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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEM 78

Complaint by Cuba of threats to international peace and security arising from new plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Revolutionary Government of Cuba (A/4832 and Add.1, A/5072, A/C.1/845, A/C.1/847, A/C.1/851, A/C.1/854, A/C.1/866, A/C.1/L.309) (continued)

1. Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) said that the United States representative's assertion at the preceding meeting that there was no threat to Cuba and that there neither had been nor could be any aggression against that country was in contradiction with the facts. In April 1961, at the second part of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, when the Committee had discussed the complaint of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba regarding the aggressive actions of the United States, incontrovertible evidence had been given of political, diplomatic, military and economic preparations for aggression against Cuba. It had been established that military units were being organized and trained in Guatemala, Nicaragua and other countries, and that the United States Government was financing and organizing the preparations for military intervention in Cuba and was providing supplies and equipment for that purpose. The United States Government and its representative in the Committee had denied those facts until, the invading force having landed and hostilities having begun, they had been branded as liars by their own Press and public opinion. The captured mercenaries and the confiscated American military equipment had since clearly established the real part played by the United States Government in the crime perpetrated against Cuba. Further evidence had been provided by recent statements such as that made by the President of Guatemala on 31 December 1961.

2. The weight of the evidence had ultimately compelled the United States to admit its guilt in that criminal attack, which had been met by the heroic resistance of the Cuban people, decisively supported by world public opinion, and had ended in defeat. Apparently, the United States had decided to resort

to armed force when it became clear that there was no other way to reassert its domination over its former semi-colony. The official pamphlet circulated on 6 April 1961 (A/4725) had been merely a futile attempt to provide moral justification for its action.

3. The aggression against Cuba, which constituted an act of open defiance of the United Nations Charter, had destroyed the myth that the United States was the ally of all countries which had emerged from colonial status or were still fighting for their liberation. It had shown that, on the pretext of maintaining peace in the Western hemisphere, United States monopolies were prepared to resort to the most discreditable methods in order to perpetuate their domination. The military aggression against Cuba in April 1961 and the new collective intervention for which preparations were being made by the United States demonstrated that imperialism set no store by the principles of international law or by international agreements and the obligations deriving from them; the only law which it recognized was the law of the jungle, and it sought, by pressure, blackmail and armed force, to attain its objectives and to protect its interests in "its" hemisphere.

4. The United Nations Charter solemnly proclaimed the equality of all States, large and small, and recognized their unqualified right freely to choose their own political and economic systems. It rejected any individual or collective interference in the internal affairs of other States. Article 15 of the charter of the Organization of American States^{1/} proclaimed the same principles. That article, together with articles 24 and 25, explained the attempt by the United States to expel Cuba from the OAS in order to pave the way for further aggression.

5. According to official Washington publications, up to 1903, the United States had intervened militarily on 114 occasions to protect its interests in Latin America. Between 1900 and 1933, it had taken such action on forty-four occasions against its neighbours to the South. It had launched "punitive expeditions" against Cuba alone in 1903, 1906, 1907, 1912, 1914, 1917, 1923 and so on. The sole purpose of all those acts of intervention, which had never been directed against any dictatorship, had been to consolidate the hold of United States monopolies and to crush those national forces which refused to sell their honour and their national dignity for dollars. Interference in the domestic affairs of other sovereign States was a basic principle of United States foreign policy. In attempting to justify that position on the ground that it bore some mystical responsibility for the whole of the American continent, the United States was using an argument that was not only naïve, but foolish and dangerous. The complaint submitted by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba revealed the danger very clearly.

^{1/} United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 119 (1952), No. 1609.

6. Immediately after the failure of the intervention of April 1961, the United States had prepared new plans to crush the Cuban revolution and replace the present Cuban Government with puppets who would blindly carry out orders from Washington. The objectives of the United States were not limited to the restoration of a reactionary and pro-United States régime in Cuba; its purpose was, by crushing the Cuban revolution, to deal a mortal blow to all national liberation movements throughout Latin America, a continent which was ripe for its second revolution of economic and social emancipation. The fiasco of April 1961 had led the United States to adopt a new strategy, under which the risk of any future venture would be shared with all the countries of Latin America. That was the point of all the recent United States proposals to the Organization of American States. Press reports and official documents showed that the State Department had already tried—in particular at the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States held at San José in August 1960, and at the economic conference held at Bogotá in September 1960—to obtain approval for collective intervention against Cuba. The agreement reached at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States at Punta del Este was merely another version of the old imperialist policy: diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba, intensified espionage, the training of armed units for a new invasion, the building up of an anti-Cuba psychosis in all the Latin American countries for the purpose of inducing them to embark on a crusade against progress and democracy. All those were familiar signs of preparations for aggression.

7. The convocation of the Punta del Este meeting and the decisions taken there, which had been far from unanimous, clearly indicated that the United States was seeking to create favourable conditions for new military ventures in the Caribbean area. The United States Government was aware that the right of self-determination and the principle of non-intervention were established in the charter of the Organization of American States and precluded the Latin American countries from openly supporting United States policy against Cuba. Consequently, all its efforts had been aimed at securing the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS so that it would be deprived of the protection, however formal, of that organization's charter and so that the United States would have a free hand for further aggression against it.

8. Under the guise of pan-Americanism and mutual solidarity and on the pretext of the need to combat Chinese and Soviet penetration, the United States was seeking to transform the OAS into an aggressive military bloc similar to NATO and, within that framework, was assuming the right to intervene as it pleased in the domestic affairs of the Latin American countries. In the desire to conceal its activities, it had always done everything in its power to prevent any co-operation between the United Nations and the OAS. The United States had learned from the failure of the aggression in April 1961, and realized that it needed the moral support of the other American countries. For that purpose, it was once more invoking the spectre of communism and was trying to convince the Latin American peoples of the need to "save the Cuban revolution" which, it said, Fidel Castro had betrayed—as if the United States monopolies cared about the Cuban revolution. In fact, the United States was deeply

concerned at the great interest aroused in Latin America by Cuba's progress in land reform, the expropriation of foreign monopolies, the creation of a national industry, the campaign against illiteracy and the mobilization of the whole people against attempts at subversion, sabotage and aggression by the United States. It considered that the Cuban Government had committed a mortal sin by establishing diplomatic relations and economic, political and cultural ties with the socialist States.

9. It might well be asked who had given the United States the right to censure a particular Government in the Western hemisphere and to intervene in the domestic and external affairs of countries in that hemisphere. Certainly neither the Charter of the United Nations nor the charter of the Organization of American States sanctioned that form of international tutelage. The United States had shown that it was interested in Latin America only when that was to its own advantage. It had always shamelessly supported dictators until the national liberation movement had reached its continent. The United States monopolies saw Latin America only as a vast source of profits. Each dollar invested brought in \$3.17. Between 1946 and 1960, the net profits on direct investments had been \$8,900 million. That was the price which Latin America had paid for its backward economy, high death-rate and poverty. It was also the main reason for the social instability of Latin American countries. As long ago as 1829 Simón Bolívar had said it seemed that Providence itself had chosen the United States to bring misery and suffering to America, in the name of liberty. In 1960, a well-known United States politician had admitted that the purpose of United States policy in Latin America had too long been to make the continent safe, not for United States ideals, but for United States big business. He would like to be able to tell that United States politician that that was the real trouble: the United States no longer had any ideals which could inspire the peoples of Latin America. That was why the United States hated the Cuban revolution, which was an expression of the high ideals of freedom and progress. The purpose of the United States programme, misnamed the "Alliance for Progress", was to deal with the problems of Latin America while maintaining United States domination. That programme, which was conditional upon the rupture of relations with Cuba, would deceive no one. As the Head of the Cuban Government had said, national independence and the future of Latin America were not for sale, and those who sold them were cheating the buyers.

10. The Revolutionary Government of Cuba had submitted to the General Assembly a complaint of threats of aggression by the United States. The events of April 1961 and those now in progress proved not only that such a threat existed, but that active preparations were being made for aggression. The United States was openly setting out to intervene in the domestic affairs of Cuba and to change the existing régime by force. Such actions were a flagrant violation of the Charter and could not be tolerated by the United Nations. The present situation was dangerous because it might lead to a local conflict and because the tension it caused might affect the whole world. The General Assembly should, therefore, make it clear to the United States that it would bear the full responsibility for its acts, which conflicted with its obligations under the United Nations Charter. The United States Government would also be responsible for the possible

effects of its acts on international peace and security. All Governments which supported or acquiesced in United States policy towards Cuba shared that responsibility.

11. At its sixteenth session, the General Assembly had reaffirmed the right of peoples to self-determination, the principle of peaceful coexistence and the need for economic and social progress. In the present case, therefore, it had a duty to oppose any attempt to prevent the Cuban people from exercising its right to self-determination, fulfilling its aspirations in freedom and enjoying true independence. That was why the Czechoslovak delegation, jointly with the Romanian delegation, had submitted draft resolution A/C.1/L.309. On several occasions the Revolutionary Government of Cuba had invited the United States Government to begin negotiations with it on the basis of equality of the parties, but the United States Government had not shown the slightest desire to do so. The least the Assembly could do was earnestly to call upon both Governments to do everything in their power to settle their dispute by peaceful means. The Czechoslovak delegation was convinced that the great majority of members of the Committee shared that view.

12. The young Republic of Cuba was threatened by a powerful enemy. In Guatemala, in Florida, at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, and elsewhere, troops were again preparing to attack Cuba. Diplomatic and economic sanctions were paving the way for that aggression. But the Cuban people was not alone or disarmed: the peoples of Latin America and of the whole world stood beside it; and, in its fight to protect its freedom, its independence and the achievements of its revolution, it could rely on the sincere support of the Czechoslovak people.

13. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thought that the facts given by the representative of Cuba at the 1231st meeting provided clear evidence of direct interference by the United States in Cuba's domestic affairs and, in particular, of preparations for further armed aggression against that country. Unfortunately, the representative of the United States, in his statement at the same meeting, had made no comment on those facts, which had an important bearing on the maintenance of peace.

14. The representative of the United States had denied that his country had prepared or was preparing to commit aggression against Cuba. Similar denials had however been made on previous occasions. For example, in the Security Council on 4 January 1961^{2/} the United States representative had said that there had never been any plan for a military invasion of Cuba. And on 17 April 1961, in the First Committee,^{3/} the representative of the United States had categorically denied an accusation that forces from Florida were threatening to invade Cuba. Yet, as the United States and the world Press had reported, that was the very day when interventionist units, trained in the United States, directed by the CIA and protected by the United States Navy, had landed in Cuba. Did the United States representative admit the fact of that intervention? Was it not true that the President of the United States, in an official statement issued by the White House on 24 April 1961, had accepted responsibility for the events of 17 April 1961?

^{2/} See Official Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, 922nd meeting.

^{3/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session (Part II), First Committee, 1150th meeting.

15. On 17 April 1961, the United States representative in the First Committee had said that the men who had landed in Cuba were "not traitors and mercenaries".^{4/} Yet according to a Press report despatched from Miami on 31 July 1961 and published the following day in The New York Times, members of the Cuban expeditionary forces who had not been taken prisoner on 17 April had ceased on that date to receive the \$250 a month which they had hitherto been paid. The report also said that that decision was presumably co-ordinated with an announcement made the previous Friday, that Cuban exiles would be eligible to enlist in the United States armed forces. The delegation of the USSR would therefore like to know whether or not the United States had subsidized the Cuban interventionists, whether or not it was continuing to finance subversive activities against Cuba and whether or not the Cuban exiles could now join the United States armed forces.

16. Moreover, in his New Year message the President of Guatemala had admitted that at the request of the United States his Government had allowed Guatemalan territory to be used for the training of invasion forces which were to be supplied with instructors and weapons by the United States. He asked if the United States representative was aware of that message which had been broadcast and televised on 31 December 1961, and if he would confirm the information which it had contained. Could he also say whether it was true or false to maintain, as the weekly U.S. News & World Report had done, that in April 1961 the Cuban interventionists had been escorted into Cuban territorial waters by United States torpedo boats and a United States aircraft carrier, and that the invaders' B-26 bombers had been escorted by fighter planes of the United States Navy?

17. At the previous meeting the Cuban representative had adduced facts to prove that the United States was preparing further aggression against the Republic of Cuba. In particular he had named several places where the future invaders were being prepared and trained. The USSR delegation expected the United States representative to confirm or deny that information.

18. The United States representative had claimed that his country's position had received virtually unanimous support at the Punta del Este meeting. In that case, how did he explain the fact that his country had not succeeded in having immediate sanctions adopted against Cuba and that the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS had not been supported by six countries with a total population of 140 million, or three-quarters of the population of Latin America? Was that proof of the unanimous support which the aggressive policy of the United States was supposed to enjoy?

19. The United States representative had spoken of the benefits which his country's aid would bring to Latin America and of the \$500 million which, apparently, had already been appropriated for the programme known as the Alliance for Progress. But was it true that United States monopolies had reaped profits in Latin America amounting to \$784 million in 1959, and \$829 million in 1961, as reported in the journal of the United States Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business? Lastly, his delegation would like to know if the United States still respected the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of all States, which was laid down in both the United Nations Charter and the charter of the Organization of American States,

^{4/} *Ibid.*, 1150th meeting, para. 24.

or whether they thought that principle did not apply in the case of Cuba.

20. He urged the United States representative to give clear answers to those questions, which were worrying the peoples of Latin America and all the peoples of the world who desired the maintenance of international peace and co-operation.

21. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America), exercising his right of reply, said that the journeys he had made in Latin America in recent years had never been kept secret for fear of the hostility of the local populations. The cordiality and hospitality which he had always encountered had even been so great that there had been times when he would have preferred to be incognito. He also drew attention to the tumultuous welcome recently accorded to the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, in Latin America, to which the photographic record abundantly testified.

22. To hear the Czechoslovak representative, one would think it was the communists who were trying to improve the lot of the Latin American peoples while the United States was trying to retard the development of that continent. The arguments put forward to support that idea were not new. They had already been adduced in connexion with the Marshall Plan, which had saved Europe from economic collapse and the triumph of communism in that part of the world. It was because the Marshall Plan had produced those results that certain people were now opposing the economic rehabilitation of Latin America through the Alliance for Progress.

23. As the Czechoslovak representative had quite rightly observed, the United States had not proposed bilateral negotiations with Cuba. The Cuban problem concerned not only the United States but the whole of the Latin American continent. The other countries of that region had more to fear from that infection than the United States.

24. Like the Cuban and Czechoslovak representatives, the representative of the Soviet Union had charged the United States with planning aggression against Cuba. It should be noted in that connexion that those three representatives had referred only to the events of April 1961 and had advanced no evidence for the only new charge: the training of Cuban refugees in various places in the Western hemisphere.

25. Finally, he pointed out that the resolutions of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States at Punta del Este had been adopted unopposed; the abstentions had related only to the means of accomplishing the objectives intended.

26. Mr. GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI (Cuba) stated that the warm welcome accorded to the President of the United States on the occasion of his recent journey to Latin America had come first and foremost from

the armed forces. According to The New York Times, one of the countries visited by Mr. Kennedy had had to mobilize 20,000 to 30,000 soldiers to protect its guest against the fury of the people. Some soldiers had perhaps been disguised as civilians, which would explain the existence of the photographs mentioned by the United States representative.

27. It was not true that at the previous meeting, the Cuban delegation had referred only to facts prior to the aggression of April 1961. It had given precise information on the CIA agents who had recently infiltrated into Cuba. The United States Press itself had reported those facts, which were undeniably new, as well as the training of those agents in various camps.

28. Mr. ZEA (Colombia) said that the reception given to President Kennedy in Colombia had been one of the most enthusiastic ever seen in that country. The extraordinarily large crowd which had thronged the capital, in particular, had spontaneously demonstrated its joy at his visit.

29. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he hoped that after studying the record of the present meeting, the United States representative would be able to give the Committee the specific replies which the questions put to him by the Soviet delegation called for. In particular he wished to have a detailed statement of the United States position regarding the aggression of April 1961. Those events were not, of course, the only ones to which the Soviet delegation had referred; it had none the less thought fit to mention them since the United States representative had stated that his country had not prepared and was not preparing aggression against Cuba. Should that be taken to mean that the United States denied having organized aggression against Cuba and that Cuba had been a victim of aggression in April 1961?

30. Although he did not wish to dwell on the welcome accorded to Mr. Stevenson or President Kennedy in Latin America, he noted that the United States representative had offered to show photographs testifying to the warmth of those receptions. In that connexion he recalled the photographs which, according to the statement of that same representative in the Committee on 15 April 1961,^{5/} were supposed to prove that the aircraft which had bombed Cuba had belonged to the Cuban Air Force, whereas in fact they had been nothing of the kind, as had been later confirmed by a report in Time magazine on 28 April 1961.

31. Mr. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) said that his country was one of those which President Kennedy had visited during his recent journey to Latin America, and that few foreigners had received a more spontaneous and enthusiastic reception in Venezuela than the President of the United States.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.

^{5/} Ibid., 1149th meeting.