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Chairman: Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL
(Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 90

**Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the
Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Dis-
armament (A/5197, A/5200, DC/203, A/C.1/867, A/C.1/
871, A/C.1/875, A/C.1/L.312/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.317) (con-
tinued)**

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. ADEBO (Nigeria) said that the Cuban crisis had made clear how urgent it was to find a solution to the disarmament problem. The primary purpose of the Committee's debate should be to exhort the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to speed the pace of its work with a view to achieving greater progress. He therefore endorsed the proposal of the representative of the United Arab Republic that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution urging the Eighteen-Nation Committee to resume its disarmament negotiations promptly and in a spirit of constructive compromise and to submit a progress report to the Assembly within a reasonable period of time.

2. A Nigerian delegation had taken part in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and had sought, together with the seven other delegations from non-aligned countries, to harmonize the views of the great Powers, which bore full responsibility for halting mankind's present race towards disaster. Although the Geneva discussions had not yielded spectacular results, they had not been futile. The great Powers had made several important changes in their positions, and the negotiations had proceeded in a positive atmosphere. If that atmosphere was maintained and the necessary conclusions were drawn from the events of recent weeks, there was reason to hope that important agreements could be achieved in the coming months.

3. Comparison of the United States and Soviet plans showed several important areas of disagreement between the two Powers. The Soviet Union felt that disarmament must begin with the total elimination of nuclear weapons, while the United States held that they should be gradually eliminated. As a concession, the Soviet Union had agreed to delay the elimination of nuclear weapons, provided that they were neutralized

in the first stage through the elimination of the means of their delivery. The United States stressed the need to maintain the balance of military forces while disarmament was under way. The positions of both parties had merit, and the failure to bring them closer together was probably due to the fact that each side, in formulating its plan, had given insufficient weight to the ideas put forward by the other side. Further negotiations should help to remedy that defect.

4. The problem of foreign military bases had also been discussed at length. The Soviet Union proposed that such bases should be dismantled in the very first stage of disarmament. The Nigerian delegation felt that their existence had served to aggravate international tension and to intensify the arms race, and that they should be completely eliminated as soon as possible. However, it was unrealistic to demand the removal of the bases without first taking steps to remove the fears which had brought them into existence. That called for the restoration of confidence between the neighbouring countries concerned.

5. His delegation considered it most important that any disarmament programme should provide for controls. It was essential to ensure that the initial declarations by the parties were accurate and, thereafter, to take measures of verification embodying adequate safeguards against the possibility that the security of any party would be impaired. The problem did not appear to be insoluble, and there were various possible procedures for ensuring effective control.

6. His delegation felt that halting the production of fissionable material and limiting arms expenditure would help to create an atmosphere of confidence that would facilitate the solution of the more basic problems. Action should also be taken to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. The year before, the General Assembly had resolved to make Africa a non-nuclear zone (resolution 1652 (XVI)), and at the current session a number of delegations were proposing that a similar decision should be adopted with regard to Latin America. His delegation supported those measures, which, although they did not solve the basic problems, helped to create a more favourable atmosphere for the forthcoming negotiations.

7. He deplored the polemical approach which often dominated discussion of the problem. It was to be hoped that negotiations would be resumed in a spirit of moral and intellectual honesty and that each side would try to understand the other's motives. The parties must adopt the language of charity and conciliation rather than that of arrogance and intransigence.

8. Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma), recalling the danger that the world had just escaped, expressed the hope that the lesson of the Cuban crisis would not prove to have been in vain. The danger was still present, and the only way to protect mankind against nuclear war was to reach agreement on disarmament.

9. His delegation was keenly disappointed at the Eighteen-Nation Committee's failure to make more substantial progress in the Geneva negotiations. Disarmament admittedly posed very complex problems, since issues like those relating to balance, verification and peace-keeping machinery affected the security and sovereignty of nations. In the divided world of today, it was not surprising that the Geneva negotiations had reached something of an impasse on those vital issues. While it would not be accurate to say that no progress of any kind had been made towards general and complete disarmament, the progress achieved had been of a purely marginal nature, and the main problem had not yet been solved. Nevertheless, his delegation had not lost hope, and it felt that redoubled efforts should be made to reach agreement.

10. It was regrettable that the Conference had failed to take any measures designed to contain the disarmament problem while a formula for general and complete disarmament was being sought. It was most important, in that connexion, to bring an end to nuclear testing, which served to intensify the arms race; his delegation was happy that the First Committee had devoted a great deal of time and attention to that matter.

11. Steps should also be taken to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons; the observations made in that regard by the Irish and Swedish delegations deserved careful study by the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Moreover, the nuclear Powers should be urged to halt their experiments in outer space, including those conducted for peaceful purposes, until such time as the world regained its unity and its sanity. Those collateral measures, which did not have as vital a bearing on the security and sovereignty of the great Powers as did the basic problem of general and complete disarmament, should be given the highest priority by the Eighteen-Nation Committee when it reconvened. No statement on disarmament would be complete without some reference to measures designed to reduce the possibility of the outbreak of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications. That was an important matter, for, whether war broke out by accident or by design, the result would be the same. He hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would give priority to that problem which was also included in its agenda.

12. He would like to say in conclusion that Burma, which was a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, would do all it could in that Committee to present the viewpoint of the small nations of the world.

13. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that the recent international crisis had demonstrated the extreme precariousness of the nuclear balance and had emphasized the urgent need for solving the problem of disarmament. It had also highlighted the essential role which the United Nations could and should play in the great work of disarmament. It had already been recognized when the Eighteen-Nation Committee had been created that it was not sufficient to inform the United Nations of the results of discussions between the principal parties; the United Nations must take a direct part in the actual negotiations. Thus, the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee were representatives not only of their Governments but also of the General Assembly; and as such they had a duty to uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter with firmness and courage.

14. The disarmament treaty, which was the goal of the negotiations, was not an ordinary treaty affecting only the interests of the parties; it was not a contractual treaty but a law-making treaty, in which a moral and juridical element was involved. If any essential provision of the treaty was not implemented, the balance would be destroyed and the danger of a nuclear conflict would become immediate. For that reason the procedures for the implementation of the treaty and, in particular, the control of its implementation were of the first importance. Control was not simply a concession made by the parties or an extrinsic guarantee of an optional nature; it was inherent in the very essence of a disarmament treaty. If control was not perfectly organized from the very beginning of the disarmament process, and if it failed to eliminate any possibility of a loophole, it would not provide adequate guarantees either for the parties or for mankind. The control system must come into being with the treaty itself, and the agency responsible for administering it should be able to take initiatives and to co-ordinate the implementation of disarmament measures. If the control agency was to be truly effective, it would clearly be preferable, as was recommended by the eight neutral nations in their memorandum of 16 April 1962,^{1/} that the scientific should predominate over the political element in its membership. Its members should be persons of unquestioned authority in the fields of nuclear physics and international law.

15. One of the most important conditions for disarmament, as had been recognized by the United States and the Soviet Union in their joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (A/4879), was the balancing of all measures of disarmament, so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security was ensured equally for all. It was therefore necessary to proceed cautiously and gradually. Moreover, as had been rightly pointed out by the Burmese representative, to attempt to bring about complete disarmament at one stroke would delay the conclusion of certain partial agreements which might reduce international tension and bring about co-operation between the Powers.

16. His delegation supported the proposals made by the representatives of Ireland (1267th meeting) and Sweden (1270th meeting) on the necessity of preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons. It also endorsed draft resolution A/C.1/L.312/Rev.1, which applied that idea by extending to Latin America the principle of denuclearization which had been approved by the General Assembly at its sixteenth session.

17. In conclusion, he expressed his conviction that the nuclear Powers would overcome the technical and psychological obstacles which were still preventing disarmament and that, abandoning outmoded concepts of sovereignty and power, they would inaugurate an era of peaceful coexistence based on trust and understanding.

18. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) believed that every country should participate in the endeavours to arrest the armaments race and help to bring about general and complete disarmament. It was in that spirit that his Government had, since 1957, recommended the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe in order to reduce tension and facilitate the solution

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. J.

of the question of general and complete disarmament. It was regrettable that the Western Powers had refused to consider the Rapacki plan, which could have succeeded in arresting the dangerous course of events in Central Europe, provided valuable experience of co-operation in the field of disarmament and given an opportunity to test various methods of control and inspection. However, he was gratified to note the United States representative's recognition of the fact that many regional disarmament problems could be solved without waiting for a general agreement. He hoped therefore that the Western Powers would at last agree to consider the Polish plan in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. In the same context, he was greatly interested in the proposal of Brazil, Bolivia and Chile (A/C.1/L.312/Rev.1) on the denuclearization of Latin America, as well as in the suggestions made by the Irish representative with regard to preventing the further dissemination of nuclear armaments. For that reason he agreed with the Swedish representative that it would be desirable to transmit to the Eighteen-Nation Committee the report of the Secretary-General and the replies of Governments with regard to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1664 (XVI) (DC/201 and Add.1-3).

19. The results achieved by the Eighteen-Nation Committee were not entirely satisfactory. To be sure, a certain "rapprochement" between the parties had been achieved, thanks to the constructive attitude of the socialist countries. Unfortunately, the Western Powers had been less helpful, and a number of key questions had not been clarified because of their position. His delegation believed that the Soviet disarmament plan was a realistic one, since it provided, in the very first stage, for effective disarmament steps which would eliminate the danger of a nuclear war. It was because that danger called for radical measures that the Soviet plan included, at the very beginning, the elimination of means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the liquidation of military bases in foreign territories, and in the second stage, the elimination of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, the danger of nuclear war would scarcely be eliminated by the United States plan, under which, at the beginning of the last stage, States would retain 35 per cent of their nuclear delivery vehicles, 50 per cent of their chemical and bacterial weapons and a considerable quantity of nuclear arms. In fact, the primary intention of the United States was to pursue its policy of the "balance of terror", as was confirmed by a statement made in a television interview the preceding evening by General Norstad.

20. Turning to the problem of control, he wished to say that the socialist States would accept any form of control and inspection that was commensurate with the scope of the disarmament measures implemented. But control without disarmament would only increase the existing distrust; verification of existing armaments was a disclosure of military potential and therefore an encouragement to surprise action. On the other hand, if the Western Powers agreed to the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, as was provided in the first stage of the Soviet plan, they would be assured of complete and effective control. The same was true of the remaining stages of the Soviet plan, which also provided for a very strict system of control after the completion of disarmament. It seemed therefore that the objections of the Western Powers on the question of control were only pretexts for rejecting any realistic disarmament proposal of the socialist States. That attitude

was one of the causes of the failure of disarmament negotiations up to the present time.

21. He recalled the many concessions already made by the Soviet Union, and was gratified to note that the Canadian representative had recognized that the new concession announced by the Soviet Union at the beginning of the session might help the parties find a way out of the existing impasse. The new Soviet proposal took into account the apprehension expressed by the United States and the United Kingdom concerning the effect which the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the liquidation of bases would have on their defensive potential. It also took into consideration the suggestions made by nations such as Nigeria and the United Arab Republic in order to facilitate a compromise agreement. His delegation therefore hoped that the Western Powers would appreciate the significance of the Soviet concessions and that they would demonstrate a readiness to seek solutions acceptable to all.

22. The Committee should not confine itself to mere appeals to the parties to speed up the preparation of a draft disarmament treaty. It must also provide the Eighteen-Nation Committee with directives for its work in the immediate future. In his delegation's view agreement was possible, despite the continuing differences, and must be achieved urgently. The longer the delays, the greater would be the danger of political conflicts which would prevent the parties from solving the problem of disarmament. The Polish delegation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee would spare no efforts to achieve a satisfactory solution.

Mr. Enckell (Finland), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

23. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking on a point of order, said that the Soviet Union had voted in favour of the resumption of work by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 12 November to consider the question of the cessation of nuclear tests. For practical reasons he had suggested that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should meet in New York, but the United States and the United Kingdom had objected. The Eighteen-Nation Committee would not be able to resume consideration of the problem of general and complete disarmament until the General Assembly had completed its discussion of the matter—in other words, until perhaps 22 or 23 November. He had always favoured the prompt resumption of the proceedings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. For that reason he had been very surprised to read an article in The New York Times of 10 November, stating that he had proposed that the work should not be resumed until January 1963. That statement was completely erroneous.

24. Mr. DEAN (United States of America), speaking on a point of order, said that his delegation had been prepared to resume negotiations that very day at Geneva, which was in fact the agreed meeting-place of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. He had suggested that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should reconvene on 19 November so as to abide by the wording of General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVI). He certainly had no desire to shut off the debate on disarmament, but he believed that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should resume its work as soon as possible, on the understanding that it would consider the question of general and complete disarmament only after the General Assembly had finished its consideration of the matter.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.