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CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 19: Question of disarmament (<i>continued</i>)	233
Organization of the Committee's work.	235
Agenda item 81: Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons	235

Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEM 19

Question of disarmament (A/4868 and Corr.1, A/4879, A/4880, A/4887, A/4891, A/4892, A/C.1/856, A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2) (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that the debate on the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2) was closed. The Committee would now hear explanations of vote.

2. Mr. PAULSON (Denmark) said that his delegation would vote for the draft resolution, on the understanding that its attitude did not prejudice the Danish Government's position on the substance of the disarmament question, and that the draft was simply an appeal made to Governments in order to ascertain under what conditions countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring them.

3. Mr. OKAZAKI (Japan) thought that the primary responsibility for ensuring the cessation of nuclear weapons tests and for avoiding the further dissemination of nuclear weapons should be borne by the nuclear Powers. If those two measures, in which Japan was deeply interested, were to be effective, they must be carried out with sufficient guarantees against violation and under an international system of inspection and control. The Japanese delegation therefore had some doubts about the effectiveness of a "non-nuclear club". However, it would vote for the eight-Power draft resolution, for it thought that everything possible should be done to promote progress in the field of nuclear disarmament.

4. Nevertheless, measures designed to create a favourable atmosphere for the achievement of general disarmament should be taken with due regard to the security of each nation. The Japanese delegation had therefore been interested to hear the representative of Sweden say (1203rd meeting) that the draft resolution did not aim at establishing a procedure that would alter the balance of power between the two blocs. His delegation hoped that each Member State, in implementing the resolution, would try to understand the

positions of other States in a spirit of calm free from all slogans and propaganda.

5. Mr. YOST (United States of America) said that the United States had probably been the first to recognize the danger of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, which its legislation and policy expressly sought to prevent. In that connexion, he recalled the United States programme for general and complete disarmament (A/4891), particularly paragraph (e) of section C under stage I of that programme.

6. Although the United States delegation appreciated the sincerity of the sponsors of the draft resolution, it did not think that the proposed method was the best. That method touched the very essence of the defensive arrangements that had been made in the present state of world crisis. Any false steps or restrictions that might affect the ability of peaceful States to protect themselves against aggression could only injure the cause of peace and security and make any real progress towards genuine disarmament impossible.

7. The eight-Power draft resolution was more than an authorization for an inquiry: the terms of its fourth preambular paragraph seemed to prejudge the question itself, and in operative paragraph 2 other possibilities were somewhat vaguely proposed, foreshadowing a chain of events with undesirable consequences. By laying stress on the possibility that States without nuclear weapons might receive them from another State, the text would prejudice existing defensive arrangements. Thus the inquiry on that aspect would be academic, since the circumstances that had made defensive agreements necessary must cease to exist before those agreements could be ended. Until general disarmament was achieved, or until the political and military threats finally disappeared, the United States must continue to give its allies the military support they considered necessary for their collective self-defence. The draft resolution seemed to question the right of free nations to join together in collective self-defence, including the right to use nuclear weapons if necessary. For those reasons, the United States delegation would vote against the draft resolution.

8. Lord DUNDEE (United Kingdom) thought it important to seek ways of preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons, so that progress might be made towards an agreement on measures designed to remove the threat of nuclear war.

9. It was true that the questions dealt with in the draft resolution were a part of the disarmament problem, as the representative of Sweden had said at the 1203rd meeting, but they should be dealt with in negotiations on disarmament as a whole, not separately.

10. The United States programme for general and complete disarmament, with which the United Kingdom fully agreed, provided in the first stage for

measures which would not only prevent the nuclear Powers from giving up control of nuclear weapons to countries which did not possess them, but would also oblige them to refrain from giving non-nuclear countries the information needed for the manufacture of such weapons. A similar obligation would be placed on non-nuclear States not to seek control of such weapons or to seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture.

11. The most recent disarmament plan of the Soviet Union also contained provisions on that subject. It was therefore a question which the new disarmament negotiating body should take up, with a view to deciding on measures which could be taken in the first stage of the programme for general and complete disarmament in order to reduce the nuclear threat.

12. The United Kingdom delegation had grave misgivings about the fourth preambular paragraph, which would take one aspect of a programme for general and complete disarmament out of its context. Measures for the creation of nuclear-free zones should be part of a general agreement, not a prelude to it. Otherwise there would be the danger, even before disarmament had begun, of undermining one of the basic principles laid down in the joint statement (A/4879), namely, that all measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain a military advantage and that security was ensured equally for all.

13. Those considerations made it impossible for the United Kingdom delegation to vote for the eight-Power draft resolution.

14. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation was gratified that draft resolution A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2 had been submitted: its sponsors were endeavouring to make some contribution to reducing the danger of a nuclear war.

15. The proposal was framed in very moderate, even weak terms. He wondered why the words "in the future" had been used in the fourth preambular paragraph. If those words were to stand, how could States which now had nuclear weapons on their territory on behalf of another State belong to a non-nuclear world? That observation applied more particularly to the Federal Republic of Germany. Not only did that country now have certain nuclear weapons on its territory, but, according to the London weekly, Tribune, of 24 November 1961, it was on the way to developing a nuclear capacity of its own. Thus, the question arose whether the Federal Republic of Germany would inevitably become a member of the nuclear club. It was a very serious matter for international peace and security.

16. Furthermore, the first preambular paragraph linked prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons with the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, thus implying that a test ban could not be achieved until the objectives of the draft resolution had been fulfilled. That implication was all the more regrettable as the Soviet Union, in its proposal of 27 November 1961 (A/4990), offered the possibility of a permanent and immediate solution of the test-ban problem without awaiting the solution of ancillary questions such as those referred to in the draft resolution.

17. However, despite its flaws, the draft resolution was a small brick in the edifice of disarmament and

a step in the right direction. The USSR delegation would therefore vote for it. It was once again surprised to hear that the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom intended to vote against it. Their negative attitude certainly would not help to create a favourable climate in preparation for negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

18. Mr. BURNS (Canada) fully supported the eight-Power draft resolution. Canada had consistently favoured the adoption of an international agreement on disarmament which would include measures to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. The inquiry called for in the draft resolution would help to clarify national positions on that vital question. Canada believed that the only effective means of preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons was through the adoption of broader international agreements which would be binding on all States.

19. Mr. PAVICEVIC (Yugoslavia) said that he would vote in favour of the draft resolution. Any increase in the number of nuclear Powers would obviously increase the threat to peace and make it more difficult to resolve the problem of disarmament. Moreover, the Yugoslav delegation did not believe that the possession of nuclear weapons was a real guarantee of national security, and its aim, in supporting the idea of establishing a "non-nuclear club", was to prohibit the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and ensure their total destruction. The measures envisaged in the draft resolution would represent a small step in the direction of the final solution of the problem of disarmament. The draft resolution, together with the similar resolutions already adopted, reflected the widely held view that the present situation demanded rapid and radical measures aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament.

20. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) said that he would vote for the draft resolution. The further spread of nuclear weapons must be prevented in order to create the conditions necessary for disarmament. The adoption of the draft resolution would also make it possible to consider the creation of denuclearized zones and thereby to ease the tension which now prevailed in some regions. In that connexion, he recalled that the Bulgarian Government had repeatedly advocated the denuclearization of the Balkans and the Adriatic region. In particular, it had proposed a non-aggression pact between the Balkan countries and an agreement for a substantial reduction of the armed forces of those countries which would bring them down to the level required only for the protection of frontiers; thus, the Balkans would be the first region in which general and complete disarmament had been achieved. It therefore hoped that the other countries of the region—in particular, Turkey and Greece—would also support the draft resolution because it might then be possible to give effect to the denuclearization of the Balkans.

21. The CHAIRMAN put the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2) to the vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Spain, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist

Republic, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia.

Against: Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Portugal.

Abstaining: Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sierra Leone, South Africa.

The draft resolution was adopted by 57 votes to 12, with 32 abstentions.

22. Mr. ANUMAN RAJADHON (Thailand) said that he had voted for the eight-Power draft resolution because he considered that it would not prejudice any present or future negotiations. Furthermore, it was rightly based on the fact that nuclear arms control would determine the success of other disarmament programmes. Although its specific purpose was to prevent the wider spread of nuclear weapons, the measures it envisaged still came within the general framework of disarmament.

23. The delegation of Thailand had been happy to see that there was a wide measure of agreement among members of the Committee in recognizing that war had to be eliminated and that disarmament was a necessity. In view of the complexity of the disarmament problem the only practical approach was a gradual one. The sponsors of the draft resolution had attempted to make such an approach by proposing an initial step that should facilitate the adoption of a disarmament programme.

Organization of the Committee's work

24. Mr. FEKINI (Libya) recalled that the Committee, after its consideration of agenda item 81 (Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons), would come to agenda item 80 (Question of Algeria). That item was undoubtedly the most important political question with which the Committee would have to deal. However, in view of the opinions expressed by the interested parties and the consultations going on among many delegations, it had been suggested that it would be better to delay discussion of the item for a short while in order to encourage progress in the matter. He therefore proposed that consideration of the Algerian item should be deferred until 14 December.

It was so decided.

25. The CHAIRMAN noted that the Committee's next task was to decide upon the order of discussion of the remaining items on its agenda. However, he proposed that consideration of the order of priority should be deferred so that the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland could make a statement on the item submitted by his delegation, namely the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 81

Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/4845, A/C.1/L.298/Rev.1)

26. Mr. AIKEN (Ireland) introduced his delegation's draft resolution (A/C.1/L.298/Rev.1). Like the three other draft resolutions on the question which the Irish delegation had submitted since 1958, and in particular the one adopted at the previous session (General Assembly resolution 1576 (XV)), the new one was designed to prevent the danger of nuclear war becoming greater before a generally accepted system of world security based on international law had been adopted.

27. Although the nuclear Powers had not yet resumed the negotiations called for by the Assembly, they were to be congratulated on having abided by the spirit of the previous resolutions by not transferring control of their nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States. Furthermore, although the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons was not directly mentioned in the joint statement of the two great nuclear Powers (A/4879), it was explicitly recognized in the disarmament proposals put forward by the United States on 25 September 1961 (A/4891) and by the Soviet Union on 26 September 1961 (A/4892), since both envisaged measures to that end in the first phase of disarmament. The measures put forward in both proposals appeared to be identical, which was highly encouraging. It therefore seemed that, as stated in the Soviet memorandum of 26 September, there was at present a possibility of concluding an agreement on the question. It was to be hoped that such an agreement would be concluded without delay.

28. The Irish delegation had explained its position in detail during previous sessions. It would therefore confine itself to appealing to the nuclear Powers to start negotiating immediately, in the manner which appeared to them most appropriate, the agreement called for in operative paragraph 1 of the Irish draft resolution. One way of doing so could be to set up a small committee of experts from those countries to work out a draft agreement for submissions to their own Governments in the first instance. When the agreement had been signed by the nuclear Powers, it would be submitted for the approval of the United Nations and the accession of the non-nuclear Powers.

29. The prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons was certainly no panacea. But the more the number of nuclear Powers increased, the more inevitable would nuclear war become. Since the many world problems which still remained to be solved would require prolonged effort, it was necessary to buy time by settling local conflicts, by reducing the tension between the nuclear Powers and by creating the climate for fruitful negotiations to eliminate the causes of insecurity and war. Conclusion of the agreement proposed in the Irish draft resolution would be an immediate contribution to the attainment of those ends and a good augury for the future.

30. Mr. POPPER (United States of America) said that his country had consistently opposed the spread of nuclear weapons and the means of producing them and had even promulgated laws to that effect. That position had been reaffirmed in the disarmament proposals submitted recently by the Government of the United States (A/4891), which provided for first-stage measures to prevent States from transferring control of nuclear weapons to other countries and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture. Any spread of nuclear arms made their

elimination more difficult and increased the risk of war. For those reasons the United States delegation would vote for the Irish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.298/Rev.1). It hoped that fruitful negotiations on general and complete disarmament would begin in the near future and that it would be possible to reach agreement on specific arrangements to prevent transfers of nuclear weapons.

31. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that he appreciated the efforts made by Ireland to limit the dissemination of nuclear weapons. It was regrettable, however, that the Irish draft resolution did not cover the contingency where one State delivered nuclear weapons to another, while still retaining control over such weapons. In spite of this substantial omission, the adoption of the Irish draft resolution would make some slight progress toward a fuller solution of the disarmament problem.

32. Although general and complete disarmament should be regarded as the decisive means of ensuring a durable peace, the possibility should not be excluded of reaching agreement on a number of measures that could help to reduce international tension and strengthen confidence between States. In its memorandum of 26 September (A/4892), the Soviet Government had proposed a series of measures of that kind. Their implementation would undoubtedly promote general and complete disarmament.

33. The difficulties of solving the problem were constantly increasing, owing primarily to the accumulation of nuclear weapons and to the steady decrease in the cost of making them. Those difficulties would be substantially greater if nuclear weapons were available to twelve States instead of four. While claiming that they were doing exactly the opposite, however, certain nuclear Powers were following a policy that encouraged wider dissemination of such weapons. Since 1957 the United States of America had taken a series of measures that had, in one form or another, assisted the NATO countries in the field of nuclear armament. That development had led, in 1959, to the agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany under which the armed forces of West Germany would be trained in the methods of using nuclear weapons and would be equipped accordingly. At the present time West Germany, a breeding place of militarism and revanchism, was armed with ballistic rockets and other weapons of mass destruction. NATO units were being trained on West German territory in the use of nuclear weapons, while German specialists were undergoing training in the United States. Far from giving up the idea of having nuclear weapons, the Bonn Government, like the Nazi leaders, was demanding equal rights in the field of armaments, and had undertaken an extensive remilitarization programme, under the pretext that there was no disarmament agreement. Chancellor Adenauer had very recently gone so far as to claim that NATO itself should have the right to make decisions on the use of nuclear weapons without first obtaining the consent of the President of the United States.

34. It should be added that, in recent years, the West Germany monopolies had taken steps with a view to the production of atomic power, and 270 enterprises were now working in that field. The Bonn military budget had for some years been allocating substantial amounts for research in nuclear physics. Finally, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany had betrayed

its militaristic aims by rejecting outright the Rapacki plan, by which West Germany would have been included in a denuclearized zone of Central Europe. Consequently, West Germany had become the greatest powder keg of the world.

35. If that state of affairs were considered, the appeal made in the Irish draft resolution would appear particularly timely. The conclusion of an international agreement to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons was all the more necessary in view of the recent decision of the General Assembly that the African continent should be considered a denuclearized zone, and of the fact that the Committee had just adopted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2) which, like the Irish proposal, aimed at restricting the number of States in possession of nuclear weapons. The Ukrainian delegation would unhesitatingly vote for the Irish draft resolution.

36. Mr. POPPER (United States of America), exercising his right of reply, said that the United States and its NATO allies did indeed, for their own protection, dispose of atomic weapons and vehicles for their delivery. These weapons were kept under the control of the United States in a stockpile system that provided the members of NATO with the means of defending themselves against an adversary that was boasting of its rocket potential, announcing the number of bombs it had earmarked for various NATO countries, and openly asserting that it would destroy monuments of Western civilization.

37. As for United States policy towards the Federal Republic of Germany, President Kennedy had very recently emphasized, in an interview granted to a Soviet journalist, that West Germany was not a military threat to the USSR, since it had only nine divisions, all under NATO command, a very small air force, and two or three submarines. President Kennedy had reaffirmed that the United States would not furnish nuclear weapons to any country, and that it had no desire whatever to see the Federal Republic of Germany become a nuclear power. He had said that no one was going to invade the Soviet Union again. The problem was to make an agreement which would recognize the interests of both sides.

38. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) was happy to note that none of the facts he had mentioned had been denied by the representative of the United States. Those facts had, moreover, been published in official United States documents.

39. The interview with President Kennedy contained interesting statements of principle, which, in so far as they were the expression of the present policy of the United States, should be noted with satisfaction.

40. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) congratulated the Irish delegation for taking account of suggestions made in previous years and for submitting an improved draft resolution at the present session. That draft resolution should be unanimously adopted.

41. The proposal submitted by Ireland at the fifteenth session, which had been adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 1576 (XV), had raised a certain juridical doubt in his delegation, since it had imposed obligations on the assumption that all parties would be of good faith, and would scrupulously fulfil all their undertakings. But the mutual distrust prevailing in the international community prevented the General Assembly from imposing international obligations that

were not coupled with guarantees for their implementation.

42. The present draft resolution (A/C.1/L.298/Rev.1) recognized the necessity for an international agreement, subject to inspection and control, to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. The Irish proposal would add extremely important articles to those of the general agreement on disarmament that would normally result from the negotiations shortly to be resumed.

43. Another useful feature of the Irish draft resolution was that it recognized that the dominant idea at the present time was that of control. The world of today

was characterized by the transition that was taking place from an international order based on equilibrium to an order in which international co-operation would impose a number of obligations without impairing the sovereignty of States. An international authority would be simply superposed upon that sovereignty without any domination, by the will of the State itself. The nuclear problem, in particular, was making it necessary for humanity to pursue its evolution by accepting international control.

44. For those reasons, the Peruvian delegation would vote for the draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.