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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72

Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.1/849, A/C.1/850, A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1, A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.291, A/C.1/L.292) (*continued*)

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (A/4799, A/C.1/849, A/C.1/850, A/C.1/L.280, A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.292) (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN said he would give the floor to speakers who had asked to explain the votes they had cast at the previous meeting on the Iranian procedural motion.

2. Mr. PAZHWAK (Afghanistan) explained that he had voted against the motion submitted by the representative of Iran because he had thought that the motion for the adjournment of the debate had been proposed in the wrong form and at the wrong time. A vote for that motion should have meant the adjournment of the debate on both the items under discussion and on all the draft resolutions on the subject which were before the Committee, including the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1). To single out one of the draft resolutions submitted on an agenda item for separate consideration during the general debate was contrary to the rules of procedure.

3. Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India) said that the procedural motion submitted by Iran comprised two parts, the first calling for the adjournment of the debate and the second calling for an immediate vote on the eight-Power draft resolution. The Chairman had based his action on rule 117 of the rules of procedure; but that rule applied only to votes on motions for adjournment, not on motions for adjournment containing new proposals. Moreover, any motion which was not purely one of adjournment could be amended, and the Chairman had not asked whether any amendments were proposed. He had simply put to the vote one of the rulings which had been challenged by a delegation, and it had been on the basis of that ruling that the

Committee had decided to bar any amendments to the Iranian motion. That procedure was extraordinary and had no precedent. All draft resolutions submitted in relation to the present debate should be considered on equal terms. If the sponsors of certain proposals thought they had good reasons for requesting priority, it was for them to ask the Committee to take a decision on the matter. The draft resolution sponsored by his delegation (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) was no less urgent than the eight-Power draft. The normal procedure, therefore, would have been to decide the question of priority by a straight vote, rather than by means of the procedural devices that had been used. That was why the Indian delegation had felt obliged to vote against the Iranian motion; however, it intended to vote in favour of the eight-Power draft resolution.

4. Mr. MATSCH (Austria) said that under the usual practice, there were three phases in the consideration of an item: the general debate, the consideration of draft resolution, and the voting. Since the general debate on agenda items 73 and 72 had been adjourned, the Committee was fully entitled to take up the consideration of a particular draft resolution. Since there was nothing in the rules of procedure to bar such a procedure, he had voted in favour of the Iranian motion.

5. Mr. GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI (Cuba) said he had voted against the Iranian motion because he did not think it possible to adjourn a debate and at the same time to take a vote on a draft resolution relating to it. Rulings of that kind, when the rules of procedure were not observed, tended to make discussion extremely difficult.

6. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) said he had voted against the Iranian motion because, by majority vote and by hasty rulings made without allowing members of the Committee freely to exercise their right to express their opinions, the Committee had turned its back on the rules of procedure, which should be observed absolutely if the Committee's work was to proceed in full legality, or in other words with due respect for the rights of Members of the Organization. A violation of the normal rules of procedure had been made easier by rulings contrary to the rules of procedure given by the Chairman and endorsed by majority vote of the Committee. In that way, the Committee had ceased its consideration of the most important problems on its agenda and had become involved in a debate, brought about by a political manoeuvre, which had been forced on it in defiance of the rules of procedure and was against the interests of the international community. That clearly reflected the efforts of certain Powers which were trying once again to use the rostrum of the United Nations for cold-war purposes.

7. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq) said that the Iranian motion was self-contradictory and was not entirely consistent

with the rules of procedure, since the Committee, after deciding to adjourn the debate on an agenda item, could not embark immediately upon the discussion of an integral part of that item. In the first place, the Committee's decision to adjourn the debate on agenda items 73 and 72 automatically covered all the draft resolutions introduced under those items. For that reason alone, the Iranian representative's proposal was not acceptable. In the second place, the provisions of rule 117 of the rules of procedure, which had been cited in that connexion, applied only to the first part of the Iranian motion, which concerned the adjournment of the debate, whereas its second part called for the opening of a new debate on a draft resolution. Rule 117 did not apply to such a case. For those reasons, he had voted against the Iranian motion.

8. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) said that since the Committee had voted to adjourn the debate on agenda items 73 and 72, that decision should have applied to all draft resolutions directly relating to those two items. However, the Iranian motion had contained a second and completely distinct part, which contradicted not only the first part but also the rules of procedure, since it called for the consideration of only one of the many draft resolutions submitted on the same subject. The Committee's decision was contrary to the rules of procedure, the more so as once a decision had been taken to adjourn the debate any decision to resume it had normally to be adopted by a two-thirds majority. Lastly, even if the Committee decided to set aside that rule, once the debate was resumed it had to embrace all draft resolutions relating to agenda items 73 and 72; and the order of priority already established could be changed only by a new decision, taken by a two-thirds majority. That breach of the rules of procedure had been the outcome of an intrigue set on foot by certain countries, and the Bulgarian delegation had therefore voted against the Iranian motion. He wished to emphasize that the irregular nature of the procedure followed at the last meeting was clear from the statements made by the representatives who had voted in favour of the Iranian motion, who had professed their respect for the rules of procedure while at the same time declaring that they could not keep to those rules because the question was a political one and should be decided as such. The Bulgarian delegation could not understand how the Chair, which had no policy but to apply the rules of procedure, could have lent itself to that intrigue. Such a procedure must not be allowed to set a precedent; in future the Committee should abide by its rules of procedure.

9. The CHAIRMAN opened the debate on the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1).

10. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan) said that the eight-Power draft resolution had been submitted as a result of a recent statement by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the effect that his country would probably soon explode a 50-megaton hydrogen bomb. The draft therefore concerned a specific case, whereas the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) was concerned with all experiments and explosions which might take place. The declared intention of the Government of the Soviet Union, and what might follow, raised many urgent questions, and it would not be in the interest of the Soviet Union or of any other Member of the United Nations to ignore them. The Committee should not simply express regrets for what was happening, for it affected the lives of many human beings and their

health and welfare. That was why preliminary steps were badly needed.

11. It was beyond dispute that the debate on the two agenda items would be difficult and complicated. The problem had many aspects, which must be carefully studied and considered. However, the specific matter dealt with in the eight-Power draft resolution and the possibilities envisaged in the six-Power draft resolution were very clear and called for no detailed discussion. The problem was to prevent certain acts which would lead to the further deterioration of a dangerous situation.

12. If the Committee delayed the adoption of the necessary preliminary measures, world public opinion might interpret its silence as a sign of indifference, and it was certain that the prestige of the United Nations would be seriously affected. Such an attitude might also lead the other party to resume tests in the atmosphere, thus creating a vicious circle from which it would be very difficult to escape. Admittedly, it could be claimed that the Soviet Union would refuse to accept the eight-Power draft resolution and that the Committee should therefore go to the root of the problem. It was to be hoped, however, that the Soviet Union would appreciate the purely humanitarian motives which had prompted certain Members of the United Nations to submit the draft resolution, which was not motivated by the cold war but by a sincere desire to appeal to the goodwill of the Powers concerned in order to safeguard the well-being of mankind.

13. Finally, he recalled that the United Nations was currently celebrating its sixteenth anniversary. All parties should celebrate that historic occasion as it deserved and should show by their behaviour that goodwill, reason and wisdom must prevail. It was the duty of the great Powers to accept their heavy responsibility for the future of mankind. He would vote in favour of the eight-Power draft resolution, and would also support the six-Power draft resolution if it was put to the vote.

14. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand) said that he would vote in favour of the eight-Power draft resolution. There was no doubt about its urgency. The world had been warned that the Soviet Union would explode a 50-megaton bomb before the end of the month; and the foreseeable consequences of the explosions which had already taken place showed the extreme gravity of that decision. The duty of the United Nations was quite clear, and if the Organization let itself be diverted from that path, its prestige would be seriously impaired.

15. The eight countries which had submitted the draft resolution were among those which were close to the probable site of the explosion and which would bear the most direct consequences. But New Zealand, despite the fact that it was relatively far away, could not remain indifferent to the threat.

16. There was another aspect of the question which should be the subject of serious concern to all Members of the Organization. It had been repeatedly stated in the Committee that a bomb in the 50-megaton range could serve no conceivable military purpose. If the Soviet Union persisted in its intentions, the only conclusion would be that its motive was psychological, and that the explosions were part of the policy of threats and the campaign of intimidation which the Soviet Government had been pursuing for a number of years, in defiance of Article 2 of the United Nations

Charter. That attitude might have serious consequences, since it vitally affected the whole future of international relations, just as it affected the whole problem of disarmament and the problem of lessening international tension. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the Committee could as soon as possible take a vote on the eight-Power draft resolution. He wished to stress once more that the Assembly was not being asked to pass judgement on one of its Members, but simply to use its moral authority by making an urgent appeal to the Power concerned on behalf of mankind.

17. Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom) associated himself with those representatives who had expressed grave apprehension at the prospect of the explosion of a nuclear device in the 50-megaton range. That situation called for a very clear statement by the United Nations, which must not hesitate to speak out on the need to spare the world an unnecessary threat. Like some of the sponsors of the draft resolution, the United Kingdom was fairly close to the Arctic Circle, and therefore vulnerable to the radio-active fall-out from nuclear tests conducted in northern latitudes. The people of the United Kingdom were therefore extremely anxious. Some members of the Committee had implied that the anxiety which had been expressed in the Committee was artificial and part of a NATO conspiracy. Some had even spoken of action by the "aggressive NATO bloc". But it was the Soviet Union which was showing an aggressive attitude; its action threatened the people of the world, their children and the survival of life on the earth. To say, as the representatives of the USSR and Romania had done, that to try to avert that threat was a political ruse against the international community was the last word in cynicism.

18. In the United Kingdom, the Medical Research Council had just reported that the explosion of a 50-megaton bomb might lead to contamination of milk by radio-active iodine at a level close to the permissible maximum, and that bone concentrations of strontium-90 might double in the course of a year. The United Kingdom Government had therefore felt it necessary to make plans to safeguard the health of children aged less than one year.

19. It was those considerations which were causing concern to the public and the authorities in the United Kingdom, and which had led the United Kingdom to support the eight-Power draft resolution, in the hope that the world would be spared an act which would show utter disregard for the fears and wishes of all peoples.

20. On 3 September, the United Kingdom had joined with the United States in proposing to the Soviet Government that they should immediately conclude an agreement, based on national control only, never again to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere. The Soviet Government had rejected that offer and had continued its series of explosions. If that series were to culminate in the explosion of a 50-megaton weapon, the amount of radio-activity it would have released in the atmosphere would be equal to that from all previous tests by all countries.

21. In 1958, a group of eighteen Soviet biologists had made a statement in which they had said, among other things, that the increased radio-activity in the atmosphere due to nuclear tests multiplied the number of severe hereditary diseases and imperilled the health of future generations, who would never forgive the present generation. Yet it was the Soviet Government which was today imperilling the health and future of

all the peoples of the world. In the face of their indignant protests, their representatives in the Committee could not, without betraying them, refrain from protesting in their turn.

22. Mr. ENCKELL (Finland) stated that it had been with a deep sense of disappointment and concern that the Finnish people had learnt of the failure of the Geneva negotiations on banning nuclear tests and then of the end of the voluntary moratorium. They were now overwhelmed by the prospect of a gigantic explosion. The President of Finland had, on 18 October, made his feelings known to the General Assembly (1040th plenary meeting).

23. Finland understood very well that each Power was concerned with its own security; but it could not but regret the probable consequences of the nuclear tests. That was why it was firmly against nuclear tests of whatever size and by whatever country.

24. When, at the fourteenth session, the Committee had considered the question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara, his delegation, while voting for the relevant draft resolution, had expressed regret that it dealt solely with the French tests and not with nuclear tests in general. It now voiced the same regret with regard to the eight-Power draft resolution, since Finland did not indulge in discrimination. On 19 October it had been disappointed to hear the representative of another great Power announce that it might resume nuclear tests in the atmosphere. His delegation solemnly appealed to the Power concerned to refrain from doing so.

25. It was in that spirit, and because Finland, in the present circumstances, found itself in a particularly exposed position, that his delegation would vote for the eight-Power draft resolution. It was grateful to the sponsors for accepting the Indian amendments (A/C.1/L.290).

26. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla KHAN (Pakistan) said that his delegation had associated itself with the six original sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1 for several reasons, and in particular because the deleterious effects of the tests in question were not ultimately confined to certain regions, but, spreading gradually to the most distant areas, would harm life throughout the world. Even if, moreover, the effects of the explosions were confined to certain areas, his delegation considered that what affected the welfare of part of mankind affected everyone.

27. The particular question under discussion must be separated from the general debate on the first two items on the Committee's agenda, because it concerned a specific threat for which a date had been fixed. Since that date was very close, time was running out for any attempt to avert the threat, and the consequences of delay might be tragic.

28. As soon as the Committee had addressed that appeal to the Government of the Soviet Union, it would resume consideration of agenda items 73 and 72, which dealt with the general question of nuclear tests, and the Pakistan delegation would probably have a great deal to say on that subject.

29. Mr. MATSCH (Austria) said he fully understood the feelings of the countries of the Northern hemisphere, and would vote in favour of the eight-Power draft resolution, which was intended as an appeal based solely on humanitarian considerations.

30. Since the Soviet Government had stated on 30 August, in announcing the resumption of its nuclear tests, that it had taken its decision reluctantly, the Austrian delegation hoped that the 50-megaton hydrogen bomb would not be exploded.

31. Mr. DIALLO Telli (Guinea) said that his delegation had taken a very clear stand against all nuclear tests, whatever their magnitude or origin. It had declared itself in favour of the immediate cessation of nuclear tests, pending agreement on an international treaty prohibiting such tests or on general and complete disarmament.

32. At the previous meeting, the Guinean delegation had intended to propose that the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) and the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1) should be merged and voted upon simultaneously, inasmuch as the eight Powers had accepted the Indian amendments (A/C.1/L.290) to their text. Since in view of the turn the discussion had taken at the previous meeting the Guinean delegation had not been able to make that proposal, it wished to ask the eight Powers whether they would agree to add as the first operative paragraph of their draft resolution the following paragraph:

"Urges all the Powers concerned to refrain from further test explosions pending the conclusion of binding agreements in regard to that question or to general and complete disarmament."

33. It was certainly desirable that the Soviet Union should refrain from exploding not only a 50-megaton bomb, but any bomb at all. But the draft resolution as amended by the Guinean delegation would also be addressed to all the other nuclear Powers and to all countries in the process of becoming nuclear Powers.

34. The CHAIRMAN asked the representative of Guinea to submit his amendment in writing, in accordance with rule 121 of the rules of procedure.

35. Mr. DIALLO Telli (Guinea) said that before submitting an amendment he would like to have a reply from the sponsors of the eight-Power draft resolution.

36. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he strongly objected to the manoeuvres by means of which the countries belonging to the Western military blocs, in defiance of the rules of procedure and of the democratic principles by which the Committee's proceedings ought to be governed, had brought about a situation in which the Committee was being allowed to consider only their own draft resolution (A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1). As he would show, the sponsors of the draft resolution were not prompted by moral or humanitarian considerations, but were in fact trying to prevent the Soviet Union from strengthening its security and to obtain very specific military advances for the United States and its allies.

37. When, from 1952 to 1958, the United States had detonated bombs of the magnitude of 15 to 20 megatons—or even 30 megatons, according to some reports—the sponsors of the draft resolution had made no protest, had expressed no alarm, had made no solemn appeal to the United States to give up its tests. At the twelfth session of the General Assembly, when the United States had already carried out more than a hundred nuclear tests, most of them in the atmosphere, Canada and Japan, supported by Norway, instead of

endorsing the Soviet proposal^{1/} for the discontinuance of all nuclear tests, had again called attention to a draft resolution they had submitted at the previous session^{2/} in which it was proposed that such tests should be subject to prior notification—or in other words, should be given a legal basis. The duplicity of the countries concerned was obvious. At the very moment when it had been telling the General Assembly of its fears with regard to the biological effects of radiation, Canada had been preparing to accept American nuclear weapons on its territory. As for Japan, which set itself up as an uncompromising opponent of nuclear tests, that country had signed with the United States an agreement under which Okinawa was ceded to the United States for use as a military base equipped with nuclear bombs. Japan had not protested to the General Assembly after the series of nuclear tests which the United States had carried out in the Pacific in 1958, although that series had appreciably increased the level of radio-activity in the region.

38. Now that the USSR was being compelled, because of the intensive military preparations being carried out and the threats being uttered by the Western countries, to take steps to strengthen its defences, the Western camp was in an uproar. Yet when, at Geneva, the Soviet representative had asked France's allies to urge that country to halt its nuclear tests, the United States representative had said that France was entitled to carry out such tests in the interests of its security. The underground tests recently carried out by the United States had been begun virtually on the day after the White House had made a statement announcing that the United States had no intention of resuming nuclear tests, since it had adequate stock-piles of nuclear weapons of all types. That was convincing evidence that the United States was guided not by considerations of defence, let alone humanity, but by the doctrine of "positions of strength". The same conclusion emerged from the threats uttered on 21 October 1961 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense of the United States, who had said that his country at present possessed tens of thousands of bomber aircraft and rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and that for each of those aircraft and rockets the United States had not one but several nuclear devices. He had added that the United States would not hesitate to use that arsenal. Indeed, according to certain top-secret CENTO headquarters documents published a few months earlier, the United States would be prepared to use it preventively against its own allies, such as Iran and Pakistan, and even against Afghanistan, a neutral State.

39. Those facts showed clearly that Canada, Japan, Iran, Pakistan, and the other sponsors of the draft resolution cared very little for the welfare of mankind, or indeed for that of their own peoples: they were simply exploiting the fears of the people of the world in order to advance their own military plans. The security and future of all States were being threatened by the Western Powers. A nuclear war would cause devastation of monstrous proportions.

40. It was precisely such a catastrophe that the Soviet Union wished to prevent; that was the underlying reason for its resumption of nuclear tests. It had been forced

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, Annexes, agenda item 24, document A/3674/Rev.1, draft resolution.

^{2/} *Ibid.*, Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 22, document A/C.1/L.162/Rev.1.

to take that step by the attitude of the Western Powers, which had wrecked the negotiations on the discontinuance of tests and had intensified their military preparations. The uncommitted countries should realize that nuclear tests were an effect, not a cause. They were the effect of the policy of strength of the Western Powers, which had replied to the USSR decision to conclude a peace treaty with Germany with threats of armed force, instead of dealing with the problem by negotiation. In those circumstances, the most effective way of protecting peace was to face the potential aggressor with the strength of the peace-loving nations.

41. What was necessary, therefore, was to do away with the cause; the effect, nuclear tests, would then automatically disappear. As Mr. Khrushchev had declared at the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, once the disarmament problem had been solved there would no longer be any reason for nuclear weapons, and consequently no further need to manufacture or test them. Only general and complete disarmament would solve once and for all the problem of nuclear tests. But time was short, and since the Soviet Union and the United States had already come to agreement on the principles for negotiations on general and complete disarmament, the Committee's best course would be to take up that question without further delay, set up the negotiating body and, on the basis of the principles referred to, formulate directives for its work. That and that alone would make possible an effective solution which would meet the interests of the peoples and would have real prospects of being put into effect.

42. Mr. VAKIL (Iran), exercising his right of reply, said it was regrettable that the USSR representative had seen fit to refer once again to certain documents fabricated from start to finish by the Soviet Union, according to which the Government of Iran had allegedly given its consent to a military plan entailing the nuclear bombing of part of Iranian territory. Those Soviet allegations had already been categorically denied by the Shah, the Prime Minister and all the competent authorities of Iran.

43. While the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1 had not hesitated to vote in 1959 for a resolution in which the General Assembly had addressed a similar appeal to a member of NATO (resolution 1379 (XIV)), he could remember no case in which a member of the Eastern military group had ventured even to abstain in the vote on a draft resolution directed against another member of the group, let alone vote for such a resolution.

44. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla KHAN (Pakistan), exercising his right of reply, wished to state once again that the foul charges and calumnies against his country repeated by the Soviet representative were nothing but falsehoods cynically invented in Moscow and glibly repeated despite the categorical denials of the Pakistan Government.

45. Mr. DEAN (United States of America) said the United States still believed that the most effective way to handle the matter under discussion was through an international treaty with appropriate controls. The United States delegation would, however, vote for the eight-Power draft resolution calling upon the Soviet Government not to explode a 50-megaton bomb.

46. Mr. ZOPPI (Italy) said that his delegation supported the eight-Power draft resolution. The Italian

people, like many others in the world, were very disturbed by the present series of Soviet nuclear tests, which, proceeding in constant crescendo, was in a few days to reach the 50-megaton level.

47. He could not understand the hesitation shown in the Committee with regard to the eight-Power draft resolution. He cited the resolution just adopted by the Socialist International at Rome, on behalf of 70 million voters, in which the explosion of a 50-megaton bomb was described as a monstrous crime against humanity. The eight-Power draft resolution, in comparison, had been very mild even in its original form, and after the acceptance of the Indian amendments it could in no way be offensive to anyone.

48. It had been said that the appeal made in the draft resolution ought to be addressed to all the nuclear Powers; but it was the Soviet Union alone which had resumed tests in the atmosphere and had announced the explosion of a huge bomb in the immediate future. Such an explosion was useless for military purposes, would make the solution of the disarmament problem even more difficult and posed a serious threat to present and future generations.

49. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) said that the United Nations must not disappoint the hopes of the peoples of the world, who were awaiting an appeal by the General Assembly for the immediate cessation of the air pollution resulting from nuclear tests and were hoping that the Soviet Union would renounce its plan to explode a giant bomb. The remarks just made by the USSR representative gave grounds for believing that the Soviet Government would correctly interpret the meaning of the appeal contained in the eight-Power draft resolution, which had been formulated in the most moderate terms.

50. Reference to the figure of 50 megatons did not, of course, in any way mean that the Committee approved of less powerful explosions. The eight-Power appeal was nothing more than an interim measure but, in view of the imminence of the announced explosion, an urgent one. At a time when the Committee was discussing the need for the cessation of nuclear tests, it could not remain silent when confronted with the specific case of an announced explosion that would be more powerful than anything in the past and dire in its consequences.

51. His delegation would accordingly vote for the eight-Power draft resolution.

52. Mr. HAEKKERUP (Denmark) said that he very much regretted that the representative of the Soviet Union had not in the course of his long speech announced that the Soviet Government would drop the idea of carrying out its plan. As the eight-Power draft resolution had been submitted five days earlier and had been commented upon in the general debate and scrutinized at that meeting, a vote should be possible without further delay in view of the extreme urgency of the question. His delegation therefore moved the closure of the debate under rule 118 of the rules of procedure, so that the eight-Power draft resolution could be voted upon as soon as possible.

53. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that under rule 118 of the rules of procedure he could give permission to speak on the closure of the debate only to two speakers opposing the closure, after which the motion must be immediately put to the vote.

54. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) said that he was opposed to the closure of the debate because the only

speakers who had taken part in the discussion were either sponsors of the draft resolution or opponents of it. He therefore did not consider it fair for the debate to be closed before the countries which considered themselves impartial, and of which very few had up to that point expressed their views, had been given an opportunity to state their position.

55. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) said that he was opposed to the closure of the debate because he felt that the representative of Guinea should be given an opportunity to submit his amendment.

56. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) moved the adjournment of the meeting under rule 119 of the rules of procedure.

The motion was rejected by 47 votes to 11, with 26 abstentions.

57. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the motion for the closure of the debate submitted by the representative of Denmark.

The motion was adopted by 54 votes to 9, with 21 abstentions.

58. Mr. DIALLO Telli (Guinea) asked whether he might explain the situation resulting from his appeal and his draft amendment. If the Chair considered that Guinea could not be allowed to give that explanation, he would then ask under rule 129 to be permitted to explain his vote before the voting.

59. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) thought that the fact that the representative of Guinea had submitted an oral amendment should be taken into account.

60. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that at the time the Danish representative had moved the closure of the debate, no amendment had been submitted by Guinea. Since the Danish motion had been adopted, the debate was closed, and no oral or written amendment to the eight-Power revised draft resolution was before the Committee.

61. Mr. DIALLO Telli (Guinea) explained that, before deciding to submit his draft amendment under rule 121 of the rules of procedure, he had wished to appeal to the sponsors of the eight-Power draft resolution. As his appeal had not been heeded, his delegation would like to direct an appeal to the entire Committee to agree to consider and vote upon the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) immediately after the eight-Power draft and while the suspension of the general debate which had been decided upon at the preceding meeting was still in effect.

62. Mr. PAZHWAK (Afghanistan), Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq), Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus), Mr. BOUZIRI (Tunisia), Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) and Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) asked that the members of the Committee should be permitted to explain their votes before the voting.

It was so decided.

63. Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia) said that he would vote for the eight-Power draft resolution for purely humanitarian reasons and without prejudice to the completely independent foreign policy of Indonesia.

64. Mr. IFEAGWU (Nigeria) said that he would vote for the eight-Power draft resolution as a purely interim measure. That vote must not in any way be construed as authorizing the Soviet Union to explode

25-megaton or 30-megaton bombs or as favouring the continuation or resumption of testing by other nuclear Powers; it signified that the Nigerian delegation was opposed to all nuclear tests regardless of the size of the bombs or the country conducting the tests.

65. Mr. BOUZIRI (Tunisia) said that he would vote for the eight-Power draft resolution because his delegation, being opposed to all nuclear testing, was opposed to the test referred to in the draft. That vote accordingly meant that Tunisia opposed, with equal vigour, all nuclear tests of all kinds in every country. He regretted in that connexion that it had been impossible for the six-Power draft resolution to be put to the vote sooner and that the appeal by the representative of Guinea had not been heeded by the sponsors of the eight-Power draft resolution. The Tunisian delegation particularly regretted that situation because one of the sponsors of the revised draft was Norway, a country whose Parliament had specifically condemned all nuclear testing on the ground of universal ethics. His delegation accordingly endorsed the statement by the Norwegian Parliament (A/C.1/849) which had considered it "a right and a duty to protest and warn against further violations of universal ethics, which condemn nuclear weapons tests".

66. Mr. DIALLO Telli (Guinea) said that though he deplored the spirit in which the debate had taken place, and regretted that the appeal made by the Guinean delegation had not been heeded and that no attempt had been made to reconcile the positions of the two parties between which agreement must be reached if any progress was to be made towards the common objective, Guinea would support the eight-Power draft resolution. In acting thus, Guinea was remaining true to a basic principle, namely, its total and unconditional opposition to all nuclear testing. In voting for the revised draft resolution, the Guinean delegation was appealing to the Soviet Union in connexion not only with the 50-megaton bomb but with all bombs regardless of their size and the place where they were tested. It likewise appealed to all the other nuclear Powers to desist immediately from testing of all kinds, and it appealed to all countries which were not yet nuclear Powers but were making progress towards that goal to forego all nuclear testing.

67. It was in the hope that the six-Power draft resolution would be voted on immediately afterwards, while the suspension of the general debate was still in effect, that his delegation would vote for the eight-Power draft resolution.

68. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) said that, in conformity with a telegram which the President of Ghana had sent to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, he would vote for the eight-Power draft resolution. The Ghanaian delegation had also appealed to all nuclear Powers to desist from all nuclear testing. But the great anxiety aroused by the announcement that a 50-megaton bomb was to be exploded must be alleviated.

69. Mr. LOUM (Senegal) said he would vote for the eight-Power draft resolution because it dealt with a crucial problem and because it was no more than an adumbration of the more general problem that would be dealt with in the six-Power draft resolution, which Senegal had supported from the outset.

70. Mr. SANCHEZ Y SANCHEZ (Dominican Republic) said he would vote for the eight-Power draft resolution and also for the six-Power draft resolution and for

anything that provided for disarmament. As the Soviet representative had himself acknowledged, it was the small States that suffered most from conflicts between the great Powers, and the Dominican delegation would therefore vote for any measure calculated to ensure peace, abolish armaments and lessen the anxiety of mankind.

71. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) said that on the subject of nuclear tests his country's position was very clear, and it explained why he would vote for the eight-Power draft resolution. His delegation fully understood the deep concern that had motivated the draft resolution.

72. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said he would be voting for the eight-Power draft resolution as an urgent measure to meet an imminent danger. But there was an equally urgent need for the adoption of a broader resolution concerning the moratorium and the suspension of nuclear testing under a test-ban treaty.

73. Mr. PAVICEVIC (Yugoslavia) recalled that at the 1176th meeting his delegation had voted against the procedural motion submitted by the representative of Iran because in its opinion the six-Power draft resolution, which provided for a general suspension of nuclear tests, could not be regarded as less urgent than the one relating to the forthcoming nuclear explosion announced by the Soviet Union. He also had grave doubts about the procedure the Committee had seen fit to adopt and he regretted the turn the discussion had taken and the atmosphere in which it had been conducted. Furthermore, he regretted that the delegation of Guinea had not been given an opportunity to submit its amendment. Yugoslavia would, however, vote for the eight-Power draft resolution, for it had always been opposed to nuclear tests, whatever their nature and origin. But it was to be understood that Yugoslavia's vote applied to tests by all the nuclear Powers, in other words not only to the USSR but also to the United States, France and the United Kingdom. However, the debate on the draft resolution had once more demonstrated the absolute and urgent need for a moratorium on all tests by all nuclear Powers.

74. Mr. AHMED (United Arab Republic) associated himself with the observations that had been made by the representatives of Tunisia, Guinea and Ghana. Much as he would have preferred to vote first on a draft resolution condemning nuclear tests of every kind, he would vote for the eight-Power draft resolution because procedural circumstances had given it priority. His delegation wished its vote, however, to be interpreted as a condemnation of all kinds of atomic tests, by whatever Power.

75. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) said he would vote for the eight-Power draft resolution. His delegation's vote was not a vote in favour of a draft resolution that was directed only against one of the nuclear Powers, that referred only to a bomb of one particular size and only to explosions in the atmosphere and to tests to be carried out before the end of the current month. Afghanistan was against any tests, of any size, conducted anywhere, at any time, by any Power. His delegation's vote was motivated by a purely humanitarian concern, and in that connexion it was a pity that the eight-Power draft resolution had not been submitted to the Third Committee, which was responsible for humanitarian questions, rather than to the First Committee.

76. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) said he would vote against the eight-Power draft resolution. The matter had been taken out of the context of the general problem, and the procedure that had been adopted had deprived members not only of their right to express their views freely but also of their right to submit amendments. That procedure could only be described as a political manoeuvre completely contrary to methods which the Organization had to apply in order to foster better understanding among all nations and to secure peace.

77. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) reserved the right to return later to the reasons why he would vote against the eight-Power draft resolution. However, as many speakers had said that the draft resolution should not be considered as directed solely against one atomic test or against one country, namely the USSR, and had expressed the hope that the vote would be directed against all tests and all countries carrying out such tests, he wished to know whether the sponsors of the draft resolution themselves also considered that their resolution was directed, not against the test in question, nor against the USSR, but against all nuclear tests and all countries carrying out such tests.

78. Mr. BUDO (Albania) considered that the manoeuvres carried out in the Committee by certain delegations provided obvious proof of the cold war propaganda objectives pursued by the United States and its NATO allies. That had been clearly shown, in particular, by the attempt made by the Norwegian delegation at the 1174th meeting to have the eight-Power draft resolution voted on, by similar attempts made during the previous meeting and by the motion for closure of the debate submitted at the current meeting. The Albanian delegation was firmly opposed to such manoeuvres, which did no credit to the United Nations. It would therefore vote against the eight-Power draft resolution.

79. The CHAIRMAN put the eight-Power revised draft resolution (A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1) to the vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Greece, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, France, Ghana.

Against: Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia.

Abstaining: Mali.

The draft resolution was adopted by 75 votes to 10, with 1 abstention.

80. Mr. HAEKKERUP (Denmark) asked the Chairman to request the President of the General Assembly to place the draft resolution that had just been adopted

on the agenda of the General Assembly as soon as possible.

81. The CHAIRMAN said he would transmit the Danish representative's request to the President of the General Assembly.

The meeting rose at 7.35 p.m.