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CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Agenda item 77:</i>	
<i>The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (continued)</i>	
<i>General debate (continued) . . . . .</i>	59

*Chairman:* Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL  
(Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 77

The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/5141 and Add.1, A/C.1/873, A/C.1/874, A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.311) (*continued*)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. DEAN (United States of America) said that in the autumn of 1961 the Soviet Union had conducted the largest series of nuclear tests ever carried out, thus ending a period during which, as far as was known, none of the parties to test ban negotiations had carried out nuclear weapon tests. He had qualified his statement because, in the absence of an effective international control system, no one could definitely prove that such explosions had not occurred. The United States knew that it had not tested, but the most it could say was that it had no evidence of such explosions in the Soviet Union. The lesson of the Soviet Government's decision to renew testing was—as the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, had said at his press conference on 29 August 1962—that gentleman's agreements and moratoria gave no assurances against an abrupt renewal of testing by unilateral action.

2. One of the draft resolutions before the Committee (A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1) called, in effect, for another moratorium on nuclear tests, beginning on 1 January 1963. In its substance and effect, such a provision encouraged States to refuse to accept the necessary prerequisite for a comprehensive test ban treaty, namely, an effective system of verification which would permit the parties to the treaty to know that it was being kept. The United States was willing to sign a treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments under effective international control, such as the comprehensive draft treaty put forward on 27 August 1962 at Geneva,<sup>1/</sup> or it was willing to sign a treaty banning all tests in the atmosphere, under water or in outer space, such as the second draft treaty submitted on 27 August,<sup>2/</sup> while it continued to negotiate on the broader treaty. It would not accept

any unverified moratorium on nuclear tests. It would not accept or negotiate about an uncontrolled moratorium on all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, and it would not accept or negotiate about an uncontrolled moratorium on underground nuclear tests in connexion with an agreed ban on nuclear weapon tests in other environments. It would stop all tests on the day that a treaty containing the necessary international verification arrangements, such as those in the comprehensive draft treaty of 27 August, was signed, which could, it hoped, be done by 1 January 1963. The United States would vote against any draft resolution providing for an unverified, uncontrolled moratorium. Passage of such a resolution could have only one effect: to postpone the day when all tests were ended for ever. The 1958-1961 moratorium had not facilitated negotiations on a test ban nor had it resulted in a permanent end to nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet tests of 1961 had destroyed any chance that a moratorium would ever be acceptable to the United States as a solution to the problem of nuclear testing.

3. The General Assembly had an opportunity at its current session to express the urgent need for the Geneva negotiations to culminate in the conclusion of an agreement to halt all tests, and the deep desire felt for such an agreement by all countries, none more than the United States. The United States and the United Kingdom had therefore sponsored a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.311) which would endorse the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty as the primary objective of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and of its Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. The draft resolution expressed the view that if a comprehensive treaty with effective international verification could not be negotiated expeditiously, the Eighteen-Nation Committee should seek the conclusion of an interim treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, the oceans and space, without prejudice to the negotiation of a comprehensive treaty. The draft resolution also requested the negotiating Powers to agree upon an early date on which a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests would enter into force.

4. When international verification arrangements were necessary to assure the continuity and stability of agreements, it was the responsibility and the duty of the leading military Powers to accept reasonable verification arrangements in the interests of peace and security. Whenever the General Assembly failed to make that clear, it became easier for States to avoid the responsibility. Broad and unequivocal backing for verification when verification was needed would promote a test ban agreement. To condone the unjustified refusal of one great Power, the Soviet Union, to accept adequate international verification

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/205, annex 1, sect. O.

<sup>2/</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. P.

arrangements would be a fatal blow to hopes for a permanent cessation of tests.

5. There had been much discussion at the past several meetings regarding the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions. There was a real and fundamental technical problem in that connexion, which stood in the way of a test ban agreement. There was also a political problem: the refusal of the Soviet Union, for political reasons alone, to accept the necessary minimum of international inspection for a comprehensive and effective test ban. Representatives of the Soviet bloc had claimed that a ban on all except underground tests would not affect the possibilities for the United States to increase and perfect its nuclear armaments. If underground tests were really so important, the United States was obviously completely justified in seeking to ensure that no clandestine tests of that kind would be carried out. It had never asked for more inspection than was warranted by the known technical facts, but it would not and could not settle for less.

6. Underground nuclear explosions could be detected only through the waves or vibrations that they generated in the earth. The earth itself also generated such waves or vibrations but many of them could be excluded because they were clearly identifiable. It was only those signals which could have been caused either by a man-made nuclear explosion or by an earthquake that needed investigation. It was estimated that in the Soviet Union alone, there would be about one hundred earthquakes annually whose seismic signals would be indistinguishable from those of nuclear explosions without actual on-site investigation of the source of the recorded earth waves. On-site inspections were at present scientifically indispensable for the positive identification of underground nuclear explosions. The United States had for three years been carrying on major research into methods of detecting and distinguishing earthquakes and underground explosions. There had been many reports on that work, most of them in the open scientific literature and thus available to the whole world. Some of the more important findings, which had enabled the United States to reduce its control requirements, had been published in a Department of Defense press release of 7 July 1962, which had been circulated to the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. If there had been any similar intensive Soviet effort, no information had been published on the subject.

7. While the identification of explosions was the more complicated part of the problem, detection also presented major difficulties. Although stations in other countries had recorded certain of the United States underground nuclear explosions, many others had not been identified or even detected by scientific stations and observatories outside the United States, despite the fact that they had been publicly announced. Another major difficulty was that of locating the geographic position of a seismic event. In order to do so, the event must be recorded at several different stations.

8. The Soviet representative had asserted that States already possessed the necessary scientific and technical means to see that obligations not to undertake underground tests were respected. If the Soviet Union really possessed scientific evidence that it had not divulged, he appealed to the Soviet delegation to

bring it forward. The Soviet Government had never advanced a shred of scientific evidence to support its abandonment of the technical basis for the test ban negotiations to which its scientists had agreed in 1958. Its sudden reversal of position on the need for appropriate international verification had prevented a test ban agreement. Legitimate scientific support for the current Soviet position could help to unblock the road to agreement, but every Soviet statement carefully avoided concrete technical facts.

9. The Soviet Union had never given any reasoned reply to the technical considerations underlying the United States position, which were as well known to Soviet scientists and officials as they were to those in the United States. That was perhaps why the Soviet Union reverted to the rather lame second argument that verification machinery could somehow be used for espionage in the Soviet Union. A more unlikely vehicle for spying could hardly be imagined. Nevertheless, the Soviet representative had contended that the inspection system, specifically the inspection and control posts, could be used to pin-point objectives for nuclear strikes. The United States and the United Kingdom had, however, proposed a system of integrated stations which would be owned and operated by the States in which they were located. Thus, in the Soviet Union the stations would be owned by the Soviet Government and the operating staff would all be Soviet citizens. The few international observers at those control posts would be unable to move from them and travel about the Soviet Union without permission from the Soviet Government. It was hard to believe that the Soviet Government regarded the presence of a few foreign observers as a serious cause for concern. If, on the other hand, it had misgivings over what would happen to the scientific data which such stations produced, that would suggest that it had not, after all, really accepted the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962.<sup>3/</sup> That memorandum and the United States-United Kingdom comprehensive draft treaty of 27 August 1962 both proposed that all data from fixed stations should be submitted to an international commission for processing and review, in order to determine which detected events needed further clarification. If the Soviet Union was objecting to the use to which such scientific data might be put, it was objecting to the eight-nation memorandum as well as to the draft treaty, and that was a very important matter.

10. The on-site inspection procedures would be surrounded by so many safeguards that they could hardly be the cause of the Soviet Union's anxiety. The fact was that "espionage" was being used as a smoke-screen to cover up the real reasons for the present Soviet refusal to sign an adequate and effective test ban treaty providing for international inspection of unidentified events. The Soviet Government was apparently determined to continue nuclear testing or, for some political reason which the Soviet leaders did not wish to divulge, it was unwilling or unable to accept a test ban. It was to be hoped that now that the Soviet Union had conducted two major test series in little over a year, one of which was still going on in the atmosphere, a start could again be made towards a truly effective test ban agreement.

11. The United States agreed that there was an urgent need to suspend all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests. It felt that a ban on tests in certain

<sup>3/</sup> *Ibid.*, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. J.

environments would be better than no ban at all, but an incomplete ban was not its objective. It would not regard the task as completed until there was an effective treaty with adequate international controls banning all tests for ever. The Soviet Union alone held the key to the question of how soon that could be accomplished. The Soviet Union alone was responsible for the absence of an agreement. If the Soviet Union were to begin to negotiate in earnest, 1 January 1963 might still be the target date for the signature of a treaty. That thought had been behind the United States proposal that the test ban sub-committee should continue to meet at Geneva during the current recess in the main disarmament talks. Although time was fast going by, the United States still stood by President Kennedy's statement, made at his press conference on 29 August 1962, that the United States Government regarded 1 January 1963 as a reasonable target date and would like to join with all interested parties in a maximum effort to conclude effective agreements which could enter into force on that day.

12. While work continued on the problem of underground tests, there was no reason why an agreement to ban tests in all other environments should be delayed. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed that existing means of control, such as each possessed, were adequate to police the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space and in the oceans. That was nothing to scoff at. Such an agreement meant in principle that a treaty could be signed which would ban those nuclear tests which caused humanity the greatest concern.

13. By submitting the draft treaty of 27 August 1962, the United States had informed the world that it was ready at any time to signify its formal renunciation of all nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in space and in the oceans. It was testing in the atmosphere which caused anxiety about radio-active fall-out. Testing in space had been criticized for various reasons and radio-activity in the oceans had also been a source of concern. All those tests which troubled people for reasons of health or genetics could be stopped almost immediately. There was no need to wait until the dispute over underground tests, which released no radio-active debris into the human environment, was settled.

14. The Soviet Government's reply to the United States appeal for an immediate end to tests in the atmosphere, in space and in the oceans had been a sterile reiteration of its demand for a further uncontrolled moratorium on underground tests. The Soviet Government could not fall back on its espionage argument, since the partial treaty offer would not involve the slightest vestige of international control. Thus, one highly spurious argument mustered by the Soviet Government to explain its opposition to the partial treaty was that an immediate ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space and in the oceans would "legalize" underground tests. In short, the Soviet position was that it was better for it to continue to contaminate the atmosphere and to test in the atmosphere, in space and in the oceans, rather than give anyone reason to think that it approved of underground tests. The Soviet Government could rest assured that its agreement to a partial treaty would not be interpreted as an endorsement of underground tests. But its refusal to agree to an immediate ban on tests in the atmosphere, in space and in the oceans, where international control was not required,

strongly suggested that it thoroughly approved of and intended to continue tests in the atmosphere, whenever and wherever it pleased. And that was a very serious matter for everyone.

15. It had been alleged that the United States could carry out underground tests better than anyone else and that a ban on tests in the atmosphere, in space and in the oceans would therefore give an unfair advantage to that country. Although the argument was quite untrue, it was a refreshing change of tune. Usually, it was asserted that Soviet science and technology led the world and that anything the United States could do the Soviet Union could do better. When, with becoming modesty, the Soviet Union granted to the United States the status of permanent leadership in the technique of underground testing, he was highly flattered but also highly sceptical. In fact, the Soviet Union appeared to be saying that its technicians were capable of doing only those things which fitted the Soviet political position. Such a double standard simply would not do. The same science for which the Soviet Union representative claimed so much when it suited his purpose could not be dismissed as totally incompetent whenever the political occasion demanded. There was nothing magic about setting off a nuclear device in a tunnel. The Soviet Union had done it before and no doubt would do it again. The United States tested underground for the sole reason that it preferred radio-active debris to be buried in the earth rather than released into the atmosphere. That course was dictated by the principle of responsibility which the Soviet Union evidently applied in its peaceful nuclear programme and which it ought to apply in its nuclear test programme. Obviously, the best solution was to stop testing altogether but if the Soviet Union continued to dodge the effective international verification procedure which was proposed in the United States and United Kingdom draft treaty—a procedure which he believed any other State would accept—then the least it could do was to adopt a responsible attitude in its nuclear testing programme.

16. In addition to stopping those tests which caused radio-active fall-out, the partial treaty would have other important advantages. It would, first, have some effect in inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapon capabilities. Nuclear weapon development programmes by States which had not previously tested nuclear weapons would at least be seriously hampered, if not crippled altogether. Secondly, weapon testing by the present nuclear Powers would also be impeded. The partial treaty would put a stop to all tests in the atmosphere, in space and under water and in doing so would accomplish much of what a comprehensive ban would do, namely, slow down the nuclear arms race. Thirdly, a partial ban would provide a platform from which it would be possible to move on to a comprehensive ban. All efforts could then be directed to the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting underground tests. And the psychological contribution which one successfully operating agreement would make towards breaking the barriers built by concealed distrust on all sides should never be underestimated.

17. The United States felt that such a partial treaty could and should be put into effect without prejudice to the negotiation of a comprehensive treaty. It would prefer a comprehensive treaty because it would achieve the objective of ending all nuclear weapon

tests and because an internationally controlled test ban treaty would be a better spring-board to general and complete disarmament. At the moment, the prospects for agreement were not particularly bright. But the political difficulties of stopping tests were not unyielding, as had been evident during the 1958-1961 negotiations. The scientific and engineering problems were complex but not unmanageable. With so much to be gained from a test ban treaty in which everyone could have confidence, it was inconceivable to the United States Government that the day when such a treaty was signed could be far removed. Now more than ever the world needed such a treaty. The United States would do everything in its power to bring about the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear tests for all time.

18. Mr. DIALLO Telli (Guinea) said that the First Committee's decision to give priority to the question of the suspension of nuclear tests reflected the anxieties of all peoples and their hopes that, at its seventeenth session, the General Assembly would put an end to the mad race towards collective annihilation imposed on them by the nuclear Powers. Such a decision was in itself an unequivocal political stand, a victory for common sense and clear evidence of the Committee's determination to face its important responsibilities with courage. The problem of nuclear testing was far from new. It had been discussed at length during eight successive sessions of the General Assembly. Speaker after speaker had expressed an impatient desire to see the United Nations bring about an international agreement putting an end to all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests.

19. From its initial appearance on the international scene, the Republic of Guinea had firmly proclaimed its complete opposition to all forms of nuclear tests, and its attitude remained unchanged. It desired the complete cessation of all tests by all countries in all environments. Such tests were a crime against humanity. The United Nations should therefore consider the question of nuclear testing as a whole, and must impress upon the nuclear Powers the absolute necessity for the immediate cessation, subject to international guarantees, of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests. To that end, an international treaty between the nuclear Powers was urgently required, particularly as the profound differences which had separated them a year ago had been gradually reduced during the recent negotiations at Geneva. The neutral countries were to be congratulated on the helpful role which they had played in that process. It was almost a miracle to observe that the two camps now envisaged the possibility of an immediate agreement on the cessation of tests under water, in the atmosphere and in outer space.

20. The only differences which now remained concerned underground nuclear tests. The most impartial observers considered that such differences were political rather than technical. In any case, they did not appear insurmountable. The eight neutral nations participating in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had worked out a reasonable compromise solution which the two sides had expressed their readiness to accept as a basis for discussion. The situation was therefore clear. Faced with the sinister demands of the warmongers, the peoples must act without delay; they might no longer have an opportunity to do so in the future. A number of States were coming dangerously

close to the threshold of the nuclear club. Clearly, any addition to the membership of that club would create new problems and new risks. The First Committee must try to reverse that fatal course of events.

21. Without an agreement on nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, progress towards general and complete disarmament was inconceivable. If the nuclear Powers remained deaf to the appeal of millions of human beings who merely wanted to live in peace, it was for the United Nations to assume its responsibilities by clearly informing those Powers that the time had come to act. The General Assembly should accept no excuse for further delays. The stage of apportioning blame was over. What the peoples of the United Nations wanted was the immediate signature of an international treaty which put an end once and for all to every type of nuclear and thermo-nuclear test. In view of the deadly peril facing all mankind, the Guinean delegation believed that the United Nations should impose a mandatory international moratorium which would be under the control of the Security Council and guaranteed by the General Assembly. Any violation of that moratorium, which would cover all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, would call for an immediate meeting of the General Assembly. Finally, the United Nations should at once address an appeal to all the nuclear Powers to conclude a test ban treaty as soon as possible and in any case before 1 January 1963. Such an appeal could be made in a special resolution based on the principles set forth in the joint memorandum submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee by the eight neutral nations on 16 April 1962.

22. His delegation would, as always, support any sincere effort designed to secure the early cessation of all nuclear tests. It had accordingly joined in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1. It was only through an immediate test ban that confidence could be restored to the peoples of the world and the present balance of terror be replaced by peaceful co-operation.

23. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand) said that it might seem strange at such a time of crisis to be dealing in detail with a minute aspect of the immense field of disarmament. On the other hand, it might be hoped that for that very reason the negotiations at Geneva would continue, with a renewed sense of the urgent need for reaching an agreement. Moreover, although the question of banning nuclear tests was only a small part of the question of disarmament, it raised the same basic problem of achieving a balance between trust and objective verification.

24. Anxiety in New Zealand over the continuation of testing had led the Government to establish its own monitoring system in the South Pacific area. Fortunately, that system had revealed that there had been no appreciable increase in radiation in the South Pacific as a result of the latest series of United States tests. However, New Zealanders were still intensely concerned over the dangers inherent in testing. Seeing the frantic acceleration of the armaments race, they were increasingly wondering how and when it could be brought to an end.

25. It was encouraging to note that there was now wide agreement that, in the long run, a continuation of the arms race would not afford national security. The present debate had yielded a number of suggestions—both technical and political—on how the remaining gap between the views of the parties con-

cerned might be bridged during the next round of negotiations. It was to be hoped that those suggestions would be considered in drafting any resolution, for the bridge between the Western and Soviet positions would have to be built from a new combination of political and technical elements.

26. As far as technical considerations were concerned, it would be noted that improvements in instruments of detection had been responsible for much of the progress that had been made towards agreement. Most countries agreed that any treaty on nuclear tests must provide for enough machinery of verification to satisfy the parties concerned, but no more. It was similarly agreed that instruments had been developed which were capable of pin-pointing from afar, with a high degree of accuracy, any nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space or in the oceans. The Western Powers were thus able to say that the amount of international detection machinery required to verify tests in those environments was nil. However, they maintained that no instruments had yet been devised that could distinguish from afar between certain earthquakes and certain explosions. Therefore, some measure of international on-site inspection was required to ensure compliance with a treaty. The inspectors could come from neutral countries, if so desired. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, alleged that all nuclear explosions could be detected from afar. Thus, in their view, the amount of international on-site inspection necessary to verify tests in all environments was nil. They did, however, suggest that they might in certain circumstances be willing to invite some international inspectors to their territory, although such an invitation should surely never be necessary if their technical claims were justified. In any case, the details of the arrangement were still under consideration at Geneva and it was on such points, where the technical aspects of the problem merged with the political, that the eight neutral members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee were making a significant contribution.

27. However, the technical gap still had to be bridged. There were two obvious ways in which that could be done. First, the West might develop instruments so sensitive that it could give up its demand for impartial identification of underground events. Alternatively, the Soviet Union could provide the West with the knowledge required to make the sensitive instruments it itself claimed to possess, thereby paving the way for an agreement banning tests for all time. If neither of those courses were adopted, there remained more devious methods of closing the technical gap.

28. First, the principle of inspection and control could be abandoned and the West could trust the word of the Soviet Union regarding any underground events occurring in that country. However, that was hardly likely in view of past experience. As Mr. Zorin had said, at the 1246th meeting, present relations among States were not such that information could be given on detection or verification machinery. For the same reason, presumably, the Western countries desired a little solid assurance. They believed that underground nuclear explosions could be of great military importance, not merely for the purpose of devising more devastating weapons but also for that of testing smaller tactical weapons as well as defensive and "clean" devices that could alter the present balance of strength. It would be of little use to expect those

countries to accept an arrangement in which they had no basic confidence, for without confidence the arms race would go on. Secondly, attempts could be made to reduce the area of disagreement on the degree of identification that was possible from varying distances. That promised to be a more fruitful line of inquiry and, as suggested by Brazil and Austria, a meeting of scientists should be held as soon as possible.

29. There was also a gap to be bridged on the political side. As a result of the stimulus given by the neutral nations there had, however, been a notable development in political thinking. Briefly, the neutral nations argued that since a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests would be far more limited than a full-scale disarmament treaty and would not be operating in a disarmed world but in a world in which fear and suspicion prevailed, it was pointless to demand an elaborate inspection and verification system. If, however, agreement could be reached on a few basic inspection measures, certain sanctions would automatically come into operation and would afford a sufficient guarantee that a test ban treaty would be observed. Given agreement on such measures, the nuclear Powers should, the neutral nations suggested, balance the risk of one side breaking a less than watertight treaty against the dual risks of continued testing—the risk to human health and the risk to international security. Although those ideas of the neutral nations did not yet fully satisfy any of the nuclear Powers, they had already altered almost everyone's thinking on the problem of stopping nuclear tests. They were also bringing the technical and political aspects of the question more into line.

30. The New Zealand delegation, however, had some doubts concerning the ideas that were being advanced on possible means of closing the political gap. In suggesting that outraged public opinion would operate as a sanction, the Swedish representative, in his statement at the 1252nd meeting, had recalled the world-wide outcry against the Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear tests and had suggested that the outcry against the violation of a binding treaty would be even stronger. There were, however, three qualifications to be borne in mind. First, it was unlikely that, in the case of an actual violation, the issue would emerge clearly; it would certainly be confused by a smoke-screen of words in the international commission of scientists which, according to the neutral nations' proposals, would be set up to process data from national observation posts, and by propaganda and pressure activities outside it. Secondly, the onus of denouncing the treaty would be, not with the party which declined to invite inspecting, but with the party which considered itself injured. The latter party would have the choice of denouncing the treaty or doing nothing and, world public opinion on nuclear tests being what it was, the West would probably feel impelled to do nothing. Thirdly, it was hard to forget how, only a year ago, the Soviet Union had demonstrated its regard for the sanction of outraged public opinion. A few days after a resolution had been adopted by the General Assembly (resolution 1632 (XVI)), by a huge majority, begging the Soviet Union not to explode a 50-megaton bomb, that country had tested a weapon of even greater destructive capacity. The conclusion to be drawn surely was that if the Soviet Union judged its national interest to require a given course of action, it would pursue that course regardless of world public opinion. Outraged world

public opinion might be a sanction, but an even better one would be enough impartial international inspection and control to ensure compliance with a treaty.

31. The neutral nations had suggested that the possibility of the other party's resuming tests would also operate as a sanction. It must be noted, however, that as long as the parties judged that possibility to exist and as long as they were dissatisfied with the verification procedure, they would be impelled to prepare against it. It was true that even a binding treaty prohibiting nuclear tests might lapse if it was not soon followed by real progress towards comprehensive disarmament. But that was all the more reason to achieve an agreement that genuinely satisfied all the parties by giving them adequate assurance that its terms would be observed. As long as any parties were dissatisfied with the inspection procedures suggested, no treaty could be satisfactory. If international pressures were to force it upon them, it would not contribute to confidence.

32. Nevertheless, the New Zealand delegation believed that an agreement was within grasp and that one more determined effort could secure it. On the technical side, the more refined instruments of detection became, the less need there was for on-site inspection. The political gap was similarly being bridged, largely because of the contribution of the eight neutral nations. The possibility of having only one or two random inspections a year was being considered. A more realistic and mature approach was also being taken to the question of whether on-site inspection should be by invitation or should be compulsory. It was coming to be appreciated that neither one nor the other might be necessary and that there might be situations in which international opinion might, in effect, make it obligatory for a country voluntarily to invite international inspection.

33. As for the feasibility of a partial treaty, the New Zealand Government would much welcome an early agreement covering tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. There no longer seemed to be any differences between the Powers concerning the detection of such tests, which constituted the greatest danger from the point of view of security and health. While New Zealand, like the United Kingdom and the United States, would have preferred a comprehensive treaty covering tests in all environments, it still felt that the nuclear Powers should seize the opportunity for an immediate if partial ban, should there be further delay in reaching the ultimate goal. As to the objections raised by the representative of Burma—that a partial treaty would not last and that a partial treaty which came to grief would be worse than none at all—they surely constituted an argument for moving ahead quickly from a partial to a full treaty, rather than for refusing to accept an interim treaty which, at the very least, would end all harmful fall-out.

34. The New Zealand delegation had some doubts about draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1. As the representative of Norway had said at the previous meeting, the proposal for a cut-off date might in reality introduce an unlimited and uninspected moratorium. It was to be hoped, however, that the draft resolution would be modified to include some of the positive suggestions that had been made by the sponsors themselves with a view to closing the technical and political gap in the thinking of the main parties. The provision calling upon the nuclear Powers to report on their negotiations before the close of the present session was an element of some significance. It was realistic to assume that a report from the nuclear Powers in December 1962 would show much more clearly whether a cut-off date would be merely a temporary expedient or would make the end of testing once and for all.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.