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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

In the absence of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Enckell (Finland), Rapporteur, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 19

Question of disarmament (A/4868 and Corr.1, A/4879, A/4880, A/4887, A/4891, A/4892, A/C.1/856, A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2) (continued)

1. Mr. WEI (China) emphasized that the development of effective machinery for the maintenance of peace must accompany the implementation of a disarmament programme. Each stage of disarmament should be so balanced that its execution would consolidate security in general and would give no State or group of States any military advantage over the others. Those essential principles had been recognized in the joint statement of the United States and the Soviet Union (A/4879).

2. A disarmament programme could be put into effect only if it were coupled with effective international control. But, during the past fifteen years, the attitude of the Soviet Union had been the principal stumbling-block to agreement on disarmament. In spite of certain conciliatory statements by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, and by the representatives of the USSR in the Committee, the Soviet position did not appear to have changed. It was that the international control organ should confine itself to verifying the destruction of armaments and the disbandment of military personnel, and that it would be espionage to attempt to procure information on the remaining stockpiles, on the manufacturing facilities, and on the military personnel retained in service or freshly recruited. That argument was absurd, for it was not what was discarded, but what still remained, that was important for disarmament. In that respect, the United States programme was more realistic than that of the Soviet Union.

3. The peoples of the world would rather see a concrete beginning of disarmament than listen to talk about some distant ideal of general and complete disarmament. While the diplomats were holding their conferences, science and technology were making headlong advances, and there was danger that measures agreed on today would be obsolete when the time came to put them into practice. In that respect there was reason for satisfaction that the joint statement provided for carrying out some initial disarmament

measures. Thanks to the efforts of the General Assembly, the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests was to resume its sittings. It was also important to consider, as a priority matter, the means of preventing the use of outer space for the arms race.

4. His delegation hoped that the General Assembly would adopt the principles contained in the joint statement as the basis for future disarmament negotiations. It also hoped that the Soviet Union would show, during those negotiations and in the resumed conference on nuclear testing, that it sincerely adhered to the principles of that statement.

5. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) felt that, in spite of the attempts of those who were unwilling to do away with the aftermath of the Second World War and opposed peaceful coexistence, the chances of making progress in disarmament were greater than they had been the previous year. The two Powers mainly concerned had agreed on the principles that should govern future negotiations for general and complete disarmament, and they were now seeking agreement for joint submission of a draft resolution on those principles and on the composition of the negotiating body. All were agreed that no dispute could be settled by war, that the arms race was one of the essential sources of international tension, and that general and complete disarmament was now no longer a utopian but a concrete goal.

6. The President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, had recently said in the General Assembly (1013th plenary meeting) that the reduction and destruction of arms was no longer a dream. The programme of general and complete disarmament presented by the USSR (A/C.1/856) went further and bore the stamp of the deepest political realism. It was based on the principle that disarmament and peaceful coexistence constituted a categorical imperative. But it was obvious that the threat of war could not be eliminated if the parties still retained weapons of mass destruction, and if the policy of the "balance of terror" were still maintained. Disarmament was thus the only way to eliminate the danger of war once and for all. The joint statement of agreed principles (A/4879) was founded on that conviction. The value of those general principles should not be over-estimated; the important thing was their interpretation and incorporation into a treaty of general and complete disarmament.

7. Neither the Committee nor the General Assembly was in a position to analyse in detail the programmes for general and complete disarmament that had been submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States. That would be the task of the future negotiating body. In the opinion of the Polish delegation, the Soviet proposals provided a comprehensive plan that should serve as the point of departure for the forthcoming negotiations. In particular, the destruction of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, as had once

been proposed by France,^{1/} was an essential measure, for it would immobilize the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and avert the danger of a surprise attack or a war by miscalculation. Moreover, the radical measures provided for the first stage of the Soviet plan would be a solid foundation for the second stage, namely, the destruction of the stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction.

8. The United States plan (A/4891) provided certain measures for the first stage which, however, could not ensure swift and comprehensive progress. Partial reductions could not be regarded as effective, for stockpiles were so great that the mere cessation of the production of fissionable materials and the elimination of certain types of rockets and aircraft could not at all diminish the potential of the great Powers. In the second stage, the United States programme provided only a further reduction in the number of nuclear weapons vehicles. Under such conditions, disarmament might take many years.

9. In contrast to what the Western Powers were saying, the socialist countries desired the strictest possible control. No disarmament without control: that was the formula to which they unreservedly subscribed. The Soviet programme provided for control and inspection from the very first stage, as well as after attainment of general and complete disarmament. In contrast to what Mr. Stevenson had said, control and inspection would cover all essential fields of military life, from the very first stage, to an extent commensurate with the measures of disarmament carried out. His delegation could not accept the argument of the Peruvian representative that control should precede actual disarmament.

10. The socialist countries wanted rapid and effective disarmament, and not control of armaments. But the notion of control over armaments was clearly discernible in the new United States plan. In the circumstances, control of the potential of States to make war could not avert war; on the contrary, it might encourage surprise attack, since the potential aggressor might avail himself of the data thus obtained in order to launch out into war.

11. Moreover, the Western countries were basing their proposals on the prevailing mistrust between East and West without realizing that so long as States possessed weapons of mass destruction, a broad system of control could only increase fears. That contradiction could only be removed by embarking without delay on general and complete disarmament, in which measures of control and inspection would keep pace with measures of disarmament.

12. The new United States plan (A/4891) contained some new points as compared with the proposals submitted by the Eisenhower Administration on 27 June 1960.^{2/} It was to be hoped that on the basis of the principles agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union, constructive negotiations could be held within the new negotiating body under consideration, which should include representatives of the non-aligned Powers.

13. During the negotiations for a treaty on general and complete disarmament, diverse measures could be taken, without delay, to curb the arms race and

diminish the threat of war. The Soviet memorandum of 26 September 1961 (A/4892) contained an impressive list of such measures. Two important resolutions had already been adopted by the General Assembly at the current session, one on the establishment of a de-nuclearized zone in Africa (resolution 1652 (XVI)), the other on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (resolution 1653 (XVI)). The Committee also had before it an Irish draft resolution on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.298), and the Polish delegation had welcomed with great interest the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2). With regard to the statement recently made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, he stressed the urgency of taking concrete and swift action in regions which, for military and political reasons, were of crucial importance for world peace.

14. German imperialism was on the rise in West Germany and the Bundeswehr was once again becoming the strongest army in western Europe. The proof was the launching of the first German submarine, the equipment of the Bundeswehr with guided missiles and the fact that Bonn was openly demanding nuclear warheads, all as a result of the growing influence of the revenge-seeking forces in the Federal Republic of Germany. In the circumstances, the threat to European security became a tangible reality to the countries whose chance of peaceful development hinged on the stabilization of Europe.

15. The Polish plan to create an atom-free zone in Central Europe, which had been presented to the General Assembly as early as 1957,^{3/} was designed to strengthen Europe's security. In 1958, Poland had submitted a modified version of that plan, known as the Rapacki plan, in order to meet the objections of the Western countries. As the plan envisaged measures affecting nuclear armaments, it was related to both disarmament and the German question. It might serve as a pilot plan for the application of disarmament measures and control in a relatively limited area and it might help to create favourable conditions for a solution of the whole German question. The Polish plan was as effective as ever. It enjoyed the unanimous support of the Polish people and of all the socialist countries. Judging by the debate in the Committee, and in particular the statement of the Swedish representative, it continued to interest other countries as well, despite the opposition of certain Western Powers.

16. The General Assembly should accept without delay the principles agreed upon between the United States and the Soviet Union, and decide upon the composition of the negotiating body. The constructive attitude of the Assembly should create a favourable atmosphere for the resumption of disarmament negotiations.

17. Mr. EDBERG (Sweden) expressed satisfaction that the great Powers had decided to resume negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests and was happy to note their efforts to agree on the creation of a new body for disarmament negotiations. He emphasized the importance of the joint statement of the United States and the Soviet Union (A/4879) and of the plans submitted by the two countries respectively (A/4891 and A/C.1/856). Of course, there were still differences of view between East and West, particularly with respect to control and inspection, but it was to be hoped that the negotiations would be resumed with the conviction that another failure might be fatal.

^{1/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 70, document A/C.1/821.

^{2/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1960, document DC/154.

^{3/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, Plenary Meetings, 697th meeting, para. 136.

According to many experts, the fact that the two sides possessed weapons with which they could destroy each other totally should deter them from launching a nuclear war. But that was a precarious guarantee because no warning system was wholly perfect and if, through a miscalculation, a false alarm were sounded, there would be a catastrophe. Furthermore, the spreading of nuclear weapons to more and more States would increase the risk of accidental war and the risk that such weapons would be used in a local war. As the Commonwealth Prime Ministers had pointed out in their statement of 17 March 1961 (A/4868 and Corr.1), and the Government of the USSR had also observed in its memorandum of 26 September 1961 (A/4892), the danger of war would be substantially increased if additional countries were to come into possession of nuclear weapons. It was those risks that had induced the sponsors to submit draft resolution A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2, which had been introduced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden at the 1196th meeting.

18. If disarmament negotiations were resumed, they would probably last some time. Additional steps should therefore be taken, such as, for example, the creation of a "non-nuclear club" to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons pending the conclusion of more comprehensive disarmament agreements. That proposal was not intended to alter the balance of forces between the two blocs. Its actual aim was to reduce the risk of war outside the sphere of action of the present nuclear Powers. In that respect, it was similar to the idea of atom-free zones.

19. The first practical step taken with regard to the creation of such zones had been the conclusion of a treaty relating to the Antarctic.^{4/} Moreover, the Committee had recently adopted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3) calling upon all Member States to consider the continent of Africa as a de-nuclearized zone. During the debate on that draft resolution, several delegations had withheld their support because it referred only to one area of the world. In particular, many Latin American delegations had pointed out that its provisions ought to be extended to the whole world. The eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2) had such a universal aim in view. It was based on an idea similar to that underlying the Irish draft resolution on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.298). The Swedish delegation hoped that several non-nuclear countries, including India and Cambodia, would be ready to accept unconditionally the three undertakings set forth in the last preambular paragraph of the eight-Power draft resolution. Other countries might want to attach certain conditions to the draft resolution since circumstances varied in different areas of the world. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden had explicitly recognized the importance of those reservations in his statement at the 1196th meeting.

20. The inquiry suggested in the draft resolution should provide the Disarmament Commission with valuable information. It might even be appropriate for a sub-committee of that Commission to make a closer study of the replies of Governments. On the whole, he believed it to be advisable to assign the study of many questions to sub-committees, groups of experts or working groups. In fact, a good many matters relating to disarmament could be dealt with separately, particularly those which were urgent or

raised special technical questions. The Swedish delegation had recommended earlier^{5/} that experts appointed by Governments should tackle technical questions in order to use to advantage the time which would elapse before the political negotiations could produce any result. The Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada had expressed the same opinion at the 1202nd meeting. The question of the economic consequences of disarmament was already under special study by a working group of the Economic and Social Council. Moreover, the French proposal for a controlled destruction of the principal means of delivery of nuclear weapons before reaching the critical point beyond which destruction and control would become difficult, if not impossible, also warranted a technical study.

21. With regard to control and inspection, the distinction between controlled disarmament and controlled armaments seemed to be partly artificial. The problem could not be reduced to such simple terms, particularly as it would be impossible ever to arrive at a completely watertight control system. That being so, the foremost consideration must be to create guarantees against surprise attack. Besides, reconnaissance satellites would soon permit the setting up of a system of inspection without previous agreement. It should therefore be possible to approach the whole question of controls from a fresh starting-point.

22. Lastly, he pointed out that the collective fear of the dangers involved in the use of nuclear weapons was a uniting agent. But a solution must be found quickly, as there was little time to lose in averting the threatening destruction, but a whole future to win.

23. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) read out a statement of his Government dated 27 November 1961 concerning the resumption of the Geneva negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests (A/4990).

24. In that statement, the Soviet Government declared that general and complete disarmament was now the only possible salvation for mankind. The Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, after analysing every aspect of the international situation, had stated its conviction that the preservation of peace was a feasible task. If the decision had depended on the Soviet Union alone, the problem of disarmament would have been solved long ago. Armies would have been disbanded, stockpiles of weapons would have been eliminated and their production would have been stopped. Unfortunately, in view of the military preparations and threats of NATO, the USSR had had to consider its security and that of all peace-loving States. Sooner or later, however, the Western Powers—if they were not bent on self-destruction—would have to consent to general and complete disarmament. The joint statement of agreed principles (A/4879) gave ground for some hope, and could serve as the basis for a decision of the General Assembly on the resumption of negotiations on the whole question of disarmament. Agreement on general and complete disarmament would remove the difficulties surrounding control, for in a disarmed world, States would no longer fear that control might be used for espionage purposes. Such an agreement would also solve the question of nuclear weapons tests, because such weapons would no longer exist.

^{5/} See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, First Committee, 1097th meeting, para. 28.*

^{4/} Antarctic Treaty, signed at Washington, D.C. on 1 December 1959.

25. In order to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union was ready to use all means which might bring the attainment of that goal nearer. For that reason, it had agreed to resume the Geneva negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. However, in order to avoid another deadlock, the Soviet Government proposed to the Western Powers that an agreement should immediately be concluded to prohibit tests in the atmosphere, under water or in outer space, since those were the environments where, as the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom themselves agreed, the fulfilment of obligations could be verified by technical devices already in the possession of States. In regard to underground tests, States ought to undertake to carry out no such tests until agreement was reached on a system of control over underground explosions as part of a programme of general disarmament.

26. The success of Geneva negotiations would be greatly facilitated if States abstained from all nuclear testing while talks continued. The Soviet Government, although it had carried out considerably fewer nuclear weapons tests than the Western Powers, was prepared to give such an undertaking. Since it was important to ensure that no member of NATO could continue its tests while its allies were taking part in the negotiations, the time had come to include France in the negotiations. Obviously, if any of the Western Powers, including France, started to carry out nuclear tests, the Soviet Union would be compelled to draw the appropriate inferences.

27. In order to guide the Geneva negotiations on a practical course, the Soviet Government had prepared a draft agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, which it submitted to the Western Powers for examination. It was confident that its proposals provided a real opportunity for the prompt achievement of agreement, and would help to create a favourable atmosphere for the solution of the problem of disarmament, the relaxation of international tension, and the strengthening of peace. According to the draft agreement, States parties would solemnly undertake not to conduct tests of any kind of nuclear or thermo-nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space, or under water; to use their own national systems of detection for the purpose of supervision of compliance with that undertaking; and not to conduct any underground tests until they had agreed together on a system of control over such tests as an integral part of a system of control of general and complete disarmament as a whole. The agreement would be signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR and France, would enter into force immediately after its signature by the four parties, and would be open to accession by all States.

28. Mr. POPPER (United States of America) said that the Soviet proposals had not yet been officially communicated to his delegation. However, he recalled that before making those proposals and agreeing to resume the Geneva negotiations, the USSR, violating the moratorium declared by the General Assembly, had begun a series of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests of unprecedented power and radio-active potential. The United States delegation hoped that at Geneva the Soviet Union would continue to work for the conclusion of a treaty to discontinue nuclear weapons tests under effective international control.

29. Mr. SHATTOCK (United Kingdom) agreed with the United States representative, and repeated his Government's view that the way to solve the problem of nuclear tests was to conclude a treaty providing for effective international control.

30. Mr. DIALLO Telli (Guinea) said that the present extreme international tension made a settlement of the question of disarmament urgent, as the participants in the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in September 1961, had declared. In that connexion, the Guinean delegation noted with satisfaction that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed on the principles which should guide negotiations on general and complete disarmament. That agreement (A/4879) was particularly encouraging because it related not only to the goal itself, but to important questions such as the peaceful settlement of disputes by an appropriate United Nations organ, through the creation of an international peace force; specific disarmament measures and the general procedures for achieving them; the need for strict international control; and the urgent need to reach a general agreement on that vital question. That was why, in spite of the remaining differences of opinion, the Committee should take note of the various points of agreement and should encourage the resumption of negotiations.

31. One of the points on which the United States and the Soviet Union still had to agree was the place of negotiation. That disagreement seemed to be of minor importance. Geneva, Vienna, Washington, Moscow or New York might be suitable, although a non-aligned country or a neutral place would offer better prospects of success.

32. The only essential preliminary condition seemed to be agreement on the composition of the negotiating body. In that connexion, he recalled that the participants in the Belgrade Conference had stated in their final Declaration that the non-aligned countries should be represented at all future disarmament conferences. That was essential if they were to be effective, and was a matter of justice. Moreover, the introduction of new participants, who were free of all prejudice and particularly concerned for the maintenance of international peace and security, was the best way, and perhaps the only way, to make a constructive fresh start in disarmament negotiations. In any event, it seemed that the United States and the Soviet Union, in spite of their apparent differences, agreed that the participation of the non-aligned countries was essential.

33. The only other disagreement related to the parity of representation of the non-aligned countries. The Guinean delegation thought that they should be given the greatest possible representation, both qualitatively and quantitatively, since the representatives of the non-aligned countries, by their presence, their balance, their objectivity and their sincerity, would help to bring about a rapid reconciliation between the views of the United States and the Soviet Union so as to lead the negotiations to a successful conclusion. It was therefore desirable that the two parties should agree on the composition of the negotiating body as soon as possible, and certainly before the end of the present session. In that connexion, the Guinean delegation was glad that draft resolution A/C.1/L.299 and Add.1 had been adopted.

34. The essential goal of disarmament was, of course, the outlawing of war as a means of settling international

disputes. To that end, a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control must be prepared and signed, so that mankind might be saved from the scourge of war and so that the resources at present devoted to the manufacture of armaments might be used for the peaceful economic and social development of the entire world. Such general and complete disarmament must clearly include the abolition of armed forces, of armaments, of foreign bases, of the manufacture of armaments and of military training institutions and installations, with the exception of those acknowledged to be necessary to States for maintaining law and order and for the personal safety of their citizens. It must also entail the absolute prohibition of the production, possession and use of nuclear or thermo-nuclear weapons, of bacterial or chemical weapons and of any installation for the launching, stockpiling or operational use of weapons or devices of mass destruction. Such a programme would obviously be incomplete without the cessation of military expenditure and the abolition of war ministries and of all institutions for organizing the military power of States. It was also agreed that such disarmament would have to be carried out in stages, effected progressively through balanced measures based on a systematic process whose implementation would be subject to control and inspection by an international disarmament organization set up within the framework of the United Nations. Lastly, once general and complete disarmament had been accomplished, no State should be in a position to disturb international peace and security, which would from then on be safeguarded by a United Nations peace force having at its disposal armed forces, establishments and resources determined by common accord.

35. The disarmament programme required the participation of all States. It was therefore urgently necessary for the United Nations to attain full universality by admitting as Members all nations arbitrarily excluded from it, in particular the People's Republic of China, whose agreement was essential to any disarmament programme. There could be no disarmament without effective control, and no United Nations organ could exercise the slightest control in a State that was not a Member.

36. There was one other basic condition required for general and complete disarmament, namely decolonization. The spirit of conquest, domination and exploitation, on which every colonial enterprise was based, could not be reconciled with the requirements of general and complete disarmament. No Power engaged in a colonial adventure could accept real disarmament, which would mean the inevitable liquidation of its unlawful possessions. Colonization, being

an act of force, could be maintained only by force of arms; and, in self-defence, the peoples subjected to colonization could not forgo the use of force to regain their freedom. If disarmament was to be achieved, it was therefore essential that colonialism should first be liquidated. That was why the adoption by the General Assembly at its fifteenth session of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (resolution 1514 (XV)) was an essential stage in the improvement of international relations, and one which would be favourable to disarmament.

37. The implementation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament would be a matter of exceptional importance, and such a treaty should therefore be prepared with the greatest possible care. The participants in the Belgrade Conference had accordingly suggested that a special session of the General Assembly or, better still, a world conference organized under United Nations auspices should be convened in order to set in motion the process of general and complete disarmament. Though the great Powers had special responsibilities in that field, it was none the less true that anything to do with international peace and security concerned all States without exception. For that reason the participants in the Belgrade Conference had declared that the non-aligned countries should participate, not only in the disarmament negotiations, but also in all the control organs set up by a general disarmament treaty.

38. The Guinean delegation was pleased to hear that negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests were to be resumed and was glad that at the current session the General Assembly had adopted resolutions concerning a moratorium on atomic tests (resolution 1648 (XVI)), the condemnation of the use of any atomic or thermo-nuclear weapons (resolution 1653 (XVI)) and the need to consider Africa as a completely de-nuclearized zone (resolution 1652 (XVI)). It regarded their adoption as minor victories paving the way for general and complete disarmament and justifying his delegation in its conviction that the hope of a world without armaments or war was no longer chimerical. It was for the United Nations to deliver the world from the danger of annihilation that hung over it. The Guinean delegation, for its part, was determined to shoulder all its responsibilities in that matter, and it intended to support any impartial action and any serious proposal for first speeding the resumption of negotiations and then implementing a decisive programme of general and complete disarmament under the best conditions for all concerned.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.