

United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SEVENTEENTH SESSION

Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1253rd
MEETING**

Monday, 22 October 1962,
at 10.30 a.m.

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Tribute to the memory of Mr. Ilya S. Tchernychev, former Under-Secretary for Political and Security Council Affairs</i>	47
<i>Agenda item 77:</i>	
<i>The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (continued)</i>	
<i>General debate (continued)</i>	47

Chairman: Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL
(Sudan).

Tribute to the memory of Mr. Ilya S. Tchernychev, former Under-Secretary for Political and Security Council Affairs

1. The CHAIRMAN, on behalf of the Committee, expressed condolences to the Soviet delegation on the death of Mr. Ilya S. Tchernychev, the Soviet Ambassador to Brazil and a former United Nations Under-Secretary for Political and Security Council Affairs.
2. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thanked the Chairman for his expression of sympathy.
3. Mr. ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil) wished to associate the Brazilian delegation with the Chairman's expression of sympathy.

AGENDA ITEM 77

The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/5141 and Add.1, A/C.1/873, A/C.1/874, A/C.1/L.310, A/C.1/L.311) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

4. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) said that although six months of intensive negotiations had not led to a test ban agreement, there was still some hope that such an agreement would be signed. It was now agreed that nuclear tests must come to an end, and the leaders of the nuclear Powers had made statements to that effect.
5. At the start of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva the nuclear Powers had held fixed and widely divergent positions, with no latitude for mutual concessions and accommodations. The eight uncommitted nations at Geneva had submitted their joint memorandum of 16 April 1962^{1/} to provide a new point of departure as an alternative to the initial rigid positions of the nuclear Powers. That memorandum still offered a

reasonable basis for agreement, and its merits had been further demonstrated by the report of the United States Department of Defense on "Project Vela". But the nuclear Powers, while professing to accept it as one of the bases for negotiation, had not yet come to grips with all its potentialities.

6. It was often said that the major reason for the failure of the nuclear Powers to act upon the eight-nation memorandum was the question whether the on-site inspection envisaged in the memorandum was mandatory or facultative; in the latter case, it was asked, what would happen if one of the parties involved refused to invite members of the international commission? The Soviet Union, through its representatives at Geneva, had stated that it would invite scientists members of the international commission upon request, to ascertain *in loco* the nature of doubtful events, but that such inspection could only take place upon invitation. In his delegation's view the only difference between the nuclear Powers on that issue was one of form rather than substance. The decision of an international commission established on a non-political basis would have all the moral backing of an indignant world concerned over an issue of survival. The eight-nation memorandum was only a basis for negotiation, not a blueprint for a treaty, and it should be subjected not to interpretation but to discussion and negotiation, so that each side might be accommodated.

7. The United States-United Kingdom proposal of 27 August 1962 for a partial treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, gave expression to the unconditional and clear view of the two Powers concerned that control over tests in those three environments could be assured by national detection systems; that was a great contribution to a solution of the problem of ending the most dangerous explosions. However, the benefit gained by the immediate cessation of tests in those three environments would be much increased if at the same time some agreement could be reached about underground tests. Any advance in weapons achieved in one country through underground tests would be likely to cause rival countries to seek parity through tests in the three forbidden environments. That was why all weapon tests must come to an end simultaneously.

8. Finally, his delegation supported the Mexican idea for setting 1 January 1963 as a time limit for ending all nuclear tests.

9. Mrs. SUPENI (Indonesia) said that her Government condemned nuclear testing of all types and in all environments. Testing not only threatened human health but was perpetuating the arms race; no nation had the right to pursue its own security interests at the expense of others or to justify its tests on the ground that another country had carried out tests.

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. J.

The cessation of nuclear testing was the first step towards nuclear disarmament, and was the paramount issue facing the Committee. Her Government favoured a test ban treaty covering all environments, with effective international control where it was necessary on technical grounds.

10. However, a test ban treaty must quickly be buttressed by more solid measures, such as a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and an agreement to destroy them. In that connexion, serious consideration should be given to the possibility of convening a conference for the purpose of signing an agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, as proposed in General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI). In the meantime, her Government favoured other measures designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, such as the establishment of denuclearized zones.

11. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.310, which her delegation had joined in sponsoring, represented an effort to accomplish as much as was possible at the present stage, taking account of the conflicting views expressed during the debate while basing itself on the memorandum submitted by the eight non-aligned nations at Geneva on 16 April 1962. It was significant that the memorandum had been accepted by the opposing nuclear Powers as a basis for negotiation, and that the only specific issue still blocking a test ban treaty was the question whether a nuclear Power would always be required to agree to inspection by the proposed international commission if a suspicious seismic event occurred. Paradoxically, in her view there was cause for hope—rather than discouragement, as the Brazilian representative had implied in his statement at the 1247th meeting—in the fact that the two blocs had not yet made a serious attempt to negotiate on the basis of the memorandum.

12. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 could not support the idea of a partial test ban, since that would permit the arms race to continue. While her Government would like to see contamination by radio-active fall-out brought to an end, it felt that mankind's ultimate survival must not be jeopardized for the sake of immediate relief.

13. The other proposed solution—the Western plan for a comprehensive test ban treaty, complete with detection and verification procedures—was unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The non-aligned nations at Geneva had refrained from attempting to mediate between the opposing positions on that proposal, since to do so would inevitably have meant siding with one or the other of the two blocs. Conscious that the General Assembly had sent them to Geneva to introduce an element of constructive impartiality into the Conference, they had presented their memorandum as a basis on which negotiations could begin afresh. They were not offering a magic formula, but rather a basis on which the nuclear Powers could develop their own formula.

14. There was some doubt whether the proposed deadline of 1 January 1963 for the cessation of testing would apply within the framework of a test ban treaty or whether it was being put forward as a separate measure. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 hoped, of course, that a treaty would be signed by 1 January; in the event that it was not, however, they were calling upon the nuclear Powers to halt their tests by that date.

15. The sponsors of the draft resolution were not calling for a moratorium, i.e., a policy agreement of some sort between the parties concerned, for they agreed with the Western Powers that no faith could be placed in informal arrangements of that kind. They were merely arguing that after a year of intensive testing in which more megatons of energy had been released than in all past years, there was no need for the nuclear Powers to continue their tests on a competitive basis simply because a treaty had not yet been concluded.

16. In connexion with operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, she wished to point out that negotiations could not be conducted "in a spirit of mutual understanding" if both sides boasted of their past concessions and used them as an excuse for hardening their current positions. The United Kingdom representative, for example, had argued at the 1250th meeting that compromises should be sought between the original positions of the two sides rather than between the "extreme Soviet position" and the "advanced Western position", which was the result of numerous concessions. However, the purpose of the present discussion was not to score debating points but to arrive at a basis for fruitful negotiation. Both sides must make concessions to majority opinion, and not only to the other side, for it was evident that at the stage now reached, the significant disagreement was actually that between the non-nuclear and the nuclear Powers. The reasoning of the Western and Soviet blocs was essentially the same in that each defended its position by pointing to the other's intransigence and each put forward technical data in an effort to obscure the fact that the real problem was a political one. Only one genuine technical issue remained, and the nuclear Powers must be prepared to overcome it, if the negotiations were not to founder on a single point. If an atmosphere of trust was ultimately to be created, risks must be taken, and the risk of a possible treaty violation was surely outweighed by the risk of world destruction if no treaty was concluded. Moreover, any such violation would be condemned by the entire world.

17. Her delegation hoped that the Committee would unanimously support draft resolution A/C.1/L.310, on which so many people were basing their hopes of liberation from the dangers now threatening mankind.

18. Mr. BARNES (Liberia) said that in the course of history man had encountered and overcome many threats to his survival, but that the worst—nuclear weapons—had been created by himself. If the arms race continued unchecked and if, by design, accident or miscalculation, a nuclear war broke out, the human race would cease to exist. It was a curious paradox that such a threat should have been created by the most advanced countries. But no one had the right thus to decide the future of mankind. Liberia, as President Tubman had told the General Assembly at the sixteenth session (1041st plenary meeting), was in favour of a complete ban on all nuclear tests. Unfortunately, the deadlock between the nuclear Powers had persisted throughout the year, and the tests had continued. Yet, there appeared to be more hope of a solution than ever before.

19. Both sides had indicated their readiness to agree to a partial test ban treaty, under which tests in outer space, in the atmosphere and under water would be prohibited. Both had thus advanced from their previous entrenched positions. The United States

and the United Kingdom, however, considered that the parties to such a treaty should be permitted to conduct underground tests pending the conclusion of an appropriate agreement, whereas the Soviet Union insisted on a moratorium on such tests. Neither side would accept the other's proposal, because neither had confidence in the other. It was understandable that the United States and the United Kingdom were reluctant to accept the Soviet proposal, despite its obvious merits, fearing that there might again be a unilateral resumption of tests. On the other hand, the Western proposal, although it would, if effective, halt the pollution of the atmosphere, would not avert the danger that testing in outer space, in the atmosphere or under water might be resumed in answer to underground tests.

20. There could be no doubt that the only completely valid solution would be an agreement to prohibit tests in all environments for all time. The eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 pointed the way towards that goal. It represented a compromise between the two opposing views, although intended only as a basis for discussion. While it was evident that no treaty could be imposed on the nuclear Powers, they were under a heavy obligation to the rest of the world to reach agreement. The essential thing was to establish a climate of confidence in which an agreement acceptable to both sides might be worked out. Such an agreement might be reached in two stages. In the first stage, the parties would immediately adopt a partial treaty banning tests in outer space, in the atmosphere and under water. The parties to the treaty would, however, be under the specific obligation of taking all possible steps to reach agreement quickly on underground tests, including the immediate establishment of an international scientific commission, with which the parties would be required to co-operate. Given the sense of urgency created by the setting of a deadline, the nuclear Powers would be under great pressure to accept any reasonable proposal leading to a comprehensive treaty. Nevertheless, the partial treaty should provide that if adequate progress towards agreement on underground tests had not been made within a certain time, perhaps three to six months, either party would have the right to call upon the other to agree to a conference of the Heads of State or Government of the parties concerned, who would assess the situation and the possibility of settling their differences. If no agreement was reached within one year, either of the parties would be entitled to withdraw from the treaty.

21. If that procedure were adopted, small concessions would be required from both sides, but the gains would be great. The Soviet Union, which was opposed to a partial ban without a moratorium on underground tests, would know that the treaty would end automatically within a year if no agreement was reached. And the Western Powers, faced with that same fact, would have an incentive to reach agreement on underground tests. The proposal he had outlined thus seemed to offer maximum protection at minimum cost, pending the signing of a comprehensive treaty.

22. Mr. SHAGDARSUREN (Mongolia) said that the question of nuclear tests was of the utmost importance for the whole of mankind, but that since other speakers had already reviewed the problem in detail, he would confine himself to stating his Government's position. The Mongolian Government considered that

the conclusion of an agreement to end all tests in any environment would check the nuclear arms race and thus create a climate of greater trust in international relations. Such an agreement would help to solve the greatest problem of the present time, general and complete disarmament. The meetings of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had unfortunately not produced the results that had been hoped for, but they had at least shown which countries were genuinely in favour of a test ban and which were not. The socialist countries were firmly in favour of an immediate ban on all types of nuclear tests, and were doing their best to bring about an agreement to that effect. The neutralists and other peace-loving States, particularly those which were members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, were doing much to help achieve that end. In particular, the joint memorandum put forward by eight neutralist States on 16 April 1962 could serve as a good basis for solving the problem. The reason why no solution had yet been found was the short-sighted policy of the United States and its allies, which had rejected every constructive proposal put forward by the Soviet Union or the neutralist countries. Their insistence on the key importance of control was a great obstacle to agreement.

23. The Western Powers accused the Soviet Union of having abandoned its earlier position on the idea of an international control system, and alleged that it had thus prevented agreement. But the essential point was not the fact that the Soviet Union had reconsidered its earlier stand, but the reason why it had done so. Any new step must be judged within the context of existing realities. In an attempt to find a way out of the deadlock, the Soviet Government had already, at the current session, put forward a new proposal. On the basis of recent scientific and technical progress, it had proposed that control of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water should be carried out by national means of detection and that the Powers concerned should undertake not to carry out tests underground until agreement was reached on a control system for tests in that environment.

24. If that proposal was considered without prejudice, it would be seen to be realistic. There was no reason to set up a cumbersome international control system when tests in any environment could be detected by national systems. In point of fact, the Western proposal for compulsory on-site inspection was merely designed to legalize spying. The soundness of the Soviet proposal had been recognized by all realists. The eight-nation memorandum, for example, stated that an effective and permanent control system could be based on the existing national networks of observation posts and other installations. Even the Western Powers admitted that national control was possible for tests in outer space, in the atmosphere and under water. Under the pressure of public opinion, they were being forced to come closer to recognizing the validity of the position on which the Soviet proposal was based; their attempts to put the Soviet Union in the wrong were merely aimed at making political capital. Their latest proposals were quite inadequate. They insisted on the establishment of an international control system before they would agree to stop underground tests, although it was known that recent tests of that kind in the United States, the USSR and France had been successfully detected by

seismic stations in many countries. Clearly, then, their insistence on control concealed an unwillingness to agree to a general ban. But the peoples of the world had set great hopes on the current session of the General Assembly, longing as they did for an end to all types of weapon tests, and effective measures must be taken to meet their wishes.

25. Mongolia considered the Soviet proposal the most realistic and acceptable. It also supported the Mexican proposal that 1 January 1963 should be set as the date for the cessation of all kinds of tests. It proposed that the Committee, on the basis of those proposals, should adopt a draft resolution calling on the nuclear Powers to conclude an agreement banning nuclear tests forthwith.

Mr. Enckell (Finland), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

26. Mr. VAKIL (Iran) said it was clear that the nuclear arms race was both legally and morally incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations. Nuclear weapon tests, with all their baleful biological effects, were contrary to the Charter principles of co-operation for the solution of social, economic, health and other related global problems and of respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals.

27. The report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation^{2/} and a number of similar national studies had made clear the horrible effects of fall-out; yet nuclear weapon tests remained a grim reality.

28. The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests had made considerable progress in drafting a test ban treaty, two-thirds of the treaty having been completed before September 1961. After the breaking of the moratorium, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had taken over the task at Geneva, and its proceedings had given some grounds for optimism. The United States and the United Kingdom had brought their views closer to those of the USSR, as had been reflected in their joint draft of 27 August 1962. Nevertheless, the Eighteen-Nation Committee had so far fared no better than its predecessor, and a number of important differences still separated the nuclear Powers.

29. Nevertheless, the narrowing of the gap between the two sides and the recent round of statements, including those made by the representatives of the nuclear Powers, offered some grounds for optimism. Both sides now proposed an immediate ban on tests in all environments, except underground, without requiring on-site international inspection and control. On the issue of underground tests, the Soviet Union was proposing a temporary cessation of such tests without means of verification, while the West was insisting on that degree of inspection and verification which was needed to make sure a treaty was observed.

30. His delegation believed that the goal of the Committee's efforts should remain the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty banning tests in all environments. Yet a partial ban, prohibiting tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, would offer some definite gains: first, it would bring to an end the radio-active pollution of the

atmosphere; second, it might at least retard the development of those nuclear weapons which required high-altitude tests; and third, such progress, though limited, would further the cause of general and complete disarmament.

31. His delegation was happy to note that valuable contributions to the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had been made by the non-nuclear Powers, who had played the role of mediator with distinction; the joint memorandum they had submitted on 16 April 1962 deserved further consideration. He shared the view of the Brazilian representative that the memorandum was not a definitive document, but one which could be used to get negotiations started on a reasonable basis.

32. A considerable degree of agreement already existed on the cessation of nuclear tests, and it was now the duty of the Assembly to call for the renewal of negotiations at Geneva. The deadline of 1 January 1963 proposed for the cessation of all nuclear tests should serve as a challenge to the nuclear Powers; if a treaty was signed by that date, it would constitute a memorable achievement of the General Assembly at its seventeenth session.

33. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal) said that a ban on nuclear testing would in itself be an important step towards general and complete disarmament. As the representative of a small nation, he called upon the nuclear Powers to put an end to testing, which was endangering human health and threatening mankind with total destruction. Even a continuance of the present so-called balance of fear would create a world of stagnation and despair that would be little better than a world laid waste by nuclear war.

34. It was encouraging that the difference between the positions of the nuclear Powers had narrowed substantially. Both sides now agreed that an international control system was not needed in order to detect and verify nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. With regard to underground testing, the Soviet Union was now prepared to agree to the establishment of an international scientific commission which could be invited to conduct on-site inspections whenever suspicious events occurred, while the Western Powers were prepared to accept a smaller number of annual inspections than they had earlier proposed. The nuclear Powers should therefore have no difficulty in reaching agreement on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962.

35. A treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water but leaving the parties free to test underground would defeat the very purpose of a nuclear test ban. At the same time, the Soviet proposal, under which a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water would be signed immediately and the parties would refrain from underground testing until an agreement banning it was reached, failed to inspire confidence in view of the violation of the voluntary moratorium in 1961. Since it felt that short-term relief should not be sought at the cost of long-term danger, his delegation favoured the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum. It could not understand the insistence on legal safeguards against the violation of a test ban treaty, since if the nuclear Powers could not be prevented from conducting tests now, they surely

^{2/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 16.

could not be prevented from violating the provisions of a future treaty. The confidence and goodwill engendered by a test ban treaty would guarantee its observance more effectively than would legal safeguards. Moreover, the prosperity that would result from the release of economic resources by a test ban agreement would act as a further safeguard against violation.

36. The problem of halting nuclear tests was not insoluble; the two blocs had demonstrated their goodwill at Geneva and a basis for negotiation was provided by the eight-nation memorandum. In that connexion, his delegation hoped that France, a nuclear Power which had been absent from the Geneva discussions, would join in future negotiations.

37. While negotiations were under way, it would be a source of reassurance to the world if the nuclear Powers undertook to refrain from conducting tests in any environment. His delegation also urged the nuclear Powers not to help any non-nuclear nation to join their ranks, and appealed to the non-nuclear nations, in the spirit of General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI), to abandon any efforts they were making to acquire nuclear weapons.

38. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.310, which his delegation had joined in sponsoring, was not intended to question anyone's motives. It merely expressed mankind's opposition to nuclear testing. It referred to the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 because that document had been accepted by all the nuclear Powers as a basis for negotiation. His delegation hoped that the draft resolution, which represented the very minimum that the Committee could do in connexion with nuclear testing, would be unanimously adopted.

39. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) said that Spain belonged to the group of countries which had no nuclear weapons and had taken no direct part in the work of the bodies set up to deal with the question. As a Member of the United Nations, however, it was under an obligation to give its opinion on the problem of nuclear tests and disarmament. The extent of a Member State's responsibilities was not dependent on its size or power, and countries such as his own could not be expected to restrict themselves to general appeals for universal reconciliation, however sincerely they might desire it. On the other hand, the fact of not possessing nuclear weapons was not a sign of virtue, but merely the result of lesser industrial development. All countries, including the nuclear Powers, must submit to the laws of international morality.

40. There was no denying the fact that hostility existed between certain political blocs and that mutual distrust made any restriction of armaments difficult. But such distrust, which there was reason for calling justified, might serve as a basis for reaching agreement and thus banishing the spectre of war, since it made it essential to provide a framework of legal guarantees. As the Japanese representative had said, there was little chance of banning underground tests, or, indeed, nuclear weapons in general, unless both sides had firm guarantees that the agreement would be observed. Once the principle of such guarantees was accepted by both sides, the world would be well on the way towards achieving its goal of security.

41. Spain did not wish to hide the fact that in the present world conflict of power, it gave its loyalty to a particular system. It did not believe in general non-political appeals, because the political issues were real. The horror of war had been known to all periods of history: nuclear weapons merely increased that horror by multiplying the power of destruction. However terrifying the present situation might be, it would be a thousand times worse if nuclear weapons were left solely in the hands of those who had already shown insufficient respect for international law and the laws of humanity in their dealings with other peoples. Sir Winston Churchill had said that Europe had been saved from Bolshevik domination at the end of the Second World War only by the atomic bomb, and the danger of such domination still remained. The Western Powers, therefore, in whose policies Spain had the fullest trust, must keep control of their nuclear weapons until the future of civilization was assured.

42. The statements made in the Committee had been of widely varying kinds and represented many different viewpoints. A survey of the views expressed during the debate had led Spain to the realistic position it now held and to the conclusion that surprising progress had been made over the previous year. Unfortunately, during the period mankind had had to suffer the consequences of a hundred nuclear tests, including the equivalent of 200 megatons exploded by the Soviet Union alone. The new series of tests had been begun when the Soviet Union had ended the voluntary moratorium, repudiating the position which it had accepted in 1958 and on which negotiations had been based in the following three years. During those years, the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests had been the scene of great efforts to achieve a nuclear test ban on the basis of international inspection. Seventeen articles and two annexes of a treaty had been agreed upon. It had only remained to settle the number of detection posts, the number of annual inspections and other details of a secondary nature. The principle of international inspection as such had no longer been disputed. But in 1961 the Soviet negotiators had gone back on their earlier commitments and rejected all international control arrangements. Thus all the work of that Conference had been lost, and it was obvious which country had been to blame.

43. If some progress had been made despite the retrograde attitude of the Soviet Union, the reasons were the conciliatory attitude of the West, improvements in the technique of detection and verification and the work of the eight non-aligned nations at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The eight non-aligned countries deserved the thanks of the Committee for their efforts; their joint memorandum of 16 April 1962 was regarded by many as a sound basis for discussion. It was to be hoped that the Soviet Union would now be prepared to move closer to the Western position, as the West had moved closer to that of the Soviet Union. In 1958, the West had envisaged the establishment of a system involving 170 ground control posts, ten ships, inspection flights and on-site visits in order to identify underground explosions. Since then the Western Powers had given up their insistence on international control for explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. The only problem that remained was the identification of underground events. For such

events, the Western Powers considered that it was necessary to establish the principle of compulsory on-site inspection, whereas the Soviet Union considered that inspection should take place only at the invitation of the country concerned. The Soviet Union thus accepted the idea of international inspection; but its position offered no guarantee that such invitations would be issued when necessary.

44. The West had also yielded on the question of internationally manned control posts, agreeing to the use of national staff co-ordinated and controlled by an international scientific commission. Similarly it was prepared to accept a much smaller number of on-site inspections, namely, one-fifth of the unidentified underground events, which could not be more than a dozen a year. Since the inspection teams would be international and appointed by the executive officer of an international control system, elected with the agreement of the Soviet Union, since the movements of such teams would be under the control of the Government concerned and since they would be accompanied by observers of that Government, there were adequate safeguards against any abuse of the system for purposes of espionage.

45. The Soviet Union denied that such a control system was necessary, asserting that all the tests it had carried out recently had been detected in the United States. But there was no proof that tests had not been carried out by the Soviet Union undetected; the Western Powers, for their part, claimed that their instruments were not sufficiently sensitive to detect and identify all underground tests. If the Soviet Union disagreed, why had it not accepted the

repeated proposals that its scientists should join with those of the West in establishing a national detection and identification system which would satisfy the Western Powers? And if, as the Soviet representative claimed, the present relations between the States concerned were such that a free exchange of information was impossible in that field, how could it expect the Western Powers to trust the Soviet Union to suspend underground tests without inspection?

46. In view of the background of the negotiations, and particularly of the unilateral resumption of testing by the Soviet Union, the Western Powers could not be expected to make any further concessions. To do so would not be a compromise, but merely an acceptance of the Soviet position without any kind of guarantee. In the circumstances, it had been gratifying to hear the United Kingdom representative state that his country would never accept agreements that were not subject to due verification. The representatives of Greece and the United States had made similar statements.

47. Any renunciation of nuclear tests by the West would be madness without adequate guarantees. But it would be wrong to despair. There was hope that the Soviet Union would respond to the desire of the overwhelming majority of countries and that it would at last agree to a treaty prohibiting, with adequate guarantees, nuclear tests in all environments, or at least in outer space, in the atmosphere and under water.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.