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Chairman: Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL
(Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 28

The Korean question (continued):

- (a) *Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/5213 and Add.1, A/C.1/877, A/C.1/882, A/C.1/883, A/C.1/L.322);*
- (b) *The withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea (A/5140, A/C.1/869, A/C.1/877, A/C.1/882, A/C.1/883, A/C.1/884 and Corr.1, A/C.1/L.322, A/C.1/L.323)*

GENERAL DEBATE

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Choi Duk Shin, representative of the Republic of Korea, took a place at the Committee table.

1. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea, which had been included in the agenda at the proposal of the Soviet Union (A/5140), was an exceptionally important one, both for international peace and for the solution of the problem of the unification of Korea on a peaceful and democratic basis. The Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953^{1/} had provided, in paragraph 60, for the settlement by negotiation of questions relating to the withdrawal of all armed forces from Korea. Yet nine years had passed since the end of the war in Korea, and South Korea was still occupied by foreign—mainly United States—troops. At the Korean Political Conference held at Geneva in 1954, the United States representative had asserted that his country did not wish to keep its troops in South Korea for ever; but that seemed in fact to be its intention. The United States needed South Korea for strategic reasons, as a bridgehead near the frontiers of the socialist States in Asia—the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Mongolian People's Republic. That was why it spent millions of dollars to keep the South Korean régime in power. The country had been transformed into a military base covered

with war installations of all kinds. It was occupied by an army of over 60,000 men equipped with the most modern weapons, and new military facilities were being built on an ever-increasing scale. In violation of the Armistice Agreement, the United States forces had been equipped with atomic cannon and with various types of nuclear rockets and guided missiles. They were not there for show; General Magruder, former commander of the United States in South Korea, had said that if a war started the United States would certainly use atomic weapons. Those facts showed that the United States and its South Korean henchmen had not abandoned their intention of extending the colonialist régime over the whole of the peninsula. The threat to peace remained.

2. The United States forces, together with units from other States, including South Korea, constantly engaged in provocative military manoeuvres under conditions close to those of nuclear war; in 1961 alone there had been thirty-four important military exercises, some of which had included mock attacks on the territory of the Democratic People's Republic. In 1962, such activity had been stepped up, more than thirty exercises having taken place between January and October. Between the 1953 armistice and October 1962, the United States had violated the Armistice Agreement 4,592 times, including 682 violations of North Korea's air space and 208 of its territorial waters. Apart from its own activities, the United States was building up the South Korean army for military operations under modern conditions. In 1961, according to a message transmitted to Congress on 11 June 1962 by the President of the United States, South Korea had received military aid amounting to \$260 million, out of a total of \$782 million of military assistance to the Far East. The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, General Lemnitzer, had stated in April 1962 that there was no area where military preparedness was maintained at such a high level as in South Korea. As long as that situation continued, there was the danger of a revival of hostilities in Korea.

3. The fact that the United States forces in South Korea were illegally using the flag of the United Nations was damaging to the Organization's prestige. The United Nations could not remain indifferent to the situation. The presence of foreign troops in South Korea was not only a threat to international peace and security, but had resulted in the Korean people being deprived of their elementary rights and freedoms. Whatever agreements might have been signed with the South Korean puppet régime, the United States occupation was a violation of Korean sovereignty and an interference in Korea's internal affairs. The Soviet delegation had provided the members of the Committee with abundant evidence of the monstrous crimes committed by the occupying forces in South Korea. A publication of the Ministry of For-

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079, appendix A.

Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic, circulated in document A/C.1/884, cited hundreds of such cases, giving the names of the victims and the time and place of the crimes; in particular, it gave detailed information, obtained from the South Korean Press itself, on the murder of over 200 people in recent years. Such were the sufferings of the South Korean people, despite the United States claim that South Korea was being transformed into a showcase of democracy and prosperity.

4. In fact the régime in South Korea differed in no way from colonial rule; as Walter Lippmann, the American political commentator, had said, South Korea was a country created by the armed forces of the United States and maintained by the strength of the United States. Parliamentary rule had been abolished; political parties had been banned; military and police terror reigned without limit. As various observers had pointed out, the policy of militant anti-communism had led the United States to support the most reactionary and despotic régime in the world. Within one week of the military coup d'état of May 1961, all political activity had been suppressed and the most elementary principles of democracy had been abrogated, including freedom of speech, of the Press and of assembly, the right to form trade unions, to hold demonstrations, to organize strikes, and so on. Such organs of the Press as had survived were at all times subject to repressive action and closure. Under the vicious system of group trials, or police trials, as many as 5,196 persons had been tried in one day. The people were never free from the danger of arrest. Official data published by the South Korean Supreme Court showed that between January and August 1962, 49,791 persons had been summarily arrested and imprisoned. Within three months of the military coup the United States imperialists and the Korean fascist military clique had arrested more than 241,000 men for refusing to serve in the army. A considerable number of those arrested had been placed in the so-called National Construction Corps, in which they were subjected to forced labour.

5. So much for civil and political rights. The economic picture was not better. South Korea's economy was undergoing a most serious depression, accompanied by mass unemployment, poverty and famine. The annual per caput income was no more than \$65, and in the single year following the military coup, industrial production had fallen by 9 per cent. The reason was clear: the United States wished to dominate the country economically as well as politically and militarily. As the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate had said, South Korea was a clear example of United States assistance which failed entirely to satisfy the hopes of the recipient country. The standard of living was constantly falling, and was already lower than that of many other under-developed countries. Agriculture was in a catastrophic state; South Korea was at present obliged to import between 750,000 and 900,000 tons of grain annually, whereas before the war it had exported some 1,250,000 tons. At the end of 1961, the cultivated area had been 200,000 hectares less than in 1945. In the spring of 1962, more than 3 million peasants had been on the verge of starvation. Some 7 million persons, or 37 per cent of the population over twelve years of age, lacked any form of education. Funds needed for education, culture and the arts were used for military preparations and police repression. Military expenditure accounted for more than two-thirds of the national

budget, and the people of South Korea had to pay innumerable taxes in order to support an army numbering 600,000 men. In that situation, which was the direct result of United States domination, no economic progress was possible. The South Koreans were forced to labour in the interests of the United States, and any sign of protest was suppressed by the occupying forces.

6. In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, by contrast, the people administered their affairs for themselves without any foreign interference. A genuinely democratic régime had been established which represented the interests and enjoyed the support of the broad masses of the population. Clear evidence of their support for their Government had been demonstrated in the elections to the Supreme People's Assembly held on 8 October 1962; in connexion with those elections, *The New York Times*, on 11 October, had spoken of "political unity and representative government". In the progressive socialist order of the Democratic People's Republic there was no exploitation of man by man. The country had long ago overcome the consequences of its colonial past and developed a flourishing industry and agriculture. In 1961 alone, North Korean industry had produced more than its total output from 1946 to 1955. A modern industrial, material and technical basis had been established which was capable of supplying all branches of the economy with modern equipment. Under the collective system of agriculture, the output of grain was increasing rapidly; in 1961 it had amounted to 4,830,000 tons, or over 1 million tons more than in 1960. Yet only two or three years before, North Korea had been obliged to import grain. The standard of living was constantly rising: during the previous eight years there had been four rises in wages and the prices of consumer goods had been reduced on six occasions. In 1961 the national income had been 1.2 times that of 1960, and the average wage had risen by 3 per cent. The standard of living of the peasants too had improved substantially. Great progress had been made in education, technical training, culture and the arts. Before the liberation there had not been a single higher education institution in North Korea; now there were ninety-three such institutions, with 209,000 students. Thirty-seven theatres and cinemas had been built in 1961. Such were the achievements of socialism in North Korea.

7. Naturally, the eyes of the South Koreans were turned towards the North. The sole aspiration of the people in both parts of Korea was to reunite their country on a peaceful and democratic basis. It had to be remembered that the question of unification was the internal affair of the Koreans themselves. Had it not been for foreign interference, they would long ago have solved the problem. Past experience showed that attempts to use the United Nations to settle the Korean question behind the backs of the Korean people themselves would never produce any fruitful results.

8. As in the past, the report of UNCURK (A/5213 and Add.1) was designed to justify United States interference in Korea in the name of the United Nations; nothing better was to be expected from that Commission, six of whose members belonged to NATO or SEATO. Every year the Commission asserted in its report that the dictatorial puppet régime in South Korea represented a legal and democratic form of government, whereas everyone knew that South Korea was ruled by a military fascist tyranny kept in power by the United States. No wonder, then, that the Korean

people, struggling for national liberation, were indignant at the activities of the Commission. The latest report was, as usual, full of inventions and distortions, as had been clearly demonstrated by the North Korean Government in its memorandum of 24 November 1962 (A/C.1/884). The Commission had discredited itself in the eyes of world opinion and become a disgrace to the United Nations. It was time for it to be dissolved, since it served no good purpose.

9. If the United Nations really wanted to contribute to a peaceful settlement in Korea, its first act must be to end foreign interference in Korean affairs and to guarantee to the Koreans the opportunity to decide their own future without any outside pressure. That meant, of course, that all foreign troops must be withdrawn from South Korea. No arguments could justify their presence; those put forward by the United States were completely unconvincing. In the past the United States had asserted that its occupation of South Korea was justified by the presence of Chinese People's Volunteers in North Korea. But those volunteers had been withdrawn in October 1958, and since then there had been no foreign troops in North Korea. Another United States argument was that if its troops were withdrawn new hostilities might break out between North and South Korea. But since the United States troops, far from guaranteeing peace and tranquillity in Korea, were a source of discord and tension, that argument did not hold water either. If the United States troops were withdrawn from South Korea all the problems connected with the peaceful unification of Korea would be quickly solved.

10. In its memorandum of 24 November 1962 (A/C.1/884), the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had put forward constructive proposals calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea and the step-by-step unification of the country. Those proposals had been warmly received by the broad masses of the Korean people and deserved the support of the United Nations.

11. The draft resolution submitted by the United States and its allies (A/C.1/L.322) merely repeated what had been said in past resolutions from the same source. Surely, nothing was to be gained by continuing to adopt resolutions demanding the unification of Korea on United States rather than Korean terms. Knowing full well that the unification of Korea could not be achieved until foreign troops had been withdrawn from South Korea, the United States insisted that unification must be a precondition for the withdrawal of those troops; its aim in doing so was to perpetuate both the occupation of South Korea and the partition of Korea as a whole. The true nature of the policy of the United States was shown by the fact that it did not want representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to be invited to participate in the Committee's debate.

12. The Soviet delegation had submitted draft resolution A/C.1/L.323 in the firm conviction that the question of withdrawing foreign troops from South Korea was bound up not only with the cause of Korean unification but also with the fight for peace and against colonial oppression.

13. Mr. CHOI (Republic of Korea) said that although it had been before the United Nations for fifteen years, the Korean question remained unsettled. He appealed for renewed efforts to persuade those who were opposing Korean unity and independence to respect the principles of the United Nations Charter.

14. In the early part of the twentieth century, after thousands of years of independent existence, Korea had fallen under Japanese occupation. At the end of the Second World War, the Allied Powers, including the Soviet Union, had promised the country its freedom. However, the Soviet Union had turned the temporary military demarcation line running along the 38th parallel into a political frontier, thus dividing Korea into two parts, and had blocked all efforts to establish a unified, independent country.

15. In 1947, the Korean question had been brought before the General Assembly, which had established the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea in order to help the country achieve unity and independence. The authorities in South Korea had co-operated fully with the Commission, but the Soviet Union had refused to admit it to the Soviet occupation zone. The General Assembly had then recommended that elections should be held in South Korea under the observation of the Commission. Elections had taken place in May 1948, and in the judgement of the Commission had expressed the free will of some two-thirds of the Korean people. A constitution providing fair and adequate representation for the people of both North and South Korea had been adopted, and on 15 August 1948 the Republic of Korea had been established. Soon afterwards, the General Assembly had recognized the Government of the Republic of Korea as the only lawful Government in Korea and had established a new Commission on Korea to continue efforts to reunify the country (resolution 195 (III)).

16. The United States occupation forces had been withdrawn from the Republic of Korea by June 1949, and the United Nations Commission on Korea had verified that fact; however, the North Korean régime had refused to permit the Commission to verify the asserted withdrawal of Soviet forces. A year later, on 25 June 1950, Soviet-trained and Soviet-equipped North Korean Communist troops had invaded South Korea on a massive scale. In response to an appeal from the Republic of Korea, the Security Council had, on 27 June 1950, asked Members of the United Nations to furnish troops to repel the North Korean invasion; sixteen nations had done so, and many others had provided medical and other assistance. The Korean people would never forget the sacrifices made by those nations in the cause of their freedom.

17. Towards the end of 1950, the Chinese Communists had joined in the aggression against the Republic of Korea, and in February 1951 the General Assembly, in its resolution 498 (V), had condemned them as aggressors. In June 1951, the Communists had appealed for a cease-fire, and after two years of negotiation an Armistice Agreement had been concluded. The Korean war had brought death or injury to more than a million Koreans, while the United Nations forces had suffered 160,000 casualties.

18. On 7 October 1950, by its resolution 376 (V), the General Assembly had established the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) in order to help establish a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea. In 1954, the Korean Political Conference provided for in paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement had been convened at Geneva. The non-Communist side had been represented by the Republic of Korea and the sixteen nations that had contributed troops to the United Nations Command; the Communist side had been represented by Communist China, the Soviet

Union and the North Korean authorities. The non-Communist countries had agreed on three fundamental principles: that the United Nations, under its Charter, was fully empowered to take collective action in Korea, that it should supervise the holding of free elections based on proportional representation of the entire population of Korea, and that the United Nations forces should remain in Korea until the peaceful unification of that country had been achieved. Although those three principles had been rejected by the Communists, they had formed the basis for United Nations resolutions on the Korean question in subsequent years.

19. The following facts were clear from the history of the Korean question: that the partition of Korea was being maintained against the will of the Korean people; that the people and Government of the Republic of Korea were committed to the peaceful unification of Korea through free elections supervised by the United Nations; that the United Nations was committed to ensure the security of the Republic of Korea and to assist in achieving a unified Korea; that the Communists had committed aggression in Korea and had consistently denied the competence and authority of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question; and that Communist intransigence was the only reason that the Korean question continued to be unfinished United Nations business.

20. The Communists refused to accept the competence and authority of the United Nations in the Korean question because they were prepared to agree to unification only on terms that would permit them to gain control of the entire country. They demanded the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from South Korea, called for direct negotiations between North and South Korea, and insisted that "democratic elections" should be held without United Nations supervision. However, what they called "foreign troops" were in fact United Nations forces which had come at the request of the Republic of Korea in order to help repel Communist aggression. It must be borne in mind that the evacuation of United States troops in 1949 had been followed within less than a year by the North Korean invasion. If the United Nations forces now left the Republic of Korea, they would be withdrawn thousands of miles across the Pacific, whereas the Chinese Communists were just across the Yalu River in Manchuria. Moreover, the North Koreans had made their armed forces more powerful than ever, in violation of the Armistice Agreement, and in July 1961 had entered into a formal military alliance with Communist China. With regard to the Communist contention that the Korean question was one to be settled by the Koreans themselves without United Nations participation, it should be recalled that negotiations between North Korea and the Republic of Korea had been under way in 1950 at the time of the North Korean invasion; it was thus clear that the Communists did not believe in the principle of self-determination. Furthermore, the meaning which the Communists attached to the term "democratic elections" had been shown by the various elections held in North Korea since 1948, which had been contrived demonstrations of unanimity and had not been held on the basis of a secret ballot.

21. In connexion with the report of UNCURK (A/5213), he wished to point out that the Republic of Korea, unlike the North Korean régime, had co-operated fully with the Commission, as the latter acknowledged. His Government appreciated the Commission's efforts to achieve Korean unification as well as the construc-

tive view which it took of political, economic and social developments in Korea.

22. While it was true that at present the Republic of Korea had a military Government, the latter's establishment had been necessary in order to restore national morale and, in particular, to meet the threat of Communist infiltration and sabotage. However, conditions had improved to such an extent that the Government was to be returned to civilian hands in the summer of 1963. A national referendum on constitutional amendments was to be held on 17 December 1962, and free elections were to take place early in 1963 under the observation of UNCURK and of any representatives of the world Press who might wish to view them. His Government had carried out emergency economic measures designed to combat unemployment, measures which had been described by UNCURK as highly successful, and had drawn up a long-range plan of industrial development. Its economic measures were aimed at promoting the development of a free, competitive economy, whose performance would, it felt certain, surpass that of the regimented Communist economy.

23. He wished to express appreciation for the assistance his country had received from the Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, and for the substantial economic investment made in Korea by a number of non-Communist nations. He also wished to point out that the Republic of Korea, although not a member of the United Nations, had subscribed to the United Nations bond issue in the amount of \$400,000.

24. The Republic of Korea now had diplomatic relations with fifty-seven countries and belonged to twelve United Nations specialized agencies. He hoped that it would soon win membership in the United Nations, which had been prevented until now by Soviet vetoes in the Security Council. He appealed to the United Nations once again to convince those who were opposing the unification and independence of Korea that they were undermining the United Nations Charter.

25. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) said that in calling for the withdrawal of what it referred to as "foreign troops" from South Korea, the Soviet Union was actually urging the withdrawal of United Nations forces which had been sent to Korea under United Nations resolutions. The General Assembly had re-examined the Korean question at its sixteenth session, and in its resolution 1740 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 had noted that the United Nations forces which had been sent to Korea had in greater part already been withdrawn, and that the Governments concerned were prepared to withdraw their remaining forces from Korea when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the Assembly had been fulfilled. Thus, the Soviet Union was in fact asking the General Assembly to reverse its previous resolution and bring about the withdrawal of United Nations forces before the conditions for stability had been achieved in Korea. Since the Korean armistice, the Communist States had insisted that the withdrawal of United Nations forces was a prerequisite for the solution of the Korean question, and more precisely for the unification of the country; but the General Assembly had consistently declared that the United Nations forces would be withdrawn from South Korea only when Korea had been unified through the free exercise by the Korean people of its right of self-determination, and that to withdraw them prematurely would be to expose

the people of South Korea to the threat of a new aggression.

26. In its explanatory memorandum (A/5140) the Soviet Union had set itself up as the spokesman of the people of South Korea; but both UNCURK and the Government of the Republic of Korea had made it clear that the people of South Korea wanted the United Nations forces to remain in the Republic of Korea until the objectives of the United Nations were achieved. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was proposing that those forces should be withdrawn at once, despite the fact that the North Korean régime rejected the objectives in question and challenged the legitimate interest of the United Nations in promoting a solution of the Korean problem on the basis of the principles of the Charter. The Greek delegation, for its part, had joined other delegations in submitting draft resolution A/C.1/L.322, which reaffirmed the objectives of the United Nations in Korea, urged the continuance of efforts to achieve them, called upon the North Korean authorities to accept those objectives, and reaffirmed the Assembly's previous declarations that United Nations forces would be withdrawn from South Korea when the conditions for a lasting settlement were fulfilled.

Mr. Enckell (Finland), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

27. Mr. VAN DER STOEL (Netherlands) said that the fact that no progress had been made towards the unification of Korea was the fault not of the Republic of Korea but of the North Korean régime and its Communist allies, which demanded that UNCURK should be disbanded and that the United Nations should no longer interfere in the Korean question. His delegation fully agreed with the view expressed in General Assembly resolution 1740 (XVI) that the United Nations, under its Charter, was fully empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security and to lend its good offices in the search for a peaceful settlement in Korea. The unification of Korea was being prevented not by the presence of United Nations troops but by the North Korean refusal to accept the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the General Assembly.

28. He welcomed the statement made by the military Government of the Republic of Korea that political activities would be permitted in early 1963 and that the Government would give equal opportunity and assistance to both ruling and opposition parties (A/5213, para. 58). He also noted with satisfaction the statement of UNCURK that the Constitutional Amendments Bill, on which a referendum was to be held on 17 December 1962, provided legal protection for the rights and duties of citizens as human beings, including freedom of speech and the Press (A/5213/Add.1, para. 9), and was glad to note that the Republic of Korea had invited UNCURK to observe the referendum, the forthcoming presidential election and the general elections scheduled for 1963.

29. It was gratifying that positive steps of that kind had been taken despite the fact that the return to normal conditions in the Republic of Korea was made more difficult by the division of the country and the continuance of the Communist threat. However, he felt bound to express his misgivings concerning the Political Activities Purification Law referred to in the report of UNCURK (A/5213, paras. 37-44 and annex IV). That law had been promulgated to prevent

political activity by individuals who had committed political misdeeds, injured the prestige of the State or engaged in leftist activities; but all of those criteria were highly subjective and were open to use against anyone who had opposed the Government.

30. He hoped that UNCURK would make full use of the powers it had been given by the General Assembly to observe and advise on the development of representative government in Korea. Unfortunately, it was able to fulfil that task only within the territory under the control of the Republic of Korea. It was clear that, while progress had been made in the Republic of Korea in the direction of restoring representative government, dictatorial suppression had continued unabated in North Korea. In the North Korean elections of 8 October 1962, the candidates had been unopposed; and according to Pyongyang radio, 100 per cent of eligible voters had cast their ballots for those unopposed candidates. Those results simply demonstrated the effectiveness of Communist measures of oppression. If the Communist nations wanted to help the cause of democracy in Korea, they should agree to general elections in the whole of Korea under United Nations supervision.

31. Mr. HSUEH (China) welcomed the representative of the Republic of Korea to the First Committee and emphasized the close historic ties existing between the Korean and Chinese peoples. Both peoples had become the first victims of the expansion of Communist imperialism in the Far East, a process to which there would be no end unless it was stopped.

32. The only way to a peaceful solution of the Korean problem lay in granting freedom of choice to the people living in the northern provinces of Korea. The problem could not be solved by the dismemberment of Korea into two States; moreover, such an arrangement would not only violate the principle of territorial integrity guaranteed by the United Nations Charter and leave a part of the Korean people under the Communist yoke, but would be a source of danger to the entire free world; the Communist invasion of the Republic of Korea and the Communist activities in South Viet-Nam and on the Indian-Chinese border showed the futility of any attempt to achieve peaceful coexistence with communism.

33. United Nations military forces had gone to Korea to repel armed aggression by the North Korean and Chinese Communists. Some of those forces were still in Korea because the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the General Assembly had not been fulfilled. The proposal to withdraw the United Nations forces was motivated by the Soviet Union's desire to remove a serious obstacle to the expansion of Communist imperialism; if the United Nations and the Republic of Korea agreed to it, no one could guarantee that Korea would not again be attacked.

34. The presence of United Nations forces had enabled the Republic of Korea to limit its defence expenditure and to make full use of its natural resources for the development of the country. The Republic of Korea had achieved remarkable successes in economic development, which were described in the report of UNCURK. Much progress was also being made toward democratic and representative government; the new constitution was clearly democratic in character, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Choi, had just reassured the Committee that the Government would be returned to civilian control in the summer of 1963. The elec-

tions to be held in the Republic of Korea would be observed by UNCURK, which would report the facts to the world. By contrast, the so-called elections held in the northern part of Korea had been reported only by the Communist-controlled radio and Press, whose fantastically exaggerated statements would deceive no one. It was clear that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was not democratic and did not belong to the people.

35. The Republic of Korea had co-operated fully with UNCURK and had allowed it to observe conditions throughout the territory under the Government's control. The report submitted by UNCURK showed that the Republic of Korea, despite the difficulties facing it, was going forward towards a better life for all the people of Korea.

36. The work of UNCURK was extremely helpful in the fulfilment of the objectives of the United Nations in Korea. Its presence in Korea was a sign to the

people in the northern part of that country that the United Nations had not abandoned them to their present tragic fate and would eventually help them to secure their freedom of choice.

37. The United Nations should continue to work vigorously to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government. The Soviet Union wanted to put an end to the work of the United Nations in Korea in order to keep the country divided and eventually bring all of Korea under Communist rule, but the United Nations would certainly not bow to the Soviet Union or abandon the Korean people. He urged the United Nations to redouble its efforts for the admission of the Republic of Korea to membership, which had been blocked for fourteen years by the single vote of the Soviet Union.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.