

United Nations
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

SIXTEENTH SESSION

Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 1168th
MEETING

Tuesday, 17 October 1961,
at 3 p.m.

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Order of discussion of agenda items (continued)</i>	25

Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

Order of discussion of agenda items (A/C.1/844, A/C.1/L.281/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.282, A/C.1/L.286) (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to the proposal submitted by Afghanistan (A/C.1/L.286) and the amendment to it submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.287), and to the Indian amendment (A/C.1/L.285) to the revised United States proposal (A/C.1/L.281/Rev.1).

2. Mr. BOUZIRI (Tunisia) said that the order in which the items of the Committee's agenda (A/C.1/844) were to be discussed was not merely a procedural matter, since it inevitably raised issues of substance.

3. His country was strongly in favour of general and complete disarmament. It possessed no nuclear weapons and very few conventional weapons. Most of the weapons on Tunisian territory belonged to foreign troops, and their presence was contrary to the wishes of the Tunisian Government and people, against whom they had recently been used. In other parts of Africa too, the forces of colonialism used their arms to suppress peoples fighting for their independence. But however much one might desire to see the question of disarmament settled, it was extremely complex and beset with difficulties. Apart from the problem of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons were widespread and under the control of many kinds of Governments. Even if such difficulties were surmountable, it might take years to settle the question satisfactorily, whereas the problem of nuclear tests could be solved quickly, even if only on a provisional basis.

4. Every nuclear test did incalculable harm to present and future generations and strained the relations between States, thus hindering the solution of other problems. It was therefore urgently necessary that the question of nuclear tests should be discussed first. That question was the subject of two items of the agenda, items 72 and 73. It had been said that those two items were connected; but the same could be said of all the other items on the agenda. If the Algerian question could be separated from that of disarmament, despite the obvious link between them, it should be possible to deal with the question of a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests separately from that of a call for the suspension of such tests. It might be said that the current series of explosions would carry weight in any negotiations regarding a treaty, so that the two items should be considered together; but that line of thought introduced the cold

war into the situation and would hinder the achievement of the immediate aim, namely, the suspension of tests. It had been claimed that a treaty had already been prepared and that there were very few obstacles to its signature. As the representative of India had shown at the previous meeting, however, such optimism was not well founded: there was still disagreement on many points, including some of the most important, and the Committee could not avoid discussing them. Another argument which had been put forward against giving item 73 priority was that a moratorium could easily be broken. But the same was true of a treaty, despite the fact that it would entail a legal obligation and would carry certain guarantees. In his delegation's view, the moral obligation imposed by a United Nations recommendation had as much force as a legal obligation. Even though France, for instance, might disregard United Nations decisions on the question of nuclear tests, its prestige was greatly impaired thereby.

5. For those reasons, his delegation considered that immediate priority should be given to item 73, and that the Assembly should take a decision aimed at ending nuclear explosions. That could be done quickly, without going into related issues, and would make the discussion of those issues simpler. His delegation would therefore support the Indian proposal (A/C.1/L.282) and, subject to further consideration, the proposal just submitted by Afghanistan (A/C.1/L.286).

6. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that although the debate was a procedural one in form, the Committee was in fact concerned with the problem of the survival of the human race, a problem created by the discovery of nuclear weapons. That was a moral issue which transcended specific juridical issues. But the strength of the United Nations lay in its moral authority, which was far greater than its political power. If it refused to exercise that authority, it would consign itself to oblivion.

7. It was generally agreed that the most important item, and the one with which the Committee should begin its work, was item 73. That item consisted of two elements, the suspension of nuclear tests and the obligations of States to refrain from their renewal. Since it was not stated whether those obligations should be moral or contractual in nature, the item covered both possibilities. The overriding importance of the question derived from the fact that the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests had broken down and that testing had been resumed. The resulting public outcry imposed an obligation on the Committee to take action. It must decide on the suspension of tests. It must also call for the renewal of negotiations, so that the suspension of tests would eventually be subject to control; but the Committee was not the place for a detailed discussion of a treaty to ban tests. Thus, as far as the Committee was concerned, the whole problem was re-

sumed in item 73, which had been proposed by India. The Committee could immediately embark on a discussion of that item, at the end of which it should take a decision to urge the nuclear Powers to stop the tests and invite them to continue negotiations for a treaty.

8. But it now appeared that India itself wished to exclude the question of a treaty from item 73, so that under that item the Committee would not even be able to make a general appeal for the conclusion of a treaty. That would mean that item 72 was to be merged with item 19, which ultimately led to the Soviet position that all aspects of disarmament must be taken together. He was whole-heartedly in favour of general and complete disarmament, but that would entail the establishment of control under international law. That would be a long process, and it was essential that in the meantime nuclear tests should be suspended and the suspension backed by the moral authority of the General Assembly. But the world could not rely on moral obligations indefinitely, so that in the not too distant future there must be a treaty.

9. For those reasons, his delegation would vote in favour of the revised United States proposal (A/C.1/L.281/Rev.1) and against the proposal submitted by Afghanistan (A/C.1/L.286) and the Soviet amendment thereto (A/C.1/L.287).

10. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) recalled that at the 1163rd meeting his delegation had proposed an adjournment, so that consultations could be held with a view to reaching agreement on the order of discussion of agenda items without prolonged debate. Such agreement had unfortunately proved impossible, and an unfortunate procedural debate had ensued. His delegation was therefore submitting a proposal (A/C.1/L.286) to the effect that the Committee should discuss item 73 immediately and defer a decision on the order of the remaining items. That proposal was intended as a compromise, and was based on the views expressed by the majority of members who had spoken. The proposal to discuss item 73 first was not directly inspired by the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union and the United States: there had been world-wide concern about the dangers of such tests even before the recent moratorium, concern which had been increased by the refusal of France to recognize the moratorium. Item 73 was not directed against the position of any particular nuclear Power; it was intended to provide an opportunity for an appeal to all such Powers to refrain from carrying out tests. The other items on the agenda were not of such immediate concern to all the Members of the United Nations; consultations on the order in which they would be discussed could be held while the Committee was discussing item 73. That was the point of the second part of his delegation's proposal, which would avoid unnecessary delay.

11. Finally, he asked that his delegation's proposal should be given priority when the Committee came to a vote.

12. Mr. DIALLO Telli (Guinea) deplored the fact that the Committee had spent so much time on the procedural debate when the substantive issues were so pressing. More important than the priority given to one item or another was the atmosphere in which the discussions were to take place, and the present manoeuvring promised ill for the substantive debate. Some delegations, indeed, seemed to think that if

priority was given to a particular item, discussion of the other items would be excluded—an attitude which must be condemned. From the very beginning the Soviet Union and the United States had taken opposing positions on the organization of the Committee's work. If they were unable to agree on that preliminary question, what positive results could the Committee hope to achieve? He appealed to those two Powers to come to an agreement on the essential issue. If they did not, his delegation would abstain in the final vote, since a tactical victory for one side or the other would merely delay a genuine solution.

13. Everyone agreed that the ultimate objective was the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under international guarantees, and that the prohibition of nuclear tests would be a fundamental part of any disarmament programme. Thus the link between items 19 and 72 was such that they could not be dealt with separately, and the priority given to one or the other was of minimal importance. The question of the resumption of the moratorium, on the other hand, deserved absolute priority. In the general debate in plenary, all delegations had spoken of the imperative need to put an end immediately to nuclear tests. The Committee could take the appropriate action without being delayed by negotiations. In so doing, far from jeopardizing the discussion of items 19 and 72, it would create an atmosphere in which a generally acceptable solution might be found. The argument that a moratorium would have only moral and not legal authority was not convincing, since any State which violated a moratorium adopted under United Nations auspices would be subject to the pressure of outraged public opinion.

14. For those reasons, his delegation would support the Indian proposal (A/C.1/L.282) and the Afghan proposal (A/C.1/L.286).

15. Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom) recalled that at the previous meeting, the Indian representative had referred to the possibility of discussing items 19 and 72 together. The United Kingdom delegation had already stated its views on the undesirability of discussing the two items relating to nuclear tests together with the item relating to disarmament; those applied even more strongly to discussing the test-ban treaty item alone in conjunction with disarmament. The communist countries contended that a treaty banning nuclear tests must await final agreement on, and implementation of, disarmament; it was the view of his delegation that given goodwill, early agreement on a test-ban treaty was possible, and he did not think the Committee would want to prejudge the issue.

16. The Indian representative had appeared to suggest that the item relating to a treaty to ban tests could not be discussed because adequate information on the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests had not been made available to the Assembly; but the records had been made available month by month in Geneva and were also available in the United Nations Library for consultation; their volume made that the only feasible procedure.

17. He could not support the Afghan proposal (A/C.1/L.286), since it seemed inadvisable for the Committee to decide now on the priority of only one item, with the prospect of devoting additional meetings several days afterward to the question of the priority to be given to the other items. It seemed to be the

general view that first priority should be given to the Indian item on the suspension of nuclear tests. The treaty item should be placed next on the agenda and discussed together with the suspension item, since the two were closely related. The following two items should be those on disarmament and on the dissemination of nuclear weapons. In the light of what he had said, he felt that the proposals in documents A/C.1/L.281/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.282 should be given priority over the Afghan proposal (A/C.1/L.286).

18. Mr. KALONJI (Congo, Leopoldville) said that if the Committee failed to agree without delay on a resolution having immediate effect, it would be encouraging the nuclear arms race. That thought should be its guiding principle in discussing the priority to be given to the various items. Some representatives had asserted that because the question of disarmament had been placed first on the agenda for three years, it should again be given priority. But it was very doubtful whether any resolution on disarmament would lead to immediate and effective measures. So far as concerned nuclear tests, on the other hand, an immediate solution was possible. It was the most urgent, rather than the most ancient, problems that should have precedence. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of giving priority to item 73, which should be followed by item 72.

19. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the United States revised proposal (A/C.1/L.281/Rev.1) because it believed that a moratorium divorced from a treaty would be ineffective. General Assembly resolutions had considerable moral authority, but they were only recommendations and the limits of their force were shown by the recent series of explosions. The international community recognized only one instrument by which violations of a commitment could be made subject to sanctions, namely, a treaty.

20. Mr. DEAN (United States of America) pointed out that the Committee might quite logically have given priority to the United States-United Kingdom item on a treaty to ban nuclear tests, since that item had been submitted earlier than the Indian item and was based on the complete text of a treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments, under effective control—a treaty brought about after three years of intensive negotiations. Nevertheless, recognizing the urgent need for action to stop nuclear testing, the United States had sought to meet the Indian delegation by proposing that the two items on testing should be discussed simultaneously. It had made that proposal because it considered the two items to be so closely interrelated that neither could be considered separately from the other, so that to give one of them priority over the other would be to prejudge the question of what was the most desirable approach to the problem of the cessation of tests and would even tend to eliminate the possibility of full and adequate discussion of the item given second place. An additional reason for the United States proposal had been the desire to stop the procedural wrangling in the Committee and to avoid a long, repetitive and unproductive debate on a question of great urgency. On the other hand, the United States had no desire to prevent any delegation from expressing its views on either or both of the items dealing with nuclear tests.

21. In order further to meet the views of the Indian representative, the United States had revised its original proposal and agreed that the Indian item

should be listed as the first item on the Committee's agenda, with the United States-United Kingdom item second, on the understanding that the two should still be discussed simultaneously. The Indian delegation had reacted by insisting on monopolistic priority for its own item. The United States regretted that attitude of intransigence, which was not calculated to foster the best atmosphere for the solution of the problem of stopping nuclear tests.

22. The effect of the proposal introduced by Afghanistan (A/C.1/L.286) would be not only to give absolute priority to the Indian item on a suspension of tests, but also to separate the two closely linked items relating to that subject and to defer consideration of the United States-United Kingdom item to some indefinite date. Curiously enough, that procedure happened to coincide with the procedure advocated by the Soviet Union, except that the Soviet Union wanted to discuss the disarmament item before the Indian item on a suspension of tests, and was not prepared to consider the question of a test ban treaty at all unless it was taken in conjunction with the question of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The effect of the Afghan proposal would be to postpone for a very long time any possibility of the effective discontinuance of nuclear testing. In the circumstances, he urged the Committee to reject the Afghan representative's suggestion that his proposal (A/C.1/L.286) should have priority in the vote on the procedural proposals.

23. It had been argued by many delegations that the re-establishment of a voluntary and uncontrolled moratorium on nuclear testing should be the Committee's first business, because such a moratorium could come into force immediately, whereas a test-ban treaty involved delay for negotiations. That was not a valid analysis of the situation. Obviously, the Committee could adopt a moratorium resolution, but it should also aim at a higher goal, namely, to bring about the permanent cessation of testing. There was no way to put a definite stop to all nuclear weapons tests except through an international treaty creating a solemn legal obligation, with effective international control. The machinery for effective control was fairly complicated, but once it had been agreed upon it would be possible to end all nuclear tests in all environments immediately. The United States was prepared to sign such a treaty at once, and was willing to use as a basis for negotiation the draft treaty submitted at Geneva and the further proposals made there.

24. The Committee should consider whether, in the light of Mr. Khrushchev's announcement that the Soviet Union would continue its tests in the atmosphere through the month of October and that they would culminate in the explosion of a 50-megaton nuclear device—equivalent to 50 million tons of TNT—there was really any possibility of stopping nuclear tests by voting a moratorium. It should be remembered that all nuclear tests undertaken by all nations prior to 1958 totalled some 90 megatons. When the current Soviet testing programme was completed, the tests it had carried out in the two months between 1 September and 31 October would have produced an additional energy yield of more than 60 megatons in the atmosphere, a figure amounting to over two-thirds of the total previous yields since 1945. The Soviet Union would have released that vast amount of energy into the atmosphere despite the existence of the moratorium for whose continuation it had voted at the Assembly's fifteenth session. Mr.

Khrushchev's announcement should have dispelled any doubts as to the nature of the Soviet Union's policy and tactics. Moreover, the series of tests begun by the Soviet Union in September had been long planned and secretly prepared, judging from the rapidity with which they had been carried out. For their part, the United States and the United Kingdom, during the three years of negotiations on a test-ban treaty, had faithfully observed both the letter and the spirit of the voluntary moratorium, and had not prepared for any nuclear tests because they had expected to sign a treaty.

25. It was most probable that the date of 31 October announced by Mr. Khrushchev as the end of the current series of tests was intended to coincide with action by the General Assembly supporting an uncontrolled moratorium on nuclear tests. The moratorium would then operate against the United States and the United Kingdom—which had observed the previous moratorium—and would place the United States in a most difficult position; moreover, the Assembly would have been tricked and deluded. There could be no moratorium which the Soviet Union would not unilaterally and secretly violate while calling upon all other States to respect it.

26. He therefore urged the Committee to exert every effort to ensure the cessation of nuclear tests in all environments by pressing for the renewal of negotiations on a test-ban treaty. A treaty would be far more than a legal obligation; it would set up scientific and properly supervised controls in order to ensure that no nation violated its provisions by conducting tests in any environment. That was the only realistic way for the Assembly to bring about the end of nuclear testing.

27. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan), replying to the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, said that his proposal (A/C.1/L.286) had been intended to crystallize the consensus of opinion in the Committee on the first item to be discussed, so that work could be started immediately. There was obviously no agreement concerning the order in which the remaining items should be discussed, and the Afghan proposal was intended to allow time for consultations between the great Powers with a view to reaching such agreement. It was not the intention of the Afghan proposal to place the United States-United Kingdom item on testing in a subordinate position or to defer its consideration indefinitely, as Mr. Dean had asserted. On the other hand, it was perfectly true that the effect of giving priority to the Afghan proposal would be the same as that of giving priority to the Indian item. His delegation felt that the Indian item should be considered first because that was the view held by the majority of the Committee, and because the non-nuclear Powers were primarily interested in the item which could most promptly and effectively deal with the world situation now prevailing. He hoped therefore that the Indian delegation would not insist on priority for its proposal (A/C.1/L.282) but would transfer its support to the Afghan proposal. Admittedly, the adoption of the Afghan proposal would defer consideration of the United States-United Kingdom item to a later date.

28. While there was no doubt that the two items on testing were similar, as the United Kingdom representative had said, that similarity was not sufficient ground for discussing them simultaneously; they remained distinct items.

29. It had been argued that the United Nations should take stronger action than the mere adoption of an appeal for a test suspension: that it should press for a test-ban treaty. The delegation of Afghanistan would support that argument if the United Nations were in a position to impose a treaty on all parties; however, some parties were unwilling to sign a treaty. Moreover, if there was to be a treaty, it should not be confined to guaranteeing the cessation of tests; it should ensure the destruction of all existing nuclear weapons. Afghanistan hoped that agreement would soon be reached among the great Powers on that vital measure of disarmament.

30. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the crucial issue was how to prevent the present grave international situation from deteriorating further and ending in war. It was therefore essential for the Committee to take up discussion of the question of general and complete disarmament. Programmes for the achievement of that goal had been submitted to the General Assembly by both the Soviet Union and the United States. The prospects for agreement on disarmament were particularly favourable, now that the Soviet Union and the United States had agreed on the basic principles for general and complete disarmament (A/4879). Obviously, once agreement was reached on disarmament and on the first measures for implementing it, the basis would also exist for a solution of the problem of nuclear testing.

31. He could not understand why the Indian representative had described the item on disarmament introduced by the Soviet Union as a "cold war item", particularly since India had itself, at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, introduced a draft resolution on general and complete disarmament. The contrary was true: the disarmament item had been introduced with a view to preserving peace.

32. Various observations had been made concerning the Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear testing. He wished to state once again that the Soviet Union had resumed testing reluctantly, having been forced to do so by the preparations openly being made by the United States for an attack on the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, which had left it no choice but to strengthen its defences. The Soviet Union considered its policy a just one, and would continue to carry it out in the interests of peace, whatever might be said about it in the First Committee.

33. The United States had long resisted the efforts of the Soviet Union and of many Asian and African countries, including India, to bring the question of the banning of nuclear tests before the United Nations. It was only under the pressure of world opinion that the United States had finally been forced to take part in the negotiations on that subject begun at Geneva in 1958. At Geneva, moreover, the United States had sought to exclude underground testing from any ban on tests, so as to be able to continue perfecting its nuclear weapons. The United States representative's assertion that his country wished to halt testing was therefore unconvincing.

34. Since the United States was at present opposed to a moratorium on testing, i.e. to the cessation of testing in the absence of a treaty, he could not understand why the United States representative reproached the Soviet Union for conducting tests. Moreover, the United States representative's assertion that a new moratorium would operate against his country was a

clear indication that the United States was preparing to carry out tests. In fact, it had already carried out three underground tests, which, because of their complex nature, had obviously called for preparations while the moratorium had still been in effect; thus, the United States representative was hardly justified in his assertion that the United States had fully observed the moratorium whereas the Soviet Union had made secret preparations for testing. The United States had violated the moratorium too, by conducting underground tests; furthermore, it had failed to dissuade its French ally from conducting tests even while the moratorium had still been in effect and negotiations had been in progress at Geneva.

35. Under existing conditions, the problem of testing could not be solved in isolation from that of general and complete disarmament. That was so because the United States was opposed to a moratorium, and was pressing for the conclusion of a treaty which would ban only certain types of tests and would set up a system of control enabling it to carry out espionage in the Soviet Union and other countries. The fact that the United States was setting those conditions showed that it did not anticipate the early conclusion of a treaty and did not intend to halt its tests. Accordingly, there was no point in discussing the question of testing except in conjunction with that of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet-United States joint statement of agreed principles for general and complete disarmament called for specific measures which would contribute to a solution of the problem and would form part of an eventual disarmament treaty. The only realistic approach to the banning of nuclear tests was for the United States, the Soviet Union and other interested Powers to work out a programme of general and complete disarmament and to reach agreement on the cessation of testing as one of the specific measures to which he had just referred.

36. In view of those considerations, the Committee should immediately take up all four items dealing with disarmament. His delegation could not support the Afghan proposal (A/C.1/L.286), which would merely create the false impression that something was actually going to be done with a view to the cessation of nuclear testing. It would continue to press for the adoption of its amendment (A/C.1/L.287) to the Afghan proposal, which would provide that items 19, 72, 73 and 81 should be discussed immediately. It was in favour of considering all four items simultaneously.

37. Mr. DEAN (United States of America), replying to the Soviet representative, recalled a statement made on 12 July 1961 by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, to the effect that if the countries of the world adopted a decision contrary to the security interests of the Soviet Union, the latter would not recognize that decision and would rely on its own strength to uphold its rights. At the present time, the Soviet Union was violating the moratorium recommended by the General Assembly. The United States had resumed testing only after the Soviet Union had done so; moreover, it had conducted only underground tests, for which no preparations had been made during the period of the moratorium.

38. The United States and the United Kingdom had offered the Soviet Union a treaty which would ban all tests in all environments, and were still prepared to sign such a treaty if the Soviet Union did so. How-

ever, there was obviously no point in voting for another moratorium when the Soviet Union was engaged in violating the earlier one and when Mr. Khrushchev had said that the Soviet Union would disregard any United Nations decision that was contrary to its interests.

39. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) said that the Committee's task for the moment was not to decide whether item 73 was more important than item 72, or to agree on a solution of either question, but to decide where the debate should start. However, the manner in which agenda items were formulated and the order in which they were discussed were significant, because they prejudged the course of the debate and sometimes even the ultimate solution. For example, the original United States proposal (A/C.1/L.281) had been worded in such a way as to place greater emphasis on a test-ban treaty and, therefore, on the question of control of testing, while the Indian proposal (A/C.1/L.282) implied that all other considerations should be set aside and that the Committee should immediately adopt a resolution calling for a new moratorium on nuclear testing. The revised United States proposal (A/C.1/L.281/Rev.1) was both fairer and more logical; it prejudged nothing. If it was adopted there would be a general debate, in the course of which some States would argue in favour of an immediate moratorium while others would press for a treaty; a consensus of opinion would emerge and eventually be embodied in appropriate resolutions. If the debate showed that a moratorium could be implemented forthwith, before the other aspects of the question had been settled, the Committee would have made a significant gain; if, on the other hand, it developed that a test-ban treaty could be signed within a very short period, the Committee would certainly be glad to recommend the conclusion of such a treaty. Thus, there was nothing sinister in the United States revised proposal. Moreover, it was in fact impossible to dissociate the two items on nuclear testing, and it was an illusion to think that they could be separated for purposes of debate. The Indian item itself was composed of two parts, one calling for the suspension of tests and the other for the obligation of States to refrain from their renewal. By adopting the agenda item in that form, the Assembly had already bound the Committee to discuss both aspects of the question.

40. In any event, the Greek delegation could not share the view expressed by the Indian representative that a treaty would have little value; that it was the moral element which was decisive in any legal obligation, and that nothing important was added by giving a moral obligation legal form. On the contrary, history had shown that people and nations had consistently sought to strengthen moral commitments by giving them the backing of legal obligations which, while not inviolable, did at least offer some guarantees.

41. He wished to conclude by pointing out that if there was complete disagreement on the subject of a moratorium the Committee would be unable to adopt any useful decision. The best that could be hoped for was that in the course of a debate on both aspects of the problem possibilities would emerge which the Committee could turn to account.

42. Mr. Krishna MENON (India) recalled the United States representative's assertion at the previous meeting that the very fact that he, the Indian repre-

sentative, had referred to the draft treaty on a nuclear test ban indicated that the treaty item and the item on the suspension of testing could not be discussed separately. He wished to point out that he had referred to the treaty only to draw attention to the enormous amount of detail which it involved and to the fact that it by no means represented full agreement between the parties.

43. Replying to the observations of the Peruvian representative, he said he had no recollection that his Government had ever taken the position that a treaty was not necessary. The point at issue was merely whether the item introduced by his delegation and the treaty item should be discussed at the same time. In the memorandum introducing its item (A/4801/Add.1), his delegation had stated that it was essential to resume without delay the effort to reach agreement on a treaty. His delegation had not opposed consideration of the United States item or attempted to place it at the bottom of the agenda, nor had it sought a monopoly for its own item, as the United States representative had contended. It had merely proposed that item 73 should be listed first on the agenda; it did not feel that item 73 must be considered apart from all the other items. Indeed, his delegation did not support the Afghan proposal (A/C.1/L.286), which, by singling out item 73 for immediate consideration, might imply that the United States item was to be placed far down on the agenda rather than in the second position.

44. In reply to the United Kingdom representative, he wished to say that he had never advocated the suspension of nuclear tests without controls. He had merely contended that neither a test-ban treaty nor disarmament would be possible so long as nuclear testing continued to aggravate international tension. Furthermore, he had not suggested that the treaty item should be discussed together with the disarmament item. His delegation's point was merely that the drafting of a test-ban treaty was a highly complex matter, while the resumption of testing posed an immediate problem.

45. He wished to point out that although the General Assembly had requested, in its resolution 1577 (XV) that the participants in the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests should report the results of their negotiations to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly, no official notice of the termination of the Conference had been received. In that resolution, which had been adopted on 20 December 1960, the General Assembly had also urged the Geneva negotiators "to seek a solution for the few remaining questions" relating to a test-ban treaty. On 3 June 1961, however, the United Kingdom and United States delegations had transmitted to the Secretary-General a "Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests" (A/4772) submitted by those two countries at Geneva on 18 April. Obviously, the extent of disagreement had been greater than that indicated in resolution 1577 (XV), and the two Western Governments had therefore transmitted their latest draft to the United Nations. The General Assembly had in various resolutions called upon the parties to the Geneva negotiations to work out a treaty banning nuclear tests. Until a new resolution was adopted, therefore, the First Committee would have no authority to take over that task.

46. Referring to the second part of the United States representative's statement, he said that while the

Committee could be said to be engaged in a procedural discussion, it was not wrangling; moreover, as several representatives had pointed out, questions of substance had been touched upon, primarily because most delegations were anxious to ensure an overwhelming vote in favour of a resolution calling for the suspension of tests, a resolution which would have so strong a moral impact on the nuclear Powers that it would compel them to discontinue testing. Thus, India's attitude was not motivated by any vested interest or desire to monopolize the debate, as the United States representative had asserted. Nor did the Indian delegation deserve to be described as "intransigent". Indeed, it had recognized the concession made by the United States in agreeing that item 73 should be "listed" as the first item of the agenda (A/C.1/L.284), and had accepted that amendment to its proposal (A/C.1/L.282). It was prepared to compromise, provided that compromise was not equated with surrender.

47. It was not true, as the United Kingdom representative had asserted, that India was seeking to evade the question of a test-ban treaty because it feared the results; in fact, the explanatory memorandum accompanying India's request for the inclusion of its item in the agenda (A/4801/Add.1) clearly invited the nuclear Powers to conclude such a treaty. However, India regarded it as a matter of paramount importance and urgency that pending the conclusion of a treaty banning tests, nuclear explosions should be stopped.

48. He denied that he had described item 19 of the agenda (Question of disarmament) as a "cold war item", as the Soviet representative had suggested. What he had said was that the procedure of linking it with the Indian item on testing would be a cold war procedure; and the same applied to item 72. The General Assembly had been discussing disarmament for ten years; yet the major Powers were still very far from agreement. If they could give assurances that they were prepared to sign a disarmament treaty within twenty-four hours, India would be glad to withdraw its item.

49. The Committee should take the Indian item first because it dealt with an urgent and important problem, because it reflected the sentiments of millions of people all over the world and because it was fully within the competence of the General Assembly. The Assembly was the appropriate organ to voice the world's concern to the four nuclear Powers. He was confident that if the Indian item was given priority and discussed separately, the Committee would not be obliged to enter into complex technical matters. His delegation had agreed that once a decision had been taken on item 73, item 72 should be discussed. Accordingly, it could not support either the Afghan proposal (A/C.1/L.286) or the Soviet amendment to it (A/C.1/L.287).

50. The Indian position was based on the conviction that the only way to stop the devastating nuclear explosions now being set off by both the Soviet Union and the United States was to bring to bear the overwhelming force of public opinion. The draft resolution which the Indian delegation had submitted (A/C.1/L.283) did no more than give expression to that opinion; it said nothing which could be interpreted as opposed to control, and it clearly recognized that every effort should be exerted to urge the nuclear Powers to conclude the necessary agreements. The

Greek representative's suggestion that India had reservations concerning the binding character of international obligations was untrue; he (Mr. Menon) had merely stated that the draft treaty (A/4722) contained a withdrawal clause (article 22) which provided that the treaty should remain in force indefinitely subject to the right of a party to withdraw and be relieved of its obligations thereunder if the provisions of the treaty were not being fulfilled and observed. It was patently clear from the terms of the treaty itself, therefore, that its enforcement depended in the last analysis on the existence of unanimity and mutual confidence between the parties. While it could not be said that a voluntary suspension of nuclear testing was equivalent to a test-ban treaty, it was likewise wrong to maintain that such a suspension had no value; after all, the last moratorium had lasted for a considerable period, and it was precisely because it had been broken that the world was in its present position.

51. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that the representative of India had not dealt with the substance of his remarks. There were three main points to be made. First, whether or not a particular question formed a single unit did not depend on the view of the person who formulated it, but on the nature of the question. By its nature, a suspension of nuclear tests involved certain obligations—the moral obligation to suspend them and the juridical obligation to embody that moral obligation in a treaty. Secondly, once the General Assembly had urged the States concerned to discuss a treaty, there was a moral obligation to continue negotiating. The Committee could not lay itself open to the charge that it had failed to recognize that obligation. Thirdly, no reason had been given why an invitation to the nuclear Powers to conclude a treaty would be inconsistent with the nature of item 73.

52. Mr. DEAN (United States of America) pointed out that item 72 had been submitted for inclusion in the Assembly's agenda by the United States and the United Kingdom before item 73 had been submitted by India. Item 72 should therefore normally have been discussed first. In order to meet the wishes of the Indian delegation, however, the United States had proposed that the two items should be discussed together. The Indian delegation had insisted that its own item should be listed first, and had said that the question of a combined debate could be discussed later. In a spirit of compromise, the United States had agreed to list item 73 first; but the Indian delegation had shown no willingness to accept the pro-

cedure of a combined debate. Thus when the Indian representative said that because his delegation had accepted the United States amendment (A/C.1/L.284), the United States should accept the Indian amendment (A/C.1/L.285), he was in effect refusing to move from his original position. The United States and the United Kingdom had already been as conciliatory as they could reasonably be expected to be.

53. The CHAIRMAN said that the procedural debate was closed, and that the Committee would proceed to the vote. The Committee had before it, first, the United States revised proposal (A/C.1/L.281/Rev.1) and an amendment to it submitted by India (A/C.1/L.285); secondly, the Indian proposal (A/C.1/L.282) as amended following the acceptance by the sponsor of the United States amendment (A/C.1/L.284); and thirdly, the Afghan proposal (A/C.1/L.286) and an amendment to it submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.287), which superseded the oral proposal submitted by the Soviet delegation at an earlier stage in the debate (1163rd meeting). In addition, the delegations of India and Afghanistan had each requested priority for their proposals. The Indian request had been submitted first and would therefore be put to the vote first. Regardless of the result of that vote, the Afghan request would then be put to the vote. If both requests were approved by the Committee, the Afghan proposal would have priority. If neither was approved, the Committee would vote first on the Indian amendment to the United States proposal and then on that proposal itself.

54. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) pointed out that when the Indian request for priority had been submitted, the Afghan proposal had not been before the Committee.

55. The CHAIRMAN observed that the representative of India had asked for priority for his proposal without further qualification. It would be put to the vote first, having been submitted first. Under the procedure he had described, however, the Committee would be able to give priority to either proposal, as it saw fit.

56. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) said that in view of the lateness of the hour the voting should be postponed until the next meeting. He therefore moved the adjournment of the meeting.

The motion for adjournment was adopted by 49 votes to 26, with 16 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 7.35 p.m.