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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72

Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1, A/C.1/L.291 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1) (*continued*)

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (A/4799, A/C.1/L.280, A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1) (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee was continuing the consideration of the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1), the general debate on agenda items 73 and 72 having been temporarily adjourned.

2. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) said that his delegation was unable to support the six-Power draft resolution calling for the suspension of nuclear tests. The United States and the other Western Powers had always been opposed to the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, just as they were opposed to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Nuclear tests had first been suspended unilaterally by the Soviet Union in March 1958, at a time when the Western Powers had carried out three times as many tests as the Soviet Union and claimed to possess a military advantage in that field. Whether or not such claims were true, they had continued testing for another seven months before agreeing to a moratorium. There was abundant evidence that the reason why they had finally accepted the moratorium was that the tests had given them the information they thought necessary for their war preparations. The true nature of the United States position had been illustrated in the statement by General Twining published in the *U.S. News & World Report* on 18 April 1958, that tests were necessary to enable the United States to improve its weapons, and the statement published on 6 June 1960 in the same periodical, that the tests carried out by the United States in 1958 had been said at the time by the Atomic Energy Commission to have provided information which it would

take a whole year to analyse. As soon as that year had ended, pressure had begun in the United States for the resumption of tests. At the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, the United States had gone back on its previous position and had repudiated its own experts' conclusion that effective control of a test suspension was possible. It had done so because it was obsessed with the idea of perfecting its nuclear weapons so that it could impose its will on the socialist States. It had deliberately created obstacles to the success of the Geneva Conference, as had been admitted in a report published in the *New York Herald Tribune* of 31 January 1960. All the members of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, in testimony before a subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives released in May 1960, had spoken in favour of the resumption of nuclear tests. Throughout the Geneva negotiations, as the discussions in the First Committee had shown, the United States had been preparing for a resumption of testing. At the 1174th meeting the United States representative had stated that his country had not made definite plans and arrangements for renewed testing—a statement which indirectly confirmed that some preparations had in fact been made. It was easy for a country as industrially advanced as the United States to assemble nuclear devices and connect up recording apparatus which had been prepared in advance; that was shown by the fact that United States testing had been resumed so quickly. Thus, the history of United States policy showed that the proposal for a new moratorium was unrealistic.

3. Negotiations could give results only where there was an atmosphere of confidence and an absence of tension between the parties. It was therefore essential that all States should give up any idea of solving disputes by force. But it was precisely such a policy that the Western Powers were following. For example, the socialist countries' proposal that a peace treaty should be concluded with Germany in order to eliminate the aftermath of the Second World War had provoked the threat of a new war. According to *The New York Times* of 26 October 1961, The Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States had been told that the United States could not go any nearer to either war or peace than the Federal Republic wished to go. But the Federal Republic was almost entirely in the hands of former Nazi generals, and its Government was led by disciples of militarism and revanchism. The Bonn revanchists had openly stated their intention of marching to the east and occupying other countries by force of arms, including nuclear weapons and rockets. The United States had associated itself with those plans and was preparing a new war. That was the real danger to mankind, rather than the fall-out from a few explosions, and it was the reason for the defensive measures taken by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

4. The representatives of the United States and various other countries had tried to perpetuate the legend that if the Soviet Union had accepted the Baruch Plan^{1/} the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests would no longer exist. But the Baruch Plan would have obliged States to surrender part of their national sovereignty, which was guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations, in the illusory hope that the United States and its allies would renounce atomic weapons at some indefinite future date; that point had been made by Mr. Henry Wallace, former Vice-President of the United States, in a letter to President Truman dated 23 July 1946. The real purpose of the Baruch Plan had been to preserve the United States monopoly of atomic weapons, so that it could dominate the whole world. The Soviet Union, which was openly stated to be the primary target, had naturally sought to thwart those plans. The United States had always refused to join the Soviet Union in making a solemn undertaking never to use nuclear weapons first. General Eisenhower, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees released on 11 March 1951, had actually stated that he would use the atomic bomb instantly if it was to his country's net advantage; and many similar statements had been made since. In order to ensure that the United States should not be tempted to seek such an advantage, the Soviet Union had been compelled to take whatever measures were necessary for its defence, including nuclear tests. The peoples of the world would understand that those tests had been undertaken in order to prevent a nuclear war. It had been said that a 100-megaton bomb could serve no military purpose, but since the Soviet Union made nuclear weapons only in order to safeguard the peace, that argument was irrelevant.

5. It was curious to note that the representatives of the Western Powers, which in the past had been resolutely opposed to the cessation of nuclear tests, were now trying to persuade the Committee that a treaty banning tests could be signed without difficulty. The reason for their sudden change of position, however, was clear. The aggressive and provocative actions of the imperialists had created extreme tension in various parts of the world, and the arms race had become more acute. Such a situation was not conducive to the conclusion of a treaty. Furthermore, the Geneva negotiations had shown that there were profound differences between the two sides, differences which could not be eliminated at present. The Western Powers knew that in those circumstances the Soviet Union could not agree to their conditions, so that they felt free to make proposals for a treaty in the assurance that they would not be accepted. If they really wanted to end nuclear tests, the simplest method would be to open negotiations as soon as possible on general and complete disarmament. Ever since the Soviet proposal on general and complete disarmament^{2/} had been submitted in 1959, the idea had been making progress, particularly since the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed on a joint statement of the principles which should govern negotiations on the subject (A/4879). The only realistic answer to the present situation was to start work on a disarmament treaty, which would naturally cover the question of nuclear tests.

6. Mr. UYS (South Africa) said that his delegation supported the principle underlying the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1), namely, that an end should be put to nuclear testing. In particular, it shared the concern to which the third preambular paragraph gave expression. The draft resolution, however, had one overriding weakness: it proposed a moratorium without making any provision for control or inspection. His delegation, therefore, would be unable to support it. An uncontrolled moratorium would not be effective, as was shown by the fact that the recent voluntary moratorium, which had been backed by the authority of the United Nations, had been violated. The pretext put forward by the country responsible had been the existence of international tension which that country had itself created. Because there had been no control system, the only purpose which the voluntary moratorium had served had been to enable the country in question to prepare for tests, thus placing the other parties at a disadvantage.

7. Since it was clear that a moratorium would not be successful, every effort should be made to bring about the immediate conclusion of a treaty banning tests under effective control. At the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, agreement had been reached on all but a few questions. A treaty could be signed, provided that there was sufficient willingness to settle the remaining problems, which were not insoluble. His delegation would therefore support the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/L.280). In that connexion, he drew the Committee's attention to the views expressed in paragraph 7 of the statement on disarmament issued by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers (A/4868) and to the Polish representative's statement at the 1178th meeting that an agreement on the cessation of testing would improve the international climate.

8. If the proposed treaty were concluded, it would greatly help to reduce international tension, particularly between the great Powers, and would lay a foundation for general disarmament and universal peace.

9. Mr. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) said that his Government had consistently supported the effort initiated by India to bring about the permanent cessation of nuclear tests through the United Nations. It had protested against the French tests conducted in the Sahara in 1959, even though those tests had not represented an irreparable set-back to the efforts of the principal nuclear Powers then negotiating at Geneva. However, the situation created by the break-down of the Geneva Conference, by the Soviet Union's resumption of testing in defiance of General Assembly resolutions and by the Soviet Union's action in exploding its super-bomb despite the appeal contained in General Assembly resolution 1632 (XVI), for which eighty-seven Member States had voted, was so serious that it would be naive for the Assembly now merely to reiterate its recommendation for a voluntary test suspension unaccompanied by effective guarantees. Previous recommendations to that effect were still in force; moreover, it would be unfair to place the United States and the United Kingdom on a footing of equality with the Soviet Union so far as concerned their compliance with those recommendations. Nor would it be fair to compare the four small underground tests carried out by the United States following the Soviet violation of the moratorium with the gigantic tests carried out by the Soviet Union in the atmosphere, allegedly in the interests of Soviet se-

^{1/} See Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, No. 1, 1st meeting, pp. 4-14.

^{2/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 70, document A/4219.

curity and of world peace. If the United Nations were to accept the premise that peace depended on the maintenance of the balance of nuclear power, the world would be faced with the prospect of an indefinitely prolonged series of nuclear tests carried out alternately by one or the other side. Such a state of affairs would mean that the Organization was completely powerless to influence the will of a few great Powers.

10. In the circumstances, the General Assembly should endeavour to go beyond a mere appeal for an uncontrolled moratorium. Such an appeal could no longer prevent the nuclear Powers from proceeding with their testing programmes and, by discriminating against those States which had observed the previous moratorium, would imply that it was more advantageous for a great Power to defy a General Assembly recommendation than to respect it. The United Nations should face the hard fact that only a treaty providing adequate controls would have sufficient force to deter nuclear Powers from resuming tests. The violation of a treaty was a far more serious matter than the violation of a voluntary moratorium, for a treaty embodied a legal obligation. The United States and the United Kingdom had declared their readiness to sign a treaty without delay. On the other hand, they had asserted that they were not prepared to suspend nuclear testing in the absence of a binding agreement of that kind. Experience vindicated their position, and if the Assembly was not to delude the peoples of the world, it should recommend, as simultaneous and concurrent measures, a test suspension and the conclusion of a treaty providing the necessary controls.

11. Venezuela would vote in favour of the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) and for the seven-Power amendment to it (A/C.1/L.294), of which Venezuela was a sponsor, because they did in fact make that dual recommendation. The amendment stressed not only the urgency of concluding a test-ban treaty, but the need to guarantee its observance by instituting appropriate international control.

12. Mr. DEAN (United States of America) said that only by agreement among the nuclear Powers on a treaty along the lines of the draft treaty submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom to the Geneva Conference (A/4772) could all States be assured that the obligation to cease all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests in all environments was being fulfilled. Such an instrument could be signed within a very short time if the Soviet Union abandoned its insistence on linking it with negotiations on general and complete disarmament. As soon as a test-ban treaty had been concluded, the United States was prepared to press forward towards a solution of the question of general and complete disarmament. However, work on that question would inevitably take time and involve considerable debate on the various proposals already submitted, including that presented by the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, to the General Assembly (1013th plenary meeting), which far transcended any previous disarmament plan placed before that body.

13. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union was continuing to test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, he wished to state, with the approval of President Kennedy, that the United States and the United Kingdom were still prepared to sign or negotiate a test-ban treaty immediately. If the Soviet Union would sign such a

treaty, all other States would be called upon to accede to it. Such a treaty would constitute a valuable first step towards disarmament, would provide useful experience in the operation of controls, would be a means of stopping fall-out and would do much to reduce international tension.

14. An uncontrolled and uninspected moratorium would not accomplish those ends, and although the United States respected the motives of the sponsors, it could not support the six-Power draft resolution. The Soviet Union's unilateral violation of the previous moratorium, its continued testing and its callous disregard for the Assembly's appeal and the clamour of world public opinion in exploding the largest nuclear weapon in history should convince the Assembly that another voluntary moratorium would be of no practical use. An uninspected moratorium provided no guarantee that the States parties to it were abiding by their pledges; indeed, as the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, had said recently, the latest Soviet test had shaken the confidence of all in such a moratorium. Moreover, a moratorium actually operated against the achievement of an effective test-ban treaty. A new moratorium would create the mistaken impression that testing could be stopped and other disarmament measures taken without controls. Experience had shown how false that impression was. The vote of the United States delegation would be guided by those considerations.

15. The United States would vote against the Afghan amendment (A/C.1/L.289/Rev.1) to the six-Power draft resolution because it did not believe the excuses given by the Soviet Union for its resumption of tests to be valid, accurate or sincere. The conduct of the Soviet Union should not be condoned by the General Assembly. The United States would abstain in the vote on the preamble of the six-Power draft, for while it fully supported the sentiment expressed in the fourth preambular paragraph, which stressed the need to halt nuclear testing, it could only support a genuine discontinuance of tests under an effectively controlled treaty. It would also abstain on operative paragraphs 1 and 3 of the six-Power text. However, it would vote against operative paragraph 2, which was unacceptable to the United States because it omitted any mention of treaty controls and because it could be interpreted to permit the postponement of a test-ban treaty until a treaty on general and complete disarmament had been concluded. Thus, the reference to general and complete disarmament would encourage the Soviet Union to attempt to bury the test-ban problem in the difficult and lengthy task of negotiating general and complete disarmament. The United States therefore favoured a separate vote on the words "or general and complete disarmament", and would vote against their inclusion. On the other hand, it would vote in favour of the seven-Power amendment (A/C.1/L.294), which it regarded as a useful contribution to the six-Power text. Although that text could undoubtedly be improved by further amendment, the United States would not sponsor any amendments to it, and hoped that the Committee would exercise restraint in that respect; even with amendments, a resolution recommending an uncontrolled moratorium would be unacceptable. However, he urged the Committee to proceed rapidly to a vote on the basic principle underlying the six-Power text and to prepare to consider the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.280) as its next order of business.

16. The United States and the United Kingdom were insisting on extensive controls to verify compliance with the provisions of a test-ban treaty because existing instruments did not yet make it possible to detect and identify, with any degree of accuracy, certain types of nuclear tests. The detectability and identification of nuclear explosions depended on the size of the device exploded, the place where it had been detonated and whether or not any attempt had been made to conceal the test. Tests in the atmosphere were relatively easy to identify by distant instruments, provided that they occurred in comparatively high yields and had been set off in the lower atmosphere. But tests of smaller yields, carried out on the fringes of outer space, presented more difficult problems, and for accurate detection of those tests, an international treaty system of reporting stations was essential. The difficulties of detecting tests of nuclear devices in outer space increased with every increase in the distance from the earth at which the devices were set off. The signals generated by such tests could be recorded on a variety of instruments, but were harder to detect if the explosions were shielded. Under the test-ban treaty proposed, the detection apparatus for such tests would be located on the earth or aboard satellites in terrestrial or solar orbits. Tests under water were also more difficult to detect; but that difficulty could be resolved, under an effective treaty organization, by installing the requisite number of control stations on board ships, on islands or in coastal areas. Thus, tests in the atmosphere, under water or in outer space could be detected by various methods, including sound, light and radic waves, radiation and the collection of radio-active debris either in the air, on the earth, or under the earth. However, tests underground were far harder to detect, only one relatively effective method being known at present. Moreover, new methods of testing had been developed which could reduce the detectability of underground explosions by muffling them or decoupling the seismic waves emanating from them. The United States had offered to conduct a scientific research programme to strengthen the detection capabilities of the proposed treaty with respect to such new methods, and had offered the Soviet Union the right to inspect the devices to be detonated.

17. For all those reasons, it was apparent that an international control system was absolutely essential if there was to be any real assurance that the obligations assumed under a test-ban treaty were being fulfilled.

18. The United States and the United Kingdom were more than willing to refrain from carrying out any further tests of nuclear weapons, provided that an effective treaty could be signed. They had not violated the moratorium, and had continued patiently to negotiate at Geneva. But in view of the proclaimed intention of the Soviet Union to continue testing and to disregard any General Assembly resolution urging it to desist from further tests, they were surely entitled to look to their own defence and that of the free world, and should not stand by helpless while the Soviet Union continued to improve its military security. If the appeal for a moratorium were adopted and the Soviet Union continued in its aggressive actions, the Assembly could not guarantee that the security of the United States and the United Kingdom would not be prejudiced by their observance of the moratorium. If the six-Power draft resolution was adopted, the United States, in view of the attitude of the Soviet Union, reserved

the right to exercise all rights which it might deem to be necessary or appropriate in its own defence and in the defence of the common interests of the free world.

19. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) said that when it sought to explain its resumption of nuclear testing as a defence measure necessitated by the threatening attitude of the United States in connexion with Berlin, the Soviet Union was insulting the intelligence of the world. The amount of preparation required for even a single nuclear test was well known; during the past three years, while offering repeated assurances that it would never be the first to resume testing, the Soviet Union had obviously been making secret preparations for the present series of tests.

20. In view of the contempt shown by the Soviet Union for the appeals addressed to it by the United Nations and by various Heads of State or Government and other eminent persons, the six-Power draft resolution, even though it had been submitted with the best of intentions, could not be expected to accomplish very much. It was to be noted, in particular, that the resolution made no mention whatever of the fact that the Soviet Union had unilaterally resumed nuclear testing in violation of the existing moratorium. It was unjust to ask the other nuclear Powers to take a course of action which, in view of the military advantage gained by the Soviet Union as a result of its current tests, might prove fatal to them and to all other countries which did not wish to be subjected to communist rule.

21. In spite of those facts, his delegation would be prepared to vote for the six-Power draft resolution for humanitarian reasons, if its text was amended in two respects. The adoption in its present form of operative paragraph 2, which urged the nuclear Powers "to refrain from further test explosions pending the conclusion of necessary internationally binding agreements in regard to tests or general and complete disarmament", would be tantamount to abandoning the idea of a separate treaty banning nuclear tests under effective international control. In the belief that the early conclusion of such a treaty was essential, his delegation had joined with six other Powers in proposing an appropriate amendment (A/C.1/L.294) to the six-Power draft resolution. If the amendment was incorporated into the draft resolution and the words "or general and complete disarmament" were deleted from operative paragraph 2, his delegation would be prepared to vote for the draft resolution.

22. He wished the record to show, nevertheless, that his delegation had little hope that the resolution would prove effective. Even a formal test-ban treaty would be of doubtful effectiveness, since there would be no way to compel compliance by a major Power. A treaty would, however, be preferable to a purely voluntary moratorium.

23. The adoption of the six-Power draft resolution could be no more than a transitional measure pending the early conclusion of a treaty. In view of the progress made by the negotiating parties at Geneva, it should be possible to conclude such a treaty within approximately one month, if all concerned acted in good faith.

24. Mr. DE MELO FRANCO (Brazil) said that, since the process of achieving general and complete disarmament would be long and complex, highest priority should be given to the problem of nuclear testing. That was the most urgent problem now facing the

world, and its solution would contribute to ultimate agreement on general and complete disarmament. The cessation of testing must be brought about forthwith, whether through the United Nations or by some other means. Continued testing could only lead to an intensified nuclear arms race and to the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, with a resulting deterioration in international relations. Furthermore, the General Assembly had expressed concern, in its resolution 1629 (XVI) of 27 October 1961, at the danger to the health of present and future generations resulting from the radio-active fall-out which was once more being released into the atmosphere.

25. It was sometimes contended that the slow increase in the level of radio-activity caused by nuclear tests did not constitute a serious danger to mankind. However, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation had stated in its first comprehensive report, issued in 1958, that even a slow rise in environmental radio-activity might eventually cause appreciable damage to health and that unnecessary exposure to radiation, whether it resulted from medical, industrial and other procedures for peaceful uses, or from nuclear testing, should be avoided (A/3838, chapter VII, paragraphs 54 and 56).

26. At the tenth session of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, which had ended on 15 September 1961, many representatives, including the representative of Brazil, had expressed deep concern over the most recent nuclear tests. However, for reasons other than scientific ones, no reference had been made to that concern in the Committee's vaguely worded progress report for 1961 (A/4881). Nothing had occurred since the publication of the Committee's 1958 report to indicate that its original fears concerning the effects of atomic radiation had been ill founded. On the other hand, several States had cited considerations of national security as justification for the resumption of nuclear testing. Whereas the combined yield of all the tests carried out between 1945 and the beginning of the moratorium in 1958 had been only some 90 megatons, the yield from the tests conducted since the end of the moratorium totalled more than 100 megatons. The recent explosion of a 50-megaton bomb by the Soviet Union, in defiance of a solemn appeal by the General Assembly, was further proof that the major States could not be deterred by United Nations recommendations from pursuing the course of power politics.

27. The Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated on 31 October that following the explosion of the 50-megaton bomb, which had constituted a veritable assault on the future of the human race, the United Nations must abandon its reliance on voluntary moratoria and must proclaim nuclear tests a crime against humanity, as it had done with respect to genocide. He had pointed out that continued nuclear testing, by creating fears of an increased level of radio-activity, also militated against the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Under the existing cir-

cumstances, the Brazilian delegation considered it essential that the United Nations should act to impose an absolute ban on nuclear testing.

28. His delegation was prepared to support any draft resolution which would help to reduce international tension and to make progress towards disarmament, whether it was sponsored by Western, Eastern or non-aligned States. The General Assembly should not be guided by cold-war considerations in dealing with such matters.

29. His delegation would support draft resolution A/C.1/L.291 and Add.1, since the de-nuclearization of Africa would strengthen the cause of peace by removing at least one source of international friction. In that connexion, he wished to state his conviction that the countries of Latin America would never employ nuclear energy for other than exclusively peaceful purposes.

30. He did not intend to discuss draft resolution A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1 at the present time, since the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, although closely connected with the two items now under consideration, could more properly be discussed within the framework of the question of disarmament.

31. Although his delegation supported the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1), it wished to emphasize that a voluntary suspension of testing did not provide adequate safeguards and must be followed immediately by an agreement having binding legal force. That was evident from the fact that tests had been carried out in the Sahara during the moratorium and from the recent resumption of testing on an unprecedented scale.

32. His delegation supported the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.280) in its main lines, since the treaty referred to in that draft resolution would set up effective machinery for the enforcement of a controlled ban on nuclear testing. The question of a test-ban treaty should be kept separate from that of general and complete disarmament, for the effect would otherwise be to delay the solution of a problem of extreme urgency. His delegation could not accept the Soviet contention that the control commission provided for in the treaty would not be impartial. No international organization, including the United Nations, could function without a presumption of impartiality and good faith on the part of its employees.

33. In any case, regardless of what the United Nations might do, the real issue was whether the nuclear Powers could reach agreement. The actions of those few States affected all other countries in the world and, indeed, the very future of mankind. They would be severely judged if they evaded their responsibilities by citing specious considerations of national security.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.