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Chairman: Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL
(Sudan).

In the absence of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Csatorday (Hungary), Rapporteur, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 90

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/5197, A/5200, DC/203, A/C.1/867, A/C.1/871, A/C.1/875, A/C.1/L.312/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1, A/C.1/L.317) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. PAVICEVIC (Yugoslavia) observed that the Cuban crisis had confirmed the correctness of the thesis which the Yugoslav delegation and the delegations of other non-aligned countries had been repeating year after year, namely, that a new approach to the problem of disarmament was necessary and that adherence to old routine procedures in the negotiations might dangerously delay the settlement of the question. It was to be hoped that the statesmen of the two military blocs would not fail to draw the necessary conclusions from recent events, would finally decide to break the deadlock which was holding up negotiations and would sincerely go about the task of initiating general and complete disarmament and ridding mankind of the nuclear nightmare in which it had been living for seventeen years. In the messages they had exchanged on 27 and 28 October 1962, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the President of the United States of America had agreed to give urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, and the peoples of the world had the right to expect those intentions to be translated into deeds in the very near future.

2. The political climate and the problem of disarmament were so closely interdependent that any relaxation of international tension would facilitate the progress of the disarmament negotiations. Similarly, even the most modest progress in the field of disarmament would be conducive to a lessening of international tension. Consequently, if the negotiations in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on

Disarmament at Geneva were to have positive results it was essential to engage in parallel efforts in all spheres of international life and in particular to halt the armaments race.

3. The establishment of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the adoption of a series of basic principles had made it possible to overcome certain obstacles that had hampered negotiations in the past. There could no longer be any doubt that the direct participation of the eight non-aligned countries in the negotiations had been most useful and would be even more so when the work of the Committee was resumed, provided, of course, that the other members of the Committee, in particular the leading military Powers, also adopted a constructive approach.

4. It was obvious that, so far, the net result of the Geneva negotiations was unsatisfactory. The relative failure of the negotiations was to be attributed to the fact that the favourable effects of the settlement of such major international problems as those of Laos, Algeria and West Irian since the last session had been considerably diminished by the continuation of the armaments race: the number and intensity of nuclear tests had increased still further, military budgets had soared, the efficiency of modern armed forces had been raised and military doctrines had been revised and modernized.

5. A positive feature of the Geneva talks was that the parallel consideration of the two plans for general and complete disarmament had led to a clarification of some of the problems involved. Nevertheless, while certain areas of agreement had emerged, it was clear that no existing plan was acceptable to both parties, and that far-reaching modifications in the plans were obviously required. In that connexion, it was to be hoped that the changes recently made by the Soviet Union and the United States of America in their original plans had been inspired by a common desire to reduce divergencies.

6. With regard to the phasing of disarmament measures, the Yugoslav delegation, while insisting on the continuity of the process of disarmament, considered that in view of the immediate danger to mankind from nuclear weapons, such weapons should be eliminated at the earliest possible stage of the disarmament process. That measure should, of course, be accompanied by a parallel and radical reduction in conventional armaments. It was obvious that the nature of the first phase of disarmament would determine the nature and degree of control during that phase. If the first phase included the essential armaments, the measures of control and inspection should be commensurate with the measures of disarmament. The Yugoslav delegation had always held that disarmament would be practicable only if all the participants were certain that the agreements were observed, but control must of course be commensurate with the disarmament measures.

7. The international situation called for initial measures which would not only facilitate the implementation of general and complete disarmament but also contribute to a speedy removal of potential causes of international crises. Such measures included the cessation of all tests of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, the establishment of denuclearized zones, including Latin America, as recommended in the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.312/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1), the prevention of the further dissemination of nuclear weapons, the solution of the problem of military bases in foreign territories, the freezing of military budgets at agreed levels, and measures for preventing the accidental outbreak of war.

8. All those measures should be part of a single process leading to general and complete disarmament and the establishment of world peace and co-operation.

Mr. Adeel (Sudan) took the Chair.

9. Dato' ONG (Federation of Malaya) emphasized that so long as disarmament was not attained, the rival blocs would continue to build up their military potential. Experience had shown that with every failure in disarmament negotiations there was an increase of fear and suspicion, which in turn led to a further acceleration of the armaments race. As a result, the art of war was becoming increasingly complex and the disarmament problem increasingly intricate. With its survival at stake, mankind could ill afford further delays in the solution of the problem. It was therefore encouraging that in their recent exchange of letters the Heads of Governments of the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom had expressed their intention of resuming disarmament negotiations with renewed determination and vigour.

10. Reviewing the work of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, he noted that for the first time both the United States and the Soviet Union had submitted detailed draft treaty proposals on general and complete disarmament. The discussion in the Eighteen-Nation Committee of the various measures proposed had helped to clarify the respective positions. The fact that as a result of that discussion both sides had introduced several modifications to their original draft proposals pointed to an encouraging development in their attitudes. The participation in the Committee's work of eight countries which were not members of either of the two military blocs and which represented different geographical areas of the world marked a new step in the course of the disarmament negotiations. It had been finally recognized that disarmament was the concern of all countries, large and small, aligned and non-aligned, and not only of the great military Powers. Of even more importance, however, was the fact that, in a practical sense, the eight non-aligned members played the part of conciliators between the two opposing sides, a part that was of extreme importance in a matter where compromise was essential to progress. It had already become evident that those eight members were fully aware of their responsibilities and that, owing to their influence, the Geneva negotiations had settled down to serious and orderly discussions.

11. Because of its immensity and complexity, the disarmament problem could not be solved at one stroke. Disarmament measures had to proceed in

stages, which should be in keeping with the progress made in building up mutual confidence and should be consistent with the security of all nations. Obviously, a disarmament programme had to be so planned that at any stage of its implementation no State or group of States could gain a military advantage. Again, it was essential to ensure that all countries, and in particular the militarily significant States—including the People's Republic of China—should be bound by any resulting disarmament agreement. Without such universal participation, no disarmament treaty could be effective, nor would international peace and security be assured.

12. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should also give serious attention to the question of an international peace force and to the possibility of adopting certain collateral measures of disarmament—such as the prevention of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications, and the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons—which permitted of immediate implementation and which would contribute greatly to the lessening of tensions and the building of an atmosphere of mutual confidence.

13. It was important that the Committee should resume its work as soon as possible, and the General Assembly should encourage it to redouble its efforts. The United Arab Republic had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.317) to that effect, which the Malayan delegation intended to support.

Mr. Enckell (Finland), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

14. Mr. VAKIL (Iran) said that it would be wrong to write the Geneva talks off as a failure. Despite the stalemate, the General Assembly should urge the continuation of the negotiations until an agreement on disarmament was reached. Although the two reports before the Committee revealed theoretical and practical divergences between the two disarmament plans, there were certain encouraging elements to be noted. Both the parties had submitted the most comprehensive draft treaties that had yet been prepared. Both had shown a willingness to negotiate and a flexible attitude. In regard to inspection, the United States had made a concession to the Soviet Union in proposing the use of the sampling technique, while Mr. Gromyko had announced certain modifications in the Soviet plan which were generally taken as a conciliatory gesture. Moreover, a Committee of the Whole had been set up at Geneva for the consideration of collateral measures calculated to lessen international tension and to strengthen confidence among States.

15. According to the policy adopted by the League of Nations, no disarmament plan could be worked out unless the major points of disagreement among the great Powers were first removed, or unless there was at least a marked improvement in international relations. Consideration by the Committee of the Whole of such collateral measures as the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, the establishment of denuclearized zones, measures to reduce the risks of war by accident or miscalculation and the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons could be regarded as a resurgence of that practice. His delegation felt that the trend should be encouraged, side by side with vigorous negotiation on general and complete disarmament. Since the conclusion of an agreement did not seem to be imminent, the question of reducing the risks of war by accident or miscalcula-

tion assumed particular importance and deserved the close attention of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

16. The two draft treaties submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee were serious attempts to achieve a break-through towards an agreement on disarmament. He considered, however, that a disarmament plan should proceed cautiously and step by step, and should include provisions to ensure that measures agreed upon were carried out; verification measures were essential to such a plan. The United States plan seemed satisfactory in that respect. It was not the First Committee's task, however, to undertake a comprehensive study of the two proposals, but to make arrangements for the resumption of the talks in the hope that a compromise agreement might be evolved. In view of the fact that both parties agreed on certain points, that objective did not appear unattainable.

17. Mr. MOD (Hungary) expressed regret that the Eighteen-Nation Committee had been unable to present a draft agreement at the current session and that one of its members had not seen fit to take part in its work. The General Assembly should accordingly outline to the Committee the principles upon which it felt that future negotiations should be based. In view of the danger from weapons of mass destruction, which, in case of war, threatened not only the belligerents but all other countries as well, it was imperative that the nuclear Powers should be prevented from using such weapons. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should therefore be recommended, first and foremost, to establish the order to be followed in the disarmament measures in such a way as to ensure that the most dangerous weapons were eliminated first. To that end the Committee should contemplate first the elimination of factors which would have the effect of extending a war to the non-belligerents. In that connexion, it should be noted that the Soviet plan provided for the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage and for the destruction of those weapons in the second stage; the United States, on the other hand, was proposing that atomic disarmament should be carried out in several phases, each lasting a long time, and that at the first stage the stocks of nuclear weapons should be reduced by 30 per cent. The United States proposal would in no way decrease the danger of nuclear war because countries would be able to keep, for a long time, enough weapons to start such a war and would be able to go on manufacturing them. Moreover, so long as States retained nuclear weapons the risk of accidental war would remain. It was therefore essential to rid mankind of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. The existence of military bases on foreign territory similarly entailed a danger of the spread of war. They should therefore be eliminated in the first stage of disarmament.

18. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should also work to create mutual trust. It should therefore be asked to consider, besides the question of general and complete disarmament, any proposal regarding the establishment of denuclearized zones, the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of preliminary agreements on various questions of detail.

19. On the question of control, the United States wanted a prior inventory of existing stocks to be taken. That measure, however, would in no way guarantee the inviolability of the disarmament agree-

ment. Any party wishing to deceive the other would always find ways of doing so by concealing stocks or modifying the programme of manufacture in certain factories to enable them to produce weapons secretly. Indeed, control without disarmament would only increase the risk of war and accelerate the armaments race. What was needed was controlled liquidation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, and the dismantling or reconversion of the factories producing them. The destruction of all delivery vehicles in the first stage would guarantee that the destruction of nuclear weapons in the second stage would be carried out, for those weapons would be useless if there were no longer any delivery vehicles. The United Kingdom representative had said that the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would not be an absolute safeguard because Soviet civil aircraft of a certain type were also capable of carrying such weapons. Everyone knew that there was little difference between the transport aircraft of the Soviet Union and those of other countries. The argument of the United Kingdom seemed rather to be prompted by a desire to impede disarmament. Considering the artificial objections raised by the Western Powers, the Eighteen-Nation Committee should be asked to rule out any artificial difficulties in examining the question of control in order to facilitate agreement between the parties.

20. Despite the partial results achieved by the Eighteen-Nation Committee, it should be recognized that some basic difficulties remained to be overcome. The Cuban crisis had merely confirmed the danger of the present situation and there could be no certainty that it would always be possible to avert the peril, as the Soviet Union had done in that instance. There was, in fact, but one safe course: general and complete disarmament. Even if an agreement were reached, however, it would have to be implemented rapidly because a process of disarmament carried out in stages at a slow rate would not preclude the possibility of war and would give countries an opportunity to do away with their out-of-date weapons and to keep their most modern ones. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should therefore be instructed to fix as short a period as possible for the achievement of disarmament and to work out a draft agreement which would ensure that the process of disarmament would be rapid.

21. Mr. TARAZI (Syria) noted with regret that the negotiations on disarmament so long in progress had still produced no results, despite the fervent hopes of all peoples for a lasting peace in the world. He therefore felt that no effort should be spared to arrive at a solution.

22. The necessity for the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should be strongly emphasized. The nuclear Powers possessed sufficient stocks to destroy the entire planet and it was time that science was placed at the service of man and his welfare instead of serving purposes of destruction. Moreover, war hysteria would continue so long as nuclear weapons were not banned, and as the Cuban crisis had shown, that represented a serious danger. The peoples of the world were certainly grateful to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for having been able to preserve the peace, but the threat remained and must be eliminated once and for all.

23. In December 1959, Mr. John F. Kennedy, then a member of the United States Senate, had pointed out that the nuclear Powers were capable of destroying

all mankind and that the nuclear arms race had become a source of tension which created many other problems. The danger of the armaments race lay in the fact that policy had to be subordinated to its designs, and in that it created tension which was particularly felt in the developing countries. In the latter connexion, the considerable sums devoted to the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction could be employed to increase technical assistance, thus enabling those countries to develop. He therefore hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would be able to present tangible and fruitful results to the General Assembly at its eighteenth session.

24. Since agreement had not yet been reached on the total prohibition of nuclear weapons, it was necessary to find ways of reducing the risks and to neglect no proposal calculated to remove the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. That was why his delegation favoured the denuclearization of Africa and of Latin America and felt that the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.312/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1) deserved serious consideration. It also thought that it would be desirable to take account of the Rapacki plan, as certain delegates had suggested, and to examine every constructive proposal for the creation of nuclear-free zones. It was certain that an undertaking by the non-nuclear Powers not to manufacture nuclear weapons or keep them on their territory for other countries would be an important step towards disarmament. He recalled in that connexion the role played by foreign bases in the attack on Egypt in 1956, which showed the danger inherent in those bases.

25. Admittedly, a certain number of prior conditions would have to be fulfilled before measures of the type proposed could be taken. Without wishing to go into those conditions in detail, he recalled that those responsible for maintaining peace must understand and accept the historical imperatives of the present era—an era characterized by political and social change and particularly by the phenomenon of decolonization and by the rapid advance of science which, despite its beneficial effects, allowed man to manufacture destructive weapons. It was therefore urgent to take a course calculated to ensure peace, i.e., a course characterized by non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. When that truth was well understood, it would be easy to disarm. His delegation therefore hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would pursue its work tenaciously and that it would be able to carry out its task in the best possible conditions.

26. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) stated the reasons underlying his Government's attitude towards the question of disarmament. At the present time the world was divided into two groups—on the one hand, the Western Powers, and on the other, the nations subjected to Soviet influence whose policy was directed by the former Russian Empire, now converted into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Spain had ranged itself on the side of the Western Powers, since it would be deplorable if the USSR and the other Bolshevik countries were allowed to gain preponderance in armaments. The Soviet system was trying to impose its ideology on the whole world and was practising an expansionist policy. Mankind must be in a position to oppose that policy and display vigilance. Accordingly, although efforts had to be made to achieve general and complete disarmament, the Western Powers must be helped to take the necessary

steps to ensure peace for themselves and for other Powers.

27. The negotiations had now proceeded for sixteen years. They had been marked by changes of position and by steps backward; so far, little progress had been achieved. The joint statement of agreed principles (A/4879) might serve as a basis for the negotiations aimed at general and complete disarmament. Any disarmament agreement must provide for a balanced reduction of armaments and military forces, for compulsory measures of control, and for machinery to ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes and the maintenance of peace under United Nations auspices. The negotiations had, nevertheless, yielded certain positive results. The two draft treaties submitted by the two major military Powers had made it possible to clarify the positions of the two parties, and the eight non-aligned Powers had exerted a favourable influence. The two parties had also agreed to change their original positions. However, general and complete disarmament was still a long way off. The most important points to be settled were the balance of forces during the various stages of disarmament and the question of inspection.

28. The Spanish Government shared the views of the Western Powers and could not accept the Soviet plan, which called, at the very first stage, for the total elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, for the abolition of foreign bases and for the withdrawal of troops stationed on foreign territory—factors which constituted the very guarantees of the Western Powers. If the Soviet plan were accepted, Western Europe would be at the mercy of conventional Soviet forces. It was true that the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his speech in the Assembly's general debate (1127th plenary meeting), had made certain amendments to the Soviet plan, but those amendments would have to be examined in greater detail. The Spanish delegation approved the examination, by the Committee of the Whole of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, of what were known as collateral measures. It was not for the First Committee, however, to discuss the disarmament proposals in detail, for it was at Geneva, in a more favourable atmosphere, that such discussions should take place. That was why the Spanish delegation supported the proposal of the United Arab Republic (A/C.1/L.317).

29. The four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.312/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1) was interesting because it showed the world's determination to avoid the ravages of modern war. However, he recalled that at the sixteenth session reservations had been expressed, in connexion with a similar draft resolution concerning the denuclearization of Africa, by the United States representative, who had felt that the United Nations should not take the initiative in recommending disarmament measures limited to certain parts of the world and, moreover, exempt from control. It might be asked why such a privilege should be granted to certain regions only. In addition, all hope of reaching a world-wide agreement should not be abandoned. Recent events should moreover serve as a lesson, as they had shown that any country might meet with disagreeable surprises through the actions of unfair opponents. The draft resolution in fact prejudiced to some extent the sovereignty of States. The recommendations would appear to reduce a State's capacity to decide for itself what responsibilities it wished to

assume and what types of effort and co-operation it considered necessary for the defence of its integrity and its principles. However, the Spanish delegation wished to reserve its final decision on that proposal, since in the general interest—and in view of the high standing of the sponsors and those who had supported the draft resolution—it was sometimes necessary to keep one's apprehensions to oneself.

Mr. Adeel (Sudan) resumed the Chair.

30. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) spoke in reply to the statement by the Spanish representative, who had cast aspersions on the Soviet Union's policy, which he had represented as an imperialist policy inspired by the desire to seize control of the world, and had then spoken of the struggle against communism. That was nothing new coming from a representative of Spain, but it was surprising that that representative had made such accusations against the Soviet Union at a time when the fascist régime was shaken by the blows of the freedom-loving Spanish people. In the view of the Soviet delegation, all Members of the United Nations should express their indignation and condemn the repressive measures taken by the Franco Government against the Spanish people. That Government wished to suppress all manifestations designed to ensure respect for human rights. The declaration of the Spanish representative in no way corresponded to the opinion of the Spanish people.

31. It was not by chance that the representative of Spain had spoken against the abolition of military

bases on foreign territory and against concrete disarmament measures, or that he had stressed the need for obtaining guarantees for Western civilization. The reason for his endeavouring to justify the policy of setting up military bases on foreign territory was that there were a large number of foreign military bases on Spanish territory, which were there not only for military purposes but also for political purposes aimed at strengthening the régime which held power in that country. He listed the American military bases in Spain. Those bases could not be defensive in character, since no country was threatening Spain. The example of Spain clearly showed the real purpose of military bases abroad. For that reason the repeated proposals of the Soviet Union for the removal of all military bases from foreign territory were particularly apposite at the present time, especially in the case of Spain.

32. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) was surprised at the humanitarian scruples which the representative of the Soviet Union was displaying at so late a stage. Nevertheless, he appreciated the advice, though for various reasons the Spanish people did not need to follow it. He also pointed out that there were bases not only in Spain but in other countries, and that it was difficult to claim that the bases in Turkey and in Africa were being used to oppress the Spanish people.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.