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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEM 20

The Korean question: reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/4900 and Add.1, A/C.1/858, A/C.1/859, A/C.1/860, A/C.1/861, A/C.1/862, A/C.1/863, A/C.1/864, A/C.1/L.302, A/C.1/L.303, A/C.1/L.305) (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that at its 1217th meeting it had adopted a resolution (A/C.1/863) in which it decided to invite representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take part in the discussion on the Korean question provided that the Democratic People's Republic first accepted unequivocally the competence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean question. The representative of Poland had suggested at the previous meeting that the reply of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (A/C.1/864) to that resolution should be regarded as satisfactory and that its representatives should immediately be seated in the Committee; however, that suggestion had been opposed by a number of representatives. It remained for the Committee to give its decision on the interpretation to be placed on the reply.

2. Mr. YOST (United States of America) said that in order to resolve that question and to enable the Committee to proceed with the discussion of the substance of the Korean question, he wished to propose formally the following motion which was phrased in the exact terms of the invitation extended by the Committee:

"The First Committee,

"Noting that the communication from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea does not accept unequivocally the competence and authority of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question,

"Decides that there is no basis for participation by a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the discussion of this question."

3. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), pointing out that in its reply the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea stated that it had always respected and recognized the United Nations Charter, asked the United States representative whether the reference in his motion to unequivocal acceptance of the competence and authority of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question was to

be understood as implying action beyond the framework of the Charter. If so, what type of action did he have in mind?

4. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) said that while his delegation agreed that the participation of the North Korean régime in the discussion was desirable, it was clear that the North Korean régime had not accepted the condition attached to the Committee's invitation. The question was not whether or nor it recognized and respected the Charter, but whether it accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations to act in the Korean question. The competence of the United Nations with respect to the question of the unification of Korea had been established by the General Assembly in a number of resolutions. The North Koreans, by stating in their reply (A/C.1/864) that the question was "by no means a question to be discussed at the United Nations", were in fact denying that competence. In the circumstances, the only reasonable course open to the Committee was to decide by voting on the United States motion whether it regarded the North Korean reply as accepting or rejecting the condition it had attached to its invitation. Greece would vote in favour of the United States motion.

5. Mr. YOST (United States of America) agreed with the Greek representative that the North Korean régime had not accepted the condition attached to the Committee's invitation, and urged that the Committee proceed immediately to the vote on the United States motion.

6. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) said that in its reply the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had accepted the Committee's invitation, stating that it recognized and respected the United Nations Charter. The United States motion thus actually called for reconsideration of the Committee's decision to invite representatives of the Democratic People's Republic, being based not on the merits of the case but on an individual interpretation of certain passages of the text of the reply. In the circumstances, its adoption would require a two-thirds majority.

7. The CHAIRMAN ruled that the United States motion did not imply the reconsideration of a previous decision and could therefore be adopted by a simple majority. It was clear from the text of the Committee's resolution (A/C.1/863) and the text of the United States motion that all the Committee was now being asked to do was to decide on the interpretation to be given to the North Korean reply, that is, to decide whether the reply actually met the condition attached by the Committee to the participation of the Democratic People's Republic in its discussion.

8. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that unless the condition attached by the Committee to its invitation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was understood as exceeding the scope of the United Nations Charter, the

reply of the Democratic People's Republic must be regarded as positive and satisfactory. He wished to remind the representative of Greece that the question of the unification of Korea was not within the competence of the United Nations; indeed, the Soviet Union regarded the intervention of the United Nations in the internal affairs of the Korean people as illegal. The decisions adopted by the Assembly on that aspect of the question were also illegal, and had been imposed by a group of States headed by the United States at a time when the latter was still in a position to impose its will in the United Nations. But times had changed, and new attitudes should be adopted in keeping with the new spirit which now prevailed.

9. He endorsed the Polish representative's view that the United States motion implied the reconsideration of a previously adopted decision and therefore required a two-thirds majority.

10. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) said it was obvious from the very language of the arrogant and discourteous reply received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (A/C.1/864) that the North Korean régime had refused to fulfil the condition laid down by the Committee in its resolution. Indeed, it had asserted that it was an "unjustified and shameful act" to attach any conditions to its participation in the debate. It had added that the Korean question was "by no means a question to be discussed at the United Nations". Consequently, it could not logically be argued that the condition imposed by the Committee had been unequivocally accepted. The Salvadorian delegation therefore considered that the Committee should proceed to consider the substance of the Korean question. In so doing, the Committee would not be reconsidering its previous decision.

11. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) observed that the Committee, profiting by experience, had recognized that its debate on the Korean question would be sterile unless it was held in the presence of representatives of the two Governments existing in Korea, and had wisely decided to invite representatives of both parts of Korea to participate in the debate. The United States was now proposing that the Committee should reconsider that decision.

12. The reasons adduced in support of the United States motion were not valid. The representative of El Salvador, for example, had complained about the immoderate language used in the North Korean reply. His complaint was untenable and irrelevant: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was a sovereign State, and was free to speak in whatever terms it saw fit. Nor was it surprising that a people which had for so many years been the target of discrimination and insults on the part of the United States and the United Nations should harbour bitterness against its enemies, who, moreover, had shed the blood of hundreds of thousands of its sons.

13. What was important, however, was the question of the real motives of those who sought to prevent the participation of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic. For no one who genuinely wished to reduce international tension and to contribute to a solution of the Korean question which would avert any future aggression could have any hesitation in welcoming representatives of the two parties directly concerned as participants in the debate. The presence of both sides was indispensable if any resolution on the

Korean question was to have the slightest chance of being implemented.

14. The position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea vis-à-vis the United Nations was clear: it recognized and respected the Charter—the only condition required of Member States or of States aspiring to membership in the United Nations. Surely, the Democratic People's Republic could not be expected to state in advance that it would accept any decision adopted by a majority in the Committee or in the Assembly, whether or not that decision was in conformity with the Charter. Yet that was precisely what the United States and certain other delegations were demanding of the Democratic People's Republic: they sought to impose upon it decisions which were contrary to the Charter because they concerned matters to which the Charter did not apply and which, indeed, were subject to the reservations contained in Article 2, paragraph 7.

15. The Romanian delegation regarded the United States motion as a proposal to reconsider a previously adopted decision, and therefore requiring a two-thirds majority.

16. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) said that his reference to the unification of Korea and to the successive Assembly resolutions adopted on that subject had been made in response to the Bulgarian representative, who had asked at the previous meeting how the question of the unification of Korea could be discussed without the participation of both parties. The Greek delegation agreed that the presence of both sides was desirable; however, the Democratic People's Republic had not accepted the condition attached to the Committee's invitation, and if it was out of keeping with the new spirit of the times to refuse to permit the participation of representatives who did not recognize the competence of the United Nations, the Greek delegation would prefer to lag behind in that respect.

17. Mr. YOST (United States of America) said that certain delegations appeared to maintain that the Committee had extended an unconditional invitation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and that, therefore, a refusal to permit its participation was tantamount to the revision of a previous decision. The fact was that a specific condition—and in no sense a humiliating or unreasonable one—had been attached to the invitation. The North Korean régime had not complied with that condition; but since there was a difference of opinion on the point, the Committee should decide it by a vote on the United States motion before proceeding with the discussion of the substance of the Korean question.

18. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) moved the closure of debate on the United States motion, and proposed that the motion should immediately be put to the vote.

The motion for closure was adopted.

19. In reply to a request for clarification from Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), the CHAIRMAN repeated his ruling that the United States motion required only a simple majority for its adoption.

20. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) said that the Chairman's ruling had not been based on the procedural merits of the case.

21. The CHAIRMAN put the United States motion to the vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

El Salvador, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Ecuador.

Against: Ghana, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia.

Abstaining: Finland, India, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Austria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon.

The motion was adopted by 54 votes to 17, with 22 abstentions.

22. The CHAIRMAN said that before giving the floor to the first speaker in the general debate on the Korean question, he would call on the representative of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, who wished to make a statement.

23. Mr. ARREGLADO (United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea), said that the Korean question centred on the attainment of the main objective of the United Nations in Korea, which was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government for the whole peninsula. The problem affected not only the Korean people, but the United Nations and all peoples interested in the preservation of peace and security.

24. In 1945, soon after the end of the Second World War, Korea had been liberated from Japanese domination, and the occupying forces of the United States and Soviet Union had agreed that the 38th parallel should be the line of demarcation between their military zones of occupation for the purpose of accepting the surrender of Japanese troops in Korea. That line had been intended merely as a temporary military frontier, not as a political frontier, for the Allied Powers taking part in the Cairo Conference of November 1943, the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of July-August 1945 and the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held at Moscow in December 1945 had agreed that a unified sovereign State of Korea should be established. Korea had been politically divided at the 38th parallel mainly because of a disagreement about the method of achieving the common purpose of unification; but that disagreement had arisen from wide international differences in outlook and policy, not from the Korean situation itself. In September 1947, the United States had submitted the whole question of Korean independence to the General Assembly,^{1/} and the Assembly had voted to take cognizance of the question. Since then, the United Nations had assumed the

main responsibility for establishing the unity and national independence of Korea under a democratic system, and had been politically represented in Korea by a series of Commissions. When the Korean conflict had broken out in June 1950, the Security Council had called upon the Members of the United Nations to come to the defence of the Republic of Korea,^{2/} thus providing the first example in history of a collective security organization in action.

25. The principal representative of the United Nations in Korea was now the Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which the General Assembly had set up by its resolution 376 (V) of 7 October 1950 with instructions, firstly, to seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea, and to make available its good offices and be prepared to assist, whenever in its judgement a favourable opportunity arose, in bringing about the unification of Korea in accordance with the principles laid down by the General Assembly in its resolution 112 (II) of 14 November 1947; secondly, to be available for observation and consultation throughout Korea in the continuing development of representative government based on the freely expressed will of the people, including elections of national scope; and thirdly, to represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea. For ten years UNCURK had attempted to promote the objectives of the United Nations in Korea, and its members had maintained a scrupulous regard for its character as an instrument of the United Nations, for its terms of reference and for the general principles laid down in the United Nations Charter. The two fundamental objectives of the United Nations in Korea were to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and to bring about the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. Since UNCURK believed that those two objectives were closely linked and that any progress towards a solution in accordance with United Nations principles would contribute to the full restoration of peace and security in the area, it had tried to make friendly contact with the North Korean authorities, to offer its good offices and to assist in every possible way in bringing about a unified, independent and democratic Korea by peaceful means. But there had been no response from the North Korean authorities, and radio broadcasts had made it clear that UNCURK was unwelcome in North Korea. The Republic of Korea, on the other hand, had placed no restrictions on the United Nations Commissions. It had continued to regard UNCURK as an important symbol of the interest of the United Nations in Korea, looked to it for assistance in solving many problems, co-operated generously with it and willingly acceded to all requests for investigatory facilities and for information. The general attitude of the people and Government of the Republic of Korea had been that it was a moral force which acted as a stabilizing factor and a deterrent to external aggression.

26. It was clear that the division of Korea in 1945 had been largely responsible for the creation of two separate and opposing political entities, each desiring unification but insisting on its own ways of achieving it. All agreed that such a division was artificial, unnatural and unacceptable except as a temporary

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, General Committee, annex 1 b.

^{2/} See Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 16, 474th meeting, document S/1508/Rev.1.

measure. The division had been aggravated by the Korean conflict, which had been ended by the conclusion of an armistice agreement. UNCURK had consistently regarded that agreement not as a peace settlement, but only as a step towards the ultimate ends that should be sought in a full-scale peace settlement. All efforts to achieve such a settlement had been in vain; the armistice was still in operation and the Korean question remained unsolved. There had been no basic change in the attitude of the North Korean authorities; UNCURK had made no progress towards the unification of Korea because it had been excluded from the North and because the North Korean authorities would not accept the United Nations principles for unification or negotiate on the basis of those principles. The division between South and North Korea had hardened, and their relations had been marked by bitter propaganda, distrust and hostile activities, which made the prospect of unification more remote.

27. The Commission had carried on its work to the best of its ability. Whether or not a political settlement leading to the unification of the country as a democratic nation belonged to the present or the future, the Commission was convinced that the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea must remain the same. In the meantime, the Republic of Korea must be secure against outside aggression. Since the United Nations had played a fundamental part in the establishment and defence of the Republic, it still had a great responsibility for support and assistance through its political, economic and social organs. The needs of the Republic were still extensive, and should not be ignored.

28. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the United States had imposed on the Committee the decision to cancel its invitation to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take part in the discussion, and the decision not to consider the question at the resumed sixteenth session. The Committee's discussion of the Korean question was thus taking place under improper conditions which would not help the United Nations to make a constructive contribution to the solution of the problem. Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation considered it necessary to present its views, in the hope that they would help delegations to arrive at an understanding of the true nature of the problem. For many years, the United Nations, under pressure from a group of countries led by the United States, had followed a wrong policy and thus contributed to a sequence of events in South Korea which endangered peace and security in the Far East as a whole.

29. From previous resolutions of the General Assembly on the Korean question, it would seem that the real problem was the unification of Korea and that the task of the United Nations was to ensure such unification—on certain conditions laid down by the United States. But was the unification of Korea an international problem, in which the United Nations was entitled to intervene? After the Second World War two States had been created in the Korean peninsula, the Democratic People's Republic, a socialist State, in which there was no exploitation of man by man, and the Republic of Korea, in which the capitalist system had been maintained. North Korea, formerly a backward colonial province, was now a developed country with a flourishing economy. In 1960, its industrial output had been eight times greater than in 1944, the last year of Japanese rule. A fully modern industrial and technological basis had been established in all fields of the economy. The introduction of a socialist system had led

to constantly increasing yields in agriculture; in 1960 the grain harvest had been one and a half times greater than in 1944. The standard of living had risen accordingly; the real wages of manual and non-manual workers had doubled between 1956 and 1960 and the material well-being of the peasants had also increased since the advent of voluntary collectivization. Huge successes had been achieved in the educational and cultural fields. North Korea was the only Asian country with universal compulsory seven-year education, and seventy-eight institutes of higher education had been set up in a country which before its liberation had had none. Thousands of engineers and other technical specialists had been trained, and now ran all the factories and other works in North Korea. In short, the country was a true democracy, providing a free, happy and prosperous life for its people.

30. In the so-called Republic of Korea, which remained a backward agricultural area, the situation was quite the reverse. Formerly an exporter of agricultural produce, it was now an importer, and its industry was stagnant, as even the misleading figures in paragraph 105 of the UNCURK report (A/4900) showed. The standard of living was constantly falling, and the population was burdened with heavy taxes, most of which went to maintain an army of 700,000. Workers were obliged to work from ten to eighteen hours a day and their wages were less than one-third of what was needed for subsistence; moreover about 6 million people, or half the working population, were unemployed or underemployed. It was no exaggeration to say that South Korea was a country of economic ruin, poverty and famine.

31. From the political viewpoint, the situation was equally bad. For many years the Syngman Rhee clique had maintained itself in power by falsifying election results and arresting and persecuting all progressive people. Even UNCURK had recognized, in its report to the General Assembly at the fifteenth session, that the previous Government had failed to observe democratic processes to the satisfaction of the people.^{3/} In April 1960, the people of South Korea had thrown the Syngman Rhee clique out, but the forces of reaction, with foreign assistance, had prevented them from enjoying the fruits of their victory. Under the régime of Chang Myun, which had followed, there had been the same violation of democratic rights, police persecution and suppression of all opposition as under Syngman Rhee. Popular protests had led the United States and the South Korean rulers to realize that the days of that régime were numbered; the outcome had been the military coup d'état of 16 May 1961. The military fascist dictatorship which had been in power since then was the most cruelly repressive in the history of the country. More than 100,000 people had been thrown into prison and special legislation of a Nazi type had been introduced. Any expression of personal opinion was punished by imprisonment and other heavy penalties. The harshness of those measures indicated how much the South Korean rulers feared their people.

32. Such, then, were the two States that existed in Korea. The peoples of both longed for unification. For many years the Government of the Democratic People's Republic had put forward proposals in that connexion, providing, for example, for free elections in both parts of the country without foreign interference, the establishment of a confederation as a first step towards

^{3/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 13, para. 42.

unification, contacts between government and other public bodies, economic and cultural exchanges, and free correspondence and movement between North and South. Unfortunately, the Syngman Rhee régime had never shown any desire to consider those proposals seriously, but had directed its whole policy towards imposing unification by force; that had been recognized by UNCURK in its report to the fifteenth session.^{4/} Under the Chang Myun régime the people of South Korea had frequently called for the establishment of friendly contacts with North Korea. The present dictatorship had made such appeals subject to severe penalties, including death; the texts of the relevant laws could be found in an annex to the report of UNCURK to the current session (A/4900, annex V). That situation, which had not been mentioned by the representative of UNCURK, was not conducive to unification; indeed, the existence of a military fascist dictatorship in South Korea was a serious obstacle to any such plan. The Democratic People's Republic would continue its struggle for a peaceful solution, although that goal could not be achieved without a change in the situation in South Korea. However that might be, the question of unification was one for the Korean people themselves to decide; intervention by any other State would be interference in Korean internal affairs. The problem was not an international one, and the United Nations clearly had no jurisdiction.

33. However, there were certain aspects of the question of an international character, with regard to which the United Nations could make a contribution for the benefit of the Korean people and of peace and security in the Far East. Although eight years had passed since the Korean war, there was still 50,000 or 60,000 foreign troops, mainly from the United States, in Korean territory, troops equipped with the most modern armaments, including nuclear weapons. They were building military bases on a large scale and were constantly engaged in manoeuvres carried out under conditions of simulated nuclear warfare. Since the beginning of 1961, they and the South Korean forces had violated the Armistice Agreement^{5/} 770 times, including 112 incursions into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic and 17 violations of its air space.

34. The presence of United States troops created tension in the area and might lead to serious complications at any time. There was no justification for their presence. At first the United States had argued that its troops could not be withdrawn because there were military units of the Chinese People's Volunteers in North Korea. However, all the Chinese People's Volunteers having been withdrawn in October 1958, there were now no foreign troops in the Democratic People's Republic. The present argument of the United States was that the Chinese People's Volunteers had been withdrawn merely to the other side of the Yalu River and could return to North Korea at any time. But the presence of troops belonging to the People's Republic of China and Chinese territory was quite natural. Did the United States intend to send troops to countries such as Burma and Nepal, which also had common frontiers with the People's Republic of China?

35. It was also alleged that the withdrawal of United States troops could lead to a military conflict between the two Koreas. Was it suggested that those troops were restraining the South Korean leaders from at-

tacking the Democratic People's Republic? That was absurd; they were restrained by the knowledge that the Democratic People's Republic had powerful allies and would rout any attack. On the other hand, there was no danger of an attack on South Korea; the Democratic People's Republic was a peaceful socialist State. It was clear that the United States troops were using South Korea, like Taiwan, as a bridgehead for aggression against the People's Republic of China and were helping to keep in power reactionary régimes subservient to the United States. They were also there to prevent the peaceful unification of Korea, to which they were the main obstacle; but for their presence in South Korea the people would have been able to voice their support for the proposals put forward by the Democratic People's Republic. The presence of United States and other troops in South Korea had no legal basis and amounted in fact to an act of occupation; it gave rise to serious difficulties in Korea and the Far East and threatened international peace and security. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could not remain indifferent to the presence of United States troops in South Korea. It was that aspect of the Korean question which was a genuinely international one; thus, it was the duty of the United Nations to bring about the withdrawal of United States troops.

36. It was obvious that the United Nations had so far acted in a manner directly contrary to the requirements of the situation. Under the pressure of the United States and its allies, the Organization had systematically tried to intervene in the internal affairs of the Korean people, laying down conditions for unification and refusing to take action regarding the presence of United States and other troops in South Korea. Such a policy was bound to have an adverse effect on peace and security in the Far East. No one, not even the United States, could expect the people of the Democratic People's Republic to give up all their political, economic and social achievements and place themselves in the hands of South Korean capitalists backed by United States monopolies. The purpose of the resolutions that had adopted adopted as a result of United States pressure was apparent: it was to increase tension and maintain a source of potential conflict on Korean soil.

37. That was not all. The United Nations, again at the behest of the United States, had set up UNCURK as a special body designed to intervene in the internal affairs of the Korean people. The very creation of such a body was a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, the Commission was composed entirely of representatives of States which were military allies of the United States: Australia, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines were members of SEATO; Turkey and the Netherlands were members of NATO; and Chile had a bilateral military agreement with the United States. Its first task had been to cover up the aggressive United States policy in Korea by making the United States troops in Korea out to be not United States troops, but United Nations troops. It had also set itself to misinform the United Nations and would public opinion about the true situation in South Korea. In 1958, for example, it had asserted in its report that under the Syngman Rhee régime the foundations of democracy had been progressively strengthened.^{6/} It had made a similar claim in 1960.^{7/} Its

^{4/} *Ibid.*, para. 7.

^{5/} *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079, appendix A.*

^{6/} *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 13, para. 26.*

^{7/} *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 13, para. 14.

latest report conveyed the impression that there was nothing improper about the military coup d'état of 16 May 1961, and concealed the fact that a fascist régime had been established. While describing the popular demonstrations of April 1960 as an abuse of freedom, the report spoke with approval of the present military dictatorship, which was even described as showing "moderation in the right direction" (A/4900/Add.1, para. 12). No mention was made of the cruel sentences imposed on tens of thousands of Korean patriots by military tribunals.

38. What then, could the United Nations do? First, it should demand the withdrawal of all United States and other foreign troops from South Korea, as proposed in the Mongolian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.302), which the Soviet delegation fully supported. Secondly, it should put an end to all its activities in Korea and, above all, it should dissolve UNCURK, as proposed in the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.303). Those simple measures would be in the interests of the Korean people and would strengthen peace in the Far East and throughout the world. For too long the Korean question had been discussed on a "cold war" basis. But all peace-loving States abhorred the "cold war" spirit, and it was time for mutual understanding and co-operation to take its place. At the current session, agreement had been reached between the Soviet Union and the United States on a number of questions; with that in mind, he appealed to the United States delegation to renounce its "cold war" policy and work towards an acceptable settlement.

39. Mr. PLIMSOLL (Australia) said that Korea had been a unified country for hundreds of years. After a long period of independence, it had become a colony, and at the end of the Second World War it had fallen under the military occupation of the Soviet Union in the north and the United States in the south. The United Nations had first entered the scene in 1947, with the object of bringing about a unified, peaceful and democratic Korea. At that time there had been no Governments, sovereign or other, in either part of Korea, but two military régimes, and the United Nations had tried to determine the facts of the situation and to bring the various parties together so that a Government based on the freely expressed will of the people could be formed for the whole country. For that purpose, the General Assembly had decided in 1947 to send a United Nations commission to Korea. That body, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, had had a wide membership, including not only allies of the United States but such countries as Syria and India; there had also been a place on the Commission for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which however had refused to take part. The Commission's mandate had been to go to North and South Korea to ascertain the facts and to help to bring into being a Government based on free elections. It had been allowed to move freely about South Korea, but had been barred from North Korea. In South Korea a Government had been set up based on free elections, and a constituent assembly had drafted a constitution. In December 1948 the General Assembly had adopted resolution 195 (III) recognizing that a Government had been established in South Korea which was based on free elections that had been observed by the United Nations Temporary Commission. In North Korea, however, there had been no such international observation or supervision.

40. The United Nations Commission on Korea, set up by General Assembly resolution 195 (III), had then gone

to South Korea, with the object of trying when opportunity arose to bring the two parts of Korea together, and in the meanwhile using its good offices and influence in order that South Korean institutions might develop along democratic lines and that the country might stay peacefully within the general family of nations. But in June 1950, armies from the northern side of the 38th parallel had invaded South Korea, shortly after observers of the United Nations Commission on Korea had completed a tour along the parallel. They had not been allowed into North Korea, but they had stated, in a report^{8/} signed before the invasion, that the South Korean forces were disposed in such a way that they were not contemplating or equipped for any military offensive. The unpreparedness of South Korea had been demonstrated after the act of aggression. The North Korean forces had advanced quickly, because the invasion had been carefully planned, and only the gallantry of the forces and ordinary people of South Korea had held up the invasion long enough for the United Nations to send assistance.

41. The Security Council having called on all Member States to assist the Republic of Korea, as the victim of aggression,^{9/} twenty States from all continents had sent forces. The Republic of Korea had survived, an armistice had been signed and the two parts of Korea had gone on side by side, but as strangers not co-operating with each other. At its fifth session, the General Assembly had replaced the United Nations Commission on Korea by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. That Commission had remained in Korea ever since. Its tasks were to observe and report to the United Nations, to use its good offices to promote the development of Korea along democratic lines, to assist in the economic betterment of the people and to work towards unification. Those were good aims, which UNCURK had pursued in the face of the North Korean authorities' refusal to co-operate.

42. Each year since 1948, the various United Nations Commissions had made detailed and factual reports. Those reports often criticized South Korea; in fact the representative of the Soviet Union had drawn extensively on them in his attack on the South Korean authorities. On the other hand, very little was known about North Korea, except that it had suppressed all opposition to communism. When the United Nations forces had advanced beyond the 38th parallel in 1950, 2 million refugees had gone from North to South Korea, and many more would have done so if they could. Such facts explained why there had been some reluctance to believe everything said in North Korea.

43. The Republic of Korea had become independent in 1948 after a colonial period during which few Koreans had exercised high political authority or gained the experience needed in a modern State. Naturally, mistakes had been made; but the various United Nations commissions had exercised some influence on the Government. The Government of President Rhee had become unpopular and autocratic; it had been overthrown and replaced, first by a caretaker Government, and then by a Government under Mr. Chang Myun. That Government had become unacceptable to many South Koreans, because of weakness rather than tyranny, and had been overthrown by a military coup d'état. That coup d'état should be examined before it was con-

^{8/} Ibid., Fifth Session, Supplement No. 16, annex 4.

^{9/} See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 16*, 474th meeting, document S/1508/Rev.1.

demned, however much one might dislike military coups d'état in general—and it was obvious that it had been hardly welcome to the United States Government. The present military Government of South Korea had a programme designed to restore normal government and free elections over a period. It had already released many persons arrested at the time of the coup, and many of its other actions and statements suggested that the country was moving steadily towards a broadly-based democratic régime with a freely functioning Parliament. It was certainly not a military, fascist dictatorship, as the representative of the Soviet Union had alleged. The people were free to move about and to express views, and South Korean newspapers often criticized the Government. In any case, it was for the Korean people to decide what they wanted; and what a people wanted was not always what outsiders thought they ought to want.

44. The Mongolian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.302) invited the States maintaining armed forces in South Korea to withdraw those forces immediately from Korean territory. That seemed a plausible requirement until it was remembered that the forces from other countries now in South Korea were very small, and were there in response to a request made by the Government of the Republic of Korea in exercise of a sovereign right. United States forces would have to be withdrawn across the Pacific, whereas the forces withdrawn from North Korea by China could be brought back within a few hours. The representative of the Soviet Union had asked why a country should now wish to keep foreign forces. The South Koreans remembered that when the United States had first withdrawn its forces, North Korea had invaded South Korea, and that Peiping had later given North Korea large forces and support. The Republic of Korea naturally wanted the presence of sufficient forces to show that there was continuing international interest in the integrity of the Republic of Korea and its defence against aggression; and that was its right. The Australian delegation would therefore vote against the Mongolian draft resolution.

45. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.303) would dissolve UNCURK, which had exercised a judicious influence with a view to fostering the development of South Korea along democratic lines, and had given useful information in its annual reports. The Australian delegation valued the work of UNCURK and believed that its beneficial services should continue to be available to the Republic of Korea, and to North Korea if that country chose to use them. It would therefore vote against the Soviet draft resolution.

46. The fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.305), of which Australia was a sponsor, reaffirmed past decisions of the General Assembly. Operative paragraph 1 then reaffirmed the objectives of the United Nations in Korea. Its words had been carefully chosen, and repeated what the United Nations had declared in the past: that the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea must be brought about by peaceful means; for none of the sponsors wanted North or South Korea to resort to force, and the present South Korean authorities had declared publicly that they were committed to peaceful methods. The sponsors also wanted a unified Korea to be at peace with all its neighbours—since it was not in the interest of world peace that Korea should be a bone of contention or a threat to any of its neighbours. Operative paragraph 2 urged that continuing efforts should be made to achieve those objectives, and operative paragraph 3 requested UNCURK to continue its work.

47. The sponsors of the fifteen-Power draft resolution wanted unification, independence, and democracy to be brought about by the Korean people themselves, with such good offices and facilities as the United Nations could provide, peacefully and in a way which would not represent a threat to any neighbour of Korea.

The meeting rose on Wednesday, 20 December,
at 12.20 a.m.