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CONTENTS

	Page
Statement by the Vice-Chairman	53
Agenda items 73 and 72:	
Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (<i>continued</i>)	53
The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (<i>continued</i>)	

Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

Statement by the Vice-Chairman

1. Mr. IGNACIO-PINTO (Dahomey), Vice-Chairman, thanking the Chairman for having welcomed him to the dais, associated himself with the tribute paid in his absence to the late Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the United Nations. He congratulated the Chairman on his election and thanked the members of the Committee for the honour they had bestowed on his country and on himself by electing him Vice-Chairman. In particular, he thanked the representatives of Niger, Costa Rica and France, who had put forward or supported his nomination.

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72

Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2, A/C.1/L.288, A/C.1/L.291) (*continued*)

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (A/4799, A/C.1/L.280, A/C.1/L.288) (*continued*)

2. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that the urgency of the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.288) distinguished it from the other draft resolutions relating to the two agenda items under discussion: the proposal stemmed solely from the announcement made on 17 October by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR that the Soviet Government intended to explode a 50-megaton bomb before the end of the month. Consequently, there could be no question of priority.

3. The delegation of Cyprus supported the draft resolution as an interim measure prompted by a natural human reaction to an imminent danger.

4. The Committee should already have taken a vote on the draft resolution; that text should be put to the vote forthwith because its urgency was its only justification.

5. Mr. DEAN (United States of America), referring to certain statements made by the Indian representa-

tive at previous meetings, expressed surprise that an objective observer should see no difference between the parties to the Geneva negotiations as regards preparations for a resumption of nuclear weapons tests. The United States had consistently had as its ultimate objective the cessation of all nuclear tests. It had scrupulously avoided taking any action which could possibly have jeopardized the success of the negotiations. Of course it had kept in being its scientific laboratories, maintained its test sites in standby condition, and maintained or repaired underground installations, but those had been measures of normal prudence in the circumstances. The United States had not made any definite plans or set up any time-tables for resuming tests, nor had it assembled a series of nuclear devices ready for testing when the signal was given. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had not hesitated to take those steps while preparing to violate the moratorium by a series of intensive tests. It was not until 5 September, after the first explosions carried out by the Soviet Union, that the United States had reluctantly concluded that it should resume testing underground.

6. The Indian representative had said that the United States had carried out its Nevada series of tests from January to March 1959, whereas they had taken place before November 1958, or before the moratorium. Those tests had demonstrated the difficulties of detecting underground weapons tests and the evidence presented on that subject by the United States had never been refuted. With regard to unmanned seismic detection stations, the United States itself had proposed to the Soviet Union that they jointly explore that method of control, which showed that, even in that respect, contrary to what Mr. Menon had alleged, the United States had not neglected any possibility of reaching agreement.

7. The representative of India had also mentioned the nuclear testing programme of France, but he had neglected to state that the draft treaty proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/4772) provided that all countries essential to the fulfilment of the agreement would be brought under the treaty obligations. Moreover, the four relatively low-yield explosions detonated by France could not justify the feverish pace of the recent Soviet testing.

8. Finally, Mr. Krishna Menon had spoken of the United States research programme known as "Project Vela" as if it were related to the testing of nuclear weapons. Actually, that programme, whose value had been recognized by the Soviet Union, was intended to increase the effectiveness of the treaty by improving methods for detecting and identifying nuclear explosions.

9. Turning to the question of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests, he expressed the view that the Committee's primary goal should be the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty with international controls. It

could not afford to accept another uncontrolled moratorium because, if nuclear testing was a danger, then clandestine nuclear testing was even more dangerous. The detectability of nuclear explosions depended on how large they were and on where they took place. The detection of tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space did not present insurmountable difficulties in certain conditions. Underground tests were a far more difficult challenge. Since the seismic waves recorded by instruments could have been caused by natural phenomena, the only way to determine their origin was by on-site inspection, which showed the importance of an effective control system. The draft treaty proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/4772) offered the best safeguards in that respect.

10. By recommending that the States concerned should conclude forthwith a treaty banning nuclear tests—a task which would be relatively easy in view of the concessions already made by both sides—the Committee, with its great moral force, would facilitate negotiations aimed at an agreement on general and complete disarmament, contain the spread of the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, eliminate the anxiety caused by the risk of radio-active contamination, and bring about a relaxation of international tension. Moreover, another moratorium would be just as ineffective as the first one. Mr. Khrushchev himself had proved that an uncontrolled moratorium could be terminated unilaterally, without explanation, by any party, thus compelling other States to react quickly in their own security interests. An uncontrolled moratorium offered no guarantee that it was actually being observed; on the contrary, by permitting secret preparations, it favoured the State violating it. In the circumstances, it was natural that a great many Governments should hesitate to subscribe to so precarious an arrangement which, in effect, evaded the basic issue. Moreover, an uninspected moratorium might give the false impression that international control in the field of disarmament was not really essential. That gross misjudgement could impede negotiations for general and complete disarmament for a long time. The United States and the United Kingdom had been guided by those considerations in presenting their draft resolution (A/C.1/L.280).

11. He explained how the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty (A/4772) ensured the establishment of effective control of the prohibition of nuclear tests. He then recounted the concessions made by the United States, since President Kennedy had taken office, in order to meet the Soviet position. For example, the United States had agreed to increase the duration of the proposed moratorium on small underground tests of low seismic magnitude (yielding below 4.75), to allow Soviet experts to investigate the mechanism of the nuclear devices used in the United States for seismic research and other peaceful purposes, to change the composition of the control commission in accordance with the wishes of the Soviet Union, to reduce the number of control posts in Soviet territory, to reduce the number of annual inspections in Soviet territory in some cases, etc. Other proposals in which the United States and the United Kingdom showed a real spirit of co-operation would be found in the United States white paper on the Geneva Conference.^{1/}

^{1/} United States Disarmament Administration, Department of State, *Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests: History and Analysis of Negotiations* (Department of State publication 7258, Disarmament Series 4, October 1961).

12. In conclusion, he emphasized that a workable and effective agreement banning nuclear tests was a fully achievable objective; the only important obstacle was the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to conclude such an agreement immediately as a separate measure, apart from general and complete disarmament. Such a treaty was the only sure way to deal with the problem of nuclear weapons testing and to put an end to an unstable and dangerous situation in which any country could break the moratorium at will. Furthermore, a treaty would break the disarmament impasse, whereas the Soviet tactic would merely delay a final solution. The United States did not believe that the conclusion of a treaty was impossible, provided that the General Assembly prevailed upon the Soviet Union to abandon its intransigent position and resume the Geneva negotiations in good faith.

13. Mr. UNDEN (Sweden), speaking as a sponsor of the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.288), said that it should be given immediate consideration, because of the urgent nature of the appeal to the Soviet Government which it contained. Following the appeal to the Soviet Government by the President of the United States, the sponsors of the draft, like the representative of India at the 1172nd meeting, had felt that the United Nations might make a similar appeal. At the 1173rd meeting, some representatives had asserted that it was not necessary to give priority to the eight-Power draft resolution since the Committee could take action at any time on the draft resolution introduced by India (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2), calling for the suspension of all nuclear weapons tests. But the Committee had not completed consideration of any text relating to nuclear weapons. The substantive debate had scarcely begun.

14. The eight-Power draft resolution was not intended to give preference to any particular solution of the problem of nuclear weapons tests. It was a spontaneous expression of the alarm and anxiety which the peoples of the sponsoring countries felt in the face of the dangers that would be created by radio-active fall-out from the proposed gigantic explosion. Such an appeal should not even need to be discussed.

15. He asked whether the representative of Guinea, who at the 1173rd meeting had described the eight-Power draft resolution as a cold war manoeuvre, believed that the Swedish people were actuated by the spirit of the cold war. If the Guinean Government were to ask France not to carry out nuclear tests in the Sahara, should its request be described as a cold war manoeuvre unless it made a similar appeal at the same time to the other nuclear Powers? It should be realized that the northern peoples felt particularly exposed to monstrous explosions in the Arctic region.

16. The sponsors of the eight-Power draft resolution simply expressed the hope that the Soviet Government would reconsider its decision, which put mankind in danger and would profit no one.

17. Mr. VAKIL (Iran), speaking as a sponsor of the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.288), also asked that it should be given priority. Iran, an immediate neighbour of the Soviet Union, had learnt with consternation of the resumption of nuclear tests by that great Power, and its concern increased as the date on which the series of tests was to culminate in a 50-megaton explosion drew nearer.

18. Soviet scientists themselves were among those who had warned the world of the terrifying dangers of

nuclear tests. At the fourteenth session of the General Assembly in 1959, the representative of the Soviet Union, speaking in the debate in the Committee on the French nuclear tests in the Sahara (1047th meeting), had seemed to share the general concern. If that was how the Soviet Union felt about an atomic bomb, it ought to understand the anxiety created by its present plan to explode a hydrogen bomb, the fall-out from which, it was said, would double the level of radio-activity in the world.

19. As regards the suspicion that the draft was a cold war manoeuvre, he recalled that its sponsors, without exception, had voted for resolution 1379 (XIV), in which the General Assembly had requested France not to proceed with its declared intention to undertake nuclear tests in the Sahara. As in 1959, the sole concern of the sponsors of the present draft was to preserve the world from the harmful effects of an experiment fraught with unknown dangers and defying control. The text, moreover, was worded very moderately; it did no more than address a solemn appeal to the Soviet Government.

20. He hoped that the great majority of the Committee's members, and particularly those who had voted for General Assembly resolution 1379 (XIV), would support the eight-Power draft resolution.

21. Mr. MALALASEKERA (Ceylon) considered that questions relating to nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons concerned all peoples, who could not be denied the right to live because some Powers felt the need to brandish destructive weapons and threaten each other in their desire to lead the world. One was constrained to wonder wherein the greatness of the "great Powers" lay. The true greatness of a nation lay in the contribution it made to the peace and prosperity of the world, to the happiness and well-being of mankind. To boast of having the biggest nuclear bombs in the world, capable of annihilating cities and millions of people, was in no way a sign of greatness.

22. The Soviet Union had stated its determination to continue nuclear weapons testing until agreement was reached to discuss general and complete disarmament, and it proposed to add a 50-megaton explosion to the twenty or so explosions it had already carried out. The United States, for its part, had resumed underground testing and was preparing to carry out explosions in the atmosphere unless a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests was concluded. The USSR would then presumably feel obliged, for the sake of its own security, to undertake another nuclear programme. Thus the contest would continue, until life on earth was endangered without war ever having been openly declared.

23. His delegation wished to state once more that the atmosphere was the common property of all mankind and that no country had the right to pollute the air and thus endanger mankind's existence. It therefore asked the great Powers to stop the present race to destruction and it urgently appealed to the Soviet Union not to carry out its plan of testing a 50-megaton bomb. It also appealed to the United States not to resume nuclear tests in the atmosphere and not to continue tests underground until a treaty was agreed upon. His delegation did not doubt the sincerity of President Kennedy, who had made an impassioned appeal to the General Assembly (1013th plenary meeting) for a peace race. It was sure that neither the President nor the people of the United States would hesitate to sacrifice many advantages in the cause of

world peace. Similarly, having spent four years in the USSR as his country's ambassador, he was convinced that war was the last thing that the people and leaders of the Soviet Union wanted.

24. It was important to find some way of dispelling the distrust which existed between those two powerful nations; the conclusion of a treaty on the suspension of nuclear tests would be a starting-point. It had been comforting to hear the United Kingdom representative state, at the 1173rd meeting, that in March 1961 the main points of disagreement between the parties to the proposed treaty had been narrowed virtually to two. It was legitimate to hope that they would shortly be eliminated, provided that the parties made a sincere and determined effort to that end. But if they were going to do so, the Powers in question would have to renounce invective, provocation, displays of force, increases in military expenditure and other war-like activities.

25. While his delegation was certain that agreement would finally be reached, it did not think that the suspension of nuclear tests should await the conclusion of a test-ban treaty. Apart from the danger to mankind of radio-active fall-out, nuclear tests were the principal manifestation of the arms race, which was causing everyone increasing anxiety. Countries which thought they were exploding nuclear weapons only to maintain peace should reflect on the contradictions inherent in their position.

26. It was mistaken to claim that nations could only negotiate profitably from positions of strength. Experience had shown that nuclear tests could be stopped under a moratorium adopted by common consent. For three years both sides had refrained from carrying out tests, and yet there had been no treaty, no control system, no control commission, no inspection zones, no detailed and elaborate provisions for detecting violations of an agreement on the cessation of tests. Each party had undoubtedly been aware of what the other was doing and, thanks to progress in scientific and technical methods of detection, had known that the other was respecting the moratorium.

27. His delegation was not convinced, therefore, that the most urgent need was for a treaty. In the ultimate analysis a treaty was necessary only because it would make permanent and final the suspension of nuclear tests. In normal circumstances it might be agreed that nuclear tests were part of the question of disarmament and should be dealt with as such; that, however, did not apply in the present situation. Disarmament was an urgent objective, but negotiations relating to it could hardly take place amidst exploding bombs. Pending the discontinuance of nuclear tests, whose essential purpose was clearly to perfect nuclear weapons in preparation for a nuclear war, there was no point in negotiating on disarmament.

28. That was why his delegation appealed for the immediate resumption of the moratorium and the suspension of all nuclear testing. It also urged all concerned to do everything to ensure that the moratorium would be followed by a test-ban treaty as soon as possible.

29. Mr. THORS (Iceland) said that the 50-megaton bomb which the USSR Government intended to explode would have 2,500 times the force of the Hiroshima bomb. Scientists from all over the world had warned of the danger which such explosions posed for present and future generations. The Special Political Com-

mittee had just approved a draft resolution expressing its concern on that subject;^{2/} and the representative of Japan had pointed out that since the resumption of tests by the Soviet Union, radio-activity had been found to be 800 times stronger than normal. Icelandic scientists, for their part, had recorded a 200-fold increase in radio-activity by the end of September. Faced with the dire threat of a 50-megaton explosion, the countries most exposed to the danger were naturally worried, and even scared. In expressing their concern, those countries were not thinking only of themselves; they knew that, sooner or later, the whole of humanity would be threatened. The removal of that threat was therefore a matter of urgency and, as a very short time-limit had been fixed for carrying the threat into effect, an immediate appeal must be addressed to the country concerned through the speedy adoption of the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.288).

30. Since the motives of the sponsors of that draft resolution had been questioned, he would stress that, since its admission to the United Nations in 1946, Iceland had always been an advocate of disarmament and had always strongly opposed atomic tests, wherever conducted. In 1957 and 1958, for example, Iceland had supported draft resolutions calling for the immediate suspension of the testing of nuclear weapons and the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. He reminded the delegations of African countries that at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly he had, in the First Committee (1052nd meeting), unreservedly opposed the nuclear tests which France had then been about to carry out in the Sahara and had voted for the draft resolution on that item, which had been adopted as General Assembly resolution 1379 (XIV). Iceland had thus adopted the same position towards France as it was now adopting towards the Soviet Union.

31. As the Indian representative had stressed at the preceding meeting, it was time to act. What was necessary was, first, to remove the threat of the 30-megaton bomb, then to give careful thought to the draft resolution introduced by India on the total banning of nuclear tests (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2) and, lastly or simultaneously, to consider the question of a treaty. Throughout, Iceland had only one aim: to eliminate the danger impending over present and future generations.

32. Mr. DIALLO Telli (Guinea) said that he wished to reply briefly to the Swedish delegation, which had apparently misunderstood Guinea's position. In his previous statement (1173rd meeting) he had merely pointed out that six of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.288 were members of military pacts and that the draft had little hope of success, while the same result could perfectly well be attained by immediately adopting the Indian draft resolution. He had also stated that very often, positions on a draft resolution were determined not by its contents, viewed objectively, but by the names of the delegations sponsoring it. What had happened since the preceding meeting gave his delegation no reason for withdrawing anything whatever from that assertion.

33. His delegation knew well that Sweden and Iceland, among others, had adopted a categorical position regarding the French tests in the Sahara. He wished to assure those countries that Guinea was as concerned as they were about the nuclear tests referred to in

their draft resolution. But precisely because it wished to see an effective solution, it preferred to vote for a draft resolution which could not be fitted into the context of opposing blocs or the cold war. Being not only against the 50-megaton bomb but against all bombs without distinction, Guinea believed that the Committee could immediately approve the Indian draft resolution, which was addressed to all countries without exception, and covered all bombs, whatever their power.

34. The primary objective of all peoples should be reached in three stages: as an immediate measure, the suspension of nuclear tests, which could be brought about by the speedy adoption of the Indian draft resolution; secondly, a treaty prohibiting all nuclear tests, which could be secured by the adoption of other draft resolutions; and lastly, the ultimate goal, namely, general and complete disarmament.

35. Mr. ENGEN (Norway), speaking as a sponsor of the eight-Power draft resolution, explained that his Government felt bound to act, in the first instance, on behalf of the Norwegian population, since the proposed test site was close to traditional Norwegian fishing grounds and since by reason of the prevailing atmospheric conditions in the area Norway was particularly exposed to the danger of radio-active fall-out. Moreover, the approximately thirty explosions recently carried out by the Soviet Union, most of them in the atmosphere, had yielded about the same amount of explosive power as the whole test series carried out in 1958, and the radio-active fall-out from those explosions had by the middle of October 1961 been considerably higher than in 1958. The explosion of the 50-megaton bomb would in itself double the combined effect of all the previous explosions; and there might even be more explosions of super-bombs coming. The Norwegian authorities had in any case been compelled to consider such steps as storing milk for one week or ten days before distributing it to consumers, in order to reduce the effects of iodine-131, and mixing calcium in bread in order to reduce the danger of strontium-90. The Minister for Social Affairs, who was responsible for the Public Health Service, had a few days earlier announced to the Norwegian Parliament that those steps might in fact have to be taken in the near future.

36. Those facts showed the absurdity of the situation, but Norway was not the only country involved: the problem was of universal importance. That was the reason why the Norwegian delegation had taken the matter up in the United Nations. It fervently hoped that a speedy agreement could be reached to put an end, once and for all, to nuclear tests of every kind. But the current issue was one of extreme urgency, for the deadline was very near. His delegation therefore formally proposed that the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.288) should be considered and put to the vote at the present meeting.

37. The sponsors of the draft resolution accepted the Indian amendments (A/C.1/L.290).

38. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he objected to the procedure proposed by the Norwegian representative. It was clearly a stratagem emanating from NATO, of which Norway was a member, and from the other military blocs, of which Japan, Iran and Pakistan were members—a stratagem designed to confine the debate to the question of a single explosion.

^{2/} Subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 1629 (XVI).

39. The CHAIRMAN said that in view of the Soviet representative's opposition to the Norwegian proposal, the Committee would have to take a decision on whether to adjourn the debate on agenda items 73 and 72 in order to take up the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.288) immediately.

40. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) said that he did not understand the procedure proposed by the Chairman. Under rule 117 of the rules of procedure, the Committee could vote only on an adjournment of the general debate. If the motion for adjournment was adopted, it would then have to decide whether it wished to take up draft resolution A/C.1/L.288. If so, there would have

to be a debate on that draft resolution before it was put to the vote. At all events, the rules of procedure must be respected if the necessary atmosphere of propriety was to be maintained.

41. During the procedural debate on the Norwegian representative's proposal, in which Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India), Mr. ENGEN (Norway), Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus), Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland), and Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) also took part, Mr. ENGEN (Norway), observing that the turn the discussion had taken was placing the Committee in a somewhat undignified situation, withdrew his proposal.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.