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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEM 80

Question of Algeria (A/4842 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1-2) (concluded)

1. Mr. BOURGUIBA (Tunisia) pointed out that for seven years the world had been watching the tragic and bloody struggle of a people which had been ignored when it spoke the language of moderation and had therefore been compelled to resort to arms to make the voice of reason heard. More than half the Algerians were under twenty years of age, which meant that five million human beings had been born or reached adulthood in an atmosphere of war, repression, terror and torture. Yet, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had consistently sought to reach a just solution by negotiation which would restore peace to that part of the world. For some time, official French spokesmen had been echoing that view. Nevertheless, on two occasions, negotiations had failed. It was true that in the past few weeks there had been rumours that secret negotiations were in progress and that, at any moment, they would be made public. Unfortunately, it was difficult to believe those rumours in the face of such brutal facts as the savage repression of October 1961 and the hunger strike of thousands of Algerian prisoners.

2. Both sides claimed they wanted to negotiate. Moreover, one of the stumbling-blocks which had frustrated the most recent French-Algerian talks, the problem of the Sahara, appeared to have been removed, inasmuch as the President of the French Republic, General de Gaulle, had publicly recognized that the inhabitants of the Sahara could have no allegiance except to the independent State of Algeria. The world waited impatiently for an end to the tragedy and for the declarations of principle or intent to be carried out. There were no longer any serious impediments to a solution. The myth of a French Algeria, created and nurtured by a juridical fiction, had ceased to exist. The greatest remaining threat was the Secret Army Organization, which had been created by the disciples of a doomed philosophy. It was hard to understand why the French Government, which was itself being attacked by those terrorists, did not apply to them the repressive measures which it had developed during the seven years of war in Algeria.

3. Notwithstanding the mistrust and bitterness which it was entitled to feel since the French aggression against it in July 1961, Tunisia was anxious for a resumption of negotiations. It was certain that the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic wanted to stop the war: there was therefore some hope. The Provisional Government needed all its strength to rebuild Algeria and to lead a real holy war against poverty, ignorance, disease and under-development. The French Government should understand that those were also the motives of Algeria's fighters as well as its diplomats and statesmen. The French Government should also realize that its anxiety with respect to the fate of the Europeans living in Algeria was unfounded: a people fighting for its freedom could not deny its inhabitants the very prize for which it had fought. In the light of the solemn pledges of the Provisional Government, there could be no doubt concerning the policy of a people which had chosen to rebuild a country in which it could live without suffering or inflicting humiliation. Furthermore, it was the duty of the French Government to follow to its logical conclusion the reasoning of President de Gaulle with respect to the Sahara, which should be Algerian without any reservations. Finally, like all the neighbours of Algeria, Tunisia had the right and duty to oppose the use of the Sahara for a resumption of the nuclear tests condemned by the General Assembly.

4. The Tunisian delegation had joined in sponsoring the draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1-2). It was based solely on recorded facts or attitudes publicly and solemnly expressed by French and Algerian leaders. His delegation had been glad to hear almost all the members of the Committee pay a tribute to the spirit of the sponsors. On the other hand, it had been surprised to hear the reservations that had been expressed.

5. In the first place, the draft resolution had been reproached with being tendentious and partisan, and, in particular, with recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) which proclaimed the right of colonial countries and territories to independence—and that resolution, it was alleged, was inapplicable because Algeria was not really a colony. That was a vestige of the myth of a French Algeria, which the French Government itself had abandoned. It had been objected further that the draft resolution, in two places, mentioned respect for "the unity and territorial integrity" of Algeria. But that principle had, by unanimous consent, been embodied in resolution 1514 (XV), and had been repeated, with particular application to Algeria, in resolution 1573 (XV), which had been adopted by a very large majority. The sponsors could not very well be reproached for encouraging the amenability shown by the parties.

6. Some speakers had pointed out that the draft resolution did not deal with the guarantees to be offered to the European minority. Independent Algeria was fight-

ing, however, to establish a democracy in which injustice and discrimination could have no place. The Provisional Government was offering the best possible guarantee to the European minority groups: full citizenship of the State of Algeria. To ask for more would be incompatible with the status of a sovereign and independent State.

7. It had been argued by some representatives that by stating, in the third preambular paragraph, that the United Nations had a responsibility to contribute towards the successful and just implementation of the right to self-determination, the Assembly might arouse doubts on the part of France concerning the other party's desire to reach a solution through bilateral negotiations. That was actually a restatement of the contention that Algeria was an internal affair in which United Nations intervention could only be harmful. That reasoning was archaic, as had been admitted even by one of its supporters. Moreover, the draft resolution urged the parties to resume direct negotiations. The United Nations could not be forbidden to make such an appeal to the two Governments.

8. The explicit mention of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had been criticized on the grounds that many Member States had not officially recognized that Government. That indicated a commendable respect for formalities, but it should be noted that in other debates, régimes which had not been recognized had been called by their names. For example, a communication signed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which a number of countries had not yet recognized, had just been circulated as an official United Nations document (A/C.1/864).

9. Another reproach directed against the draft resolution was that it erred by prejudging the results of the negotiations; its wording allegedly was in contradiction with the agreement of the parties with respect to the procedure of the talks. In other words, the Committee had been reminded that the French Government was not officially engaged in talks with the Provisional Government. Of course, quotation marks might be used, but it would seem pointless inasmuch as the quotation marks had disappeared not only in the French Press, but, and more importantly, in the official statements of the French Government itself. Although that argument appeared to be of a legal nature, it was merely a weak pretext.

10. He hoped that the draft resolution, which was moderate, realistic and, above all, constructive, would be adopted unanimously. It was not conceivable that anyone should refuse to vote in favour of a labour of peace.

11. The CHAIRMAN declared the general debate closed. He would permit representatives to explain their votes on the draft resolution before the vote was taken; explanations of vote should not exceed three minutes.

12. Mr. GALLIN-DOUATHE (Central African Republic) thought that, in considering a draft resolution, the General Assembly should avoid two pitfalls: first, it should not adopt a draft resolution so drastic—even if it were justifiably so—as to render it inoperable; secondly, it should resist the temptation to adopt resolutions which, in the worthy attempt to gain general acceptance, merely confined themselves to "breaking down an open door".

13. The sponsors of the draft resolution should be congratulated for having drafted a text acceptable to the overwhelming majority of delegations. It was balanced and objective, and it recalled the principles underlying United Nations action. Its usefulness however, was open to doubt. For some weeks now, informal contacts had taken place between the French negotiators and their Algerian counterparts, and although their talks were secret, nobody was unaware of the difficulties they were encountering. But those difficulties were not insurmountable, because there was no longer any serious difference between the parties. In particular, the French Government no longer challenged the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence. Moreover, by abandoning the pre-condition it had previously posed concerning the Sahara, it had recognized the principle of the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria. At the critical juncture that had been reached, when it would take very little to precipitate a disaster, silence was perhaps the best contribution which the United Nations could make to help end the tragedy of Algeria. Taken as a whole, the draft resolution, which had been outstripped by events, could have no useful result, and might, on the contrary, jeopardize the cause of peace which it sought to serve. The Central African Republic would therefore abstain in the vote, but it wished to make it clear that it strongly urged swift negotiations aimed at stopping the war and enabling the Algerian people to exercise its right of self-determination over the whole of its territory.

14. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) felt that there was room for optimism since the newspapers reported that meetings and conversations between the French Government and the representatives of Algeria were continuing. President de Gaulle and the French Government had acknowledged the Algerian people's right to self-determination; they had also accepted the principle of the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria, which were laid down in General Assembly resolution 1573 (XV). The negotiators still had to reach agreement on one point, that is, the guarantees that would be granted to the European population. There was some hope that the issue would be settled in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the genuine interests of the French and Moslem populations. Success, which could not be long in coming, would be due to the heroism of the Algerians and to their tenacious determination to reach an agreement, as well as to the imposing personality of President de Gaulle, who had often seemed to be the only person to accept those principles enthusiastically.

15. In a certain sense, the independence of Algeria would represent the clearest expression of the spirit of the Charter. It was the principle of self-determination of peoples which marked the superiority of the United Nations Charter over the Covenant of the League of Nations. Accordingly, he commended the sponsors of the draft resolution who had made a praiseworthy effort to act with understanding and moderation. Moreover, the solution of the Algerian problem would mean that a final reconciliation had been achieved between two peoples, one of which had intended to carry out a mission of conquest and colonial expansion but now wished to undertake a mission of co-operation and friendship, on an equal footing with those to whom it had heretofore been bound by purely political ties. It would be the culminating point in the recognition of Islamic culture in the Mediterranean basin, the meeting place of European, Asian and African cultures.

16. For those reasons, the draft resolution must be on a plane with the special character of the whole situation. The purpose of the text was, of course, to establish a propitious climate for the negotiations. The second preambular paragraph did not take into account the real scope of the question. It was not, in fact, a matter of the simple colonial question dealt with in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the paragraph might preferably be reworded in the following terms: "Considering that the Charter of the United Nations sets forth the principle of respect for human rights, and in particular the right of self-determination".

17. Objections might be raised to the sixth preambular paragraph from the legal point of view, because it referred explicitly to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. Why not say "the two parties concerned", as in the fifth preambular paragraph? A separate vote might still be taken on the words "by the Government of France and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic"; if those words were deleted, the paragraph would read: "Regretting the suspension of the negotiations entered into". If the words were deleted, either by a vote or by the sponsors themselves, his delegation would be pleased to vote in favour of the sixth preambular paragraph.

18. It was essential that the text before the Committee should be adopted unanimously. A draft resolution was not submitted in order to give expression to personal ideas, and the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1-2 certainly had not submitted their text for that purpose. Today it was necessary to encourage the establishment of a climate of peace and faith and to lay down terms of reference which responded to the voice of public opinion.

19. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary) considered the draft resolution entirely applicable to the situation in Algeria, which was a manifestation at the same time of established colonialism and of neo-colonialism. The exploitation and oppression of a colonial people by the members of NATO fully justified the reference to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Resolution 1573 (XV), which had also been cited, had recognized the right of the Algerian people to national independence and territorial integrity. The Algerian question came within the competence of the United Nations because it involved not only a colonial problem but also a situation which endangered the peace throughout one region of the world, as the Bizerta affair had shown. Furthermore, the security and well-being of Africa were threatened by nuclear tests conducted by France on Algerian territory in defiance of the protests of the peoples of the region and of General Assembly resolution 1379 (XIV).

20. In view of the crimes which France had committed in Algeria, the patience and moderation of the Algerian people must be admired. The least that France could do was to resume negotiations in good faith and without subterfuges.

21. Mr. VELAZQUEZ (Uruguay) said that his country was strongly attached to the principle of free choice, since it had secured its sovereignty and its independence by a genuine act of self-determination. Consequently, his delegation whole-heartedly endorsed the appeal made in the draft resolution for a resumption of negotiations between the two parties to the Algerian conflict so that they might settle their differences, once for all, in a peaceful manner. It could not however approve the last preambular paragraph, which

mentioned the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic by name; that paragraph not only served no purpose but was likely to put many delegations in a difficult position since it implied a tacit recognition of the régime concerned. He hoped that the Committee would make it possible for his delegation to express its whole-hearted support for a cause which everybody, including the head of the French nation, had recognized as just.

22. Mr. SOW (Chad) said that both parties had repeatedly shown their desire to resume negotiations so that they might reach a final settlement of the Algerian dispute, particularly with regard to respect for self-determination, the guarantees to be granted to the French minority, and respect for the territorial unity of Algeria. But the whole matter was most delicate, and the French dissidents should give more serious reflection to the consequences of their resistance to the liberation policy of President de Gaulle, whose determination to grant Algeria its independence was, most fortunately, unquestionable. The leaders of the Algerian movement, for their part, should give some more thought to the internal dissensions in France and to certain essential concessions. His delegation thought that the parties concerned must be trusted in so far as a final agreement was involved; it would abstain from voting on the draft resolution.

23. Mr. FERREIRA (Argentina) approved the general principles of the draft resolution. It was a constructive proposal, based on the principles proclaimed by the United Nations Charter, and his delegation fully supported it. It was fortunate that the sponsors of the draft resolution had put the stress on negotiation, since that offered the only path to a genuine settlement. It was regrettable, however, that the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic should be mentioned by name in the last preambular paragraph; as matters were, the inclusion of that reference in an official United Nations document was inadvisable, particularly when the Committee wanted to promote a peaceful and effective settlement of the Algerian question. If the words were deleted, his delegation would vote for the draft resolution as a whole; if they were maintained, his delegation would be compelled to abstain, although it would support the principles laid down in the draft resolution, including the right of self-determination of peoples.

24. Mr. AVNER (Israel) recalled that his delegation had always supported the principles of self-determination and independence, as well as resort to negotiations for the settlement of disputes. Accordingly, it would have been pleased to support the draft resolution if the sponsors had merely appealed for a resumption of negotiations with a view to reaching an agreed solution based on the Algerian people's right to self-determination and independence. Unfortunately, the draft resolution dealt with some controversial questions which were related to the substance of the negotiations between the parties. His delegation would take those considerations into account in voting on the draft resolution. It sincerely hoped that negotiations would soon be resumed and would lead to an agreement enabling the Algerian people to achieve independence and lead a peaceful existence.

25. Mr. PLIMSOLL (Australia) was pleased to note the progress which France and the Algerian people had made during the past year towards a solution of the issue. Although there were still many difficulties, the prospect of an agreement might be envisaged with a certain amount of confidence. The practical problems

that arose did not relate only to self-determination. The draft resolution before the Committee dealt with various questions in a way which was open to criticism. For instance, the number of the parties concerned was not limited necessarily to two. The direct and indirect interests of the Algerian people, the settlers, the French people and the States bordering on Algeria must all be considered. It had been argued by some that one particular group was not necessarily the only spokesman for the Algerian people. The reference to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was particularly to be regretted, since many Governments would have difficulty in accepting it. Furthermore, at the present stage, a United Nations resolution had little chance of influencing the prospects for an agreement. The important thing was that the chief negotiators, French and Algerian, should exercise sufficient authority over the people they represented so that the negotiations might result in an agreement. Accordingly his delegation could not vote for the draft resolution.

26. Mr. SANCHEZ Y SANCHEZ (Dominican Republic) said that he was in agreement with the general intention of the draft resolution, which was to promote a resumption of negotiations with a view to giving a people its independence. However, as the text mentioned the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, which might be interpreted as a recognition of that Government and of the state of belligerence, and as it contained no provisions guaranteeing the rights and interests of the French population of Algeria after independence, his delegation would have to abstain in the vote on it.

27. Mr. GONZALEZ CALVO (Guatemala) said that his Government was opposed to colonization in any form and therefore sympathized with the aspirations of the Algerian people. However, it felt that disputes should be settled by peaceful means, in accordance with the Charter, and that the United Nations should play a purely conciliatory role. As the draft resolution did not reflect his Government's ideas exactly, the Guatemalan delegation would abstain on it.

28. Mr. PLAJA (Italy) said that he had certain reservations to make regarding the draft resolution. In the first place, the reference to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was misleading, as the Algerian question was not a classical colonial problem; if it had been, France would have solved it long ago by applying the far-sighted policy by which it had given independence to many countries that were now Members of the United Nations. In any event, France had already decided to recognize Algeria's right to independence.

29. Although no one now questioned the right of the United Nations to discuss the Algerian question, many delegations felt that it was important not to do anything that might prejudice the success of the bilateral negotiations. In those circumstances, it was difficult to see what purpose was served by stressing, in the third paragraph of the preamble, that the United Nations had a responsibility in the Algerian question. The Italian delegation also regretted that the draft mentioned some points which were to be the object of negotiations, giving the views of only one of the parties. Lastly, the reference to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic gave rise to objections from many delegations, particularly as no reference of that kind had been included in previous resolutions on the question.

30. The Italian delegation sincerely hoped that the bilateral negotiations would be resumed without delay; for that reason it would have liked to see changes made in those parts of the draft resolution which, in its view, did not help to reach that goal.

31. Mr. AUGUSTE (Haiti) felt that progress on the Algerian question gave grounds for hoping that the day was near when Algeria would be received into the United Nations as a free and independent State. The fact that that progress had been slow was not due to any lack of good will on either side; it was inherent in the nature of the negotiations and in the fact that both parties were still bleeding from their wounds. However, everyone recognized the genuine desire of both parties to put an end to the painful drama and to start sincere negotiations with a view to reaching final agreement. In the circumstances, the best course would be to have faith in the two parties and merely exhort them to resume the negotiations which had momentarily been interrupted. Convinced that that was the right course, the Haitian delegation would abstain when the draft resolution was put to the vote, although it appreciated the intentions of the sponsors.

32. Mr. FERREIRA (Argentina) asked for a separate vote on the last preambular paragraph of the draft resolution.

33. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) said that the sponsors of the draft resolution had taken great pains to make the wording as moderate as possible. He appealed to the Argentine representative not to spoil the balance of the draft resolution by pressing his proposal.

34. Mr. FERREIRA (Argentina) withdrew his proposal.

35. The CHAIRMAN called upon the Committee to vote on the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1-2).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Yemen, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tanganyika, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Venezuela.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Israel, Italy, Madagascar, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay.

The draft resolution was adopted by 61 votes to none, with 34 abstentions.

AGENDA ITEM 20

The Korean question: reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/4900 and Add.1, A/C.1/858, A/C.1/859, A/C.1/860, A/C.1/861, A/C.1/862, A/C.1/863, A/C.1/864, A/C.1/L.302, A/C.1/L.303, A/C.1/L.305) (continued)*

36. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (A/C.1/864) to the communication addressed to him by the Secretary-General transmitting the resolution adopted by the Committee at its 1217th meeting (A/C.1/863).

37. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) said that, now that the Committee had received a reply from the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it should invite the representative of that Government to take part in the debate.

38. The CHAIRMAN asked whether there were any objections to that procedure.

39. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) disagreed with the Polish representative. He pointed out that in its reply, the North Korean régime refused in unequivocal terms to accept the competence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean question. The sentence reading: "The Korean question, which was originally one of the questions subject to post-war settlement, is by no means a question to be discussed at the United Nations" could be interpreted in no other way. The condition laid down by the Committee had, therefore, not been met.

40. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that in its resolution (A/C.1/863), the Committee had invited the representatives of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take part in the discussion on the Korean question. A reply had now been received from that Government, which confirmed its readiness to take part in the discussion and emphasized that it had always respected and recognized the United Nations Charter and had never violated it. It stated further that the question of the peaceful unification of Korea should be settled by the Koreans themselves and that, without the participation of its representatives, any discussion of the Korean question would only be futile. In the circumstances, the Committee should invite the representatives of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate directly in the discussion. However, in order to give those representatives time to arrive, it would be advisable to postpone the discussion of the Korean question until the resumed session of the General Assembly. In the meantime, the Committee should inform the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that its delegation was invited to take part in the discussion.

41. Mr. YOST (United States of America) recalled that pursuant to the Committee's resolution, representatives of the North Korean régime had been invited to take part in the discussion on the Korean question provided that "it first unequivocally accepts the competence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean question as has already been done by the Republic of Korea". However, in its reply (A/C.1/864) that régime clearly rejected the invitation in the terms in which it had been extended. Moreover, it did not

indicate, even equivocally, that it recognized the competence and authority of the United Nations to take action on the Korean question. Although it claimed to have "always respected and recognized the United Nations Charter", everyone knew that it had in fact violated the Charter by invading South Korea. It even went so far as to state that in its opinion the Korean question was "by no means a question to be discussed at the United Nations". Lastly, the North Korean régime attacked the United Nations and the Republic of Korea in slanderous and virulent terms, and questioned the authority of the United Nations.

42. As to the proposal of the Soviet Union representative to defer discussion of the Korean question, he recalled that it had been the view of the General Committee, at its 143rd meeting, that the resumed session should deal only with those matters that were considered most urgent and important. The General Committee itself had found only two in that category: Ruanda-Urundi and Angola. While the First Committee had the option of recommending the addition of other items to the General Assembly for consideration at the resumed session, the United States delegation did not feel that the Korean question was one that should be included in that very restricted group. In any case, he believed that the Committee could take a definite decision then and there with regard to the participation of the North Korean representatives in the discussion.

43. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan), without endorsing the terms employed by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, said its reply (A/C.1/864) seemed to indicate that it was willing to recognize and respect the United Nations Charter. That, in his opinion, was how the sentence reading: "The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has always respected and recognized the United Nations Charter designed for international peace and security and has never violated it" was to be interpreted. Moreover, that Government now accepted discussion of the Korean question in the United Nations and indicated its desire to participate in that discussion; that was the interpretation to be placed on the sentence: "Since the Korean question is discussed at the United Nations, the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must take part in it".

44. The representatives of North Korea should be invited to participate in the discussion. If they were not invited, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could not be blamed for failing to co-operate with the United Nations, and any decision which might be taken as a result of "unilateral discussion" would be ineffective since it would be regarded as "null and void" by the North Korean Government.

45. Mr. QUINTERO (Philippines) noted expressions such as "unjust resolution", "main culprit", "illegal discussion" and "criminal acts" in the reply of the North Korean régime (A/C.1/864). He could not therefore regard that reply as an unequivocal acceptance of the competence and authority of the United Nations to take action on the Korean question.

46. Contrary to what certain representatives had stated, it would be unrealistic to treat the North Korean and South Korean régimes in the same way. North Korea had waged war on the United Nations, South Korea had not. North Korea had refused agencies of the United Nations access to its territory; South Korea had welcomed them. North Korea had not been recognized by the United Nations, South Korea had;

*Resumed from the 1219th meeting.

furthermore the Government of South Korea had been recognized by the General Assembly as the only lawful Government in all Korea.

47. The least the North Korean régime could do was to recognize the competence and authority of the United Nations as South Korea had done. In its invitation, the Committee had not required North Korea to accept in advance the decisions of the United Nations; it had only required it to recognize the competence and authority of the United Nations, which was without doubt a fundamental and important condition if North Korea's participation in the General Assembly's debate was to serve a useful purpose. If the representatives of North Korea came to question the United Nations authority to deal with the Korean question, or to repeat the diatribes against the United Nations to be found in the bulky documents issuing from North Korea and made available by the Soviet Union for the past several sessions, North Korean participation in the present debate would not contribute to a solution of the Korean question.

48. For those reasons, his delegation was not in favour of allowing the representatives of North Korea to take part in the Committee's deliberations.

49. Mr. ANUMAN RAJADHON (Thailand) said the reply of the North Korean Government showed that it did not accept the authority and competence of the United Nations as required by the resolution adopted by the First Committee (A/C.1/863). Furthermore, the rude and slanderous language of the reply should be rejected by the Committee.

50. Despite the distorted picture of North Korea given by certain delegations the previous week in an attempt to show that the aggressor was in reality the victim, the Committee had thought fit to place conditions on the invitation it had extended to the North Korean authorities. Another attempt was now being made to enable the representatives of those authorities to take part in the Committee's deliberations on the Korean question. His delegation had already stated on previous occasions why the North Korean authorities should not be represented. The tone of the reply by those authorities to the Committee's invitation made it pointless to discuss the matter further. The Committee could vote then and there on whether or not to invite representatives of North Korea.

51. Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) said that despite the conditions imposed on it, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had declared its willingness to take part in the debate on the Korean question. In its telegram of 19 December 1961 (A/C.1/864), it stated that it had always respected and recognized the United Nations Charter designed for international peace and security and had never violated it. That declaration was sufficient, and the somewhat vigorous language of the reply by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should not prevent the Committee from inviting its representatives. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had criticized United States policy in its reply, as it was perfectly entitled to do, but the United States should not be identified with the United Nations.

52. It would, however, be physically impossible for the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reach New York before 20 December. It was therefore necessary to defer consideration of the Korean question until the resumption of the General

Assembly session. In that connexion, he would point out that the General Committee had not, contrary to what the United States representative had said, decided that only two items should be considered at the resumed session. It had left the First Committee quite free to decide itself which questions it would discuss at that time. It would in any case be entirely unreasonable to argue that the substance of the Korean question could be properly discussed twenty-four hours before the closure of the session. Lastly, there would be no point in discussing the Korean question without the participation of the representatives of both Korean States. Contrary to the opinion expressed by the United States representative, his delegation thought the Korean question was very important and deserved the Committee's full attention.

53. Mr. CHENG (China) said that no fair-minded person could conclude from the abusive and intransigent reply of the North Korean régime that the latter was willing to accept the conditions laid down by the Committee. True, opinion on the issue was divided, but there was no doubt that any decision on it must be based on the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter. Any other course would mean that the Korean people and the United Nations forces had made great sacrifices and shed their blood for the freedom and independence of the Republic of Korea in vain. The very dignity and authority of the United Nations were at stake. The Chinese delegation would therefore oppose any proposal to invite a representative of the North Korean régime to participate in the debate.

54. Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia) felt that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, albeit under protest, had accepted the Committee's invitation. It was therefore unnecessary to send another one. The only question which remained to be settled was when the Committee was going to discuss the Korean item. Since the session was to be adjourned within twenty-four hours, the item could only be discussed in substance at the resumed session. By that time, the Committee would know whether the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was sending a representative.

55. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) understood why the United States, which had military bases to defend in Korea, was opposed to the immediate participation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the discussion of the Korean item but he failed to see why other members of the First Committee should adopt the same attitude and refuse to hear representatives from the two parts of a country which allegedly they wished to unite.

56. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could not have been expected to send a reply expressing satisfaction at the humiliating conditions in which it had been invited to take part in the Committee's debate. It had stated, however, that it had always respected and recognized the United Nations Charter, which was designed for international peace and security. It had added that without the participation of the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, any discussion of the Korean question could only be futile. That was a truth which had to be stated, for it was incontestable.

57. The Committee should therefore postpone consideration of the Korean item in order to have a useful debate and make progress towards the unification and rehabilitation of Korea.

58. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that the Chairman was ready, if there were no objections, to invite representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. However, the prospect of a debate in which those representatives would tell the truth about the Korean situation and about the obstacles to the settlement of the problem did not please the United States representative. Should the Committee base its decisions on what was pleasing or not to a particular delegation? Since, in spite of the humiliating conditions which had been imposed upon it, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had accepted the Committee's invitation, the question of the invitation was settled. Furthermore, no formal proposal had been made not to invite the representatives in question. The situation was therefore very simple. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should merely be asked to state when its representatives could come to take part in the Committee's debate. As it seemed physically impossible for them to arrive in time for the Committee to consider the substance of the Korean question before the adjournment of the session, the debate on the item should be postponed until the resumed session.

59. He did not agree with the United States representative's interpretation of the decision taken by the General Committee at its 143rd meeting. The General Committee had decided that those Committees which had not yet finished their work should themselves decide what items on their agenda they would take up at the resumed session. That decision had that very afternoon been confirmed by the General Assembly (1083rd plenary meeting). The Soviet delegation therefore formally proposed that the consideration of the Korean question should be deferred until the resumed sixteenth session of the General Assembly.

60. After the Committee's decision, the Secretary-General should send a telegram to the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea stating that the Korean item had been included in the agenda of the resumed sixteenth session. That would enable the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to send an appropriate delegation. If a member of the Committee was opposed to such notification, it should submit a formal proposal.

61. The CHAIRMAN considered that the USSR representative's proposal was a motion for the adjournment of the debate under rule 117 of the rules of procedure. Two representatives could therefore speak in favour of the motion and two against, after which he would immediately put it to the vote.

62. In reply to questions by Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) and Mr. YOST (United States of America), the CHAIRMAN stated that, as the resumed session would still be the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union representative's proposal was, in his opinion, a motion for the adjournment of the debate under rule 117. Under rule 120 such a motion had priority.

63. Mr. CAMPBELL (United Kingdom) said that his delegation was opposed to the motion for adjournment put forward by the Soviet Union representative. The statement by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (A/C.1/864) contested the legality of the invitation to which it was supposed to reply. It said that the United Nations had been discussing the Korean question illegally every year and that the Korean question was by no means a question to be discussed at the United Nations. Ob-

viously, the Committee's invitation had not been accepted in the terms in which it had been extended.

64. Consequently, in his delegation's view, there could be no question of seating a North Korean representative for the discussion of the item in question. His delegation was strongly opposed to the proposal that the question should be discussed at the resumed session since such a postponement would serve no purpose.

65. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) felt that the remarks just made by the United Kingdom representative were irrelevant. The General Committee, after having considered the progress of work, had deemed it necessary to hold a resumed session on 15 January 1962. The Soviet Union representative had therefore proposed, in view of the acknowledged importance of the Korean question, the adjournment of debate on that subject until the resumed session. It would be impossible for the Committee to study seriously the substance of the Korean item in the twenty-four hours which remained before the adjournment of the session.

66. Furthermore, the Committee had received from the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea an affirmative reply to the invitation which it had received to send representatives. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had replied affirmatively to that invitation, extended under very dubious conditions, because it wished to make its contribution to the debate and help members of the Committee to grasp the situation with a view to adopting a resolution compatible with the aims of the United Nations.

67. The essential criterion for judging the attitude of a State towards the United Nations was its respect for the obligations incumbent upon it under the Charter. The reply of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was very clear in that respect.

68. In the spirit of the decisions already taken, the Committee should grant the representatives of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea the opportunity of taking part in the debate on the Korean question and, hence, send them an invitation. Furthermore, since the question was an important one, the Committee should allow itself the necessary time to discuss it.

69. For all those reasons, the Romanian delegation supported the motion for the adjournment of the debate submitted by the USSR representative.

70. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) said that his delegation favoured the adjournment of the debate on the Korean question until the resumed sixteenth session.

71. Because of the very short time remaining before the adjournment of the session, it was impossible for the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to arrive in New York in time to take part in the debate and it was impossible for the Committee to consider the substance of the matter.

72. Contrary to what the United Kingdom representative had said, the question of the invitation to the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been settled because of the decision taken by the Committee to send the invitation and because of the acceptance by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

73. Furthermore, the question of Korea was too important to be postponed *sine die*. Although the pro-

posals made in preceding years by delegations anxious to have the matter settled had not been adopted, a new approach might enable certain measures to be taken to solve the question finally and peacefully and to ensure the reunification of Korea.

74. The Polish delegation therefore supported the motion for adjournment submitted by the USSR representative.

75. Mr. YOST (United States of America) opposed the motion for adjournment. There was no justification for overloading the agenda of the resumed session of the Assembly. Most delegations wanted to cut to a minimum

the number of items to be taken up at that time. Furthermore, it was clear that the North Korean régime had rejected the Committee's invitation in the terms in which it had been extended.

76. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the USSR representative's motion for the adjournment of the debate on the Korean question until the resumed sixteenth session.

The motion for adjournment was rejected by 41 votes to 20, with 24 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.