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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEM 80

Question of Algeria (A/4842 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1) (continued)

1. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) introduced draft resolution A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1 on behalf of all the sponsors. It was a simple and moderate draft resolution: its preamble was a recital of well known and non-controversial facts, and its operative part called for a resumption of negotiations, which was certainly in keeping with the wishes of both parties. Its intention was not to force anyone to do anything, but simply to get the parties to enter into official negotiations with a view to settling the Algerian question by granting independence to the Algerian people throughout the whole of Algeria, as one country, without any division and without any conditions whatsoever. He hoped that the Committee would appreciate the spirit in which the draft resolution had been submitted and adopt it unanimously.

2. Mr. DJERMAKOYE (Niger) said that there was only one way of ending the painful conflict between Algeria and France: Algeria must achieve independence and territorial integrity. It would be the responsibility of an independent Algeria to settle the question of its residents of foreign origin, in consultation with France. The difficulties created by the coexistence of minorities of different origins were far from insurmountable. In the first place the idea of establishing a system of dual nationality, as a compromise solution, should be ruled out. Apart from the practical and political difficulties which it would create militarily, diplomatically and in the field of public international law, such a solution—which, it was true, had been adopted by certain countries—was actually an encroachment on the national sovereignty of the country concerned and opened the way to abuses which no independent nation could tolerate or accept in its institutions.

3. There could be no real independence without national unity. All who wished to benefit from the rights devolving from Algerian nationality would have to accept the obligations implied in the acquisition of that nationality. Those obligations had been clearly defined by the representatives of the Algerian people. They were in keeping with traditional ideas in civilized countries. They would make it possible for all foreigners living in Algeria to acquire Algerian nationality. And even if those foreigners should

choose to retain their present nationality, they would still have the rights enjoyed by all foreigners under private international law, the general principles of which would doubtless be adopted by the Algerian State, as they had been by all civilized nations.

4. The second major difficulty dividing the French and Algerian negotiators was the question of the Sahara. Once again, there was no real obstacle to agreement on that point. The starting-point must be the principle that it was normal and legitimate for a country which had attained independence to exercise its sovereignty over all the territory within its geographical boundaries. It was an acknowledged fact that Algeria included within its borders a part of the Sahara. Accordingly, the independence of Algeria could only be understood to mean the independence of the entire country, including that part of the Sahara. After the statement made by the President of the French Republic, General de Gaulle, on the subject, that principle could surely not be challenged again. There remained the problem of the economic interests involved in the exploitation of the resources of the Sahara. Negotiations on that matter could be concerned only with the ways and means of distributing those resources equitably among all the bordering States, in proportion to their rights.

5. Consequently, there should be nothing to delay the long-awaited settlement of the distressing problem of Algeria, which had cost so many lives. Algeria's attainment of independence would, in addition, be a major step towards the total emancipation of the African continent. By helping to bring it about, France would be following its traditional policy: that of working for the liberation of peoples under colonial rule in accordance with the humanitarian ideals which it had been the first to champion and to apply.

6. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) said that despite the French superiority in military personnel and "matériel", the colonialists had lost the Algerian war, and sooner or later Algeria would become an independent republic. The war had resulted in political defeats for France, and internally, the drama of Algeria was also the drama of France. While the United Nations was not competent to deal with the internal dangers threatening France, it was its duty to see to it that the Algerian people attained their independence without further delay, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)).

7. It was also the duty of the United Nations to remove any threat to peace. The colonial war in Algeria was a constant threat to peace in Africa, as had been shown when the French colonialists, in July 1961, had made an aggressive attack on Tunisia in order to maintain their military bases in North Africa for use against the Algerian people. Without the military and

financial aid of its NATO partners, moreover, France could not have continued the war for long—a fact which confirmed the international character of the Algerian question.

8. The year since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1573 (XV) had been one of hard but useful experience. The passionate struggle of the Algerian people for independence had been strengthened, the prestige of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had been enhanced within the country and abroad, and the solidarity with Algeria of the forces of freedom and peace had been broadened. The signs of evolution in President de Gaulle's Algerian policy, which had made it possible to establish direct contacts between France and Algeria, had aroused some hope, but they had been followed by new disappointments. The talks at Evian and Lugrin had ended in a stalemate as a result of the conditions imposed by France.

9. In the past few months, the situation had deteriorated both in Algeria and in France. The bloody massacres of the Arab population by the fascist Secret Army Organization and the endless series of bomb explosions showed that the defenders of colonial and imperialist interests did not intend to lay down their arms. The real aim of the Secret Army Organization was to carve for themselves out of Algeria as large and rich a colonial enclave as they could, and to add the Sahara to it. That enclave was to be called the "European Republic of Algeria", and would be inhabited by people of European origin and by some Moslems who would serve as cheap labour.

10. France wanted to keep the Sahara not only in order to exploit its fabulous mineral riches and oil, but also because it was using the Sahara for its nuclear test explosions, which had repeatedly imperilled the security of the whole of Africa. The only way to ensure that there would be no further testing in that territory was to recognize that the Sahara was Algerian and should belong to Algeria. The only way to end the Algerian crisis was to safeguard the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the future Republic of Algeria.

11. The practical solution should be sought in the suggestions made in October 1961 by the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, who had proposed negotiations in two stages: first, negotiations on the proclamation of the independence of Algeria, including the Sahara, and on a cease-fire; secondly, negotiations on co-operation with France and guarantees for the French population of Algeria.

12. By recognizing the right of the Algerian people to independence, France would be strengthening its position in North Africa and throughout the world. It would also be helping the European minority in Algeria. Any further delay in solving the Algerian question could only play into the hands of the enemies of the peoples of Algeria and France. Consequently, the Algerian question should be settled without further delay, in accordance with the wishes of the Algerian people, and by direct negotiations with the Algerian Provisional Government, which was the only representative of the Algerian people. For all those reasons, Poland would vote in favour of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1).

13. Mr. ZEMLA (Czechoslovakia) said that if the people of Algeria were closer today to their objective

of freedom and national independence, the merit belonged not to the United Nations, which had been considering the question for a number of years, but to their own unshakable determination, demonstrated during the long fight for national liberation against the French colonialists. Like all peace-loving countries, which desired the complete abolition of colonialism, Czechoslovakia, whose people had very often had to defend their own freedom by force of arms, was following the struggle of the Algerian people with admiration and sympathy, and was giving it full support. France was still refusing to admit that the day of colonialism had passed. It was using every means to delay the moment when its supremacy in Algeria would end. If it continued to wage its war of extermination against the Algerians, however, it would inevitably be defeated, in spite of the very substantial assistance that was being given it by other imperialist and colonial Powers.

14. The Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)), the principles of which had been reaffirmed at the current session in resolution 1654 (XVI), made it an obligation for the United Nations to contribute in a decisive manner towards the implementation of the right of self-determination of the Algerian people. The results of the debates at the preceding six sessions of the General Assembly had been far from satisfactory. The colonial Powers had succeeded for a number of years in barring the adoption of any resolution denouncing the policy of France and recognizing the right of the Algerian people to independence. At the fifteenth session, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1573 (XV), which had duly recognized that right; but because of the attitude of France and its NATO allies the provisions of that resolution, like those of many other resolutions proclaiming the right of colonial peoples to independence, had remained a dead letter. France had intensified its policies of repression and oppression in Algeria, especially against the civilian population; he recalled, in that connexion, the disgust and indignation that had been aroused throughout the world by the brutal suppression of the demonstrations of 5 July 1961. The French authorities had also intensified their policy of police terror and lawlessness against the Algerians living in France. In spite of the solemn appeal addressed to France by the General Assembly in its resolution 1650 (XVI) of 15 November 1961, that country was still refusing the status of political prisoners to the thousands of Algerians who had been arrested.

15. The defeats suffered by France on the battlefield, and the failure of its repressive measures against the civilian population, had finally convinced even the most stubborn colonialists in French Government circles that nothing could break the Algerian people's will for freedom, and that the continuance of the war was the cause of the permanent political instability of France itself. That was why the French leaders had attempted, during the past year, to obtain at the conference table what a long and bloody war had not given them. The French Government's primary object in its negotiations with the representatives of the Algerian people was obviously to allow the maintenance, under new forms, of the shattered positions of French colonialism in Algeria and Africa, and to give French and other foreign monopolies an opportunity for the further unlimited exploitation of

Algeria's natural resources, economic wealth and manpower.

16. In the course of the negotiations, the French representatives had attempted, by various manoeuvres, to divide the Algerian people, to isolate them from their allies and friends, and to weaken the unity of the African countries by fabricating artificial conflicts between them in connexion with the question of the Sahara and the exploitation of its natural riches. Of the various proposals for a solution of the Algerian problem that had been advanced, from time to time, by responsible French officials, none had ever contemplated the free and unconditional application of the Algerian people's right of self-determination. The so-called "association" between the Republic of Algeria and France would only represent a form of neo-colonial dependence. The alternative envisaged by President de Gaulle on 12 July 1961 would be even more unacceptable: the partition of Algeria which would give France supremacy over the regions of greatest natural wealth would undermine the bases of the country's political independence and ensure the total economic subjection of Algeria to the imperialist Powers.

17. It seemed that the main problem for the French Government was not the application of the Algerian people's right to independence, but the so-called "right of self-determination" of some hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen living in Algeria, and the defence of the imperialist interests of France and NATO on Algerian territory. That was why France was preparing a "regrouping" of population in Algeria, and the separation from Algeria of its important coastal zones and of the Sahara. The realization of those neo-colonialist plans would mean that France would control 750 kilometres of Algerian coast out of a total coastline of 1,100 kilometres, together with the richest agricultural regions of the country; Algeria would also be deprived of its principal mineral resources. Those plans, which would lead to the establishment of a non-viable Algerian State, at the mercy of the colonialists, could not serve as the basis for a just solution of the Algerian problem; the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had therefore rejected them. Yet although they were contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1654 (XVI), those plans were still being fully supported by the other imperialist Powers, and it was only the political, moral, financial and military assistance of those Powers that enabled France to continue its "dirty war". The Powers in question were seeking to protect the interests of their great monopolies, which were exploiting the Sahara. They also wished to maintain French supremacy in Algeria because of the country's strategic importance; and accordingly, they were supporting the efforts of the French Government to retain its military bases on Algerian soil.

18. At the present time, new negotiations between the representatives of the Algerian people and those of the French Government might arrive at an equitable and peaceful solution of the Algerian question. But if that was to be so, both parties would have to approach the negotiations on a basis of equality, and with a genuine desire to find a solution in harmony with the legitimate interests and rights of the Algerian people. The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had always shown its willingness to settle all questions in dispute with due regard to France's rightful interests. It had never made un-

warranted demands. It had simply, and justifiably, refused to allow itself to be deprived at the conference table of the results achieved over more than seven years of warfare, at the cost of many human lives. The sole responsibility for the failure of all negotiations held so far thus rested with the French Government and those who supported it. The stand taken by the French Government could not be conducive to a peaceful settlement of the question of Algeria.

19. Today, when the entire African continent was involved in national liberation struggles, nothing could prevent the long and heroic fight of the Algerian people from ending in absolute victory. But that objective should be achieved without further bloodshed, without further privations and sufferings for the Algerian people. It was the duty of the United Nations to make every effort to ensure the peaceful solution of the Algerian question, as soon as possible, in conformity with the principle of the Algerian people's right to self-determination, and in the interests of international peace and security. The colonial war in Algeria concerned not only France and Algeria but all States, because it was an ever-increasing threat to international peace.

20. The draft resolution that had been submitted (A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1) would undoubtedly contribute to the peaceful solution desired, and the Czechoslovak delegation would therefore vote for it.

21. Mr. FEKINI (Libya) said that it was particularly regrettable that, at a time when the United Nations was pronouncing the final abolition of colonialism and most of the African peoples had at last acceded to independence, colonial warfare, more atrocious and murderous than ever, was still raging in Algeria. The sufferings of the civilian population, subjected to extortion and the most unjust measures of repression, had reached unimaginable proportions, especially in the internment and "regroupment" camps where more than two million Algerian men and women were living in appalling conditions. The main towns of Algeria were a prey to the sadistic excesses of groups of extremists, under the impassive or ineffective supervision of the so-called forces of order. The scandalous actions of the Secret Army Organization, led by a handful of ambitious conspirators, were seriously compromising the country's democratic future. Hundreds of thousands of Algerians of all ages had become refugees in Libya, Tunisia and Morocco, leaving behind them their wrecked villages and devastated fields. The Algerian people, however, in face of the injustice, privation and exploitation which it had suffered for over 130 years, had taken the irrevocable decision that its legitimate aspirations to human dignity and national independence should triumph. After seven long years of heroic struggle, the Algerian nationalist revolution had found ever-increasing support on the international level, because it was based on right, justice and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and had always represented the Algerian people's will to liberation.

22. The colonial war in Algeria was a serious threat to the peace and security of North Africa and even of the rest of the world. It dangerously hindered the peaceful and constructive development of the neighbouring countries; it threatened to have fatal consequences for France, and menaced the stability of the whole of Europe. The international nature of the Algerian conflict, already admitted by the United

Nations, the recognition by France of the principle of self-determination for the Algerian people, and the favourable development which was discernible if the positions of the two parties were compared, made it the duty of the international Organization to pursue its efforts for a peaceful settlement. To that end everything must be done to promote and consolidate conditions likely to accelerate that favourable development. It was very regrettable that the French delegation was not taking part in the discussion; it would have been able to report to its Government the deep anxiety created in the United Nations by the continuance of the Algerian tragedy, and it could have given the Committee a clearer idea of the progress of the talks for a peaceful settlement.

23. The United Nations had already recognized that there were two parties to the Algerian conflict—on the one hand the French Government, and on the other the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. The French Government had itself admitted the fact, since on three occasions—at Melun, Evian and Lugrin—it had engaged in official negotiations with the Provisional Government, which was, moreover, recognized by a growing number of sovereign States. Libya, for its part, had recognized that Government since its constitution, because it was the expression of the Algerian people's legitimate aspirations to self-determination and independence, because it exercised all the attributes of national sovereignty over vast areas of Algerian territory, and because it was the valid spokesman for Algeria in negotiations with France for the restoration of peace in the country. In that connexion, it was interesting to note that President de Gaulle himself had expressed the opinion, on 8 November 1961, that self-determination would lead to the establishment of the State of Algeria. The President had considered that, if self-determination was to take effect, it was necessary that the French Government should conclude an agreement in advance with the Algerian political elements, and particularly with the representatives of the rebellion, who had on their side the majority feeling of the Algerian people.

24. The United Nations had explicitly recognized the Algerian people's right not only to self-determination but also to independence. Furthermore, when in the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)) it had called for respect for national unity and territorial integrity, the Organization had in fact condemned any French intention to partition Algeria. It had assumed its responsibility in regard to guarantees of impartiality and popular consultation by recognizing, in General Assembly resolution 1573 (XV), "the imperative need for adequate and effective guarantees to ensure the successful and just implementation of the right of self-determination".

25. In the more recent development of the situation, two important elements were noteworthy. On the home front, the Algerian nationalist movement's armed resistance had been conspicuously reinforced by the Algerian masses' open action, which had been steadily intensified since December 1960. That popular support constituted irrefutable proof of the Provisional Government's authority and standing with the Algerian nation, and was an eloquent indication of the direction in which Algeria was moving. From the bilateral standpoint, the statement made in January 1961 by the Provisional Government, that it was will-

ing to enter into negotiations with the French Government on the conditions for self-determination, had been followed by a positive reply from the French Government. Accordingly, the negotiations at Evian and Lugrin had been held between the two duly accredited official delegations of the French Government and of the Provisional Government. Those talks had unfortunately ended without conclusive results, owing to the French negotiators' rigid ideas regarding the Algerian Sahara. On that subject the Chairman of the Algerian delegation at Lugrin had emphasized, in a press conference at Geneva on 31 July, that all the countries in Africa which had regained their sovereignty had obtained independence within the framework of their territorial boundaries. In his view, to compromise on the principle of territorial integrity would, for the Algerian people, amount to renouncing the struggle, accepting a mere semblance of independence and agreeing to the continuance of colonialism in the very heart of Africa. Libya unreservedly supported the integrity of Algeria within its territorial limits, which undoubtedly included the Algerian Sahara. He himself was in complete agreement with the remarks concerning the territorial integrity of Algeria made by the representatives of Senegal in the General Assembly (1012th plenary meeting, paras. 44-46) and in the First Committee (1220th meeting). Furthermore, he appreciated the realism and sense of responsibility shown by the Algerian leaders in their approach to the question of co-operation in the exploitation of the wealth of the Sahara.

26. The fate, in an independent Algeria, of the community of European stock was another question which appeared to be hindering the peaceful settlement of the Algerian affair. It was interesting to note that in Libya, Tunisia and Morocco the problem of the European minorities, whose size in relation to the indigenous populations was no less than in Algeria, had, after the three countries' accession to independence, been solved most satisfactorily for all the parties concerned. The elements of European origin lived there in security, harmony and increasing prosperity, with the recognized status of foreign minorities; admittedly they did not enjoy their former privileges and prerogatives, but they had equality before the laws of the State and all the fundamental guarantees, including those concerning the free practice of their religion, the use of their own language and the type of education to be given to their children. The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, aware of the assistance that members of the European minority could give in the country's recovery, was prepared not only to provide them with the same guarantees but also to offer them Algerian citizenship. An Algerian of European stock would have the same political and civil rights and duties as an indigenous Algerian, without having to abandon his own cultural, spiritual and moral characteristics. In view of those generous offers, the behaviour of a fraction of the European community of Algeria, whose racist activities appeared to reflect collective madness, could not but cause astonishment. The criminal acts committed by those unbalanced individuals—exploited by a handful of adventurers and ambitious persons, mostly foreign to Algeria—must be severely condemned, and it was the duty of the French Government to put an end to a state of affairs which jeopardized the prospects for peace and peaceful coexistence in Algeria.

27. The possibility of a negotiated settlement of the conflict had increased since President de Gaulle, on 5 September 1961, had clearly given the impression that Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara was recognized. If that was the case, there would only remain—given the positive attitude adopted by the Provisional Government in the matter of the European minority—secondary problems which could be solved by mutual concessions. It was to be hoped that a more realistic view of the situation would bring the two parties to reopen their talks, and that good will and common sense would ensure the triumph of peace in Algeria.

28. It was the duty of the General Assembly to hasten the movement towards peace and reconciliation by adopting a constructive attitude in regard to the Algerian problem. The Libyan delegation was accordingly, together with a considerable number of other delegations, submitting draft resolution A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1, which it hoped would receive the general support it deserved.

29. Mr. QUAISON-SACKY (Ghana) recalled that his country recognized the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic both *de jure* and *de facto*, that it gave total support to the cause of the Algerian people, and that it was doing everything in its power to help them to free themselves from the colonialist yoke.

30. The discussion of the Algerian question was being held in happier circumstances than in the past. The parties involved had already held talks. The right of the Algerian people to self-determination was no longer in doubt. Finally, the majority of delegations to the United Nations had recognized, and emphasized, the responsibility of the United Nations in that matter, as reaffirmed by General Assembly resolutions 1573 (XV) and 1514 (XV). While all that was encouraging, the war in Algeria was still going on, and more and more people were being killed. The war had already cost some 300,000 casualties in dead, wounded and missing, according to unofficial French figures, but according to authoritative Algerian sources the casualties amounted to some 600,000. That useless immolation of the youth of France and Algeria must be stopped, but for that, Algeria would have to become independent.

31. France no longer regarded Algerian self-determination as a desperate solution excluding co-operation, but rather as a reasonable solution on which new and fruitful results could be built. In his press conference of 5 September 1961, President de Gaulle himself had acknowledged the inevitability of full independence for Algeria. He had also recognized that there was not a single Algerian who did not believe that the Sahara was an integral part of Algeria. If President de Gaulle strongly believed those two propositions, then it was the responsibility of the United Nations to support and encourage him in his task. If he deviated from that path, the United Nations should act resolutely on the terms of the resolution it had adopted.

32. The sovereignty of Algeria over the Sahara should not be in question. The Sahara belonged to Algeria, as followed, more particularly, from the resolution adopted by the General Assembly to the effect that France had no right to conduct nuclear tests in that territory. He emphasized that point, because he felt that there must be no misunderstanding between France and Africa.

33. Following the popular manifestations in Algeria in December 1960 and July 1961, France had accepted the representative character of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. It had even given that Government *de facto* recognition for purposes of negotiation. The Provisional Government, for its part, felt that it was possible to find a just and realistic solution of the conflict between it and France. As its Prime Minister, Mr. Ben Khedda, had emphasized on 24 October, the inevitable independence of Algeria did not exclude co-operation with France; on the contrary, that co-operation was called for in the interest of both parties. Independence should mark the point of departure for a new era, especially in relation to the French living in Algeria, who would, it was true, no longer be the super-citizens they had been in the past, but would, instead, occupy a place in Algeria in keeping with their position, their dignity as men, and their true interests. The Provisional Government was ready to envisage the future of the Europeans in Algeria with realism and justice. The rapid and just solution of the Algerian problem, which now appeared possible, would thus not be jeopardized by the problem of that minority. The fears and demands of the minority groups living in Algeria had no better foundation than those of similar groups in Angola, South Africa, or any other part of Africa. Their fear of being overwhelmed by the majorities over which they were now ruling was even offensive. In fact, all that was being asked of them was that they should co-operate with the inhabitants of the country to which they had come to settle, that they should act like human beings, and that they should be prepared to accept the law as it was, with all the guarantees provided within the Constitution.

34. The deplorable activities of the "ultras" and the adventurers of the Secret Army Organization were, on the other hand, seriously prejudicing a peaceful solution of the problem, and also were undermining the interests of the European element in Algeria. Referring to the acts of terrorism by the extreme rightists in Algeria, he emphasized the responsibility of the United Nations in that matter. It could discharge that responsibility by encouraging President de Gaulle to continue along the path he appeared to have chosen. It should support the resumption of negotiations and the action being taken for the independence of Algeria. In that connexion, he recalled his statement to the Committee at the fifteenth session (1133rd meeting).

35. Believing that, in the interest of peace and security, it was the duty of the United Nations to take measures to facilitate a final and peaceful solution of the Algerian problem, his delegation had joined in sponsoring the draft resolution before the Committee.

36. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan) said that the struggle of the Algerian people had become a shining example of sacrifice for freedom, and had inspired many liberation movements in Asia and Africa. Thanks to the heroes of Algeria, the problem needed no explanation. It was a colonial issue, pure and simple.

37. The Algerian people were determined to regain their national independence and to safeguard the territorial integrity of their homeland. Today, they had their own Government, which was recognized by more than thirty-five countries, which favoured negotiations leading to a democratic, peaceful and just solution of the Algerian problem, and which had shown

exceptional foresight, wisdom and ability. Asia and Africa and freedom-loving States all over the world admired its patience and its sincere desire to put an end to bloodshed and human suffering.

38. World public opinion recognized that the Sahara was part and parcel of the territory of Algeria. President de Gaulle himself had recognized the territorial integrity of the whole of Algeria when he had declared, on 5 September 1961, that there was not a single Algerian who did not believe that the Sahara was an integral part of Algeria. There was not a single African nationalist who did not share that view. But since there were two States involved, France and Algeria, negotiations were needed in order to put an end to the seven-year war, and to bloodshed and human suffering. But such negotiations, of course, must not be for the purpose of bargaining about the rights of the Algerians, but for that of securing the exercise of those rights. They should promote international co-operation between two equal States, and the establishment of the same relations between them as those which existed between France and Morocco and between France and Tunisia. Moreover, for those negotiations to be fruitful, they would have to be realistic and to be conducted with the true representatives of Algeria. France could not negotiate with its own puppets. Experience had shown that no solution could be imposed on the Algerians.

39. It was to be hoped that France, which would have avoided so many massacres, arrests and executions, and so much destruction, if it had heeded the voice of reason as soon as the matter had been brought before the United Nations, would now grasp the actual situation and realize that only negotiations with the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic could bring about an amicable solution.

40. No one wanted to make the task of France difficult except the French "colons" of Algeria, who had enormous vested interests in Algeria and influential lobbies in Paris. It was the cupidity of the "colons" and their desire to hold on to the colonial way of life of the nineteenth century, that was the cause of the trouble. Their spirit of exploitation was so deep-

rooted that they sometimes revolted against President de Gaulle, who was trying to save the interests and prestige of France.

41. If the French settlers chose to live in Algeria on a basis of equality with the other citizens, they would find no difficulty. Their case would not be unique, for there were also minorities of European settlers in Tunisia and Morocco, where they were living in dignity and equality. The United Nations Charter, international law, and treaties constituted the best guarantee for the various minorities. After all, those who had been born in Algeria should not consider themselves aliens. Of course, if the Europeans in Algeria wished to be considered Algerians, they should share the life of the other inhabitants of the country, and live in the spirit of solidarity, equality, and equity for all. If they considered themselves Europeans, then they would have duties and responsibilities to the country of their allegiance. The choice was theirs.

42. He deplored the terrorist tactics employed by some French settlers in Algeria. France bore full responsibility for the conditions of violence and insecurity caused by those extremist European elements in Algeria, for it possessed the means to suppress that underground movement. It could make use to that end of some of the half million French soldiers it was maintaining in Algeria. Luckily, in France there was a vast body of liberal thought. It had called the Algerian situation "humiliating"; it knew exactly what role the settlers played, and it considered that the underground activist movement was threatening the republican form of government in France. If France would liberate itself from the pressure of those activists and their lobbyists in Paris, it could help to bring peace to Algeria.

43. Jordan was one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1, which contained nothing controversial, and he hoped that it would be adopted unanimously.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.