

# United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SIXTEENTH SESSION

Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 1201st  
MEETING

Wednesday, 22 November 1961,  
at 8.50 p.m.

NEW YORK

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**Chairman:** Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

## AGENDA ITEM 19

Question of disarmament (A/4868 and Corr.1, A/4879, A/4880, A/4887, A/4891, A/4892, A/C.1/856, A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1) (*continued*)

1. Mr. KALONJI (Congo, Leopoldville) considered that the two plans for general and complete disarmament submitted respectively by the United States and the Soviet Union were both satisfactory. In addition, he noted that it had been proposed that negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests should be resumed on 28 November and that the Disarmament Commission should reconvene not later than 14 December 1961. As those two dates were rapidly approaching, urgent action was called for in the much-neglected question of the participation of the small States. Indeed, those States could play a very useful role as arbitrators if the two blocs agreed to their attending the discussions not merely as observers but as participants. The small States could play an important part, for they represented a conciliating factor and some of them were suppliers of products that were used in the manufacture of nuclear bombs.

2. The time limit of three or four years to which reference had been made was much too long. A solution must be found forthwith if mankind was to be saved and the steadily mounting fear, tension and distrust dispelled. It would be tragic if the world lost confidence in the United Nations, but that was likely to happen if talk was not followed by resolute action. His delegation accordingly appealed to the great Powers to forget their ideological differences and to come to an agreement in order to save mankind.

3. Mr. MATSUI (Japan) said that he wished to believe that there was a general desire for disarmament, since such a desire was a minimum basis for any progress towards disarmament. The resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union was therefore particularly regrettable and had cast doubt on its sincerity with regard to disarmament. On the other hand, the Soviet Union did not cease to accuse the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries of an aggressive intent and a desire to pursue the arms race indefinitely. Although all States were committed to general and complete disarmament, the gap between that lofty ideal and reality was based on distrust and was apt to become dangerous if no means were found for dealing with it suitably. The Japanese delegation had been impressed by the courage of the Minister

for External Affairs of Ireland when he had said in the First Committee (1096th meeting) at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly that the present generation would have to learn to live with nuclear bombs and gradually build up the rule of law without being duped by slogans which concealed the difficulties. His reasoning had been that the nuclear Powers would not give up their weapons so long as there was no way of detecting their stores of weapons.

4. The difficulty, not to say impossibility, of controlling nuclear weapons stockpiles had changed the trend of disarmament negotiations since 1955, and it was for that reason that it must now be asked how the problem of verification or control of the destruction of such stockpiles was to be handled. In that connexion, the two disarmament plans submitted by the United States (A/4891) and the Soviet Union (A/C.1/856) provided for that question to be the subject of joint studies in the first stage of the plan. The Japanese delegation sincerely hoped that such joint studies would be successful in leading to a solution of the touchy problem of verification and control or at least to some means of circumventing the difficulty, such as the control and elimination of means of delivery of nuclear weapons, to which emphasis had been given in recent disarmament proposals.

5. Although the achievement of general and complete disarmament gave rise to many difficulties, it was encouraging to note that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed on the principles which should govern disarmament negotiations (A/4879) and had reached a compromise concerning the time limit for carrying out a programme of general and complete disarmament. In addition, the Soviet Union had accepted the principle that during and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament the most thorough control should be exercised. His delegation felt that if serious studies of concrete methods of control of each disarmament measure were undertaken on the basis of that agreed principle, the difficulties inherent in the question of control would be overcome.

6. Despite the existing agreement concerning the principles which should govern disarmament negotiations, differences of opinion had become apparent during the general debate, owing mainly to distrust between the parties. In order to restore confidence, therefore, it was imperative that such disarmament measures as could at present be applied with effective control should be adopted without further delay. Such a course, the United States and the Soviet Union had themselves recognized, was not in any way incompatible with the notion of general and complete disarmament. Among those initial measures, the most important was the cessation of nuclear weapons tests and the prompt conclusion of a treaty to ban such tests under effective international control. Such a treaty would provide valuable experience on the institution

of an effective international control system and would make it possible to envisage the future progress of disarmament negotiations with confidence by greatly reducing the distrust which had resulted in particular from the resumption of nuclear tests. An encouraging sign in that connexion was the fact that the Soviet Union was ready to resume the Geneva negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. It was to be hoped that the parties would resume the negotiations in good faith so as to achieve prompt results.

7. As pointed out in the joint statement (A/4879), it was important for States to refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions and to seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means in order to strengthen the confidence indispensable for an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Nevertheless, it was no good thinking that the task would be easy; above all it would be essential to avoid any enthusiasm created by slogans that concealed the difficulties and to be prepared to face reality courageously.

8. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) was pleased to note that the Soviet Union and the United States had agreed on certain principles which should govern the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, for only through the adoption of a programme of general and complete disarmament, providing in its first stage for a substantial reduction in the armaments of States, could the danger of a nuclear war be averted. That was precisely what was provided for in the programme proposed by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/856) which, from the very beginning, would make it possible to stop the armaments race and to eliminate the possibility of a surprise attack, thus greatly reducing the danger of war. In addition, the radical nature of the measures contemplated at the outset and their progressive implementation under the strictest kind of international control offered a guarantee that general and complete disarmament, once initiated, would go forward as an irreversible process. The adoption of the Soviet programme would therefore have a favourable effect on the international situation by reducing or even eliminating tension and by finally banishing the danger of war.

9. Everyone was impatiently awaiting the resumption of negotiations on general and complete disarmament. To judge, however, from the reservations expressed by the United States concerning the principles set out in the joint statement and from the disarmament programme which it had proposed (A/4891), it would seem that that country and the other members of NATO had not yet abandoned the negative attitude which had so far hindered the progress of the negotiations. In the United States programme, no provision was made for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction or the means for delivering them until the third stage. In other words, such action was relegated to a very vague future, whereas even the representative of France had recognized the absolute need for such measures to be taken in the first stage of a programme of general and complete disarmament. The United States plan also provided that during the second stage the stocks of nuclear weapons should be progressively reduced to the minimum levels which could be agreed upon. That meant that even when the programme had been adopted the danger of nuclear attack would continue to be present, at least during the first two stages. The danger of nuclear war could be banished only through the elimination of all means of delivering

nuclear weapons, the liquidation of foreign military bases and the prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons. It was therefore imperative that such measures should be adopted at the very beginning of a plan for general and complete disarmament. Reductions affecting nuclear weapons stocks and the means of delivering nuclear weapons would not be sufficient to prevent a nuclear attack and would create a false sense of security.

10. It was against the background of those features of the United States plan that the reservations expressed by the United States Government regarding paragraph 6 of the principles agreed on by the United States and the Soviet Union in their joint statement (A/4879) appeared in their true light; that paragraph provided that the nature and extent of such control would depend on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. The spacing out of the nuclear disarmament measures, as provided in the United States plan, meant in practice that it was impossible to eliminate nuclear weapons, since their destruction was made dependent on acceptance of arms control. That provision was therefore in contradiction with the steps provided for in paragraph 3 of the principles enunciated in the joint statement. In that respect, his delegation agreed with the French representative, who had stated at the preceding meeting that it was urgently necessary to begin nuclear disarmament by taking effective steps for real disarmament. Without effectiveness, the measures provided for in the two first stages of the United States plan were only more or less camouflaged attempts to establish arms control, which States could not accept, since such control was the exact opposite of disarmament and might precipitate a nuclear war. Arms control was in fact only a convenient means by which war-mongering circles could obtain the military information needed to carry out their aggressive plans.

11. Those dubious proposals of the United States concerning general and complete disarmament, taken together with the intensification of war propaganda, the enormous increase in military expenditure, the concentration of particularly dangerous weapons at the most sensitive points of the globe, such as West Germany and West Berlin, and in the network of United States military bases round the peace-loving States, and the preparations for a new invasion of the Republic of Cuba, made it clear that United States policy continued to be swayed by certain war-mongering circles whose influence had been recognized by President Eisenhower and President Kennedy themselves. That being so, the peace-loving international community must intensify its efforts to bar the road to war, to obtain explanations during the negotiations and to make progress towards the completion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV).

12. The Committee could facilitate that task by speaking out in favour of the principles already agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union and by helping to establish the negotiating body. It had before it an equitable proposal for that purpose based on equal representation of the socialist States, the Western States and the non-aligned States. Contrary to the statements of the United States and its allies, that representation was wholly in accordance with reality since it corresponded to the real division of the contemporary world. In any case, his delegation could not agree that, as the United States proposed,

two or three other countries belonging to the Western alliances should be included in the negotiating body as a counterpart to the admission of a number of non-aligned countries. That, in fact, was the gist of the United States proposal in document A/4880 that ten other countries, the choice of which was highly significant, should be added to the Ten-Nation Committee. It was to be hoped that the Western Powers would desist from obstructing an agreement on the composition of the negotiating body. The establishment of such a body would ensure that the negotiations would take place in more favourable conditions than in the past. The Romanian Government, for its part, was prepared to take part in the negotiations on the preparation and adoption of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a framework consistent with the aims set forth by the General Assembly in resolution 1378 (XIV) and in which the chief interest and political tendencies of the present-day world would be represented.

13. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) considered that the world was now faced with a choice between peace through disarmament and the nuclear war to which the arms race was leading. At a time when people were anxiously wondering who was pushing the world towards the abyss and obstructing the road to peaceful coexistence, his delegation had no desire to inflame passions in the Committee, especially after the unanimous adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/L.299 and Add.1 requesting the Soviet Union and the United States of America to reach agreement on a negotiating body before the end of the sixteenth session.

14. The Soviet Union had submitted a programme of general and complete disarmament because in the present circumstances no half measure could avert the threat of a nuclear war. The purpose of the programme was to ensure peace by the complete destruction, under strict international control, of all the means of waging war. It was therefore not surprising that the peoples of the world saw in that programme the means for consolidating world peace.

15. Unfortunately, as post-war history showed, the United States and its allies were opposed to disarmament. At the fifteenth session, the representatives of the Western Powers had not wanted the General Assembly to approve specific directives for the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. In order to conceal their hostility to disarmament, they had sought to create the impression that the dispute concerned the means to be employed. At present the prospects were more encouraging: the Soviet Union and the United States had agreed on the fundamental principles on which negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be based. Those principles included certain ideas expressed at the fifteenth session in the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.259 and Add.1-2). At that time the draft resolution had been opposed by the United States, which had considered that it would tie the hands of the negotiating parties. They also included some of the ideas in the Soviet draft resolution submitted at the fifteenth session (A/C.1/L.249).

16. While welcoming the agreement which had been reached, he was sorry that it represented only a minimum. In particular, he regretted the attitude of the United States and its allies, which recently, far from contributing to the establishment of a political

and psychological atmosphere favourable to disarmament negotiations, had accentuated the cold war and the war hysteria regarding the peace treaty with Germany. It was impossible to disregard the paradoxical situation in which the United States and the United Kingdom stated, on the one hand, that they sincerely desired a solution of the disarmament problem and on the other hand, under the cover of "arms control", gave themselves over to an unrestrained arms race. Not content with reviving the "arms control" doctrine of John Foster Dulles, the present Government of the United States had immediately put it into practice, as one of the first of President Kennedy's messages to Congress testified. Military orders in the United States had been increased by \$4,000 million at the beginning of 1961, and the Government's new policy had led to a series of increases in military appropriations.

17. There was one problem which had not been settled during the negotiations between the United States and the USSR: the question whether controls should be exercised over armaments or over their destruction. Mere arms control would not decrease the danger of war. The Soviet Union had repeatedly stated that it was prepared to adopt any Western proposal designed to establish control over the destruction of armaments, on condition that the Western Powers in their turn accepted the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament. Unfortunately, the United States had not yet agreed to the Soviet proposal. Perhaps it had no confidence in its own control system. As for the Soviet system, it had often been presented in the West in a distorted fashion, as an article in the National Guardian of 23 May 1960 had shown.

18. Mr. Stevenson had sought to create the impression that in the Soviet plan control would apply only to the destruction of weapons of war and not to their manufacture. A glance at the first stage of the Soviet plan (A/C.1/856), which dealt with means of delivery of nuclear weapons, was enough to refute that statement. The control organization would have the right to inspect all undertakings previously engaged in the production of means of delivering nuclear weapons and to prevent the organization of clandestine production. Such measures would in practice eliminate the danger of nuclear attack. The United States plan (A/4891) provided, in the first stage, for a reduction in delivery vehicles and for their partial elimination and destruction, but without indicating proportions or fixing time-limits. In other words, there could be partial disarmament with complete control, which would be contrary to the already accepted principle that the nature and extent of the control must depend on the requirements for verification of the measures taken at each stage.

19. The General Assembly could adopt a resolution endorsing the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (A/4879) as the basis for an agreement on a programme of general and complete disarmament. It should also help to establish a working body in which constructive and fruitful negotiations could take place. It went without saying that the initiative in implementing draft resolution A/C.1/L.299 and Add.1 would rest with the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The body in question should include representatives of the socialist States, the Western States and the non-aligned States. His delegation also supported the proposal that a special session of the General Assembly should if necessary be convened.

20. No one denied the complexity of the disarmament problem but the accumulation of armaments was likely to aggravate the problem. Since all recognized the need for disarmament, and principles had been agreed upon, an agreement on general and complete disarmament should be worked out without delay.

21. Mr. KOIRALA (Nepal) was pleased to note that the United States and the USSR had seen fit to issue a joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations. That statement should augur well for progress in the field of disarmament in the near future. It had the merit of laying down, in broad terms, the major goals and principles which would eventually lead to general and complete disarmament under strict international control and which would, for the time being, serve as a guide in any discussion on disarmament.

22. He was glad to note that the two Powers had come to some measure of agreement on a system of effective international control. His delegation felt strongly that at no stage of the disarmament plan should any Power have any advantage over the other. Control over those weapons that were being retained and verification of the nuclear weapons that were being destroyed must be maintained at every stage of disarmament. While for technical reasons it should be left to the Powers concerned to decide whether disarmament should be accomplished in one or several stages, it would be well to set target dates for the beginning and the completion of disarmament.

23. The Nepalese delegation had strongly supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.299 and Add.1, which urged the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body before the conclusion of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. That, in its opinion, was at present the major problem. As early as 10 October 1961, during the Assembly's general debate (1031st plenary meeting), it had defined its position, saying that provision must be made for a wide geographical representation and for the participation of the non-aligned countries. Although they did not possess the means for manufacturing the most destructive arms, the small and medium-sized countries were entitled to have a say in the matter. At the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Belgrade in September 1961, His Majesty King Mahendra had declared that the basic source of tension among nations was not the ideological conflict but economic disparity, and that the basic cure for that evil was economic development. It was therefore high time that man's great technological and scientific achievements and potentials should be directed towards peaceful progress and development.

24. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) expressed his pleasure at the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union (A/4879) on the need for a resumption of negotiations and hence for the establishment of a negotiating body.

25. The main difference between the two parties lay in the fact that the Soviet Union did not accept any control except over the weapons to be destroyed—thus retaining for itself the possibility of manufacturing and stockpiling weapons without any control—whereas the Western countries which possessed nuclear weapons wanted adequate control to ensure that the destroyed weapons would not be replaced and that the levels agreed upon would be respected.

26. Furthermore, it was impossible to disregard the fact that during the last fifteen years the Soviet Union had violated fifty-two of the fifty-eight important international conventions of which it was a signatory. The most recent example was the explosion of the 50-megaton bomb in violation of the moratorium on nuclear tests which the Soviet Union had voluntarily accepted in its unilateral declaration of 31 March 1958. It was obvious that the series of nuclear tests upon which it had embarked on 1 September 1961 had required a long period of preparation, which must have begun at the very time that it had been pledging itself to cease testing.

27. Hence the Spanish delegation felt somewhat sceptical about the statement of the USSR Government that it was ready to resume talks on 28 November on the banning of nuclear tests. As Marshal Zhukov had said, the mere existence of atomic weapons implied the possibility of their being used. In the event of international conflict, armies which possessed nuclear weapons would inevitably use them to defeat the enemy. That, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had himself recognized, would be the suicide of mankind.

28. It was well to remember that on 7 January 1946 the United States, which at that time had had the monopoly of nuclear weapons, had offered to renounce them and that, after the adoption of the resolution of 24 January 1946 setting up the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (General Assembly resolution 1 (I)), it had expressed its readiness to hand over the secret and the monopoly of the manufacture of all fissionable material to an international authority for atomic development operating within the framework of the United Nations. To that proposal the Soviet Union had given a negative response. Similarly everyone remembered the negative and sarcastic response that Mr. Vyshinsky had given when the General Assembly, acting on a United States proposal, had, on 11 January 1952, adopted resolution 502 (VI) which provided for the establishment of the Disarmament Commission.

29. The Soviet Union had never wanted disarmament because it had had every intention of producing and improving its own nuclear weapons. Since 1955 it had been speaking about disarmament for propaganda purposes, making proposals that it had known to be unacceptable to the free world. There was an obvious reason for that attitude, which the USSR representative had revealed at the 1195th meeting of the Committee when he had said that the Soviet Union was now ahead of the United States in means of delivering nuclear weapons.

30. It was only natural that the free world should be reluctant to conclude a disarmament agreement with the Communist Powers unless it could be certain that the agreement would be strictly observed. It was common knowledge that any system of inspection could be circumvented and that it was easy, for instance, to keep a considerable part of the stocks of nuclear weapons concealed beyond detection. Hence, in order to eliminate any feeling of mistrust, it was imperative that any agreement should provide for measures of inspection and control. The Spanish delegation also considered that the composition of the negotiating body was of great importance and it whole-heartedly supported the position of the United States on that matter. It would be unwise to divide the future members of such a body into arbitrary categories.

31. Among the proposals before the Committee, draft resolution A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1 had particularly attracted the attention of the Spanish delegation. That draft proposed that an inquiry should be made into the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive in the future nuclear weapons on their territories on behalf of any other country. The Spanish delegation could not yet say exactly how it would vote on that proposal, but it was somewhat concerned at the idea that such an undertaking should be limited to countries which did not possess nuclear weapons. At first glance that would seem to be a sterile measure, but it was conceivable that it might eventually help to improve the general atmosphere.

32. It was to be hoped that the nuclear Powers would finally come to an agreement, even if that agreement should countenance some slight degree of injustice, for injustice was preferable to disorder, which was liable to lead to annihilation. Spain, for its part, was a peace-loving country whose doctrine forbade any offensive war. Nevertheless, the defence of values such as liberty justified war, for a life lived under the yoke of violence was not worth living.

33. Mr. NONG KIMNY (Cambodia) said that he was fully aware of the delicate and limited role of the smaller nations in the debate on disarmament. Nevertheless, all countries of the world had the duty to try to banish war for all time as a means of settling disputes among nations. If mankind wished to survive, it would be absolutely necessary to abolish all weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction, and, through effective international control, to prevent their future production.

34. Conscious of its own military weakness, Cambodia had no intention of speaking as a critic nor as a spokesman of the non-aligned world. It merely wanted to assume its responsibilities in the light of the experience it had acquired in the course of its long history, and particularly during the post-war years which had seen the cold war intensify throughout the world, and even in South-East Asia where it was now raging in consequence of the power struggle between the two blocs and of the furnishing of large quantities of weapons to the countries and political groups which had chosen to align themselves with those blocs. Cambodia, though neutral, had suffered from the troubles that were affecting its neighbours. Although its policy was above reproach, certain Powers accused it of serving as a base for attacks by communist forces on neighbouring countries. Those accusations were absolutely false. Prince Norodom Sihanouk had invited all who accused his country and all interested foreign observers to come to Cambodia and make an investigation on the spot. Meanwhile, the International Commission for Supervision and Control established under the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia, signed at Geneva on 20 July 1954, had found all the accusations against Cambodia to be groundless. The fantastic report of 25 October 1961 of an invasion against South Viet-Nam by Cambodia had also been proved false as the result of an investigation by a United States journalist. Nevertheless, such false reports, taken up by the Press, could do enormous harm to Cambodia and filled it with the greatest misgivings regarding the intentions of the persons disseminating them. Cambodia thus felt a direct concern in the problem of disarmament.

35. The Cambodian delegation had voted for the five draft resolutions already approved by the First Committee at the current session of the Assembly because it believed that attention must be given to the situation as it stood and because those measures, although far from complete, might contribute towards creating a propitious atmosphere for the resumption of negotiations. Pending the conclusion of a treaty regulating the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the Committee should work towards reconciling the different points of view and seek the means by which such a treaty might become a reality.

36. The Cambodian delegation endorsed draft resolution A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1. If all countries not possessing nuclear weapons could succeed in forming a non-atomic club, a constructive first step would have been taken. Cambodia knew that it would never receive nuclear weapons and would be glad to see other countries undertake never to acquire them and thus contribute to arresting their dissemination. Cambodia had always favoured the creation of denuclearized zones, whether in Europe under the Rapacki plan, or in Asia. It went further and supported the establishment of neutral zones to serve as buffers between the two blocs and thus avoid friction which might result in conflict.

37. The Cambodian delegation had been happy to learn that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed on principles by which disarmament negotiations should be guided. Its hope for the resumption of negotiations was nevertheless tempered by the disillusioning results of the repeated efforts of fifteen years to lead the negotiations into constructive channels. Almost everything still remained to be done. The major task was to create a climate of trust, as that was indispensable to the success of the negotiations. Effective international control was obviously necessary for a treaty to be of value, and to that end it might be useful to set up inspection committees composed of nationals of non-nuclear countries whose neutrality and good faith were universally recognized. It might even be that such sincerely neutral countries should be invited to participate in the disarmament negotiations in the event that the great Powers should feel that some non-aligned countries might make a useful contribution.

38. Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands) recalled that the current discussion on disarmament flowed from General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV). Since 1946 there had, to be sure, been comprehensive disarmament plans and, later on, proposals for partial disarmament but those attempts had failed because they had been outstripped by technological developments. The newer weapons had now given the disarmament negotiations added importance and urgency and had also affected the contents of disarmament plans. Levels of forces and stocks of weapons were still important matters, but new elements had been introduced, such as the speed, mobility and vulnerability of modern weapons and their ever-increasing range. From a military point of view, continents could no longer be regarded as isolated geographical entities.

39. Those developments showed that general and complete disarmament was at present the best approach, as partial disarmament could not eliminate war as an instrument of international policy. The Netherlands Government therefore advocated general and complete disarmament.



40. Such disarmament was, however, far from a sovereign remedy for all political, social and economic conflicts and might even create new conflicts by radically altering the internal situation of States and the present system of international relations. It might lead, in fact, to a political reorganization of the world. That prospect should be a stimulus for more studies on the consequences of general and complete disarmament and on the provision to be made for guaranteeing peace and progress when such disarmament was realized. The Netherlands delegation accordingly welcomed the study now being made of the economic and social consequences of disarmament.

41. The Netherlands Government was glad that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that progress in disarmament should be accompanied by a strengthening of institutions for keeping the peace and for ensuring the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and by arrangements for the creation of an international peace force. That should not mean, however, that the already complex negotiations on disarmament itself should be retarded by detailed negotiations on procedures for strengthening peace during disarmament operations. The two problems should be discussed simultaneously, but separately. His delegation consequently supported the suggestion that the Secretary-General might present his own ideas on the improvement of United Nations machinery for observation, fact-finding conciliation, mediation and adjudication.

42. Disappointments in the field of disarmament had been sufficiently numerous for his country not to expect miracles from the agreement reached between the Soviet Union and the United States, but that agreement did prove the usefulness of their bilateral talks and their firm intention to reach common ground. There were, of course, differences between their positions, but there might be more of a common background than was immediately apparent. The Netherlands was convinced that an earnest attempt should be made to arrive at the treaty contemplated in the joint statement (A/4879). The two parties were agreed on the necessity of time limits for each disarmament phase and for the operation as a whole. It was also significant that the last paragraph of the statement left room for the implementation of partial disarmament measures pending the conclusion of a treaty on a total programme. Such latitude was desirable provided that at no stage of the disarmament process would any State or group of States gain any military advantage and that the negotiations on the total programme would be continued without interruption. The conclusion of a separate agreement for restricting the number of nuclear Powers might be regarded as an example of a partial approach. His country's preference, however, was for a comprehensive treaty, because only that would make it possible to establish the disarmament organization provided for in the joint statement. The Netherlands Government welcomed the proposal to regard that organization as part of the United Nations.

43. One of the main obstacles to general and complete disarmament was the problem of control. The crux of the matter was whether the verification of compliance with disarmament obligations should or should not include the possibility of ascertaining that not only were reductions of armed forces and armaments taking place as agreed, but also that retained armed forces and armaments did not exceed agreed levels at any stage. At the fifteenth session, the Netherlands delegation had

stated that the means for applying that principle could be debated but that the principle itself was essential. It trusted that the principle would be upheld in the provisions of the treaty. Verification should be progressive but it should also, as had been explained by the United Kingdom representative, extend to all the component parts of each measure; otherwise there would be no security for anyone. While the statement of the Soviet Union representative was not encouraging in that respect, it was to be hoped that at the time of the negotiations practical arrangements would be found to ensure active control with guarantees against possible misuse. It was further to be hoped that the United States and the Soviet Union would speedily agree on the composition of the disarmament body in which the detailed negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament would be continued. The Netherlands delegation had no fixed ideas on that body's composition, but it hoped that the Soviet Union would not insist on its tripartite formula.

44. It was the desire of all peoples that the disarmament negotiations should be resumed as soon as possible, and the Netherlands Government hoped that the negotiators might soon report progress towards general and complete disarmament.

45. Mr. MOD (Hungary) said that whereas two years previously many people had been hostile to the idea of general and complete disarmament, today that idea was acceptable to both the peoples and government circles in all countries. The Soviet Union representative had stressed the urgency of the question and the pressing necessity to resolve it so that the threat of war could be effectively banished. Weapons were being perfected daily and their destructive power was constantly increasing. With progress in techniques of production, there was no guarantee that nuclear weapons would not sooner or later spread throughout the world. Meanwhile, the manufacture of other weapons was constantly progressing; in his message to Congress, the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, had called upon the American people to strengthen their military potential. Mobilization had begun and Congress had voted supplementary appropriations to improve the army, and some strategists were advocating construction of the neutron bomb. That appalling arms race must, clearly, be brought to a halt.

46. The Hungarian People's Republic had special reasons for desiring general and complete disarmament, for the two world wars had brought unmitigated disaster to the Hungarian people.

47. Today, a spark in Germany might set the whole world aflame. With a view to reducing international tension, the Soviet Government had proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany to normalize the status of West Berlin and convert it into a free and demilitarized city. The United States and its allies had replied by acts of provocation against the German Democratic Republic. President Kennedy had stated that he would risk a war rather than accept Mr. Khrushchev's proposals on Berlin. The gravity of the German problem was increased by the revival of German militarism within the framework of NATO, in violation of international agreements. The "Bundeswehr" did not yet possess nuclear weapons but Mr. Strauss, the West Germany Minister of Defence, had stated that anyone who opposed the acquisition of atomic weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany was committing a crime. German troops were con-

ducting manoeuvres in the United Kingdom and other NATO countries. The Federal Republic of Germany was preparing strategic plans independently of its Western allies. A year before, the French Press had announced with consternation that a West German Minister, Mr. Seehörm, was claiming certain parts of France and the Sudetenland, and that Vice-Chancellor Erhard was laying claim to Polish Silesia. German militarism, which was being revived by the United States, and Germany irredentism were attended with grave dangers.

48. Disarmament would resolve many other problems, for instance, the colonial problem, which could be settled more easily if war were eliminated as a means of settling international disputes. Aid to under-developed areas would be facilitated and international scientific co-operation would make great strides. The members of NATO and the parties to the Warsaw Treaty were appropriating \$90,000 million to \$100,000 million for military purposes in 1961. Those enormous sums could be used to accelerate progress in the under-developed areas. The United Nations could also become a genuinely universal body, whereas at present the strategic and military interests of the United States were excluding a number of countries from the Organization.

49. As Mr. Khrushchev had said, nuclear weapons and rockets would wipe out the whole world and they thus divested the territorial factor of its erstwhile importance. In the present day, war could not and must not be a means of solving international conflicts and disputes.

50. Hitherto, lack of confidence had prevented disarmament negotiations from yielding any result. He emphasized that in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in 1955, when the Soviet Union had accepted the basic features of the Western Powers' proposals, the latter had immediately broken off the negotiations, the United States delegation stating that it could no longer consider its own former proposals as a basis for negotiations.

51. The Soviet Union's position on the subject of general and complete disarmament was unequivocal. By contrast, as was explained in an article in The Nation of 28 October 1961, the United States had been the main obstructionist in the field of disarmament until 25 September 1961, the date of President Kennedy's address to the 1013th plenary meeting of the General Assembly. Perhaps the United States attitude could be explained by the fact that it had never experienced the hardships of war to the same extent as the European countries. There were significant forces inside the United States advocating recourse to military methods, and he would like to see more wide-spread support in that country for the opinion expressed by Mr. Stevenson on 15 November (1195th meeting), when he had said that there was one point on which the United States was inflexible: the necessity of starting to disarm immediately. He was glad to see the United States Government break with its former attitude and draw up a plan for general and complete disarmament (A/4891). But that plan had drawbacks. The United States representative had said that it provided first for an immediate measure of disarmament and secondly for effective international control—which was the logical order of priority—but unfortunately in his statement he had laid the main stress on the question of control. The United States plan did not refer to the complete liquidation of foreign

military bases, which were a root cause of international tension, but instead called for the destruction of intercontinental missiles, which would give a unilateral advantage to the United States and deprive the Soviet Union of one of its effective means of defence. As President Kennedy had emphasized in his address to the General Assembly, disarmament must proceed by balanced stages, with guarantees to ensure that no State gained a military advantage. He did not think, however, that the United States plan took that sound principle into account, and he feared that the authors of the plan had not intended that the balance should be kept. Secondly, the United States plan did not fix any time limits for the various stages or for the final completion of the disarmament. It was crucial that exact time limits should be fixed during the negotiations, for that was the only guarantee that the decisions taken would be put into practical effect. The Soviet proposal (A/C.1/856) was specific on that point.

52. At the end of the first stage of the United States plan, 2.1 million men would still be under arms, but the Soviet plan went further and proposed that only 1.7 million men should be kept under arms. The Soviet proposal was justified by the spirit of disarmament; furthermore, if the troops stationed abroad were withdrawn and military bases abolished, it would no longer be necessary to maintain such large forces.

53. The key to effective disarmament negotiations was confidence. If it was to be created, the Western Powers must understand that they could not declare themselves ready to negotiate and to sign pacts while at the same time instituting war preparations. The important thing was to start negotiations as soon as possible. Moreover, concrete measures must be taken from the outset of the negotiations to pave the way for a general agreement. Such partial measures might include the elimination of the vestiges of the Second World War, the execution of the Rapacki plan, the creation of the "non-nuclear club" proposed by the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, the denuclearization of Africa, and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the members of NATO and the parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

54. His delegation believed it was possible to halt the arms race, achieve general and complete disarmament and banish war forever. World opinion, which was resolutely clamouring for disarmament, was opposed to military adventures, and the Governments of a growing number of countries—in particular, those of the so-called non-aligned countries—were pursuing a policy of peace. The draft resolution submitted by Ghana, India and the United Arab Republic (A/C.1/L.299 and Add.1) proved that the neutralist countries were striving to contribute to the success of the negotiations by means of constructive proposals.

55. The joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (A/4879) signed by the Soviet Union and the United States showed that the two great Powers were aware of the immense dangers presented by the present arms race. That document went beyond the usual statements, since it defined the basic principles of general and complete disarmament and could thus serve as a basis for negotiations, which should begin in the near future. The fact that the parties were thus in agreement showed that the initial difficulties had already been overcome. Admittedly, there were still many problems to be resolved and many misunderstandings to be cleared up, but the positions of the

principal parties had already been clarified and when the negotiations were resumed, it would be possible to concentrate on the major issues.

56. Another ground for optimism was the Soviet Union's acceptance of the United States proposal concerning the resumption of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. Once again the Soviet Union had given the lead and it was to be hoped that that lead would be followed by the Western Powers. Taking the joint statement as a basis, the First Committee could adopt a resolution to set up a new disarmament commission comprising representatives of the socialist, Western and neutralist States and request it to draw up by a given date a

draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

57. Where the composition of that body was concerned, he felt that the participation of the neutralist countries was a prerequisite, since those countries represented a considerable proportion of the population of the globe and a large number of the countries of the world. As for control procedures, care must be taken to work out procedures for the different stages that were not tantamount to legalized espionage.

58. It was to be hoped that negotiations in the new body would begin in the near future.

The meeting rose at 11.45 p.m.