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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Ignacio-Pinto (Dahomey), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72

Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1, A/C.1/L.291 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1) (continued)

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (A/4799, A/C.1/L.280, A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1) (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that the general debate on agenda items 73 and 72 had been temporarily adjourned and that the Committee was now considering only the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) and amendments to it.

2. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla KHAN (Pakistan) regretted that the representatives of the Soviet Union, in spite of the categorical denials of his delegation, persisted in accusing his Government of conspiring with its allies in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) to commit aggression against the USSR and to create vast areas of destruction within its own territory in order to prevent the advance of Soviet troops. The documents which had been produced to support that charge were forgeries and had been categorically repudiated as such by the Governments concerned. Furthermore, it was surprising that the documents in question, which did not emanate from the Soviet Government but from Tass, the Soviet press agency, had been circulated as an Assembly document (A/C.1/853 and Corr.2) for the purposes of the present discussion.

3. Pakistan, like every other sovereign State, had a right and a duty to ensure its own security and to join its allies in planning collective defence against possible aggression. With that end in view, it had undertaken certain obligations—obligations which were in

strict conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter—but that did not mean that Pakistan was not the master of its own policies. On major questions on which the General Assembly had been called upon to take a decision, Pakistan had as often found itself on the side of the USSR as on that of the United States, and on some occasions, when those two Powers had voted in the same way, it had not hesitated to vote in opposition to both of them. Only recently, without consulting any other State, Pakistan had taken the initiative in the General Assembly (1023rd plenary meeting) in calling for an examination of the grave situation created by the resumption of nuclear tests.

4. Mankind's misuse of the blessings showered on it by its Creator had brought it to the critical stage in which it found itself. The decision must be made now whether to apply science and technology to the service of man or to condemn the world to total destruction. The testing of nuclear weapons on the scale on which it was now being pursued was a first step towards the destruction of life on the earth, and those who had engaged in such testing bore a heavy responsibility. It should be noted in that connexion that the only difference between the recent Soviet explosions and the tests which France had carried out in the Sahara was that the latter had been less dangerous to human life. It was true that France's Western allies should have restrained it from proceeding with its nuclear plans. However, the French tests did not furnish a valid reason for the Soviet resumption of tests, which, moreover, had been premeditated. In resorting to acts of intimidation in order—as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had himself explained—to induce the Western Powers to resume negotiations on Berlin, East Germany and disarmament, the USSR had demonstrated the most callous cynicism.

5. Following the Soviet explosions, the United States had announced that it would be compelled by considerations of its own security to resume testing in the atmosphere unless a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests under effective international control was speedily concluded and put into effect. Negotiations towards an agreement had already made considerable progress; there remained only two points of difference, one relating to the number of inspections each year, and the other to the composition of the control units in the territory of the USSR. It was clear that a treaty on the subject in question would be satisfactory only if the parties agreed to the setting up of a control system which did not leave room for evasion. The position of his delegation was that, while it made due allowance for legitimate security requirements, it insisted that mankind must be safeguarded against the manifest dangers attendant on nuclear tests.

6. A voluntary moratorium could be arbitrarily broken. That formula had already failed miserably and had indeed been shown to constitute a positive danger.

Those delegations which sought to restore the moratorium should explain how it was expected to be effective in practice, considering that the USSR refused to consider the suspension of tests independently of general and complete disarmament, and that the Soviet Government flouting the appeal addressed to it in General Assembly resolution 1632 (XVI), for which eighty-seven Member States had voted, had carried out a test of unprecedented size. In the absence of satisfactory explanations on that point, the Pakistan delegation would vote against the concluding words of operative paragraph 2 of the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) and in favour of the new operative paragraph 3 proposed in the seven-Power amendment (A/C.1/L.294). The result of the voting on those paragraphs might determine Pakistan's attitude on the draft resolution as a whole.

7. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising his right of reply, said that the documents whose authenticity the representative of Pakistan had challenged had been issued in 100 copies by the military secretariat of CENTO, and copies had been sent not only to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army but also to the Chiefs of Staff of Iran, Iraq and Turkey, as well as to several embassies. The aggressive policy being pursued by the Western Powers in the Middle East was clearly apparent in those documents. Moreover, it was confirmed by the flights of United States military aircraft—like the U-2—based on Pakistan soil.

8. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla KHAN (Pakistan) replied that the Pakistan Government had stated publicly that it had not been aware of the destination of the U-2 aircraft when it left the Pakistan airfield. Furthermore, Pakistan had made it quite clear to the United States that in future Pakistan would have to know the destination of any United States aircraft and the purpose of its flight before authorizing such aircraft to take off from Pakistan territory.

9. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) reserved the right to comment on the documents mentioned by the representatives of Pakistan and the Soviet Union after his Government had given full consideration to them.

10. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq) stated that his delegation had no hesitation in supporting the six-Power draft resolution. The extremely dangerous increase in radio-active fall-out resulting from the resumption of nuclear tests made the restoration of the moratorium more urgent than ever. The small Powers, including Iraq, had neither the means nor the desire to become members of the exclusive club of terror and destruction. They could rely only on whatever moral pressure they could exert in the General Assembly in furtherance of peace.

11. The Iraqi delegation did not claim, any more than the sponsors of the draft resolution, that that text provided a complete solution to the problem. It was therefore wrong to argue for its rejection on that basis, as the United Kingdom representative had done. An immediate voluntary moratorium did not exclude the negotiation of a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests. On the contrary, the negotiation of such a treaty required the most auspicious conditions possible, and such conditions could not be achieved while explosions were going on around the world. Besides, the six-Power draft resolution called upon the nuclear Powers to engage with urgency in the necessary efforts to conclude such agreements expeditiously. The General Assembly, which could not impose the terms of a

treaty, was surely not expected to stand idly by pending the conclusion of a treaty through negotiations, while nuclear explosions filled the atmosphere with their deadly fall-out. To confine itself to urging the States concerned to renew negotiations would be equivalent to authorizing them to continue to explode their bombs so long as they were unable to agree on a treaty.

12. Mr. FERNANDEZ (Argentina) observed that, despite the disagreements which had arisen on procedure, opinion was unanimous on the danger presented by the terrifying race for weapons of mass destruction and on the imperative need to put a speedy end to it. It was one of the many paradoxes of the thermo-nuclear age that the Committee should have to devote its immediate attention, not to the elimination of atomic armaments, but to the suspension or prohibition of the tests aimed at improving them. That minimum first step was a matter of urgency, for vast areas of the world were threatened with radio-active contamination, and consequently the nuclear-Powers were not the only parties concerned. Countries which lacked the technical capacity to master the atom had nevertheless a duty to act in defence of their own existence.

13. Disarmament had always been considered an elementary means of preventing armed conflicts, which were as old as mankind; but nowadays, when the possession of new weapons of mass destruction and the development of advanced processes for their manufacture conferred a decisive advantage, no nuclear Power would renounce those means of waging war unless it was certain that the adversary would do the same. Despite the statements which had been heard over a long period and the noteworthy progress which had been made at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, a new and tragic event had just occurred: the breach of the voluntary moratorium by the Soviet Union and the consequent resumption of testing. The solemn appeal addressed to one of the nuclear Powers by the General Assembly (resolution 1632 (XVI)) had been disregarded. His delegation strongly condemned that attitude, and the Committee's best course was to adopt draft resolutions providing for the immediate suspension and prohibition of nuclear tests under international control. That did not seem an impossible solution, for the parties concerned had agreed on some important clauses of a test-ban treaty and more recently on general principles for disarmament negotiations, as the test-ban treaty and joint statement of 20 September 1961 (A/4879) showed. A mere suspension, with no official undertaking and no effective international control, would merely prolong or even increase the existing tension. That was borne out by recent events.

14. His delegation would support any measure designed both to halt tests immediately and to prohibit them permanently under an agreement which made provision for means of control sufficient to guarantee its strict application. His delegation condemned nuclear tests, which exposed mankind to grave dangers and were designed to increase the destructive power of the new weapons. It therefore regarded the six-Power draft resolution as a first step which might have useful results provided that it was followed by the conclusion of a treaty banning tests for all time. It should be possible to resolve the remaining differences of opinion regarding the safeguards which such a treaty should afford the parties and the rest of the world. In that respect the amendment submitted by seven Latin American delegations (A/C.1/L.294) sup-

plemented the six-Power proposal and made it more definite. His delegation also considered that all mention of general and complete disarmament, which belonged to a later stage, should be deleted from operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

15. The adoption of the six-Power draft resolution as a first emergency step should be followed by an urgent request to the nuclear Powers to negotiate immediately a treaty permanently prohibiting nuclear tests with the exception of tests carried out, under control, for purely scientific purposes.

16. Mr. AHMED (United Arab Republic) recalled that since the Bandung Conference in April 1955 the Asian and African countries had appealed unceasingly to all Powers to agree on the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests. They had been impelled to do so by the threat to the world represented by atomic radiation from nuclear tests. The Indian representative, in his statement at the 1172nd meeting, had quoted the testimony of many eminent scientists on that point. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, in the report it had submitted in 1958 (A/3838), emphasized the seriousness of that danger and concluded that all steps designed to minimize irradiation of human populations would act to the benefit of human health. The Fourteenth World Health Assembly, for its part, had, on 24 February 1961, approved^{1/} the action taken by the General Assembly at its fourteenth and fifteenth sessions relating to the immediate cessation of nuclear testing.

17. The United Arab Republic had always maintained that all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, whether extra-atmospheric, atmospheric, submarine or underground, should be halted. Moreover, if testing continued, many States would ultimately manufacture atomic bombs, thus making it far more difficult to end the tests and to eliminate those weapons. In fact, the United Arab Republic's position had been the same as that taken by the United Nations in recent years. In that connexion he recalled General Assembly resolution 1379 (XIV), concerning French nuclear tests in the Sahara, and resolutions 1402 (XIV), 1577 (XV) and 1578 (XV), concerning the suspension of nuclear tests in general.

18. It was regrettable that France should have carried out nuclear tests in the Sahara in violation of the resolutions of the General Assembly. That attitude had directly and indirectly hurt the Geneva negotiations and had contributed to the present grievous situation. On the one hand, the Soviet Union had carried out a series of extremely powerful nuclear explosions, a fact which the Government of the United Arab Republic had deplored on several occasions, notably at the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in September 1961. On the other hand, the United States had carried out underground explosions and had also reserved the right to carry out tests in the atmosphere.

19. However, the moratorium had not been useless. It had represented a major step in the right direction and had for three years preserved mankind from the hazard of radio-active fall-out—a hazard which the General Assembly had explicitly recognized in resolution 1629 (XVI), adopted without opposition on 27 October 1961.

20. Since nuclear tests continued despite the resolutions of the United Nations, his delegation had joined

with other delegations in sponsoring the six-Power draft resolution, which urged that tests should be halted because the negotiation of a treaty on the cessation of tests was likely to take time and for that very reason could not prevent tests from being carried out in the interim. The same difficulty would be encountered if the cessation of testing was made to await the signature of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

21. The position of those who supported the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.280), on the ground that the conclusion of a treaty on the suspension of nuclear tests accompanied by measures of inspection and control was much safer and more effective than the restoration of a moratorium, was based on a misunderstanding. The sponsors of the six-Power draft resolution did not prefer a moratorium to a treaty providing for effective measures of inspection and control. On the contrary, they attached great importance to the conclusion of such a treaty; that was why, in their proposal, they called upon the nuclear Powers to spare no effort to reach that goal. However, pending the conclusion of mutually acceptable agreements, the General Assembly could not remain idle while each of the nuclear Powers undertook new tests. It was therefore necessary to begin by putting a moratorium into effect immediately. The nuclear Powers could then begin negotiating the necessary international agreements and even general and complete disarmament. That was what they were called upon to do by the countries which had neither the means nor the knowledge to protect themselves from radio-active fall-out.

22. Mr. ANUMAN RAJADHON (Thailand) said he was prepared to support any proposal providing for effective measures to stop the testing of nuclear weapons and prevent the use of existing nuclear devices. It was tragic that the Soviet Union had not heeded resolution 1632 (XVI) in which the General Assembly had solemnly appealed to it not to explode a 50-megaton bomb. In view of that, how could any trust be placed in proposals put forward by the Soviet Union, whose behaviour certainly did not entitle it to speak in the name of peace? That violation only accentuated the arms race, which could never provide any nation with a solution to the problem of its national security. Furthermore, it was unjust to the eighty-seven Member States which had voted for resolution 1632 (XVI) to describe their action as bourgeois propaganda. That disregard of the moral value of the United Nations gravely undermined its prestige and its authority.

23. It was imperative to ban the testing and manufacture of nuclear weapons by a treaty based on effective international control. The six-Power draft resolution provided mainly for the establishment of a moratorium, which was inadequate unless it was accompanied by a treaty establishing precise duties and obligations for States. Despite that reservation, the Thai delegation supported part if not the whole of that text, while urging that additional measures should be taken immediately to ensure the effectiveness of the absolute ban on testing. It also supported the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution, which satisfied most of the criteria for the solution of the problem. On the other hand, it could not support the Afghan amendment (A/C.1/L.289/Rev.1) to the six-Power draft resolution, since it might imply a justification of the recent violation of the moratorium by the Soviet Union. Lastly, the Thai delegation fully supported the seven-Power amendment (A/C.1/L.294), with which it agreed in all respects.

^{1/} See Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 110, resolution WHA14.56.

24. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) regretted that the hope engendered by the Geneva Conference had been shattered by the Soviet resumption of testing. It was also regrettable that the USSR had exploded its 50-megaton bomb in defiance of world opinion and of the appeal made by the United Nations.

25. The Geneva Conference had been the first attempt to bring nuclear power under the rule of law. A treaty banning nuclear testing could have served as a pilot project for the establishment of the control and inspection arrangements of a wider agreement on general and complete disarmament; it might have created a climate of international confidence and relaxation conducive to the solution of major political problems frozen by the cold war. At the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, the representative of Israel in the First Committee (1037th meeting) had voiced the hopes aroused by the Geneva Conference. Unfortunately, those hopes had now been shattered and the longer the delay, the closer the danger came. In that connexion, he cited the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (A/3838), and various statements by scientists in the Soviet Union and other countries, which clearly proved the reality of the danger.

26. The Israel delegation associated itself with the appeal made by the sponsors of the six-Power draft resolution to the nuclear Powers to stop their tests. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel had stated in the General Assembly on 9 October (1030th plenary meeting), it was necessary to take effective measures which would guarantee that the cessation of tests would be a lasting one, and the unilateral violation of the present moratorium clearly showed that only by such measures would it be possible to end tests forever. However, the Israel delegation shared the concern expressed by the sponsors of the six-Power draft resolution and associated itself with their appeal to the nuclear Powers to conclude without delay binding agreements providing for a system of effective control and verification for the cessation of tests. It therefore supported that text, and the very important seven-Power amendment. With regard to the political course of action to be followed in order to reach an agreement on the cessation of testing, the Israel delegation favoured the formula proposed in the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom.

27. Mr. KAMIL (Federation of Malaya) profoundly deplored the fact that the Soviet Union, in defiance of world opinion and of the resolutions of the General Assembly, had resumed nuclear tests in the atmosphere and, in particular, had exploded a bomb of even greater power than that announced by Mr. Khrushchev. Such tests increased international tension by accelerating the arms race. In addition, they might impel other countries to follow that example. It was known that the United States had already carried out underground explosions and had announced that, unless an effective ban was imposed on testing, it would, in the interest of its own security, have to embark upon tests in the atmosphere. Nuclear testing and the arms race were of course only the symptoms of international tension, but there was no doubt that testing, in its turn, increased that tension. There must therefore be an immediate halt to tests of any kind in order to reduce the threat of nuclear war, ease international tension and advance towards the goal of general and complete disarmament.

28. It was more than ever necessary to conclude without delay a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control, especially as, despite the collapse of the Geneva negotiations, the nuclear Powers were in fact in agreement on most of the essential principles which should govern such a treaty. The first logical step towards that goal must be the immediate restoration of the moratorium and the resumption of negotiations. Undoubtedly a moratorium alone would not solve the problem, but it would perhaps create a climate more conducive to the conclusion of a treaty. The General Assembly should therefore use its moral force to urge the nuclear Powers, not only to restore the moratorium, but to make it more enduring and more effective by concluding a treaty. Furthermore, since an indefinite moratorium would be merely a ban without control and inspection and would therefore not be able to preserve peace and security, that treaty must be concluded as soon as possible and without awaiting an agreement on general and complete disarmament which, however desirable it might be, would necessitate laborious negotiations. The position of the Malayan delegation on the six-Power draft resolution and the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution would be based on those considerations.

29. Mr. UNDEN (Sweden) said that the debate had centred mainly on the question whether there should be a moratorium or a treaty, but the attempt to make a distinction in that connexion between the six-Power draft resolution and that of the United States and the United Kingdom might be misleading. The former text, while urging the Powers concerned to refrain from further test explosions, implied that it was desirable and natural that a binding agreement should then be concluded dealing with control and other questions. The Swedish delegation supported that draft resolution for reasons similar to those put forward by the representative of Canada.

30. As far as the draft resolution of the United Kingdom and the United States was concerned, none of its provisions appeared to be unacceptable. However, the discussion had shown that, according to the sponsors of that text, no moratorium should enter into force before the conclusion of a treaty on the control system. The Swedish delegation did not share that view. It again expressed the opinion that less importance should have been attached to the control issue in that connexion, since most of the tests could be detected in other countries by means of existing instruments; that was of far greater importance than any control system designed to enforce the legal ban on tests. The risk that secret explosions might be detected by technicians in other countries was surely the most efficient guarantee against violations of a legal ban. A country which considered it necessary in its own interests to accept the test ban would act foolishly if it committed secret infringements that would probably be detected and that would make other countries denounce the ban.

31. A certain amount of control was undoubtedly essential, and it was desirable that the guarantees against secret tests should not rely exclusively on the instruments of detection of the opposite side. It ought not to be impossible, however, to conduct successful negotiations on the question of control, if limited importance was attached to that question. It followed that the resumption of negotiations between the nuclear Powers was essential for further progress towards a ban on testing.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.