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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEM 81

Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/4845, A/C.1/L.298/Rev.1) (*concluded*)

1. Mr. SHATTOCK (United Kingdom) said that he wished to pay a tribute to the Irish Government for its perseverance in seeking to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. The greater the number of countries independently able to start a nuclear war, the greater the risk of its being started through accident, miscalculation or irresponsibility. If, after the Second World War, the Baruch Plan^{1/} had been accepted, the problem would by now have ceased to exist. If a treaty on the suspension of nuclear tests could be concluded, an important step would be taken towards preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. The Irish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.298/Rev.1) afforded another opportunity to prevent the wider diffusion of the control of nuclear weapons. There seemed to be a good chance that agreement could be reached, since the new United States disarmament plan, which the United Kingdom supported, contained similar provisions to those in the draft resolution, as did the most recent Soviet plan, although the formula in the latter was not so satisfactory. It should be realized, however, that the effect of the draft resolution would be to concentrate the power to decide the issues of war and peace even more strongly in the hands of the nuclear Powers, and thus increase their responsibility for preserving peace. The need to remove the danger of war by general and complete disarmament would accordingly be still greater. Until that was done, there would be a great temptation for the non-nuclear Powers to develop their own nuclear weapons as a deterrent against aggression. For those reasons, his delegation would support the draft resolution.

2. Replying to the remarks made by the Ukrainian representative at the previous meeting, he said that the sole purpose of NATO was to preserve peace and security in the North Atlantic Treaty area, for both nuclear and non-nuclear nations. It was a defensive alliance, which was obliged to rely on nuclear as well as conventional weapons. The system for the control of nuclear weapons within the alliance did not en-

courage, but in practice discouraged, the emergence of further independent nuclear capacities.

3. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that the President of the General Assembly and the Chairmen of the Main Committees had decided that in order to speed up the work of the Assembly the right of reply would be granted only at the end of meetings and only for replies relating directly to statements which had been made.

4. Mr. BURNS (Canada) said that his Government attached overriding importance to preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. An increase in the number of countries possessing such weapons would merely aggravate an already dangerous situation. The best way to prevent it would be to conclude appropriate international agreements. Canada had frequently indicated its desire to see measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons included in a comprehensive programme of disarmament, and was glad to note that both the United States and the Soviet Union had introduced such provisions into their respective disarmament plans. His delegation would therefore support the Irish draft resolution (A/C.1/298/Rev.1), and hoped that its adoption would lead to the conclusion of an agreement of the kind mentioned in operative paragraph 1.

5. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand) said that his Government fully shared the desire of the Irish Government to prevent any wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. New Zealand did not possess such weapons and, like most other Member States in that position, had no intention of acquiring them. However, there was no guarantee that some non-nuclear States would not change their position in the future; the ultimate solution to the problem could only be disarmament. But even if the Irish draft resolution did not provide the perfect answer, it did offer a possible and sensible means of action. It should not be very difficult to establish measures of control to prevent the manufacture of nuclear weapons by countries which did not already possess them. An agreement to that end could perhaps be initiated by the non-nuclear Powers themselves. It would be far from easy, however, to prevent the nuclear Powers from transferring weapons to the non-nuclear Powers, in the absence of a comprehensive agreement on nuclear disarmament under international control. His delegation had abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2 because it felt that the value of the inquiry it called for would be reduced by the fact that many countries would be obliged to qualify their replies, if they wished to treat the matter as more than an exercise in political advantage. It had also felt that the Irish draft resolution was a more positive proposal which, while stressing the importance of control, recognized that the main responsibility lay with the nuclear Powers; his delegation would therefore vote for it.

^{1/} See Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, No. 1, 1st meeting, pp. 4-14.

6. Mr. POLDERMAN (Netherlands) said his delegation had on previous occasions argued that as science and technology progressed, the number of countries possessing their own nuclear weapons was likely to increase. That possibility was a danger to peace, and might hinder the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. His delegation was therefore grateful to Ireland for raising the matter once again. It had been unable to support the draft resolution submitted by Ireland at the fifteenth session—which had been adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 1576 (XV)—because that proposal had entailed unilateral moral obligations, had contained no provisions for adequate control and had not laid enough stress on the need for an international agreement. Those defects had been rectified in draft resolution A/C.1/L.298/Rev.1. In particular, a very sensible provision had been added to the effect that information necessary for the manufacture of nuclear weapons should not be transmitted to States not possessing such weapons. His Government felt that the draft resolution offered the best means of limiting the "nuclear club" to the present membership, and would therefore vote for it. It had been unable, on the other hand, to support draft resolution A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2 because it referred to a number of issues which could be dealt with effectively only within the framework of general and complete disarmament. To settle those issues separately, particularly those relating to the storing of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear countries—above all, in Europe—would be at variance with the principle that no State should acquire a military advantage from disarmament.

7. Mr. AL-SHABIBI (Iraq) said his country believed that any further spread of nuclear weapons would further complicate the international situation and increase the danger of nuclear war. No arguments based on national security or the balance of power could justify an enlargement of the "nuclear club". It was because it held those views that his delegation had voted for draft resolution A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3 declaring Africa a denuclearized zone and for draft resolution A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2. In the same spirit it would vote for the Irish draft resolution. But whether or not the aims stated in that proposal were achieved would ultimately depend on the progress made in the various fields of disarmament. If the resolutions he had referred to were not respected, the danger of war would be even greater. In that connexion, he wished to recall that Israel, with the assistance of France, had built an atomic reactor, allegedly for peaceful purposes but in fact for military purposes, as part of its expansionist plans. It was the responsibility of the nuclear Powers to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons and of information pertaining to their manufacture.

8. Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) said that over the preceding three years, while the General Assembly had been discussing ways of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, attempts had been made to increase the membership of the "nuclear club". France had tested its own atom bomb, despite public protests, and could be expected to experiment with thermo-nuclear weapons. At the last two sessions of the NATO Council it had been revealed that plans to supply NATO forces with atomic weapons might be put into effect at any moment. If, as the United States representative had stated at the previous meeting, his country could not under its own law hand over nuclear weapons or information connected with their production to others,

it was difficult to understand why he had voted against draft resolution A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2. During the debate on agenda item 19, the Polish delegation had submitted evidence of the efforts made by the Federal Republic of Germany to obtain nuclear weapons for its army. Since the Federal Republic was committed to a policy of annexing the German Democratic Republic and one-third of Polish territory, there was every reason for alarm. As more and more States acquired nuclear arms and other States felt themselves threatened, a chain reaction would be set up which would be fraught with peril for international peace. According to expert opinions, another twelve States would soon be capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons; eight more were in a position to develop them; and another six had the economic resources, although they lacked scientific knowledge and industrial and labour resources. If that process was not halted, and in particular, if the army of the Federal Republic of Germany was given nuclear weapons, the present chance of achieving an agreement on general and complete disarmament might be ruined. Moreover, the danger of a war caused by accident or folly would be increased. For those reasons, his delegation would support the Irish draft resolution.

9. Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India) recalled that his Government had raised the question now before the Committee on a number of occasions in the past. His delegation therefore welcomed the Irish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.298/Rev.1), although it did not go as far as India would have wished. He regretted, however, that attempts had seemingly been made in the debate to tie the question of the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons to that of general and complete disarmament. But the conclusion of a disarmament treaty would be a long process, and countries would meanwhile be free to develop their atomic resources. He had understood from the Irish representative's statement at the 1208th meeting that the idea was to deal with the spread of nuclear weapons separately; indeed, the Irish representative had even suggested that the nuclear Powers should set up a committee of experts to prepare an agreement, which, after signature, would be submitted for the approval of the United Nations and the accession of the non-nuclear Powers. If some such procedure was not followed, the draft resolution would bear no fruit.

10. One drawback of the draft resolution was that although it would prevent any transfer of control of nuclear weapons, it said nothing about the transfer of the weapons themselves. Thus, it would still allow troops belonging to non-nuclear countries to be trained in the use of such weapons, although control of them would continue to be vested in the present nuclear Powers. In those circumstances, it would not be difficult for the non-nuclear countries to gain physical control of those weapons. But there was no need for the smaller countries to possess nuclear weapons for purposes of national defence. The main use of such weapons was as a deterrent, and those possessed by the nuclear Powers fulfilled that role adequately. While the great Powers alone possessed them, moreover, there was less incentive for other countries to acquire them and thus set off a world-wide nuclear arms race. The matter was urgent, and his delegation would support the Irish draft resolution. Its support should not, however, be interpreted as implying any approval of the continued manufacture or retention of nuclear weapons by the present nuclear Powers. Until they agreed to abolish them, there could be no effective disarmament.

11. Mr. AIKEN (Ireland) said he hoped that the forthcoming negotiations between the nuclear Powers would be as short and unanimous as the present debate. It was becoming more and more urgent to reach agreement on preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons, because of the growing pressure on the nuclear Powers to give such weapons to their allies, and because of the pressure exerted by the military authorities of non-nuclear States on their Governments to equip them with weapons which possible opponents might have. Although the enlightened self-interest of the nuclear Powers might be depended upon to prevent them from giving nuclear weapons to their allies, it might be more dangerous to rely for too long on the resistance to military pressure of the Governments of non-nuclear countries which had the capacity to make nuclear weapons; and it was much easier to stop countries from getting arms than to persuade them to give up arms they possessed.

12. The representative of India had observed that the control referred to in the Irish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.298/Rev.1) was narrower than ownership; in fact it was wider, for under the draft resolution non-nuclear States would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons by ownership or by any other means. He trusted that the nuclear Powers would respond to the unanimous feeling of the Committee and would begin serious negotiations for an international agreement to end the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons.

13. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel), replying to the representative of Iraq, said that nuclear research was being undertaken in many countries, including India, Israel, Iraq and Egypt; but detailed information about that research was available only for Israel. His delegation accepted the nuclear objectives proclaimed by all Governments, in the absence of proof that they did not correspond to the facts. He referred the Committee to his statement of 26 October (1178th meeting), in which he had made it clear that Israel's nuclear research was directed to peaceful purposes alone.

14. Mr. AL-SHABIBI (Iraq), exercising his right of reply, said that in view of Israel's attitude towards United Nations resolutions, the Israel representative's denial could not be taken at its face value. If Israel insisted that its nuclear research was directed to peaceful purposes alone, a United Nations commission should be set up to investigate the situation.

15. The CHAIRMAN said that before putting the Irish draft resolution to the vote, he would call on representatives who wished to explain their votes.

16. Mr. FERNANDEZ (Argentina) said that few draft resolutions had been so warmly or unanimously welcomed as the Irish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.298/Rev.1), which offered the best means of ending the nuclear arms race pending a final agreement on disarmament. He associated himself with the remarks of the United Kingdom representative, and hoped that the draft would be adopted unanimously.

17. Mr. MORALES ADRIAZOLA (Chile) in supporting the Irish draft resolution, which was a constructive step towards removing one of the most serious dangers to the world, deplored the explosion of a nuclear bomb of over 50 megatons.

18. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) said he supported the Irish draft resolution without reservations, but suggested that its third preambular paragraph would be more consistent with the first operative paragraph if

the words "manufacturing them" at the end of the paragraph were replaced by "manufacturing or acquiring them".

19. Mr. AIKEN (Ireland) said that while he had no objection to that suggestion, it would be better to keep to the original text, which had been shown to many delegations.

20. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) was glad to note the support expressed for the Irish draft resolution, and hoped it would be adopted unanimously.

21. The CHAIRMAN said that, in the absence of any objection, the Irish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.298/Rev.1) would be considered as adopted unanimously.

It was so decided.

Order of discussion of agenda items (A/C.1/844, A/C.1/848) (continued)*

22. Mr. RITCHIE (Canada) proposed that, in view of the decision taken at the 1208th meeting to defer consideration of the question of Algeria until 14 December, the First Committee should next take up agenda item 21 (Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space), since that Committee had now produced a unanimous report (A/4987). The matter was one of the Organization's most important responsibilities, and deserved early and thorough consideration.

23. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) proposed that the Committee should first take up agenda item 20 (The Korean question: reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea). His delegation had originally suggested that that item should be discussed after the question of Algeria, but the countries which had originally requested discussion of the latter question had now asked for it to be discussed on 14 December.

24. Discussion of the Korean question was essential, now that the report of the United Nations Commission for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/4900) had been published, since that report revealed the nature of the present South Korean régime, set up on 16 May 1961, which had suppressed all opposition and was treating the South Korean people as chattels. The situation created by the tolerant attitude of the United States and of UNCURK towards that dictatorship was a threat to international peace and security, which should be taken up as soon as possible. He welcomed the Mongolian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.300) on the question. The Soviet delegation did not think the question of outer space unimportant, but there was no reason why it should not be considered in a week's time.

25. Mr. CAMPBELL (United Kingdom) supported the Canadian proposal that the Committee should take up the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Since that Committee had now produced its report (A/4987), there could no longer be any constitutional or formal objection to discussing the item. By referring the Assembly to the verbatim record of its meeting (A/AC.105/OR.1), the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space had passed on for consideration a wide range of substantive proposals. It was important that the First Committee should have time for a thorough study of the issues raised; it would be very unfortunate if the United Nations, by inactivity or failure to agree, should miss

*Resumed from the 1170th meeting.

a new opportunity for valuable international co-operative effort.

26. Mr. OKAZAKI (Japan) said that in deciding on the order of discussion of agenda items, more weight should be given to considerations of urgency and timeliness than to intrinsic importance. The United Nations had already lost two years which might have been spent in organizing international co-operation in the rapidly developing field of space research and exploration; the matter had therefore become urgent. Moreover, the term of office of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was to expire within one month, and action must be taken to extend its mandate. Consequently, Japan believed that the next item for discussion should be that relating to the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

27. Mr. QUAISON-SACKY (Ghana) thought that priority should be given to the outer space item because it would not be controversial and could be disposed of in two or three meetings. Indeed, all the Committee might have to do was to take note of the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and to decide that the Committee should reconvene in 1962, possibly with an expanded membership. On the other hand, the question of Korea had become a cold-war issue and was likely to give rise to lengthy debate.

28. Mr. DE MELO FRANCO (Brazil) said that while his delegation had previously opposed the Committee's giving priority to agenda item 21, the fact that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space had now submitted its report altered the position. Though the report was brief, the verbatim record of the Committee's meeting indicated some measures that might be taken by the First Committee. Brazil would therefore vote to give priority to that item.

29. Mr. ANUMAN RAJADHON (Thailand) said that the question of the peaceful uses of outer space should be the next item taken up by the Committee because in view of present-day developments it was urgent that all the potentialities of outer space should be examined and that a constructive programme should be worked out for its peaceful use. Unless such action was taken, there was a clear danger that attempts to conquer outer space would become irrevocably entangled with the struggle for power.

30. Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) said he saw no reason why the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space should be treated as a matter of urgency. The Committee had met only once in two years, and had produced a purely formal report. Moreover, co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space could be achieved only through agreement between the Soviet Union, which had already launched its first cosmonauts into orbit around the earth, and the United States, which was preparing to do so. In the absence of such agreement, the First Committee could not discuss the item constructively. On the other hand, it was urgent to consider the Korean question because the most recent developments in South Korea raised a danger to peace in the Far East, and because the General Assembly had been unable to deal with the question at the fifteenth session for lack of time. As a first step in its consideration of the Korean question, the Committee, as proposed in the Mongolian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.300), should invite representatives of the two Korean States to participate in the debate.

31. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan), speaking on a point of order, proposed that the list of speakers on the

procedural issue should be closed within ten minutes, that a three-minute time limit should be placed on all statements and that if the procedural debate had not been concluded by 6.30 p.m., the meeting should be adjourned.

32. The CHAIRMAN agreed to the first proposal, but suggested that the time limit on statements should be five minutes, and that the motion for adjournment should be made at the appropriate time. He also urged the Committee to settle the question of the order of the remaining items on its agenda at the present meeting.

33. Mr. TSEVEGMID (Mongolia) supported the Soviet proposal that the Committee should consider the Korean question as the next item on its agenda. The situation in South Korea, where a military coup had been organized with the support of foreign troops and a fascist dictatorship was persecuting the population, called for urgent examination. It was significant that the Western Powers, which had pressed for the earliest possible discussion of the Korean question at a time when they presumably hoped to impose the South Korean régime on the North, had now reversed their position and were seeking to delay public discussion of the arbitrary measures being taken by the reactionary régime now in power. They could no longer invoke the pretext that there was no report of the United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, for there were two such reports before the First Committee, one dating from the previous year (A/4466 and Add.1) which had not yet been considered. They had both been issued before the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and representatives had had ample time to study them. Any delay in the solution of the Korean question, moreover, would bring added suffering to the Korean people and would jeopardize peace and security in the Far East.

34. Mr. BRUCAN (Romania) pointed out that so long as no agreement had been reached between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two Powers responsible for the greatest achievements in outer space, nothing could be gained by discussing the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. On the other hand, the Korean question deserved prompt consideration by the First Committee because recent developments in South Korea were a threat to the peace of the area, and because the United Nations flag was shielding a military dictatorship supported by the United States Army. The situation was such that the world might at any moment be faced with a new military adventure in the Far East. The danger was that what the representative of Ghana had described as a cold-war issue might develop into a hot war. Consequently, the Committee should consider the Korean question as the next item of its agenda.

35. Mr. YOST (United States of America) said that the question of outer space was an urgent matter and should be taken up as the next item on the Committee's agenda. The mandate of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was to expire at the end of the year, and it was of the utmost importance that it should be renewed in order to ensure continuity. Although the Committee had not yet been able to function effectively, the United States intended to promote all efforts to reach agreement with respect to the constructive work that it could and should accomplish. Unless decisions could be taken at the current session to lay the basis for international

co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, national research and development programmes might reach the stage where it would be too late to integrate them into an international scheme. The United States intended to submit a draft resolution which could serve as a basis for the Committee's discussion.

36. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) said that the Committee should not allow itself to be swayed by the various pretexts which the United States was invoking to delay consideration of the Korean question. The United States appeared to have lost interest in Korea, perhaps because the overturn of the régime which had taken place in 1960 had frustrated its plans. Now, however, there had been another coup d'état in South Korea; was the Committee to await still a third coup d'état before considering the Korean question? The situation in South Korea was deteriorating daily under the repressive rule of a military "junta", and United States troops were still present in South Korea. In the interest of world peace, the Committee should consider the Korean question immediately.

37. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand) said that his decision on the question which item the Committee should next take up would be determined by the prospects it offered for contributing constructively to the achievements of the sixteenth session. Although nothing dramatic could be achieved by discussing the peaceful uses of outer space, there might be some gain in doing so, for an agreement to use outer space for peaceful purposes would only increase the security of all nations. While the tenor of the USSR representative's remarks on the subject did not augur well for complete agreement, a serious discussion might lead to some measure of understanding. On the other hand, judging from the approach of the Soviet Union and several other States to the Korean question, the Committee could scarcely hope to make a constructive contribution to the solution of that problem. In the circumstances, New Zealand considered that the wisest course would be to concentrate on the item on outer space as the Committee's next business.

38. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that it was a matter of urgency to

stabilize conditions in the Far East, bring about the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea, restore normal conditions for all the Korean people and achieve the unification of Korea. As disagreements had been expressed, however, he proposed as a compromise that the Committee should now take up only one aspect of the Korean question, the Mongolian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.300) inviting representatives of the two Korean States to take part in the discussion of the Korean question. The Committee could perhaps adopt that resolution on 4 December as a procedural decision; it could then, without waiting for replies from the two Korean States, take up the problem of co-operation in the peaceful use of outer space. When that question had been disposed of, the Committee could pass on to the substance of the Korean question, which could be disposed of by 14 December, when the Algerian question was to be taken up. He appealed to the Canadian representative to withdraw his proposal.

39. Mr. RITCHIE (Canada) said that he could not withdraw his proposal. When the question of invitations to Korean representatives had last been discussed in the Committee, it had led to an endless debate on the substance of the Korean question.

40. The CHAIRMAN asked the Committee to vote on the Canadian proposal that the next item to be considered by the Committee should be agenda item 21 (Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space).

The proposal was adopted by 56 votes to 13, with 16 abstentions.

41. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) proposed that immediately following the consideration of agenda item 21 the Committee should take up agenda item 20 (The Korean question: reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea).

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.