régime continued to exclude UNCURK from the area under its control, there was enough information on North Korea to make the contrast between the two régimes very clear. The present Government of the Republic of Korea had continued its economic reforms and was preparing to re-establish civilian government in 1963. On 5 November 1962 it had published a new constitution, which was to be voted on in a national referendum on 17 December 1962 as a prelude to elections to be held in the early part of 1963. But in their attempt to build political institutions and achieve economic progress, the people of South Korea were constantly handicapped by the need to guard against the possibility of another attack from the North. They deserved the support of Member States.

11. The Republic of Korea had established diplomatic relations with thirty-five countries, and was in the process of establishing relations with fifteen others. It had been admitted on 16 November 1962 to the Colombo Plan. It endorsed the United Nations programme for the unification of Korea, and was advocating unification through general elections to be held in both North and South Korea under United Nations observation.

12. In contrast, the North Korean régime continued to exclude UNCURK from its territory, and had not allowed it to observe the so-called elections of 8 October 1962. It rejected the right of the United Nations to take action on the Korean question; moreover, it had demonstrated its aggressive character by supporting the recent Chinese Communist aggression against India.

13. He reviewed the provisions of the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.322), of which his delegation was a sponsor. The draft covered the whole of the Korean question and reasserted the principles and objectives established by the General Assembly for the solution of the Korean problem. Those principles and objectives should be reaffirmed by all who desired a lasting peace in Korea in justice and freedom.

14. Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) regretted the Committee's failure to invite representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take part in its discussion. He fully supported the position of the Democratic People's Republic in refusing to recognize the competence of the United Nations in the question of the unification of Korea, a question which was an internal affair of the Korean people; the exclusion of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea through the imposition of unacceptable conditions was difficult to reconcile with the principle,

just referred to by the United States representative, that the United Nations was a forum in which all States had the right to be heard and to express themselves freely.

15. Certain States wished to preserve the territory of South Korea as one of their military bases in the Far East, and were therefore in fact working to maintain the partition of Korea. It was only to achieve that goal that the organ known as UNCURK was being artificially kept in being, although in the twelve years of its existence no progress had been made toward the unification of Korea. The so-called United Nations objectives actually implied the unification of Korea under the military and fascist régime of South Korea. Accordingly, UNCURK was trying to present the South Korean dictatorship in the most advantageous light. That was natural, for both the Commission and the South Korean régime were in fact tools of the United States. There was thus no hope of achieving any progress towards the unification of Korea by extending the Commission's work to North Korea; in the Polish delegation's view, UNCURK should be dissolved.

16. But although the United Nations could not directly interfere in the question of the unification of Korea, which was outside its competence, it could and should remove the obstacles which were impeding a rapprochement between the two Korean States. The most important obstacle was the occupation of South Korea, under the cover of the United Nations flag, by foreign troops whose presence was preventing the people from reaching an agreement with the people of North Korea to unify the country. The proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for nationwide general elections, or alternatively for a confederation of the two Korean States, as also other proposals aimed at improving relations between the two parts of Korea, had been rejected by the South Korean authorities. There was thus a vicious circle: on the one hand, United Nations resolutions maintained that the so-called United Nations troops would be withdrawn upon the unification of Korea; on the other hand, unification was actually being prevented by the continuance of the military occupation.

17. South Korea had been turned into a major United States military base which constituted a threat of aggression in the Far East. There was no military threat to South Korea from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; indeed, the latter had proposed the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two States. The occupation of South Korea by foreign troops under the United Nations flag had brought a terrorist fascist régime and economic catastrophe to that part of Korea. In contrast, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had achieved impressive results in its economic and cultural development, since it was an independent and sovereign State and had been able to choose the road of peaceful socialist construction.

18. The foreign occupation of South Korea was a form of neo-colonialist domination and was therefore doomed to failure. It was the duty of the United Nations to assist the Korean people in their struggle for national unification; the basic prerequisite for that was the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. His delegation therefore fully endorsed the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.323).

19. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he wished to reply to some of the observations made by the United States representative. The

<sup>4/</sup> See *ibid.*, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 16, paras. 202-203.

latter had said that he (Mr. Zorin) had incorrectly stated at the previous meeting that North Korea had not imported grain for the past two or three years. What he had actually said, however, was that North Korea had still had to import grain two or three years ago but was now able to meet all its own food requirements.

20. The United States representative had laid great stress on the assertion by the South Korean representative that the presence of United States troops in South Korea was essential. However, it was common knowledge that, as the report of UNCURK (A/5213) showed, representative government did not exist in South Korea; the present South Korean Government had not been elected but had been installed as the result of a coup d'état. Thus, the South Korean representative now participating in the Committee's debate did not in fact represent the people of South Korea. Since he owed his position to the United States troops in South Korea, it would be strange indeed if he did not say precisely what the United States representative wanted him to say.

21. It was significant that the United States representative had devoted the greater part of his two statements to the historical background of the Korean question rather than to the present situation in South Korea. The reason was obvious: even the report of UNCURK, which was slanted in a very definite direction, could not conceal the fact that contemporary events in South Korea were making a mockery of democracy and human rights. In paragraph 33 of the report, for example, it was stated that, except for "a few demonstrations by university students in June 1962 in connexion with the question of the conclusion of a Status of Forces agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States", the period under review had been "relatively stable". The report had then gone on to indicate the reason for that stability: "Political parties were not functioning and there were no elections." In short, South Korea was today as quiet as a graveyard because the political parties had been dissolved and their leaders either imprisoned or executed.

22. In paragraph 34, after noting that its mandate called for it to observe "political developments and the development of representative government in Korea", the Commission reported that "the development of representative government was interrupted on 16 May 1961" and quoted the head of the military Government as saying that the May revolution had been "a painful surgical operation needed to protect and develop true democracy" in Korea. Thus, the Commission, whose task was to observe the unification of Korea and the maintenance of the fundamental principles of the United Nations in Korea, had done nothing more than dispassionately report that on 16 May 1961 "the development of representative government was interrupted".

23. Although the Commission was not carrying out its assigned tasks and should be dissolved, its report clearly showed that South Korea was under the arbitrary rule of a military dictatorship and that the United States military command was determining who should be put in jail and who should be let out. So long as United States occupation troops remained in South Korea, there could be no free elections there. The Commission had reported the holding of "free" elections in past years, but that had not prevented

the dissolution of Parliament and the establishment of the present dictatorship.

24. The United States contended that it could not withdraw its troops from South Korea now because North Korea and the Soviet Union hoped to seize South Korea or, at all events, to introduce certain changes there which would not be to the liking of the United States. The United States proposed that elections should therefore be held throughout all of Korea under the supervision of UNCURK before any consideration was given to the possibility of withdrawing United States troops from South Korea. He would like to know, however, how the United States representative could call for the holding of free elections in all Korea when his Government could not organize elections of any kind or ensure democratic rights in South Korea, which it controlled. The people of North Korea, who had elected a Government on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot and who were rapidly developing their economy and their culture without the benefit of foreign troops or United States advisers, would not permit outside interference in their affairs and the imposition upon them of the oppressive system now installed in South Korea.

25. Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea) said that the figures mentioned in the Soviet representative's survey of conditions in the two parts of Korea bore no resemblance to reality. Equally misleading had been the Soviet representative's references to justice in the Republic of Korea. He had spoken of "group trials" in which thousands of men had been sentenced in a single day; but the fact was that while there had of course been trials of Communist agents, election-riggers and criminals of various kinds in the Republic of Korea, they had involved only a few score of individuals, who, as UNCURK's report showed, had been accorded every legal safeguard, including the right of appeal. In North Korea, on the other hand, despite the ostensible existence of a judicial system comparable with that of the free nations, no single case had ever, in the fifteen years since the régime's inception, gone from a lower to a higher court.

26. It was true that the Republic of Korea for the time being had a military Government. The reason was that such a Government had been needed to rejuvenate the national morale and to meet the threat of Communist infiltration, agitation, sabotage and espionage. When the military Government had finished its work of national reconstruction, democracy in the Republic of Korea would be stronger than ever before.

27. In contrast, the Government in North Korea was obviously undemocratic. In fifteen years the North Korean régime had held only two elections, although its so-called Constitution called for elections every four years. In the elections to the so-called Supreme People's Assembly held on 8 October 1962, 100 per cent of the eligible voters were reported to have elected all 383 candidates; it was obvious what kind of democracy that indicated. Moreover, the Assembly had never discussed or rejected any bill forwarded from the Communist-dominated executive organs. The Soviet representative had accused the Government of the Republic of Korea of suppressing the freedom of the Press; yet there were in fact 38 daily newspapers, 291 periodicals and 12 news agencies operating in the Republic of Korea, whereas there were only two newspapers in North Korea. Finally, although the Soviet representative had tried to depict life in North Korea as heaven and life in the South as hell, millions of

refugees had fled from the North to the South, while none had fled in the opposite direction.

28. The Soviet representative had protested against "foreign interference" in Korea. Yet in 1945 and 1946 the Soviet Union had urged that Korea should be brought under a prolonged trusteeship; moreover, the Soviet representative had declared in the First Committee at the sixteenth session of the Assembly (1215th meeting) that the Korean question was a matter of concern to the peoples of the whole world.

29. The United Nations had come to the rescue of the Republic of Korea at a time of national peril and had maintained the lofty principles of its Charter. He urged the Committee to support the fifteen-Power draft resolution, under which the United Nations would continue its efforts for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea. The Republic of Korea, for its part, pledged its continued support to the United Nations in its endeavours to achieve a solution of the Korean problem.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.