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Chairman: Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL
(Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 77

The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/5141 and Add.1, A/C.1/873, A/C.1/874, A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.311) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. SANTOS MUÑOZ (Argentina) noted that the members of the Committee were in agreement in considering the question of banning nuclear tests to be of such urgency and importance that its consideration should be given absolute priority. During the previous twelve months, the number of nuclear explosions had increased in geometric progression, and the power of the explosions was also increasing. Nevertheless, the prospects for an agreement banning the tests appeared somewhat more favourable than formerly. The improvement of detection methods had made it possible for the Western Powers to reduce their demands with regard to control. The Soviet Union, for its part, while advocating control by national means of detection, conceded the possibility that an international commission of experts might be invited by Governments to conduct investigations on their territory. That narrowing of the gap had not been the result of scientific progress only; the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva had contributed substantially towards it, and the eight neutral countries, in particular, had opened a very encouraging possibility by submitting their memorandum of 16 April 1962^{1/} to serve as a basis for negotiations between the nuclear Powers.

2. It was generally recognized that the continuation of testing was greatly increasing international tension, that the conventional arms race was accelerating because some countries whose nuclear weapons were less highly perfected were fearful of being outstripped and that the nuclear Powers already possessed an arsenal large enough to destroy mankind. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union now appeared to agree on the possibility of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water without the establishment of international control machinery. With regard to the

detection of underground explosions, some progress had been made by reason of the fact that a large number of countries had been able, using their own facilities, to record several underground tests which had been carried out without prior notice by the United States, the Soviet Union and France. It continued, however, to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to detect and identify low-yield tests carried out with certain precautions in certain earth formations and at certain depths. It was possible, as the United States representative had stated, that the USSR was capable of detecting such explosions with its own instruments—in which case it was difficult to understand why it refused to reveal the method used—but the Western Powers did not yet possess those means and therefore had to insist on international on-site inspection as the only method by which they could determine the good faith of the other party. Moreover, the need for controls in that connexion had already been recognized by the General Assembly, which, in its resolution 1649 (XVI), had specified that the treaty should have as its objective the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments under inspection and control machinery adequate to ensure compliance with its terms.

3. The eight neutral members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had stressed in their memorandum the possibility of establishing on a purely scientific and non-political basis a system of continuous observation and effective control which would combine action by national agencies with that of the international commission of scientists whose establishment they advocated. In that connexion, the only logical way in which that commission's role could be conceived was to accept the hypothesis that the State in whose territory a suspect event occurred would be required, upon the suggestion of the commission, to invite the latter to carry out an inspection. Having visited the site, the commission would communicate its observations to the Powers concerned. Since the composition of the commission, as well as the inspection procedure and the duration of the inspection, would be agreed upon in advance, the risk of espionage appeared to be very slight.

4. It was essential that the treaty banning nuclear tests should contain a clause ensuring absolute compliance. In view of the technical advances which had been made, control of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water could be carried out by national machinery. As far as underground tests were concerned, since the possibility of identifying them by national means was still the subject of some controversy, it would be necessary to resort to an impartial international system which would be as limited as possible in order that it might be accepted by all countries.

5. It had been alleged that a partial treaty of the type in question would not be in keeping with the final

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. J.

objective, which was the prohibition of all types of nuclear tests. In that regard it should be recalled that, while nations had not found satisfactory means of abolishing war, they had nevertheless endeavoured to reduce its horrors through the conclusion of conventions on such subjects as the humanitarian treatment of the wounded, prisoners of war and the civilian population, and the prohibition of the bombing of open cities. Those measures had achieved a considerable improvement of the previous situation. Similarly, until an end had been put to nuclear tests in all environments, efforts should be made to prohibit those which were most dangerous to health and to the future of the human race. Some representatives had argued that a prohibition of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water would be tantamount to legalizing underground tests. However, since nuclear tests were not now prohibited in any environment, the legal status of underground tests would remain the same even if a treaty on the prohibition of tests failed to mention them.

6. Consequently, in view of the prevailing climate of mistrust, the most acceptable formula would be a declaration in which the Assembly would recommend the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition—without inspection—of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and would support all efforts for the negotiation of an agreement on the prohibition of underground tests which would provide for the minimum amount of international control consistent with the general security and take account of the scientific devices available to the parties.

7. The Argentine delegation would also support a moratorium, provided that the necessary control measures were taken to ensure that the obligations undertaken were respected by all parties. That condition was justified by regrettable previous experience. Moreover, the Government of one Western hemisphere country, betraying the principles it had pretended to defend, had permitted the Soviet Union to install on its territory launching pads for nuclear missiles directed against the American continent. It must not happen that tomorrow, under the cloak of a treaty based merely on the good faith of the signatories, one of them might secretly perfect its nuclear weapons and entrap those who complied with their contractual obligations.

8. Mr. BUDO (Albania) said that in his opinion the reason why the question of the prohibition of nuclear test explosions had not yet been solved was the negative stand taken by the United States and its allies. His delegation could not share the optimism expressed by some delegations because it felt that the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had not produced any concrete results. The United States position actually remained unchanged because, while that country accepted the prohibition of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, it continued to demand that its right to conduct underground tests should be recognized so that it could continue with the development of atomic weapons and with the armaments race. To justify its position, it claimed that it did not possess instruments of sufficient sensitivity to detect underground tests and proclaimed its willingness to conclude an international treaty prohibiting tests in all environments but at the same time providing for on-the-spot inspections, which would enable it to engage in espionage activities in the territory of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Clearly,

the Soviet Union could not accept such conditions, which, incidentally, would not yield satisfactory results and would make international peace and security even more precarious.

9. The Soviet Union, in a sincere desire to reach an agreement, had expressed its willingness to sign a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and providing for an undertaking by the nuclear Powers that they would not carry out any underground test explosions while negotiations for an agreement definitely prohibiting underground tests were in progress. The Western Powers, however, were endeavouring to concoct pretexts to justify their rejection of the Soviet proposal. They maintained that that proposal was tantamount to a moratorium without control and had accused the Soviet Union of having once before violated such a moratorium. The fallacy of such accusations had already been demonstrated. Under the terms of the Soviet proposal, the nuclear Powers would undertake a solemn commitment stipulated in an international treaty the binding nature of which was beyond doubt. The arguments which the Western Powers had advanced to camouflage motives which they did not wish to admit could deceive no one, and the United Nations should draw the necessary conclusions.

10. At Geneva, the Western Powers had suggested the establishment of a committee of experts which would conduct studies on the control of underground explosions, but it was common knowledge that the failure to reach an agreement had been due not to technical difficulties, but to political and military considerations. Specialists of all countries, including United States specialists, had recognized that adequate means of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions were now available. It was therefore important not to be deceived by such proposals, for experience had shown that the Western Powers were using the negotiations as a means of gaining time in order to perfect their nuclear weapons and to press forward with the armaments race. It was the task of the United Nations to prevent the success of such attempts, which were aimed at lulling the peoples into a false sense of security by making them believe that something was being done to solve the problem, whereas in fact every possible obstacle was being put in the way of an agreement.

11. His delegation appreciated the efforts of the eight neutral nations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee to help the nuclear Powers find a common ground. The memorandum that they had submitted on 16 April 1962 was based upon the existing possibilities of detecting all types of nuclear explosions by national systems. In a spirit of compromise, the option of whether or not to invite the international commission to verify a suspicious event on the spot would be left to the country on whose territory the event took place. The attitude taken towards that memorandum by the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and by the Western Powers, on the other hand, had provided an opportunity of testing the sincerity and goodwill of both parties. Although both sides accepted the memorandum as a basis for negotiations, the Western Powers had not waived the requirement of compulsory international inspection. The purpose of that requirement was clearly to prevent an agreement from being achieved. The experience of many years' negotiations had shown that the Western Powers did not wish to reach an agreement and that the United States had scant concern for the possible consequences of nuclear

explosions for the population of the world. Its recent high-altitude tests provided new proof that that was the case.

12. In accordance with the principles of the Charter, the United Nations must reply to the appeals of the peoples and take practical and decisive measures to ban tests of nuclear weapons in all environments. His delegation, which pursued the policy of peace that was characteristic of all socialist countries, fully supported the Soviet proposal, which was aimed at prohibiting nuclear arms tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, while providing for the suspension of underground tests as long as negotiation on the final banning of such tests was being held. Moreover, the proposal made by the Mexican representative in the General Assembly (1153rd plenary meeting) concerning the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests by 1 January 1963 was in keeping with the urgency of the problem and the wishes of all peoples. The acceptance of that proposal by the nuclear Powers would constitute a first step on the road to the final settlement of the problem.

13. Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom), who had asked for the floor to exercise his right of reply in relation to speakers who had referred to his own previous intervention (1250th meeting), said that the Cuban crisis demonstrated the urgent need for the conclusion of a treaty to ban all nuclear weapon tests and that it should cause the parties to redouble their efforts towards that end. The United Kingdom, for its part, undertook to do everything possible in that respect.

14. As some representatives appeared to believe that the proposal for a small annual quota of on-site inspections was a purely Western idea, he recalled that the Soviet Union had made a similar proposal in 1959. In that connexion, he quoted a statement made by the Soviet representative in the First Committee on 18 November 1959^{2/} in which he had said that the Soviet Government had on 23 April 1959 presented a proposal providing for a fixed number of inspections to be carried out each year if the control posts detected events that might be underground explosions. He had added that it would undoubtedly be possible to agree upon a number of inspections that would fully guarantee the possibility of detecting a violation of the agreement. He had further recalled that the Soviet Prime Minister had stated on 15 May 1959 that the Soviet Union was willing to consent to the unhindered admittance of inspection teams to its territory. He had, in conclusion, proposed that the number of inspections should be periodically reviewed. That Soviet proposal was identical to the one contained in the draft comprehensive treaty^{3/} which had been submitted by the Western Powers on 27 August 1962. The Soviet Union had upheld that proposal until November 1961. It thus followed that that proposal could not be regarded as contrary to the security of the Soviet Union.

15. The Soviet representative had said at the 1246th meeting that the Soviet Union had altered its standpoint because trustworthy means now existed of verifying the implementation by all of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. If those means existed and were made available to the international scientific

commission, the Western Powers would at once be ready to sign a comprehensive treaty with no provision for on-site verification, since all events would be identifiable by other means. Testing could then be stopped by 1 January 1963, or possibly earlier. If the Soviet Union and the countries that had endorsed its views possessed such means but refused to make them available, they were assuming a terrible responsibility. But if there was some mistake and they did not in fact possess such means, it would still be possible at the present time to conclude an agreement providing for a few on-site checks a year, in accordance with the proposals which the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR had himself declared and which had been sustained until November 1961. A comprehensive treaty could therefore be signed. The only obstacle lay in the fact that it was apparently more important to the Soviet Union to continue nuclear weapon testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water than to tell other countries how underground tests could be identified.

16. If, however the Soviet Union considered that the two solutions he had mentioned constituted a greater threat to its security than the continuance of testing, agreement would still be possible on the basis of the second Western draft treaty, which provided for the cessation of all nuclear tests without any international verification in the three environments in which it was agreed that such verification was no longer necessary.^{4/} The Western Powers were prepared to sign such a treaty immediately and unconditionally while negotiations continued on the banning of tests in the fourth environment. In refusing to sign such a treaty, the Soviet Union was incurring a very grave responsibility. The condition set by the Soviet Union, namely, that of a moratorium, was unacceptable. During the period when testing had been voluntarily suspended, from 1958 to August 1961, about 100 incidents of considerable size which had taken place in the Soviet Union had been detected each year; it had not, however, been possible to identify them. They might have been earthquakes or some of them might have been nuclear explosions; the truth would never be known. That was a risk which the Western Powers had accepted so long as they had believed that the Soviet Union was negotiating in good faith. But when the Soviet Union had unilaterally resumed testing during the negotiations and had conducted a test series for which preparations must have been in progress for at least nine months and probably longer, the confidence of the Western Powers in the good faith of the Soviet Union had been shaken. Thanks to research carried out in the United States and the United Kingdom—in which the Soviet Union had refused to participate—a greater number of underground events could now be identified, but it was still not possible to identify them all. Of the events of substantial size that took place in the Soviet Union, at least fifty or sixty a year could not be identified without on-site verification. In other words, there were four or five such events a month and perhaps more. To ask the Western Powers to agree to an unlimited and unverified moratorium was to ask them to agree to a situation in which the Soviet Union might conduct four or five underground tests of considerable size every month. Such a condition was obviously unacceptable. The Polish representative himself, in his statement at the 1254th meeting, had emphasized the importance of underground tests. Since those tests were important,

^{2/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, First Committee, 1057th meeting.

^{3/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/205, annex 1, sect. O.

^{4/} *Ibid.*, sect. P.

it was equally important to assure the observance of any undertaking to cease them.

17. The debates in the Committee sometimes seemed to suffer from a lack of realism. If that was indeed the case, the Cuban crisis should awaken the Committee to reality. That crisis showed that in the present international atmosphere neither side was prepared to trust the unsupported word of the other. That was a regrettable but undeniable fact, which had been recognized by the Soviet representative at Geneva. It would therefore be an illusion to attempt to impose an unverified moratorium and the Committee should not found its resolutions on illusions. The principle of international verification was an essential element in building confidence and securing peace. It was the key to the problem of stopping nuclear tests; it was also the key to disarmament and might well be the key to the solution of the Cuban problem. That fact had been emphasized by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, speaking in the House of Commons on 25 October 1962. In dealing with the question of nuclear tests, efforts should be concentrated on finding the means of identifying all events; in the meantime, a minimum number of verifications—perhaps one a month, or even less—should be accepted in order to ensure that the comprehensive treaty was being observed. The representative of Ethiopia interpreted the Soviet Union's acceptance of the principle of verification upon the invitation of the country concerned as a solemn undertaking to invite the international commission to carry out inspections in its territory. In fact, the Soviet Union had never given such an undertaking; it reserved the right to invite the commission or not to invite it. However, if the Soviet representative were to confirm that the Ethiopian representative's interpretation was correct and that the Soviet Union would invite the international commission whenever it was requested to do so, then a treaty could be signed within a week or two. Unfortunately, the Soviet representative had said that no change should be expected in his country's position.

18. He had listened with great interest to the constructive ideas put forward by the representatives of Austria, Ireland, Cyprus and Sweden, among others. The United Kingdom itself was willing to explore any compromise proposal, provided that a minimum amount of international verification was accepted where it was needed. There was no comparison between the risk to the world of the continuation of nuclear testing and the alleged risk involved in a minimum of verification. That was why the Western Powers were offering, on terms that the Soviet Union could and should accept, either a ban on all tests that caused fall-out or a comprehensive ban with a minimum of international verification to ensure that the agreement would be honoured.

19. Mr. ADEBO (Nigeria) thought that so much progress had already been made in regard to nuclear disarmament, particularly by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, of which his country was a member, that it would be regrettable if the task were not speedily brought to completion.

20. The First Committee's prime duty was to make it abundantly clear that it condemned all nuclear weapon tests and thought they should be ended without further delay. That was the purpose of draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1, of which Nigeria was a sponsor, and he appealed to the Committee to give it over-

whelming support. It must be left to the Conference at Geneva to work out the details of the agreement on the cessation of tests and to decide when it should take effect, but the First Committee should request the Eighteen-Nation Committee to give the matter priority and to report on the results of its work before the end of the present session of the General Assembly. He hoped the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee would pursue their initiative and prevail upon the nuclear Powers, by patient persuasion, to enter into fruitful negotiations.

21. The Cuban crisis had underlined the gravity of the situation created by nuclear armament. He hoped everyone would now realize that the end of the world might not be a remote possibility, that the leaders of the great Powers bore a grave responsibility in that respect and that it was the duty of all nations, and particularly of the non-aligned countries, to help those Powers to discharge that responsibility by the honest and frank expression of their views.

22. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) recalled that his Government had always condemned nuclear weapon tests irrespective of the country by which they had been carried out. The Ghanaian Government and people were convinced that the interests of mankind and the cause of international peace and security were not served by continuation of the tests. Yet despite the dangers they entailed for present and future generations, test explosions were continuing and were becoming more numerous and more powerful. The nuclear Powers maintained that they were necessary for their military needs and for their security, but no one could accept such arguments as valid when the result might be general catastrophe and the annihilation of mankind.

23. That was why the President of Ghana had sponsored a non-governmental conference with a view to finding a new approach to the solution of problems which might lead to nuclear war. That conference—the Accra Assembly on "The World without the Bomb"—which had taken place in June 1962 and had been attended by over a hundred distinguished personalities from all over the world, had been a considerable success. His delegation commended its conclusions, which would be published shortly as an official document of the Committee. The conference had reached the following conclusions on the question of a treaty banning nuclear tests: nuclear weapon tests must be discontinued because they intensified the arms race and caused serious damage to the health of present and future generations; they must be discontinued in all environments; the eight non-aligned States were to be congratulated on submitting a compromise test ban proposal, which should serve as a basis for negotiations among the nuclear Powers; it was hoped that, in order to break the deadlock, the United States would agree to the use of national means of detection co-ordinated by means of an international monitoring commission, and that the Soviet Union would agree that the international monitoring commission should be invited by any nation to carry out on-site inspection of suspicious seismic events; all scientists should try to find new methods for the detection and verification of tests; the Eighteen-Nation Committee should urgently study the possibility of general and complete disarmament and of the conclusion of a test ban treaty; pending the signing of such a treaty, individuals, organizations and nations should call attention to the necessity of stopping nuclear tests in all environments and by all States.

The conference had especially urged the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on whether any nation had the right to conduct nuclear tests.

24. The Government and people of Ghana had followed with keen interest the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and had been disappointed that it had not been able to reach agreement. It appeared, however, that the area of disagreement had been narrowed, which justified a certain optimism. The improvement in the situation was due in no small measure to the sustained and constructive efforts of the eight non-aligned nations represented at the Conference. Their memorandum of 16 April 1962, which had represented a very sound attempt to break the deadlock, had been accepted by both sides as a basis for negotiation. But although both sides had agreed on the conclusion of a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, differences still existed with regard to underground tests. While the United States and the United Kingdom proposed that the nuclear Powers should be left at liberty to conduct underground tests, the Soviet Union advocated the suspension of such tests pending the conclusion of an agreement.

25. His delegation could not approve either the position of the United States and the United Kingdom or the position of the Soviet Union. The basic issue appeared to be the detection and identification of underground explosions. Although it was no longer as difficult as it had formerly been to detect underground nuclear tests, there was as yet no agreement on whether such events could be identified, particularly if the explosion was not of great strength. It thus appeared that if a means of identifying all underground explosions could be discovered, on-site inspection would be unnecessary. The question was thus partly scientific, and it would certainly be worth considering the establishment of an international technical body to study the matter together with other questions which might arise in the course of future negotiations at the Geneva Conference. In that connexion, the Accra Assembly had proposed the establishment of a permanent international institute for disarmament research. His delegation was of the opinion that the establishment of an international institute under the control of the international commission proposed by the eight non-aligned nations would be of great assistance.

26. The problem appeared, however, to be mainly of a political nature. That was clear from the reactions of the nuclear Powers to the suggestions contained in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations. While accepting the memorandum as a basis for negotiation, the Western countries had continued to maintain that the major deterrent to clandestine tests was on-site inspection, to be undertaken solely at the discretion of the international commission. The preoccupation of those countries appeared, however, to be fully met by the provisions of the memorandum, for under its terms the international commission would be sole judge as to whether a given event was suspicious and whether on-site inspection was necessary. Although it was open to the nation concerned to refuse to invite such inspection, it would surely be impossible for it to adopt a negative attitude on such a vital matter in the face of world public opinion. So far as the Soviet Union was concerned, it was difficult to comprehend how its security could be imperilled by the acceptance of a minimal number

of on-site inspections. It was equally difficult to accept the contention that such inspection could be used as a cover for espionage.

27. His delegation was of the opinion that at the current session the Committee should go further than it had done in resolution 1648 (XVI). It should endorse the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for negotiation; it should urge the nuclear Powers to refrain from testing in all environments forthwith, and in any case before 1 January 1963, pending the outcome of negotiations; in order to ensure that serious negotiations were pursued, it might stipulate a time limit, which should be not later than 10 December 1962, by which the Assembly should receive a report on the progress made. In view of the importance of the question, it was the duty of all countries to ensure that the negotiations were conducted along the lines laid down in draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1, of which his delegation was a sponsor, and it was to be hoped that that proposal would be adopted unanimously.

28. Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands) said that he was almost entirely in agreement with the views expressed by the representative of the United Kingdom. In his opinion, it was important to ban tests, first, because, with the exception of underground tests, they endangered human life, and also because such a step would prevent the number of nuclear Powers from growing and would reduce the tension which existed between the parties, thus making it possible to carry on more fruitful negotiations on disarmament.

29. During the latest negotiations on the banning of nuclear tests, the Western Powers had once again shown great willingness to compromise. They had agreed that tests in three environments should be banned without international control, that the staff of control stations should be composed of nationals of the country concerned and no longer of international technicians, that the number of stations should be reduced and that on-site inspections should be restricted to the absolute minimum. Despite those numerous concessions, the Soviet Union which, until November 1961, had been prepared to accept a few on-site inspections, now refused to accept them. It was because of that Soviet intransigence that the negotiations had come to nothing.

30. A system of verification was indispensable. Research carried out in the United States and Italy had shown that it was not in fact possible to identify all the events recorded by seismic stations. If, as the Soviet Union claimed, it possessed the means of identifying all those events, it was incomprehensible why it refused to make them available. In that respect, the international scientific conference proposed by the representative of Austria might be extremely useful, as was shown by the experience of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests, held at Geneva in 1958.

31. He paid tribute to the eight non-aligned nations, whose efforts had made it possible to avoid a complete stalemate. But, as the representative of Brazil himself had said (1247th meeting), the memorandum presented by those countries was only a basis for discussion, for it was for the nuclear Powers to work out the text of the treaty. With regard to the verification system proposed in the memorandum, the representative of the Soviet Union had not hesitated to state that such

inspections would be used for espionage. It seemed, therefore, that the Soviet Union would never consent to inspections being made in its territory. It was to be hoped that the Soviet Union could be persuaded to adopt a more conciliatory attitude on that point. Although the Western proposals already provided for guarantees to ensure that inspections would not be used for espionage, and the Soviet Union had produced no evidence for the validity of its suspicion, the system of inspection must perhaps be further perfected in order to dissipate the fears of the Soviet Union.

32. There could be no question of accepting an unverified moratorium on underground tests. On the other hand, it was a matter of urgency to end tests which created fall-out. Negotiations regarding the

banning of underground tests might take a long time and should not block agreement on the cessation of tests in the three other environments. The Committee must speak out clearly on the problem of underground tests after agreeing on the necessity for an immediate cessation of tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. In its resolution 1649 (XVI), the General Assembly noted that an agreement on the banning of tests would be a first step towards reversing the arms race; and the events in Cuba, where the Soviet Union had posed a new nuclear threat to the Western hemisphere, clearly showed the urgency of the problem. That first step should therefore be taken without delay.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.