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Chairman: Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL
(Sudan).

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Enckell (Fin-
land), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

AGENDA ITEM 77

**The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-
nuclear tests (A/5141 and Add.1, A/C.1/873, A/C.1/874,
A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2, A/C.1/L.311) (continued)**

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

1. Mr. JACOME (Ecuador) said that although the General Assembly was the highest representative body in the world, it did not have the power to impose a solution in the matter of nuclear testing. Nevertheless, the nuclear Powers could not disregard the memorandum submitted in Geneva on 16 April 1962^{1/} by the eight non-aligned countries which the Assembly, at its previous session, had appointed to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in the hope that their impartial mediation would lead to agreement. The Assembly should endorse the eight nations' recommendations; in doing so, it would be satisfying the universal demand for the ending of the nuclear arms race and taking a first step towards the effective prohibition of war. It should be noted that theoretically war was already forbidden by the Charter of the United Nations, as were acts which endangered international peace and security. While everyone hoped that the nuclear Powers would honour their commitments under the Charter and that they were sincere in their often expressed desire for peace and negotiated settlements, the fact remained that they continued to accumulate weapons of mass destruction and to threaten the survival of mankind by testing them. As the Mexican representative had said, the nuclear Powers had no right to decide the fate of other nations. In any case, each of the opposing sides claimed that it already possessed sufficient weapons to annihilate the other. What, then, was the purpose of developing them further, if not to blow up the earth?

2. The participants in the nuclear arms race must heed the pleas of the peoples of the world and cease to poison the atmosphere. Unfortunately, the Geneva

negotiations had foundered, despite the apparent progress achieved, because of the differing interpretations given to the provisions in the eight-nation memorandum concerning international control of underground tests. But it would appear that, if the two sides could not agree on that question, the most logical course would be for the authors of the document to give their definitive interpretation. The General Assembly would not be the best place for them to do so, but when the Eighteen-Nation Committee resumed its meetings they might be asked to state their position, which the nuclear Powers would then be asked to accept as final. Alternatively, the Assembly itself, knowing from experience the doubtful value of promises, might recommend the form of compulsory control provided for in the memorandum. Operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2 might be amended to that effect: the memorandum would be accepted as a basis for negotiation on the understanding that the different interpretations on the question of control, which were the product of mutual distrust, would be abandoned in favour of the general interpretation. Such an amendment might open the way to agreement.

3. Again because of lack of confidence, the nuclear Powers had not accepted the Mexican proposal that 1 January 1963 should be fixed as the deadline for the cessation of tests. The purpose of that proposal was to protect mankind from the dangers of fall-out while a final test ban treaty was being negotiated. It called in effect for an indefinite moratorium, adopted not as a revocable unilateral declaration but as an agreement binding on Governments. But any effective agreement must carry some guarantee of its observance. Given the present state of international relations, the proposed moratorium should be made subject to the international control provided for in the eight-nation memorandum, in the form decided upon by the nations in question or by the Assembly. An amendment to that effect should be made in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

4. There was no denying that the issue of tests was a political one. The danger of nuclear war arose from the concealed world conflict known as the cold war. The ending of that war might be a distant hope, but the fears of mankind could be assuaged to some extent by the cessation of tests and the Assembly must make that its urgent task.

5. Sir James PLIMSOLL (Australia) said his Government had hoped, particularly after the recent exchanges of messages between the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR, that the First Committee would adopt a single resolution designed to further the progress thus far achieved on the question of a test ban agreement, rather than divide on conflicting draft resolutions which would force countries to take sides between the nuclear Powers. Since, however, the Committee

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex I, sect. J.

was to vote on two draft resolutions, he felt that it would be useful to survey the existing situation in the light of the First Committee's debate and of recent events in connexion with Cuba.

6. One major lesson of the Cuban crisis was that the world would remain in great danger so long as the disarmament problem remained unsolved and so long as nuclear weapons remained available for use in war. But there was also a second lesson, in the technical field which had been discussed by the Committee in recent weeks. In the course of the Cuban debate in the Security Council, differences had arisen as to the existence of certain weapons in a particular place, as to their nature and as to the credibility of national means of detection. The negotiators of a test ban treaty had to consider what could be done in situations of that kind, in which the national means of detection used by one Power were challenged by another Power.

7. A number of delegations, including his own, believed that it was not enough merely to call upon the nuclear Powers to stop testing, when it was clear that the three major Powers concerned did not agree on the conditions for a test ban. There would be no point in the First Committee's endorsing either the United States-United Kingdom proposal or the Soviet proposal, seeing that neither was acceptable to all the parties.

8. The crux of the matter concerned the identification—or even the detection—of underground nuclear tests. One could not be sure that all tests would be detected or identified, or that all phenomena that were considered to be tests were necessarily so. The United States representative had made it clear that his country had carried out in Nevada a number of underground tests which had remained unidentified and even undetected by stations outside the United States, despite the fact that such stations had been given in advance the precise time of the explosions. The figures for United States underground tests quoted during the current debate by representatives of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian SSR had varied. But the purpose of inspection was not simply to prove that infringement had occurred, but also to disprove false identifications. The United States representative had told the Committee that in 1958 the Soviet Union had announced that it had detected the detonation of a United States device, when in fact there had not been any explosion. Thus it was in the interest both of the Western nuclear Powers and of the Soviet Union that the true facts should be established, by reliable means, in any question relating to underground testing.

9. He did not regard inspection as a restrictive device to be forced on one or another nuclear Power, or on all of them. On the contrary, if there was to be progress in disarmament, a way would have to be found to broaden the access of all countries of the world to information about what was going on in other countries. That was a goal which was desirable in itself, and should not be dismissed with words such as "espionage". Accordingly, since his delegation had to vote on two draft resolutions, it would vote for the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.311).

10. He could not support draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2, principally because of the varying interpretations placed on the provision, in operative

paragraph 2, "that such tests should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963". Some representatives considered that requirement to be unconditional, while others considered it to be subject to other paragraphs of the draft resolution. But a vague resolution that meant all things to all men might result in discord and possibly even charges of bad faith in the future.

11. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should resume its work at Geneva as quickly as possible. He hoped that its efforts, together with those of the three nuclear Powers, inspired by the spirit of the messages recently exchanged between the Heads of their Governments, would result in an agreement which was acceptable both to the nuclear Powers and to all other countries, and which would not only bring about a cessation of nuclear tests but also give the world some certainty that they would never again be resumed.

12. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden) expressed gratification that the gaps between the Eastern and Western positions on the cessation of nuclear testing had narrowed and, in particular, that the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had responded rather favourably to the proposal for an early cut-off date for all testing. It was clear that the simultaneous cessation of all testing would not affect the world balance of power and that there were no major practical or technical obstacles to such a step. Her delegation therefore felt that the Committee should adopt a resolution clearly setting forth the broad principles on which there was agreement and leaving the practical aspects of a test ban to be decided by negotiation.

13. Since various interpretations of draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2 had been put forward by members of the Committee, she wished to state that in sponsoring the resolution her delegation had not intended to indicate a negative attitude towards proposals for a partial test ban agreement, for it felt that any agreement between the nuclear Powers would represent a step towards the ultimate banning of all tests. However, a partial test ban must not, of course, serve the purpose of legalizing underground tests.

14. The first two operative paragraphs of the draft resolution were deliberately worded so as not to exclude the possibility that a nuclear Power might voluntarily choose to stop testing; in that respect, the draft resolution merely reiterated an appeal made in past General Assembly resolutions. However, the sponsors were in no sense calling for a cut-off date without controls. Her delegation continued to support the proposals for a verification system contained in the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962, which was endorsed in operative paragraph 3 as a basis for negotiation. However, the question whether internationally binding agreements were necessary for a test ban, and the conditions to be laid down for such a ban, were matters which could be decided only by the nuclear Powers.

15. Her delegation would like to offer some practical suggestions on the crucial question of controls. It might be that by 1 January 1963, the proposed cut-off date for all testing, the nuclear Powers would still be deadlocked on the question of underground tests. The non-nuclear Powers could, however, not recede from the demand that underground testing should

also be discontinued, because, among other things, it might lead to the emergence of new nuclear Powers. A possible approach would be an arrangement that made an underground test ban less uncontrolled, even if, for a certain period of time, it continued not to be covered by a detailed and final treaty. The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs had suggested at the 1252nd meeting that underground testing should be banned for a limited period, and a similar idea had been voiced in the First Committee by, among others, the United Arab Republic, Norway, Cyprus and Israel.

16. Such an arrangement would be compatible with the present positions of both the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was prepared to agree to the discontinuance of underground testing pending further negotiations, and such negotiations obviously could not be carried on indefinitely. Moreover, the comprehensive test ban treaty proposed by the Western Powers would in effect permit a certain period of "uncontrolled" discontinuance of testing, since its provisions implied that the contemplated control machinery could not start functioning until at least six to twelve months after the treaty had entered into force. Her own and several other delegations therefore advocated a provisional underground test ban of six to twelve months, or perhaps as much as two years, during which time controls of a kind acceptable to the two main parties concerned and which could be established without delay would be introduced to the widest possible extent.

17. The most important immediate step would be the establishment of the international commission of scientists envisaged by the eight-nation memorandum. The section of the memorandum relating to the commission had been explicitly accepted by the two blocs. Moreover, the proposal made by Sweden in the Eighteen-Nation Committee for the immediate establishment of the commission had been endorsed by the United Kingdom representative at Geneva more than four months before, and the same suggestion had been made in the First Committee by many delegations, including those of Canada, Cyprus, Burma and Norway. Although the commission could be only an interim body for the present, it should be entrusted with some of the functions envisaged in the eight-nation memorandum. Specifically, it should be provided with electronic computing equipment and rapid communication facilities to enable it to evaluate data from the hundreds of national observation stations which were already in existence. It should be noted that the failure of any such station to maintain continuous communication with the commission would inevitably be noticed and arouse suspicion. The commission would also be able to undertake such auxiliary tasks as comparing the geophysical records for 1961-1962 with the information provided by the nuclear Powers concerning the tests which they had acknowledged carrying out during that period. In addition, it would be able to acquire a great deal of valuable information about technical questions of instrumentation, desirable locations for observation stations, etc.

18. The functions of the interim commission would not necessarily include that of organizing on-site inspections. However, if an opportunity should be afforded to carry out such an inspection in any country, it would be of immeasurable value in demonstrating whether such inspections could in fact determine the origin of unexplained seismic phenomena.

19. In its report to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session, the Economic and Social Council had drawn attention to its resolution 912 (XXXIV) on international co-operation in the field of seismological research.^{2/} Her delegation would suggest in that connexion that it would be in the interest of the First Committee's work on disarmament if the conference on international seismological co-operation which it was proposed to hold in 1963 or 1964 could be held in 1963, and if an item on international scientific co-operation in the identification of all seismic events was added to its agenda.

20. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that there was unanimous agreement on the need to introduce a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests as soon as possible. It was therefore unfortunate that the Committee should be faced with a choice between two draft resolutions. The decisions of the General Assembly carried great moral authority, and that authority would be diminished if it were evident that there were considerable differences of opinion on the means of achieving the common goal.

21. Some delegations held the view that the function of the General Assembly was merely to promote negotiations, but the Peruvian delegation considered that it must also be represented in them. The latter view had been followed in the establishment of the Eighteen-Nation Committee at the previous session, since the eight neutral representatives, although representing their Governments, had received an explicit mandate from the Assembly. He had stated at that time that it would be quite proper for the matter to be referred back to the Assembly if the negotiations gave rise to difficulties which could not be solved by the intervention of the eight neutrals, provided that the issues were not too technical to be settled by the Assembly.

22. Such difficulties had in fact arisen; but it was clear that the problem was simple in form. It was established that international control was unnecessary for tests not carried out underground. With respect to underground tests, the non-aligned countries had put forward a well-conceived plan, in which the only change necessary was to make the optional provisions compulsory. Until proof was presented that it was scientifically possible to detect and identify any explosion by national means, common sense and legal wisdom demanded the institution of control. As the United Kingdom representative had suggested, if the Soviet Union possessed instruments capable of detecting and identifying all underground explosions, it was its duty to pass its knowledge on to the Assembly. If such means of identification did not exist, however, there was no justification for making control taboo. It was recognized legal practice to include guarantees in any treaty when there was the slightest possibility of non-compliance. Since that would be the case with a test ban treaty, control was essential. Such control must not, of course, infringe national sovereignty; but to say that any kind of control was a violation of sovereignty was to make international relations impossible. Ever since the signing of the Charter of the United Nations, international law had taken precedence over the abusive exercise of national sovereignty.

23. On the question of espionage, the United States representative had offered every possible guarantee.

^{2/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 3, p. 59.

He had said that there would be only a limited number of inspections, that the inspectors would go only to certain places and that they would be authorized to go to other places only under the supervision of the host country. The teams of inspectors would consist mainly, or even exclusively, of scientific experts, so that control would be taken out of the political field. Thus, there was absolutely no reason for the Soviet Union to fear control or to insist that the proposed international commission must wait for an invitation from the country concerned before making an inspection it considered necessary. If the Soviet Union would overcome its fears, it should be possible to sign a treaty before the end of 1962. That could perhaps be done in New York, with the co-operation of the eight non-aligned nations.

24. Holding those views, he had some difficulty in accepting draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2 as a whole. Although there were elements of incontestable value in its preamble, its operative part might be interpreted as implying a moratorium. If it was made clear that that was not the correct interpretation, but rather that the resolution was intended to pave the way to the conclusion of a treaty, he would be able to vote for it.

25. If it proved impossible to reach agreement on the suspension of underground tests, it would be wrong to take the position that no treaty of any kind was possible. Negotiations could be continued and the scientific committee could get on with its work, with the object of finding some means of identifying underground tests by national means. But meanwhile mankind could be freed from the danger of further radio-active fall-out. If the world failed to check that growing danger, it would be betraying the sacred principle established by past generations that immediate interests must yield to those of the generations to come.

26. Whether he abstained or voted for draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2, he would vote for the Western Powers' draft resolution (A/C.1/L.311) which provided that negotiations should be resumed on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum while in addition making provision for control. It would be recalled that at the previous session the Assembly had voted in favour of a suspension of tests under effective international control, the only contrary votes being cast by members of the Soviet bloc. That resolution remained in force, although it no longer applied in the case of tests not carried out underground. Thus the principle of control had not been abandoned. Since there was no draft resolution before the Committee calling upon the great Powers to drop their conditions and, in particular, appealing to the Soviet Union to accept the principle of control, the Peruvian delegation would cast its vote in the way he had described.

27. Mr. MATSCH (Austria) said that his delegation would vote for both draft resolutions before the Committee, though he was afraid that in their existing form they would have no beneficial consequences. Representatives of two nuclear Powers had stated that they would vote against draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2 because it provided for an uncontrolled and unlimited moratorium on all nuclear tests beginning 1 January 1963—which in their opinion would have the effect of postponing the day when all tests would be banned for ever. On the other hand, the representative of the third nuclear Power had told

the Committee that the Western Powers' draft resolution (A/C.1/L.311) was unsatisfactory, for reasons which had been explained previously, and had repeated his delegation's view that all testing should cease by 1 January 1963—tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water being prohibited, and tests underground suspended while negotiations were carried on for their prohibition by treaty. In order to overcome those difficulties, so that tests might be ended *de facto* by 1 January 1963, his delegation suggested two measures.

28. First, the members concerned should be urged to improve further, by national or international efforts, methods for the fullest possible identification of all detected seismic events. In that connexion, he wished to clarify a misunderstanding which had arisen in connexion with the suggestion he had made at the 1247th meeting. What he had suggested was the convening not of an international conference but of a small working group of scientists or of the international scientific commission mentioned in the eight-nation memorandum, to begin work at once on the development of identification methods. Such efforts would prevent the moratorium on underground tests from becoming an unlimited one, for it could reasonably be expected that sooner or later the universal identification of all seismic events would become a reality.

29. Secondly, in order to ensure that the moratorium was not an uncontrolled one, he suggested that the international commission of scientists mentioned in the eight-nation memorandum should be established as soon as possible, to be available for such tasks as the parties concerned might entrust to it. On the crucial issue whether on-site inspections should be compulsory or should take place by invitation, a compromise could be suggested: that the international scientific commission, having collected and examined all relevant facts relating to a suspicious seismic event, should recommend—not decide but recommend—verification on the site. If such a recommendation was made, the country in question should extend an invitation for such an on-site visit, as its prestige would demand.

30. His delegation hoped that the three nuclear Powers would give favourable consideration to those suggestions for improving the conditions of the interim moratorium on underground tests to start on 1 January 1963 pending the conclusion of negotiations for a treaty to prohibit all nuclear weapon tests in all environments for ever.

31. Mr. DEAN (United States of America), after briefly reviewing the efforts made in recent years to put an end to nuclear weapon testing, explained his Government's position on the draft resolutions under discussion. The United States and the United Kingdom were prepared to sign a treaty banning all tests in all environments; on such a treaty, further negotiations at Geneva would be necessary. They were also prepared to sign immediately a treaty banning all tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, while negotiations continued on the more comprehensive treaty. The United States could not support draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2 because it appeared to imply an uninspected and uncontrolled moratorium, which, in his delegation's view, would not help to bring about agreement.

32. The draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.311), calling upon the parties to end all testing in all environments

under effective international control, or in three environments without any control, was not incompatible with draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2. While many representatives might wish to vote for the latter, they would be making a valuable contribution if they would also give their support to draft resolution A/C.1/L.311.

33. His Government would continue to devote its efforts and resources to solving the problem of positively identifying underground nuclear explosions. Its principal hope, however, was the conclusion of a lasting treaty, with effective international control, which would put an end to all nuclear testing. For that reason it urged the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/L.311.

34. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2 could provide the basis for further negotiations on a nuclear test ban, since it embodied the three main principles on which most members of the First Committee were agreed: that all nuclear tests should be halted, that there should be a cut-off date for testing, and that the eight-nation joint memorandum afforded the basis for an agreement. The President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had agreed in their recent exchange of messages

that it was possible to conclude a test ban agreement. He hoped that the United States delegation would be as flexible on that matter as the Soviet Government had been in recent days with regard to matters of a far more acute nature, so that a common basis for agreement could be found.

35. He recalled that, although the draft resolution on general and complete disarmament introduced in the First Committee in 1960 by twelve non-aligned States^{3/} had not been accepted by the United States as a basis for negotiation, its basic provisions had subsequently been reflected in the principles for general and complete disarmament agreed upon by the Soviet and United States Governments. Similarly, draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2, although it suffered from certain weaknesses on which he might comment later, could provide a basis for the further work of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and of the sub-committee of the three nuclear Powers, so that an agreement banning all nuclear tests by 1 January 1963 could be concluded.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Session, Annexes, agenda items 67, 86, 69 and 73, document A/C.1/L.259 and Add.1-2.