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Chairman: Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL
(Sudan).

Tribute to the memory of Mr. Sukardjo Wirjopranoto, Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations

1. The CHAIRMAN expressed the Committee's condolences to the Government and delegation of Indonesia on the death of the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations, Mr. Sukardjo Wirjopranoto.
2. Mr. IDRIS (Indonesia) thanked the Committee for the expression of sympathy.

AGENDA ITEM 77

The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/5141 and Add.1, A/C.1/873, A/C.1/874, A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.311) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

3. Mr. SOULEYMANE (Mauritania) noted that, once again, Members were the helpless spectators of one of the most sinister tragedies ever known to mankind, in which the great Powers pursued a frantic race to perfect weapons of mass destruction while at the same time continuing their deaf men's dialogue, with each side losing sight of the true objectives and seeking mere diplomatic successes for propaganda purposes.
4. There was some cogency in the Soviet Union's explanations of its reasons for repudiating, in November 1961, all the articles of the draft treaty on the prohibition of tests which had been worked out after three years' negotiation with the United Kingdom and the United States; moreover, the Soviet Union had now agreed that the conclusion of a treaty on the ending of nuclear tests need no longer be linked to agreement on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In August 1962, the United Kingdom and United States had withdrawn their demands for international control, except in the case of underground tests, and even in that case were proposing less stringent conditions. While the Western position had some merit, one of its main weaknesses was the systematic refusal to consider

any moratorium on underground tests, owing to the Soviet Union's violation of the earlier moratorium on tests.

5. Basically, the solution of the question of disarmament did not depend on the spurious problems which had for years been raised in innumerable conferences at various levels. Disarmament was not a cause, but an effect; the cause was the spirit of domination of one ideology by another which had caused two world wars, had engendered colonialism and imperialism and lay behind the current armaments race. There could be no agreement unless the two giants recognized the possibility of harmonious co-existence between countries with different political, social, economic and cultural systems. The co-existence of the major religions of the world, after centuries of frightful religious wars, illustrated a principle which was even more valid in the field of political science.

6. Ever since its creation, the United Nations had been considering the vital question of disarmament but had never been able to reach positive conclusions; the main reason was that the great Powers wanted to conduct negotiations independently of the rest of the world. It seemed as though any important problem was discussed outside the United Nations by a kind of club, which then either presented other Member States with a fait accompli or asked them to put a democratic seal on its decisions. The effective contribution which could be made by the neutralist countries had been demonstrated at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva which, but for their participation, would probably have been a complete fiasco. Nuclear tests and disarmament in general were of concern to all States and to all peoples. Matters which threatened international peace and security must be dealt with in or under the auspices of the United Nations, which should convene a world conference of all States, including non-member States, with a view to the establishment of a truly international agency to implement general and complete disarmament and promote genuine control measures.

7. While general and complete disarmament required lengthy discussion and sustained effort, the halting of nuclear tests brooked no delay. No human being was infallible, and continued tampering with the elements might well have irreparable consequences. Scientists did not always exactly foresee the effects and consequences of their discoveries. There must be an end to the strong suspicion that the birth of deformed children and the occurrence of earthquakes, floods and climatic changes might be due, to some extent, to nuclear explosions which poisoned the earth, the oceans and the atmosphere in the name of scientific progress. There was real danger in delay, and before the end of the current session of the General Assembly, the indignation which was

universally felt must find expression in a resolution demanding the halting of nuclear experiments of every kind. His delegation was grateful, therefore, to the representative of Mexico, who had proposed that nuclear testing should cease as from 1 January 1963, and it would support any draft resolution to that effect.

8. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the new Soviet proposal, under which an agreement banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water would be signed and the parties would undertake to refrain from conducting underground tests while negotiations for banning them were under way, provided the basis for a solution of the problem of nuclear tests. If the United States and the United Kingdom really wanted to put an end to testing, an immediate decision to that effect could be taken in the General Assembly. Unfortunately, however, the position taken by the Western Powers, and in particular their unwillingness to abandon the subterfuge of control, indicated that they did not want to end testing.

9. It was not true, as some delegations had contended, that the position of the United States and the United Kingdom had undergone substantial changes. The agreement on the part of those Powers to waive control in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was merely a tactical device, since the precise manner in which compulsory control for purposes of espionage was introduced into an agreement was immaterial. The "suspicion" of the Western and pro-Western members of an international control commission would unquestionably be directed in the first instance towards those areas of the Soviet Union which were marked in white on the Pentagon's maps.

10. His delegation fully supported the proposals put forward by the USSR representative in his statement at the 1246th meeting. The United States and the United Kingdom, however, planned to continue underground tests, since, as *The New York Times* had recently reported, underground testing was yielding useful data. The United States hoped that that information would give it an advantage over the Soviet Union. Apart from the fact that continued underground testing would prolong the arms race, such tests affected human health by releasing radioactive vapours and contaminating underground water sources.

11. The memorandum submitted by the eight non-aligned nations at Geneva on 16 April 1962,^{1/} proposing that an international commission of scientists should evaluate the data provided by national control stations while the States concerned should be left to decide whether to invite the commission to carry out on-site inspections, had been immediately accepted by the Soviet Union as a basis for negotiation. However, the United States, after taking a similar position on the memorandum, had continued to insist on compulsory international control over underground tests. Under the United States plan, the most important decisions at national control stations would be taken by an international body which the Western Powers intended to dominate.

12. There could be no partial solutions to a problem as vital as that of halting nuclear tests. A partial ban on testing would merely legalize continuation

of the arms race while creating the illusion that it had been halted.

13. His delegation would vote against the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/L.311), which in effect rejected both the Soviet proposal and the eight-nation memorandum and could not constitute a basis for negotiations. As the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs had said at a news conference on 13 October, underground nuclear tests could be detected by means of national instruments. The Western Powers refused to acknowledge that fact because they did not want to halt nuclear testing in all environments; the two United States technical memoranda (A/C.1/873) had been circulated for the purpose of drawing the Committee into fruitless technical discussions. The contention that compulsory international control was essential for the detection of underground nuclear explosions was refuted by the fact that the United States had been able to detect an underground test conducted by the Soviet Union in February 1962 and to distinguish it from earthquakes occurring during the same period, just as the Soviet Union had been able to detect an underground test carried out by the United States in December 1961. Thus, the two United States memoranda had been circulated for purely political purposes and did not reflect the present level of United States technology with regard to the detection of nuclear explosions.

14. The Western Powers' earlier demands with regard to control over tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, which had prevented progress towards a solution of the problem for a number of years, had finally been discredited and abandoned. If they were really concerned with the future of mankind, those Powers would now give up their demand for inspection in connexion with underground testing.

15. If the nuclear arms race was not brought to an end soon, testing would become even more difficult to halt, since ten additional countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, now had the means of manufacturing nuclear weapons, and that number would probably rise to thirty within the next two decades.

16. The United States atomic warriors must be made to realize that the forces of peace were now much stronger than the forces of war and that any aggressor would be consumed in the conflagration which he himself had started. It was absurd that the United States should think in terms of gaining military supremacy at a time when the entire world was demanding the elimination of war from human affairs, with the banning of all nuclear tests as a first step.

17. He shared the view of the Ceylonese delegation that the question of nuclear testing was primarily one of disarmament and not of radiation. That interpretation pointed the way to the only effective solution of the problem, namely, the cessation of tests in all environments. However, he was disturbed by the United Kingdom representative's statement at the 1250th meeting, which had suggested that the Soviet Union completely rejected any kind of international control of nuclear tests. It was known that the USSR was the first and, in fact, thus far the only nuclear Power which had agreed to take the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 as the basis of a future

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. J.

test ban agreement. The USSR thus accepted the basic premise of the memorandum—that suspicious events should be subject to international control, with the consent of the States on whose territory they were observed. The United Kingdom statement had made it clear once again that the Western Powers would not consent to negotiate on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum. The United States and the United Kingdom would not agree to the compromise it contained, thereby keeping tightly shut the door to an agreement to prohibit all tests in all environments.

18. The representatives of the United Kingdom, Australia and other Western States proposed an agreement to stop testing for the present, in only three environments, making out that underground tests were nothing more than children's games. In fact, however, many of the underground nuclear explosions set off by the United States were more powerful than the bombs which the United States had dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The most important concern in the matter of banning nuclear tests was to halt the arms race and the drift towards war, and the way to achieve that was to halt all tests in all environments, as proposed by the peace-loving States of the world. A continuation of underground testing would mean a further development of nuclear weapons and an increased threat of nuclear war.

19. The Western representatives said nothing about that when they sought to leave open the question of halting underground tests, i.e., to legalize such tests. The United Kingdom representative had said that the cessation of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water would make it possible to concentrate on the question of underground tests. However, the Soviet proposal to halt tests in three environments, with States being required to continue negotiations on an underground test ban, no such tests being conducted pending the conclusion of a suitable agreement, would clearly make possible a far greater degree of concentration on those negotiations. Progress would be easier without the accompaniment of underground nuclear explosions.

20. Four countries—the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France—possessed nuclear weapons at the present time. France, having entered the nuclear weapons race last, was trying to make up for lost time. Its example was encouraging other countries to develop their own nuclear weapons, thus increasing the danger of a further spread of such weapons. Moreover, France had refused to participate in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

21. His delegation was forced to conclude that the United States and the United Kingdom still did not want an agreement on a nuclear test ban. That was a reflection of their general aggressive foreign policy. It was no accident that the representatives of those States did not have the courage to support the demand made by a large number of countries for the creation of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world, including Africa. The Byelorussian delegation supported the representatives of African States who had spoken during the discussion in favour of the denuclearization of Africa. It called upon the United States, the United Kingdom and France to heed the voice of the African peoples. With goodwill on the part of the Western Powers, denuclearized zones could also be set in Central Europe, the Balkans, the Far East and Latin America.

22. His delegation held the view, which had been expressed by other representatives, that if nuclear tests were not halted, the solution of the fundamental problem of general and complete disarmament would be indefinitely delayed, since the continuation of nuclear tests in any environment could only intensify the arms race. It welcomed the proposal in draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1 that all nuclear tests in all environments should be halted not later than 1 January 1963.

23. Mr. KAKA (Niger) said that the nuclear Powers had arrogated to themselves the right to conduct nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests which endangered all mankind, in defiance of world opinion. The other nations of the world therefore had the right and the duty to oppose such actions by all the means at their disposal. The United States and the Soviet Union bore the greatest responsibility for the present explosive situation. Their dangerous competition had produced an atmosphere of blind distrust in which problems which appeared very simple to neutral countries often could not be solved; they had thereby created a process which now held them prisoner.

24. The representatives of the two great nuclear Powers had proposed test ban agreements with controls and without controls. Any partial agreement, with or without controls, was unsatisfactory because it did not dispel the anxieties of mankind; total and unconditional cessation was called for. The two blocs seemed to agree on the principle of stopping tests but disagreed on the question of control. His delegation deplored the deadlock and he appealed to the four nuclear Powers to reach a satisfactory compromise. In view of the distrust between the opposing blocs, any agreement must include international control if it was to be effective. That control could be so organized as not to hamper the activities of the nation in whose territory it was exercised. He remained convinced that the firm determination of mankind to put an end to nuclear and thermo-nuclear testing would have the desired effect on the nuclear Powers themselves.

25. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) said that new possibilities of solving the problem of a nuclear test ban had emerged from the discussions in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. Firstly, although complete solutions had not been reached, an agreement was possible on the prohibition of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Secondly, possibilities of an agreement on underground tests could be discerned, thanks to the efforts of neutral States. The eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 could be used as a basis for settling the question of control.

26. His delegation could not agree to the continuation of underground tests, since they made possible the development of new types of nuclear weapons, facilitated the manufacture of weapons of high destructive power and helped in the development of so-called "small" nuclear weapons. Consent to their continuation could only accelerate the spread of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, underground tests also involved a radiation hazard, as stated in the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.^{2/} Under present conditions, if tests in all environments were not halted simultaneously, their

^{2/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 16.

continuation in one environment would reduce the effectiveness of the ban on tests in the others; that would preserve one important component of the arms race, thus defeating the ultimate purpose of a test ban. Any halt to testing must, of course, be put into effect simultaneously by all States.

27. Another essential condition was for the control to be limited to matters covered by the test ban; there should be no possibility of the control system being used for any purpose other than those covered by the agreement. That requirement was not met by the draft treaties submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom on 27 August 1963.^{3/} The position of those two Powers tended to exaggerate the importance and to distort the function of international control. Such an attitude was bound to arouse misgivings that the two countries were intent either upon making an agreement more difficult to achieve or upon securing advantages that would jeopardize the justified security interests of the other side. Nor was there any purpose in the Western proposals, since modern equipment could detect and identify nuclear explosions even at great distances.

28. The proposal to stop all but underground tests was aimed at securing a unilateral advantage for the Western Powers, since it was they who conducted most of their nuclear tests underground. The eight-nation memorandum met all the needs of the present international situation. It provided for the immediate and simultaneous cessation of all nuclear tests and for the establishment of a control system based on national means of detection and identifying explosions with an additional instrument in the form of an international scientific commission. It would be the latter which, after consultation with and by invitation of the States concerned, would be able to carry out on-site inspections. It was thus a compromise proposal which took into account the position of the Soviet Union regarding the possibility of detecting explosions through national means of control and that of the Western Powers regarding an international control organ. In the Polish delegation's view, the practicability of the proposal was beyond doubt, since it provided for the cessation of all tests, defined the control system in unequivocal terms, and was solidly based upon modern scientific achievement. As the representative of Canada had pointed out at the 1247th meeting, it offered a sound basis for a generally satisfactory agreement and should be incorporated without delay in a draft treaty providing for a ban on all nuclear tests.

29. One great merit of the memorandum was that it established a system for safeguarding the implementation of an agreement on a nuclear test ban, under which an international scientific control commission capable of evaluating any event would be instituted and measures under international law would be invoked against any party violating the agreement. If the proposals contained in it were accepted, a test ban agreement could be signed immediately—but they had been rejected by the Western Powers.

30. The Western Powers had also rejected the Soviet proposal for a ban on tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, coupled with simultaneous negotiations on a ban on underground tests. That proposal, unlike the Western proposal, wisely

provided for an immediate ban on underground tests until agreement was reached on their complete prohibition. The Soviet proposal was advantageous to both sides, since it kept open negotiations, satisfied the demand of world public opinion for the ending of all tests and did not upset the military and strategic balance. The technical arguments advanced against the proposal were unconvincing since, according to the document submitted by the United States delegation (A/C.1/873), there were now real possibilities of detecting even underground explosions of 1 kiloton by the use of national means.

31. The whole question, in fact, was not technical but political. That was clear from the rejection by the Western Governments of the Soviet proposals, which went half way to meet their own position, from their negative attitude towards the eight-nation memorandum, and from the way in which the United States representative had passed over in silence the Mexican proposal for the immediate establishment of an early date for the unconditional cessation of testing.

32. The dangers resulting from the lack of a test ban agreement would increase with the rising spiral of the nuclear arms race and were out of all proportion to the very small risk involved in the possible non-observance of an agreement. In any case, the advantages to be derived by all parties from a lasting ban on all nuclear tests would far outweigh the risks involved. Such a ban would slow down the arms race and the spread of nuclear weapons considerably. It must be remembered that the spread of nuclear weapons, once started, would not be easy to stop, as was evident from the actions of France and the example of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which sought to establish the technical means of producing its own nuclear missiles and was co-operating ever more closely in that field with France. A test ban would also mean the elimination of the hazards to human health resulting from radiation and it would relax international tension and promote mutual confidence. All those objectives could be achieved at the current session of the General Assembly.

33. The Polish delegation was fully aware that the question of ending nuclear tests could not be treated as an isolated issue, but only as part and parcel of the major problem of general and complete disarmament. However, partial disarmament measures, including the non-dissemination of atomic weapons, the denuclearization of areas where there was a particular danger of conflict and the outlawing of the use of nuclear weapons, were of great importance. His delegation was convinced that the Polish plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe was realistic, possible and timely. Any proposal that would facilitate the peaceful solution of contentious problems, strengthen peaceful coexistence and co-operation and eliminate factors contributing to the armaments race should be adopted.

34. The First Committee could contribute greatly to world peace by taking positive action to halt nuclear tests. If it had the will and strength to take the correct political decisions and availed itself of the results of the Geneva discussions, it could do much to advance the cause of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing.

35. Mr. NORDAHL (Norway) said that the question how to put an end to nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapon tests was one of the most crucial problems

^{3/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/205, annex 1, sect. O and P.

of the day. It was a matter of deep regret to the Norwegian Government and people that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva had been unable to reach an agreement on a test ban; however, considerable progress had been made, and the distance between the positions of the nuclear Powers had been reduced to a point that should offer hope for a final solution. The eight non-aligned nations at that Conference had worked vigorously to harmonize conflicting points of view, and the nuclear Powers had had the political wisdom and courage to adjust their positions in the light of technological advances.

36. While the responsibility for ending tests lay primarily with the nuclear Powers, other countries must state their views in the United Nations so that there could be no doubt about their feelings, and also in order to assist the nuclear Powers in their deliberations. In the decisions it made, however, the First Committee should seek to facilitate the coming negotiations at Geneva.

37. The Norwegian Government and people remained opposed to all nuclear weapon tests; they believed that no Government had a moral right to poison the air men breathed and the food they ate. In the absence of a treaty between all nuclear Powers banning tests in all environments—the best and most effective solution—the Norwegian Government endorsed the proposal for an immediate ban on all testing in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space as a valuable step towards a more comprehensive treaty. His Government's whole-hearted approval of a ban on precisely those tests which produced radio-active fall-out did not imply legalization of testing in other environments. His delegation also endorsed the memorandum presented at Geneva

on 16 April 1962 by the eight non-aligned States as a sound basis for further negotiations on underground testing. On the basic question of international control, his Government had seen no conclusive evidence that existing detection techniques were sufficient to verify all underground nuclear or thermo-nuclear explosions, and it could therefore understand the insistence on a certain number of on-site inspections until more accurate technical devices were available.

38. To enable the General Assembly to have as clear a picture as possible of the technical problems involved, it might be wise to decide to establish at an early date an international scientific commission, as proposed in the eight-nation memorandum, and to request the commission, if possible, to report to the Assembly at the current session. The Assembly might also find it advisable to express the view that the nuclear Powers had a strong moral obligation to furnish the scientific commission with the necessary technical and scientific data.

39. His delegation would welcome the cessation of all tests as from 1 January 1963, but it understood the strong reservations of many Member States with respect to the uninspected and unlimited moratorium which might result and which, in the light of previous experience, might be used as a cover for preparing extensive new tests. His delegation would prefer a moratorium limited in time, which could be used for renewed efforts to reach an agreed test ban.

40. An agreement between the nuclear Powers seemed to be near, and he trusted that the Committee would act forcefully and constructively to assist in freeing mankind from the hazards of nuclear and thermo-nuclear testing.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.