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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Ignacio-Pinto (Dahomey), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 80

Question of Algeria (A/4842 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1) (continued)

1. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) noted that for seven years the world had witnessed the fierce struggle which had caused such great loss of life on both the Algerian and French sides. The losses had not for a single moment weakened the Algerian people's determination to continue the struggle to the end. Its sacrifice and courage had won the admiration and active support of the entire Arab world. France, the traditional champion of freedom, had sacrificed the cream of its army and the flower of its youth in a fight from which it could not emerge victorious.

2. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) had been referred to in the course of the debate, but the Algerian problem was not exclusively a colonial problem: it had other aspects—economic, cultural and spiritual—which made it complex and precluded simple and facile solutions. If there were simply a noble impulse to achieve independence on one side, and a totally negative and brutal attitude on the other, the United Nations would have to try to vindicate the cause of freedom by bringing the full weight of world opinion to bear. But the broad principles of a settlement had already been agreed upon. France had already recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. Negotiations had been begun on that basis and, although sporadic, had not been broken off. France's liberal African policy, the high moral stature and determination of its Head of State, and the acts and official statements of its Government, betokened the good faith of France and indicated that it was resolved to grant independence to the Algerian people. The absence of the French delegation was a matter for regret, for it might have told the Committee of the difficulties the French Government was encountering and inform it of its plans for the immediate future.

3. He had endeavoured to show the objectivity that was necessary because of the traditional friendship which bound his country to the Arab world and to the French nation. He hoped that the negotiations between the representatives of fighting Algeria and the French Gov-

ernment would be resumed as soon as possible, because the tragic events had shown that such negotiations were the only way of finding a radical solution of the problem.

4. Mr. ASTAPENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the question of Algeria conjured up the tragedy of an entire people whose only wish was to be independent, and it also spelt a condemnation of colonialism and of France's monstrous colonial policy in regard to Algeria. One year had elapsed since the General Assembly had recognized, in resolution 1573 (XV), the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence and the imperative need for adequate and effective guarantees to ensure the successful and just implementation of the right of self-determination on the basis of respect for the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria; but the French Government had still failed to carry out that resolution. The scheming of the French colonialists continued: reassuring statements of good will, plans for forming a phantom Algerian government which disguised their continued domination, and cynical threats to partition Algeria. In the meantime, moreover, they continued their colonial war, sparing no expense to safeguard the interests of the monopolies. The French colonialists hoped to continue to line their pockets by exploiting the natural wealth of the Sahara and other parts of Algeria. In the Hassi Messaoud area alone, oil extraction had risen fivefold between 1959 and 1960, and by 1972 enough oil and natural gas would be produced in the Sahara to supply half the needs of Western Europe. In addition, important copper, uranium, iron and other mineral deposits had been discovered in the Sahara.

5. The FLN and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had clearly done all in their power to reach a peaceful settlement with France. However, whenever the French Government, under the pressure of world opinion, had entered into negotiations, it had declined to negotiate on the only acceptable basis: recognition of the independence and territorial integrity of Algeria. Previous speakers in the debate had convincingly shown that the French colonialists were responsible for the failure of the Algerian-French negotiations. In continuing the war, the French Government acted against the wishes of the peace-loving peoples of the world and in violation of the United Nations Charter, the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)) and important decisions by the General Assembly on the Algerian question.

6. France shared its responsibility with those who supported its war effort: the countries of the colonialist NATO bloc and in particular the United States, without whom France could not have carried on its infamous war against the Algerian people for so many years. The determining factors in the position adopted by France, the United States and certain Western

Powers on the Algerian question were the oil monopoly interests and the desire to maintain atomic bases in the Sahara and military bases in Algerian territory—particularly the naval base at Mers-el-Kebir—in order to retain means of exerting military and political pressure on the newly independent States of Africa. But the national liberation movement was sweeping away the remnants of the colonial system and nothing could help France to hold the Algerian people in colonial bondage. Yet, though the war was already lost by the colonialists, they continued in their death-throes to commit monstrous crimes against the Algerian people. Indeed, the war in Algeria played into the hands of the most evil forces of reaction, which were undermining the democratic rights and freedoms of the French people itself.

7. The only way to settle the Algerian question was to have the French Government put an immediate end to the colonial war, in keeping with the legitimate aspirations of the Algerian people. Both sides would gain thereby and world peace would be considerably strengthened. His delegation would support any proposal that would contribute to the speedy and peaceful solution of the Algerian problem and to the exercise by the Algerian people of its right to self-determination and independence on the basis of respect for the country's unity and territorial integrity.

8. Mr. SULAIMAN (Iraq) considered that the question of Algeria, which had been before the United Nations since 1955, was the most striking manifestation of the historic struggle between colonialism in decay and the rising national liberation movement. The Algerian people had accepted a supreme sacrifice in order to enjoy the fundamental rights set forth in the United Nations Charter and in the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. That objective could have been attained peacefully if France had accepted from the outset the inevitable verdict of history.

9. The FLN had sought a peaceful settlement from the time the revolution had started in 1954. To that end, it had undertaken to respect French interests and to settle future relationships between France and Algeria by agreement. Its leaders' efforts to persuade the adversary to negotiate had proved fruitless and the continuance of the war was due to France's persistent refusal to negotiate a settlement of the question. Today, after seven years of war, the position taken by the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was still the same. The Algerian leaders, while resolved on gaining independence, had tried in every possible way to avoid war. Three alternatives had been open to them: direct negotiations with France; attempts at settlement through the United Nations; and resort to force. Having failed to attain their liberty through peaceful means, they had had no course left but to keep on fighting.

10. The Algerian leaders had done everything possible to settle the dispute by peaceful means, but their attempts to reach an agreement in the discussions at Evian and at Lugrin had been hampered by the French position with regard to the territorial integrity of Algeria and by the French designs to partition the country. Despite those repeated set-backs, the Provisional Government had expressed its readiness, time and again, to resume negotiations and it was for the French Government now to respond in order to bring an unhappy situation to an end.

11. The Algerian leaders, having failed to induce France to negotiate, had turned to the United Nations, encouraged by the principles clearly set forth in Article 2 of the Charter. But their efforts since 1955 to find a just solution through that Organization had been unsuccessful. France persisted in disregarding world public opinion and the Algerian people had no alternative left but to continue fighting. War had been waged for more than seven years with all its accompanying horrors and tragedies. Casualties amounted to one million and hundreds of thousands of Algerians were held in camps or prisons or had taken refuge in neighbouring countries. The number of those killed, displaced, held in custody or forced to flee was more than a quarter of the total population.

12. The war in Algeria was costing France \$3 million per day. Its political impact could be judged from the fact that since its outbreak France had had two Republics and two Constitutions. Its moral effects were deeply felt all over the world, including France itself. The atrocities committed by the French Army and policy had aroused indignation everywhere. France, a great Power, using the bulk of its army, navy and air force, was waging a ruthless war against a small and freedom-seeking nation.

13. When, on 16 September 1959, the President of the French Republic, General de Gaulle, had solemnly recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and had affirmed that the future of Algeria rested with the Algerians and would be determined in accordance with their freely expressed wishes, the Provisional Government, with justifiable pride that events had taken that turn, had reaffirmed the primary objective of the revolution, namely, self-determination. But, despite President de Gaulle's declaration, the advocates of pacification and of a military solution of the Algerian problem had continued to cling to the myth of a French Algeria. In spite of the fact that both sides had been in agreement in accepting the right to self-determination as the basis for a solution of the problem, it had taken France more than a year and a half to recognize that the implementation of self-determination could not be achieved except through agreement with the Provisional Government, the sole spokesman of the Algerian people. The 1961 referendum had proved that the Algerian people stood behind its Government.

14. Despite the failure of the negotiations at Evian and Lugrin, those two meetings had been significant in that the French Government had finally recognized two facts: first, that the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was the sole authority representing the Algerian people; and, secondly, that the only way to achieve a settlement was through negotiations with that Government. The French delegation had reaffirmed at both those meetings that negotiations should be conducted with the FLN on the basis of self-determination. But implementation of that principle was still awaited. It was abundantly clear to everyone, and had been acknowledged by the French Government itself, that independence was the only possible result of any popular consultation. The Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, Mr. Ben Khedda, had therefore suggested, on 24 October 1961, that an immediate peace could be established by opening negotiations on the principle of independence, the procedures for putting it into effect and the date of its proclamation, as well as on the conclusion of a cease-fire. He had further stated that new negotiations could follow for the definition of the new relationship between France

and Algeria and of guarantees for the French population of Algeria.

15. Those proposals provided a logical foundation for an immediate cease-fire as well as the most feasible way of implementing self-determination. The Provisional Government was willing, if the need arose, to agree to a referendum, but the method suggested by Mr. Ben Khedda was a more realistic approach which would prevent further bloodshed. The proclamation of independence enabling a cease-fire to be speedily concluded would hardly change the existing situation, as had been pointed out in an editorial in the newspaper *Le Monde* of 26 October 1961. It would therefore be better to recognize that Algeria would choose independence and to resume negotiations with the honest intent of bringing the tragic war to an end.

16. The second problem concerned the issue of Algeria's unity and territorial integrity. On 16 September 1959, President de Gaulle had spoke of Algerians as individuals and not as a people. He had indicated that those who voted for integration would remain with France and that those voting for secession would organize themselves separately in the territories where they lived. In other words, the country might be partitioned. President de Gaulle had added that, in any event, French interests in the Sahara would be safeguarded and that arrangements would be made to ensure the exploitation and transport of oil. The Provisional Government could not accept any solution that failed to guarantee its national integrity. The Sahara constituted 80 per cent of the Algerian national territory and the Algerian people could not surrender its sovereign rights over that territory merely because the French Government had decided in 1957, for reasons of administrative convenience, to separate it from the rest of the country. To exclude the Sahara, if a plebiscite was held, would mean continuation of the war. France, and President de Gaulle himself, had admitted that, in the event of a popular consultation, the Sahara would vote for independence and unification with the rest of the country; they should therefore create a favourable climate by abandoning, once and for all, any idea of or attempt at partition. President de Gaulle's partition plans had been severely criticized, not only by the Algerians but also by some of France's allies and by the French Parliament itself. In spite of the severe repressive measures taken by the French Army and police, the "National day against partition", proclaimed throughout Algeria on 5 July 1961 by the Provisional Government, had been clear proof of the determination of the Algerian people to resist any partitioning of its territory. It seemed that, on that point also, France's position had shifted to a more realistic approach, and it was to be hoped that the French Government would ultimately recognize, fully and unequivocally, Algeria's unity and territorial integrity, thus paving the way for a peaceful settlement.

17. The Algerian point of view with regard to French atomic tests in Algeria, which coincided with world public opinion and the position taken by the great majority of States, commanded support. By taking that attitude, the Provisional Government was joining those throughout the world who desired to have nuclear tests banned. Furthermore, the French design to keep military bases in Algeria imperilled the country's sovereignty and thus created an obstacle to an over-all solution to the problem.

18. The third problem was that of the European minority. After the conquest of Algeria, the French Gov-

ernment had resorted to colonization to secure its domination. At the beginning, 40,000 had been settled in Algeria. The French colonialists had worked out a scheme intended to facilitate the acquisition of land by Europeans. It had been estimated that the indigenous inhabitants had lost about 45 per cent of their land in that way between 1881 and 1889. The number of European settlers had later increased to 900,000. The existence of that European minority had been put forward as a factor hindering Algerian independence, although the Provisional Government had solemnly and repeatedly declared that in the Republic of Algeria there would be no distinctions based on race or religion and that all legitimate interests would be respected. That position had been reaffirmed by Mr. Ben Khedda, the Prime Minister, and by the Foreign Minister. In those circumstances, it was hard to see why that problem should be a real obstacle to general settlement. It had been solved in Tunisia and Morocco, and there seemed no reason why it should not be solved in Algeria.

19. While public opinion in France, even in official circles, had been favourably impressed by the Algerian position, it was unfortunate that a small section of the European minority—the "ultras"—had resorted to criminal acts and killings. The leaders of that campaign had set up the Secret Army Organization. They had been condemned by France itself and were living underground, and many of them had been sentenced to death. Their atrocities had aroused the indignation of the Europeans themselves in Algeria, who had organized a counter-movement, which they called the Republican Committee of Defence. It was evident that it was not in the interest of either France or Algeria to allow the group of fascists in the Secret Army Organization to continue its criminal activities, blocking the road to a peaceful settlement. The softness with which the French Government had acted in dealing with the terrorist campaign had earned it serious criticism from the French Parliament.

20. Another thing which must be mentioned was the brutality with which the French military and police authorities treated the Algerian nationalists in France and in Algeria. The atrocities committed on 1 November 1961, the mass arrests and deportations of Algerians, were too recent to be forgotten. Those excesses and the criminal behaviour of the fascist organizations in Algeria could not but be prejudicial to an equitable settlement of the problem of the French community in Algeria. He believed that the generous proposals made by the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic with regard to the European minority could hardly be rejected by any Government, for they provided a just and generous solution.

21. The last problem was that of the French economic interests in Algeria, a problem which was closely linked with the French design to partition the country and to the question of the European minorities. It was well known that the Sahara contained inestimable mineral resources. Those immense sources of wealth explained why the French Government was attempting to separate the Sahara from the rest of Algeria. It was unfortunate that the French authorities had prolonged unnecessarily the settlement of the Algerian problem by attempting unsuccessfully, on the one hand, to divide the ranks of the Algerian people and on the other, to start manoeuvres with the States bordering on the Sahara to gain their support against the position of the Provisional Government. It was only after the complete failure of those at-

tempts that the French had shown signs of a change in attitude. That should hasten the resumption of negotiations with the Provisional Government. The position taken up by the Algerian leaders on that problem had been extremely fair to France and very encouraging. They had recognized the existence of French interests in the Sahara and had stated their willingness to co-operate with France and to respect legitimate French interests. In fact, once France recognized the sovereignty of the Algerian people over its territory, including the Sahara, there did not seem to be any reason, taking the attitude of the Provisional Government into consideration, why that problem could not be solved in the mutual interest of both parties. And colonial interests deeply rooted in the best parts of Algeria, mainly in the north, had given rise to a similar problem. There again, the vested interests of a small fraction of the French minority in Algeria had advocated the partition of the country; but the Provisional Government had firmly expressed its readiness to recognize and respect the legitimate interests of the French minority. In good faith, that Government had declared its readiness to follow a policy of co-operation with France, safeguarding its legitimate interests and those of the French community in a sovereign and independent Algerian Republic. That statement should provide a basis on which negotiations could be started and the problem solved between the two parties.

22. The full responsibility for the delay in the settlement of the Algerian problem lay with France. The independence of Algeria was now an undisputed fact awaiting formal recognition by France. Iraq was a sponsor of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1) which called upon the two parties to resume negotiations. He expressed the hope that the draft resolution would be unanimously adopted and that Algeria would soon take its proper place in the family of sovereign and independent nations.

23. Mr. GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI (Cuba) said that the struggle of the brave Algerian people for their national liberation would be an example to the peoples still under the colonial yoke and to those whose independence was threatened by colonial Powers. Until the revolutionary Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had taken its place in the United Nations, all those who sincerely advocated independence would speak for it, both within and outside the United Nations.

24. A small country that was not represented in the United Nations was struggling heroically for the principles laid down in the Charter and for its rights which had been recognized by the General Assembly, while a great Power, a founding Member of the United Nations, by carrying on an unpopular war, was trampling the Charter underfoot and acting in defiance of the opinion of the majority of the Assembly, of world public opinion, and of its own people's best traditions. The colonialist aggression in Algeria, through seven long years of torture and acts of genocide by the colonial Power, was a fight against all peoples, including the French. That was a situation which endangered world peace and seriously jeopardized the prestige of the United Nations.

25. Throughout the struggle, the Provisional Government had shown its willingness to put an end to the war. After first refusing to participate in preliminary talks, the French Government had later decided to open them and then had broken them off. The disagreement between the two Governments now appeared to relate to

the following points: the so-called question of the European minority and that of the territorial integrity of the new State. If the argument adduced in connexion with the first point was taken seriously, no country that had been colonized could ever become independent, for there would always be a European minority to protect. The generous decision of the Algerians to offer the nationality of the new State to the Europeans who decided to opt for it rendered that argument untenable. As for the second point, the colonialists were at their old game of trying to reserve for themselves part of the territory of an independent country, naturally the part richest in mineral and power resources. That phenomenon, only too well known in colonial disputes, had produced the fiction of the French Sahara, by which neo-colonialist rule in the territory was to be maintained.

26. Many of the Governments represented on the Committee, including the Cuban Government, recognized the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, and it had been represented at the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Belgrade in September 1961, at which the right of the Algerian people to independence and territorial integrity had been proclaimed. By holding discussions with the Algerian leaders on ways of ending the war, France itself had officially recognized the existence of the new State.

27. The war in Algeria, which was a world problem, was also a threat to French institutions. That was why negotiation, which was always a step towards peace, would be preferable for all concerned, particularly France. The Cuban delegation therefore urged all representatives to vote for draft resolution A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1. That text, which had been carefully worked out, was the minimum support that could be given to those, both in France and in Algeria, who were striving to settle the dispute by peaceful means and in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations.

28. Algeria should serve as a lesson for France and for all the colonialist Powers. A small country fighting for its independence could not be destroyed, however powerful its adversaries. The more the colonialists persisted in trying to destroy national liberation movements, the more they made themselves ridiculous in the eyes of the world, despite their armies, their military bases, their aircraft and their nuclear bombs.

29. Mr. AKAKPO (Togo) recalled that the members of the Committee were asking for the seventh time for an end to the Algerian war, which was a constant source of anxiety to the public throughout the world. There now seemed to be a better atmosphere and every reason to hope that the end of the Algerian tragedy was in sight. No one disputed the Algerian people's right to independence any longer. President de Gaulle had decided upon independence, his Government had endorsed it, his Parliament had approved it and the French people had ratified it. It was true that the actual granting of independence had been delayed and the difficulties which President de Gaulle had encountered in the process of achieving that objective were well known; but the skill with which he had recently sought to overcome those difficulties had also been demonstrated.

30. One of the obstacles which had led to the suspension of the Lugin negotiations was the question of the Sahara. That obstacle also seemed to have been overcome, for President de Gaulle had in fact recognized that the Sahara was Algerian when he had stated, on

5 September 1961, that there was not one Algerian who did not believe that the Sahara should be a part of Algeria.

31. So far as the question of the minority was concerned, his delegation thought that the Algerian nation should be a single nation, like all other nations. Minorities could be integrated into the nation; the members of a minority could become citizens of the State and take part in the exercise of the State's sovereignty or they could retain the citizenship of their country of origin and remain aliens in the nation. That alternative was the same everywhere. It was a question for the minorities themselves to decide and no one could decide it for them.

32. His delegation believed that France sincerely desired to reach a speedy settlement. It hoped that the negotiations, which had been interrupted several times, would be resumed as quickly as possible under favourable auspices and would reach a solution which would satisfy all the aspirations of the Algerian people.

33. Mr. USHER (Ivory Coast) noted that, while the Algerians had been struggling to achieve independence for almost eight years, nearly twenty countries, practically all of which had had the same metropolitan country, had peacefully gained independence, a fact which could only increase the very understandable impatience and passionate feelings of the Algerian patriots. Algeria was undergoing a slow and difficult period of decolonization due to the fact that it was a colony of settlement. Some of the countries of Central Africa which had suffered the same misfortunes seemed to face an uncertain future; others seemed to have lost control of their affairs forever because European minorities had settled there. In Algeria that difficulty was complicated by the legal fiction that Algeria was a province of France. Nevertheless, while there could be no doubt about Algeria's ultimate independence, certain other colonies, about which the same legal fictions had been created, presented a very gloomy and uncertain future outlook for Africa. French colonial policy had not been fully appreciated up to 1956 because it seemed to be as unstable as the French Governments. While in 1944 General de Gaulle had declared that the goal of that policy was self-determination, other no less important politicians had said that France must hold on to its colonies not only because they were a legacy of the past and the French had no right to abandon an inheritance conquered by their fathers with so much toil and bloodshed, but also because the colonies might be the resource of the future for France. That had been the era of assimilationist policy, the policy of the French Marxists with its accompaniment of repression and war in Indo-China, Madagascar, the Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. It was paradoxical that it had been the semi-bourgeois governments which had begun the process of decolonization by stopping the war in Indo-China and granting independence to Tunisia and Morocco. A few years later, a Minister, the son of a French lawyer of the Ivory Coast, had, by the "loi-cadre" of 23 June 1956, drawn attention to the need for decolonizing Africa. The assimilationist Governors-General, however, victimized by the extremist upholders of French Algeria, the "ultras", had committed France to an unrelenting war against the Algerian nationalists.

34. But the resistance of the nationalists had exasperated the "ultras", who had laid the blame on the parliamentary system. Then, on 13 May 1958, the

Fourth Republic had died, the Fifth Republic had been born, and an appeal had been made to the man of the hour, General de Gaulle.

35. General de Gaulle was a nationalist; he was a man of his word, of sincerity and good faith; he was the man of Brazzaville. In one of his first post-war speeches, delivered at Bordeaux, he had said: "It is for each territory to discover itself and to organize itself in its own interest." The organizations of the left had then placed their own construction on those words, depicting General de Gaulle as a despicable racist. He had, however, granted independence to Syria and Lebanon and had stated, on 25 October 1944, that French policy consisted in leading each of the colonial peoples to a stage of development which would enable them to administer, and later to govern, themselves. It could be seen, with a little hindsight, that the famous pronouncement of Bordeaux had been only a rough adumbration of the principle of self-determination. If General de Gaulle had not been forced into retirement in 1946, he might have shown France to the world in a different light. There might not have been an Indo-Chinese or Algerian war.

36. It was because this conflict, which the President of the Republic of the Ivory Coast called a "Franco-French" conflict, had shown signs of degenerating into civil war and of dismembering the French nation that General de Gaulle had been called back to power on 13 May 1958. In contrast to his predecessors, who had decided not to fight on two fronts but first to wipe out the Algerian nationalists while turning a blind eye to the extremists, President de Gaulle had decided to fight on all fronts at the same time: against the extremists in France and in Algeria, against the disaffected military and against the nationalists. To counter the extremists' slogan of "French Algeria" he had retorted with the slogan "Algerian Algeria" and, from then on, the battle joined between him and those who had supported him on 13 May had become a fight to the death. He had told the French of Algeria on 29 August 1959: "The Algerians will work out their own destiny: that is necessary." He had ordered the military to terminate the "pacification" and had stated that the Algerians would then decide their own fate.

37. So far as relations with the FLN were concerned, President de Gaulle had been the first French official in a responsible position to recognize its members as soldiers and to take note of their legitimate claims.

38. It was clear from President de Gaulle's press conference of 5 September 1961 that no major obstacle to a final settlement remained. President de Gaulle had said:

"Our objective is not at all one of retaining the political, administrative and economic responsibility for Algeria. That particular policy... would today be vain and anachronistic, and we do not believe that the interest, the honor and the future of France should be, in this present era, based on continuing the domination of populations the great majority of which are not of its people and which everything impels and will impel on an increasing scale to become free and be their own masters."

So far as co-operation was concerned, President de Gaulle had said: "... co-operation is by no means necessary to us; we want it only to the extent that it means exchange and understanding". In regard to the Sahara, he had said that there was not one Algerian who did not believe that the Sahara should be a part of Algeria

and that there would not be a single Algerian Government which would not be obliged insistently to claim Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara.

39. Objectively speaking, if the few imperialists still remaining in the United Nations spoke the same language, the General Assembly would not have needed to adopt resolution 1514 (XV) on decolonization. Colonization was the canker of a century; it was a misfortune; but, just as the colonized did not feel responsible for the fact that their ancestors had not resisted colonialism to the last man, it would be simple honesty not to blame those misfortunes on the colonialists of the present generation to the extent that they had decided upon decolonization. Centuries of colonialism had undoubtedly created certain rights which complicated the process of decolonization; those acting in good faith should be helped; they should be encouraged to decolonize not by vilification or demagogic outbursts but by constructive proposals which could accelerate the decolonization process. Mr. Houphouët-Boigny, the President of the Republic of the Ivory Coast, had emphasized that point on 3 January 1961, when he had told the National Assembly: "It is because we sincerely love all our Algerian brothers, those who are fighting and those who are not taking part in the fighting, because we understand them, because we also love the people of France, that we consider that we have no right to be content with facile positions which are but cowardly solace; on the contrary, we believe that we must continue without flagging to exhort both sides, and especially France, to do everything possible to achieve Algerian self-determination in 1961 at the latest."

40. France could not ignore the mortal danger threatening Africa as a result of the prolongation of the Algerian war; nor could it ignore the tragic position in which it would place the African peoples if, for some unfortunate reason, there was no response to their appeal for peace, negotiation and the democratic application of the principle of self-determination. It could not continue to let twelve countries, which sought only to co-operate with it, be unjustly regarded as contributing to a situation which there was an imperative duty to bring to a speedy end. It was impossible that France should fail to understand the African peoples. But neither could any sincere friend of France and Algeria fail to appreciate the indisputable fact that the Head of the French State had recently brought the "Franco-French" debate into the context of the Algerian problem.

41. If, as he had recently indicated, President de Gaulle intended to relinquish power if the great majority of the French people did not support him in his policy of self-determination for the Algerian people, that decision would be fraught with consequences which should frighten those who truly desired peace.

42. His delegation wished to point out in a friendly spirit to the Algerian people, whose impatience was perfectly understandable, that there were two major snags which had to be avoided: internationalization of the conflict and the degeneration of the "Franco-French" controversy into a tragic "Algero-Algerian" conflict.

43. The parties appeared to have adopted the method of secret negotiations in order to avoid arousing passions and in order to avoid the excessive publicity which had caused the previous talks to fail. The General Assembly should therefore have sought to avoid doing anything which would aggravate the problem and

saying anything likely to ruffle anyone's feelings and compromise the negotiations.

44. The newspaper *Afrique-Action* of 13-19 December 1961 had published an interview with President de Gaulle, in which he had said that the problem of subversion—the Salan venture—would resolve itself once the fighting and revolt had ceased, and that the problem of the remnants of "French Algeria" resistance could no doubt be settled in co-operation with the FLN. It was such co-operation that the Government of the Ivory Coast earnestly desired, and not an internationalization of the conflict which would lead to the permanent partition of Algerian territory.

45. His Government wished to assure its Algerian brothers of its sincere hope that all the efforts applied by the Governments of the various countries throughout the world to help them would result in the independence and unity of Algeria. However, his country, which had adopted the most thankless approach—direct contact—would continue to use that method in the belief that it too was helping its Algerian brothers and Africa.

46. Mr. CHEHLAOUI (Syria) said that the Algerian cause no longer needed to be defended. The sufferings and martyrdom of an entire people had opened the eyes of the whole world. His country had espoused the Algerian cause from the very outset, even before any Algerian question had existed. It was Syria that had offered asylum to those who, after fighting heroically against colonialism, had been overcome by weight of numbers, and the descendants of the great Abd-el-Kader and of his companions in misfortune still found a home and a refuge there.

47. The United Nations and all its Member States desired to contribute to a peaceful solution of the Algerian problem. The Algerian leaders themselves had hoped for and sought a peaceful solution. Not a single fact could be adduced which cast any doubt on the good faith of the Algerian representatives. The latter had, in fact, made many concessions in order to achieve a peaceful solution. For years the world had followed with anxiety and sympathy the heroic struggle of a people which one of the most powerful regular armies had been unable to conquer. President de Gaulle himself had finally made concessions also. Initially, those concessions had been more in the nature of encouragement. At that time French public opinion had perhaps not yet been sufficiently prepared for the relinquishment of Algeria and much further suffering had been necessary before a large sector of the public had recognized the right of the Algerians to self-determination. However, substantial progress had been made towards the settlement of the Algerian question.

48. Some difficulties nevertheless remained, and two of them—the Sahara and the question of the European minorities—deserved particular attention. Those two questions appeared to have been the main reason why negotiations between the parties had been broken off, as it was impossible for the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic to compromise on either of them. There could be no question of splitting up Algeria, as that country was one and indivisible, and the Sahara formed an integral part of Algeria. Certain French administrative decisions taken some years before could in no way alter that fact. On the other hand, the Algerians had indicated that they were prepared to recognize certain French interests in the Sahara, in order to facilitate discussion of the whole Algerian problem, by linking the question of the exploitation of resources with that of sovereignty. But

the French had refused to deal with this problem and had implied that the question of the Sahara should not be discussed until an Algerian State had been set up which would be only one-fifth the size of the present Algeria.

49. The second difficulty delaying a solution of the Algerian problem was the future of the European minorities in Algeria. What guarantees would they be offered on the day Algeria became independent? Since 1954, the FLN had endorsed the principle that they should be able to choose between Algerian citizenship and alien status. It should be recognized that the Algerian leaders had shown a very noble attitude towards those who had always lived on Algerian soil, enjoying advantages from which the Algerians themselves had been excluded. The question of the European minorities in an independent Algeria appeared easy to solve provided the French authorities really believed in the good faith of the Algerians and their repeated solemn declarations. There could be no question as to their good faith, and it was to be hoped that an agreement might soon be reached between the parties.

50. It was difficult to believe that a small group which was opposed to any suggestion of peace should have the upper hand and plunge Algeria once again into an interminable war. A solution imposed by force could not bring peace to Algeria. Its people, which had already fought for seven years, would not give up the fight. Moreover, it was obvious that nothing could withstand the forces of national liberation and Algeria was no exception to that rule. Since a military victory by the French Army was impossible, the voice of reason should be heeded, the facts should be accepted and the problem should be settled peacefully. A peaceful solution was desirable, possible and necessary. It could be achieved by direct negotiations between the French Government and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. Negotiations had taken place in 1961. However, notwithstanding the patience and wisdom shown by the Provisional Government, the French attitude at Evian and at Lugin was scarcely of such a nature as to facilitate a settlement of the dispute. Algeria could not be expected to sacrifice four-fifths of its national territory, nor could the Algerians be expected to accept the creation of a State within their State by granting excessive privileges to a minority.

51. It appeared at present to be unanimously agreed throughout the world that negotiations should be resumed, yet the negotiations had been suspended for five months. The Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, Mr. Ben Khedda, and his colleagues had, on several occasions, made specific proposals for the resumption of negotiations. On the French side, several similar statements had been made. Unfortunately, statements were not enough. What was expected of the French Government was action: in other words, that it should forego certain demands which were incompatible with Algerian territorial integrity and the principle of the unity of the Algerian people. It was also to be hoped that serious efforts would be made to eliminate the obstacles in the way of successful negotiations. The complete elimination of certain secret organizations should be ensured, as that would prevent the murders of Algerians which were still being committed openly before the almost indifferent eyes of the authorities.

52. The negotiations should be resumed and it was the duty of the United Nations to insist on their resumption. The negotiations should lead to France's unconditional recognition of Algerian independence which, so far as the majority of mankind was concerned, was an established and undeniable fact. The Provisional Government was already a member of the family of Arab and of African-Asian nations and, at certain international conferences, the Algerian people had already occupied the seat to which they were entitled. He trusted that France would heed the voice of mankind which appealed to it to negotiate and to make a potent contribution to the restoration of peace in Algeria. It was to be hoped that the representatives of Algeria would take their place in the General Assembly at the next session.

53. Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) noted that most representatives were agreed that the settlement of the Algerian problem had reached a decisive phase. It was not the first time the forecasts had been optimistic and both sides had seemed equally sincere in their intentions but, on the present occasion, there were many signs which encouraged the hope that the headlong rush of war would be replaced by the orderly progress of peace. Moreover both parties seemed to realize that agreement was necessary and serious negotiation inescapable.

54. Although the principle of self-determination had been qualified by several limitations in President de Gaulle's statement of 16 September 1959, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had accepted that statement as a positive basis for honest discussion which might lead to a settlement. The principle had been subjected to steady attrition in many subsequent statements but the Provisional Government, in its anxiety to miss no opportunity of peace, had decided to rely on President de Gaulle's original attitude.

55. Meanwhile some French elements, with the connivance of governmental and military circles, had launched a systematic campaign against everything which brought the French Government and the Provisional Government closer to a positive outcome. It must be acknowledged that neither President de Gaulle nor the Provisional Government had allowed themselves to be swayed by the activities of those elements; on the contrary, they had begun talks at Evian on a better-defined and more satisfactory basis. The preparations for that meeting, the exclusion of any preliminaries which might have held up the negotiations, and the choice of representatives on either side had beyond question augured well for the establishment of a peace based on justice and co-operation. Unfortunately it seemed that the French Government had not really wished to go further than a direct exploration of the Provisional Government's intentions, since the position to which it had clung had systematically excluded a number of basic principles that must be recognized before peace could be restored. The French delegation had been responsible for the suspension of the talks at Evian, for the Algerians had been unable to agree that the negotiations should relate to only a part of their territory, the economy of which was to be dependent on France, or that a privileged minority should be allowed to control the destiny of the Algerian people. They had taken the view that there could be no cease-fire before a political agreement; and no political agreement could have been concluded without first spelling out what self-determination meant and what guarantees were to protect it. No one

had challenged the legitimacy of the Algerian attitude. The French Government itself had been careful to explain the suspension of negotiations by the need for a period of reflection.

56. The Provisional Government had continued to hope for a further meeting which might be more constructive and, when President de Gaulle had stated that no one thought of questioning Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara, conditions had appeared favourable to a resumption of negotiations. The Provisional Government, for its part, had been ready to make substantial concessions on all the points at issue. Unfortunately the optimism which had ushered in the talks at Lugrin had soon evaporated. France had remained intransigent on certain vital questions, including that of the Sahara. Obviously, a people who had struggled many years for independence wanted to recover their homeland exactly as it had been wrested from them by conquest. Moreover it had been solemnly proclaimed that countries recovering their independence should resume the exercise of their sovereignty over the whole territory in which the colonizer's writ had run. While refusing to lend itself to intrigue, the Provisional Government had never contemplated refusing to co-operate in the exploitation and development of the wealth of the Sahara, provided that such co-operation did not prejudice its exclusive sovereignty. The resources of the Sahara were more than sufficient for Algeria's needs and would remain, for some years to come, more than sufficient for the needs of the nearest African countries. The exploitation of such wealth would require financial and technological investment which, again, exceeded the capacity of the African countries. It was logical, therefore, to make use of the various forms of co-operation which would enable Europe and Africa to take full advantage of such exploitation. On the other hand Algeria could no more agree than could other African countries that France should continue to test atomic and ballistic devices in the Sahara. Furthermore, if France exercised any sovereignty over the Sahara it would use it to keep apart the two parts of the African continent, which had a common destiny and a community of interests. Instead of constituting a link between North Africa and the rest of the continent, the Sahara would become a bastion for foreign military bases designed to hold a permanent threat over the independent States of the African continent.

57. The problem of the European minority obviously could not be approached from the standpoint of historical notions closely bound up with conquest, occupation and the entrenchment of excessive privileges. However, the Provisional Government had always solemnly proclaimed that, in addition to the guarantees conferred by international law on all foreign nationals in a given country, independent Algeria would unconditionally offer citizenship to all who might wish to live in its territory.

58. The difficulties which had arisen during the most recent negotiations had crystallized about another vital point. The two parties had agreed on self-determination and on the procedure for the referendum, but France had claimed the right to retain sovereignty and responsibility for law and order during the interim period; that was incompatible with the exigencies of the situation created by seven years of war which had ranged the French Army against the Algerian people.

59. In the Moroccan delegation's opinion no purpose would be served—other than that of building up illusions and producing greater disappointments—by holding more and more meetings in order to chalk up more and more failures and blame them on the other side. His delegation continued to hope that the French Government and the Provisional Government would resume their talks without delay, but it coupled that wish with an urgent appeal to the French Government to follow up its own statements and bring its working attitude into line with its official proclamations. Independence accompanied by partition was unthinkable, and independence was incompatible with co-sovereignty and the preservation of minority privileges. Without underestimating the difficulties faced by President de Gaulle in pursuing his policy, or the forceful attitude with which he had met them, it was natural to feel alarmed at certain recent plots which had resulted in a resurgence of racism and acts of violence and terrorism in Algeria. It was difficult to overlook the fact that responsibility for the existence of the Secret Army Organization lay with the French Government itself. It was no secret to anyone that the leaders of that movement and the paid assassins they recruited were known to the French Government and that their networks, financial resources and contacts abroad had been exposed. Yet no serious action had been taken against them. A Government which could mobilize 800,000 men and a powerful police force against the Algerian people could not plead inability to neutralize a handful of cashiered officers and politicians. The greatest asset of the Secret Army Organization was the deterioration of the political situation in France as a result of the climate kept in being in Algeria by the prolongation of the conflict. The most powerful weapon to use against it would be the speedy resumption of negotiations and the establishment of peace. In fact, the problem came down to the question of how sincere the French Government was, and how real its desire for peace.

60. The Provisional Government was waging war and seeking peace with a unity of purpose which both supplied its strength and offered France the opportunity to end the war with the Algerian power which was waging it and to build peace with the only power which could guarantee it. It was vain to seek any dissension among the leaders of the Provisional Government; their unity had withstood events and intrigues, and the five Ministers imprisoned by the French Government saw eye to eye with the other five who were negotiating with it. If the French Government recognized that fact, new negotiations would have great prospects of success. The Algerian people had proved that, whatever the hardships of revolution, they were willing that several years of struggle and suffering should end in a compromise. At a time when everyone hoped that peace was near, it would have been appreciated if the representative of France had been present in the Committee to announce, on behalf of his Government and people, that France also shared that wish.

61. The Moroccan delegation had joined with other delegations in submitting a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1) designed to give positive expression to the Committee's unanimous view on the Algerian question. The text contained references to previous decisions, including General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1573 (XV), and a paragraph regretting the suspension of negotiations, in order to make it quite clear that no real negotiations were currently in progress.

62. In reply to certain representatives, he stated that the appeal in the draft resolution was aimed at bringing the two parties together in bilateral negotiations, and not within the framework of the United Nations. So far as the expression "Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic" was concerned, he noted that the delegations which had submitted the draft resolution represented Governments which had recognized the Algerian Provisional Government and which consequently found it logical to call that Government by its name. Some representatives had seemed surprised that the draft resolution pressed the question of the territorial integrity of Algeria, which they said France had never challenged, while no mention was made of the guarantees claimed by the European minority. It should be noted in that regard that all delegations which had upheld the point of view of the Provisional Government had done so on the basis of the statements made by Algerian spokesmen both before and after the negotiations; in those statements, the rights of the minority had been officially recognized, and specific guarantees had been proposed to the French delegation during the bilateral negotiations. It was unnecessary to refer in the draft resolution to guarantees which had already been accorded to the French Government, since the latter did not recognize the right of those offering such guarantees to invoke them in the United Nations.

63. He urged the Committee to subscribe to the appeal, which would be the expression of the general desire to see peace achieved through direct negotiations between the French Government and the Provisional Government.

64. Mr. HASEGANU (Romania) stated that if the Algerian question did not find a solution consistent with the legitimate aspirations and interests of the Algerian people and if the colonialist war continued in Algeria, international peace and security might be endangered.

65. Under resolution 1573 (XV), the General Assembly had recognized the Algerian people's right to self-determination and independence; it had also recognized that the United Nations was competent to deal with the question and that it had a responsibility to contribute towards its just solution. Unfortunately, the French Government had ignored that resolution, just as it had ignored General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. As a result, the war in Algeria, now more than seven years old, continued to claim new victims, arousing profound concern throughout the world and even in France, where an ever-widening segment of public opinion was speaking out for the cessation of that ridiculous war and for the granting of independence to the Algerian people.

66. President de Gaulle himself, in his speech of 2 October 1961, had stated that the aim of French policy in Algeria was the exercise by the Algerians of the right to determine their own fate, the establishment, if they so wished, of an independent and sovereign Algerian State through self-determination, and the co-operation of France with the new Algeria for its existence and development, which implied, in particular, that the community of European origin in Algeria would have its rights and guarantees. Nevertheless, no agreement had yet been reached between the two parties. The negotiations initiated in the first half of 1961 had failed because of different interpretations of the ideas of Algerian "independence", "self-determi-

nation" and "integrity". Doubts had even been cast on the representative character of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. But the actions on the field of battle and the great popular demonstrations had proved to the whole world that the FLN and its embodiment, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, were the only political force which had the confidence and support of the majority of the Algerian people.

67. The peaceful solution of the Algerian question was prevented by the desperate opposition of a small group of colonialists and militarists strongly supported by the French and foreign monopolies which controlled the natural wealth of Algeria. The colonial war in Algeria was also financed by the military bloc of NATO, and first and foremost by the United States and West Germany. The military assistance extended to France by the United States during the past ten years, for example, exceeded \$4,500 million, and Senator Humphrey had acknowledged in the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, on 15 June 1961, that American equipment had been used by French troops in Algeria. The fact that 14,000 German soldiers, most of whom were former SS-men of Hitler's army, were serving in the Foreign Legion was also significant. During the past year, an added factor had been the development of a terrorist movement which, through its attacks and murders, sought to prevent the solution of the Algerian question. That movement, of typically fascist origin, represented a grave danger not only to the Algerian people but to the French people also. Its object was first to prevent at all costs any negotiations between the French Government and the Provisional Government and later to extend the military and fascist dictatorial régime to France. That view was held by Mr. de la Malène, French Secretary of State for Information, as reported in *Le Monde* on 5 December 1961.

68. The Romanian Government advocated the effective implementation of the principle of self-determination in Algeria and in all other States which were still under colonial domination, and respect for the unity and territorial integrity of those States, in the interests of world peace. It believed that the Algerian war could be brought to an end through direct negotiation between the French Government and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. It expressed the hope that in that way the Algerian people would be able to win its sovereignty and independence without delay and that it would be possible, at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, to welcome the Algerian Republic into the United Nations. His delegation would vote for the draft resolution before the Committee.

69. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) recalled that his delegation had always held that the United Nations was not competent to deal with the Algerian problem, which was covered by Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations. Spain could not therefore endorse an attitude which reflected a radically different interpretation of the Charter from its own. Despite Spain's sympathy for all suffering peoples, it was immediately aware of the enormous damage being done to mankind and world peace by the violation of international laws and the substitution of violence for reason and law. Moreover, there were more effective ways of dealing with the Algerian question than those advocated in draft resolution A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1. Negotiations between the French Government and the FLN had been initiated, broken off and resumed in one

form or another. In the preceedings, however, the positions of the parties had been reconciled to the point where there remained only two matters in dispute: the guarantees to be given to the Algerian inhabitants of European origin and the protection of French and African interests in the Sahara.

70. His delegation therefore earnestly hoped that the bilateral negotiations would be resumed and continued so that an end might be put as soon as possible to the sufferings of the Algerian inhabitants, both European and African, to which Spain was bound by ancient ties of blood, culture and history. It hoped for an end to violence and for reconciliation.

71. The draft resolution, despite the good intentions that had prompted it, expressed the differences of views among the members of the Committee. By reflecting only the basic position of one of the parties and ignoring the serious preoccupations of the other, the text was controversial. Moreover, if the Committee should attempt to modify it so as to eliminate its one-sidedness, it might end by substituting itself for the actual negotiators. Indeed, that was already happening, to judge by certain statements made in the

Committee. His delegation of course agreed with the sponsors of the draft resolution that the negotiations should continue, but it could not approve the biased aspects of their text, such as the reference to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The draft resolution also referred to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, which the majority of States Members of the United Nations had not recognized. There was, lastly, the matter of the phrase regarding the competence of the United Nations to deal with the issue, which a number of delegations had refused to acknowledge in the past.

72. His delegation would therefore be unable to vote in favour of the draft resolution, for it was convinced that such a text would do nothing to promote a successful outcome of events, and in fact might well wound legitimate susceptibilities and so introduce a new element of discord into a problem which was already delicate. The Algerian tragedy was too grievous for the Committee to risk jeopardizing its solution with a text which, though well intentioned, was extremely dangerous.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.