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CONTENTS

Page

Order of discussion of agenda items (continued) 7

Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

Order of discussion of agenda items (A/C.1/844, A/C.1/ L.281, A/C.1/L.282) (continued)

1. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla KHAN (Pakistan) said that the question of nuclear tests was ancillary to that of disarmament, and that the resumption of testing was a present and continuing danger. Consequently, the two agenda items relating to nuclear tests (items 72 and 73) should be given priority over item 19, entitled "Question of disarmament". Since the two items on testing were intimately linked, they should be taken together in the general debate. The United Nations should not be content with a voluntary moratorium on testing, such as the one which had unfortunately just ended; a new test suspension should take the form either of the acceptance of a General Assembly recommendation to that effect or of an agreement between the nuclear Powers. At the resolution stage of the discussion, each draft resolution submitted on the items concerning nuclear tests should be considered separately and voted.

2. Mr. BROOKS (Canada) said that while his delegation was as determined as any other that the United Nations should take positive steps to facilitate progress towards disarmament at the current session, it considered that the recent resumption of nuclear weapons testing had created a situation of such urgency as to demand immediate consideration. Consequently, the question of nuclear tests should be taken up first by the Committee; if the broader issue of disarmament were debated first, it would prevent the immediate action on nuclear testing which the majority of Members desired.

3. The Committee should not permit a procedural dispute on the order of agenda items to delay the beginning of its substantive work. Whatever procedural proposal was adopted—that of the United States (A/C.1/L.281) or that of India (A/C.1/L.282)—it was clear that in practice it would not be possible to consider any one aspect of the problem of halting nuclear tests in isolation from the other aspects. Consequently, the two items relating to nuclear tests should be discussed simultaneously, on the understanding that specific proposals and draft resolutions would be given separate consideration.

4. As it had become apparent that little progress could be hoped for in resolving the differences of opinion on procedure which had been expressed in the Committee, the Canadian delegation hoped that there would be no further adjournment and that the order

of discussion of agenda items would be decided, if necessary by vote, after the list of speakers on it had been exhausted.

5. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that the two items on nuclear tests should be taken first. It was logical that the Committee should give priority to those two items, both because they were specific and clearly defined, and because it should be relatively easy to dispose of them in view of the unanimous support among delegations, Governments and peoples for the cessation of nuclear tests. The discontinuance of nuclear testing was a matter of vital urgency; scientists were agreed as to the harmful effects of tests on human and plant life, and their dangers for future generations. It was the duty of the General Assembly, which represented the conscience of humanity, to tackle the problem of nuclear testing as quickly as possible.

6. If the Assembly took positive action, by a decisive vote, on the question of tests, a favourable atmosphere would be created for discussion of the more complex problem of general and complete disarmament. Although agreement had already been reached on the guiding principles for negotiations on that broader issue, much time would be required to work out detailed ways and means. If the Committee took up those very serious problems of detail first, it would be turning a deaf ear to the clamour of mankind for the cessation of nuclear testing.

7. The two items on nuclear tests were very closely linked; the *de facto* suspension of tests and the obligation of States to refrain from their renewal represented the goal or end, while a treaty to ban tests under international control constituted the means to that end. Not only, indeed, should both questions be discussed together, but there could be a single resolution to cover the two items.

8. The objective of the Committee should be to restore the moratorium agreed on in good faith between the three nuclear Powers, side by side with negotiations aimed at giving the cessation of tests the juridical backing of a treaty providing for inspection. The voluntary moratorium had been more than a bilateral agreement; it had been a solemn moral commitment to all peoples to continue the suspension of tests until a treaty was concluded. Now that the moratorium had been ended, every effort should be made to reinstitute it and to see that it was followed by sincere efforts for the conclusion of a treaty offering the safeguard of inspection.

9. Mr. ZOPPI (Italy) said his delegation strongly felt that the items relating to nuclear tests should be discussed first. The reasons which had prompted the recommendations made by the General Assembly since 1958 still held good. The controlled discontinuance of all tests was still the most urgent problem to be solved, if confidence was to be built up in international relations. The urgency of the problem also derived

from the fact that one of the parties to the test-ban negotiations had seen fit to disregard all the work that had gone into the preparation of a treaty and to insist that the discontinuance of tests should either be effected without proper guarantees or await the completion of the entire process of general disarmament.

10. In view of the dangerous situation that had been created by the resumption of tests in the atmosphere, the Italian delegation felt that before initiating a debate on disarmament as such the First Committee must give sober and thorough consideration to the items on its agenda relating to nuclear testing. While the relevant resolutions would have to be voted on separately, it would be impossible to discuss the two items in isolation. Accordingly, the Italian delegation supported the United States proposal.

11. Mr. ANUMAN RAJADHON (Thailand) said that the items relating to nuclear weapons tests should be discussed first, since they concerned vital issues which must be settled promptly in the interests of peace and the very survival of mankind. While not belittling the importance of the question of disarmament, his delegation felt that since that highly complex question had been discussed outside the United Nations for some time without results, it was very doubtful if a mere two-months' discussion would produce the desired agreement. It was disappointing to find that the sponsors of the two items relating to nuclear tests had been unable to reach a compromise on the order in which their items should be discussed. However, since the United States delegation had in fact modified its position in order to offer some measure of compromise, Thailand was prepared to support its proposal (A/C.1/L.281).

12. In view of the urgency of the problem of nuclear tests, his delegation appealed to the major Powers to do their utmost to find a solution to it. The outcome of the discussions on the question would affect the whole human race for generations to come. The continuance of tests would not only increase the pollution of the earth's atmosphere but would inevitably lead to a suicidal nuclear holocaust and the eventual destruction of the world.

13. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) said that the question of general and complete disarmament was the most important political question on the agenda of the sixteenth session; the conclusion of a treaty on that question would exclude for all time the possibility of war among States. The General Assembly had shown its awareness of that fact by proclaiming in its resolution 1378 (XIV) that the question of general and complete disarmament was the most important one facing the world today and by deciding, in resolution 1617 (XV), to take up for consideration at its sixteenth session the problem of disarmament and all pending proposals relating to it. The need to reach a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament had recently become even more urgent because of the increased danger of war resulting from the intensification of the arms race by the United States and other NATO Powers and the acceleration of their military preparations. However, a first step towards a solution had already been taken, in the form of agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the guiding principles for disarmament negotiations (A/4879). Only general and complete disarmament, the prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of their manufacture and the destruction of existing stockpiles could finally solve the problem of nuclear tests.

14. The Government of Romania was in favour of the earliest possible destruction of all nuclear weapons. It was clear that the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament providing for the destruction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery would free mankind from the danger of nuclear war and of the effects of nuclear tests. The experience of the Geneva negotiations had shown that the cessation of nuclear tests did not reduce the danger of nuclear war or guarantee peace; nor did it reduce the military potential of States, conventional and nuclear, or prevent them from continuing to produce nuclear weapons of existing types. Furthermore, throughout the period of the Geneva negotiations the moratorium on testing had been defied by France, one of the NATO Powers; and the French Government had declared that it would not be bound by any agreement reached on a test ban. The negative position of the Western Powers on the moratorium had been shown by President Kennedy's statement, at his press conference of 11 October, that he did not feel that the moratorium would be extended during the period of negotiations. The Geneva negotiations had been frustrated by the insistence of the United States and the United Kingdom on legalizing certain types of tests so that specific nuclear weapons could be perfected.

15. During the period of the Geneva talks, moreover, the NATO Powers had increased their military expenditure, accelerated the mobilization of their military manpower and expanded the production of weapons and military vehicles at an unprecedented rate. United States military expenditure had increased from \$45,500 million in 1958—the year in which the so-called moratorium and the Geneva negotiations had begun—to \$46,600 million in 1959, after a year of negotiations; and it had now reached more than \$50,000 million. During the same period, the United Kingdom's military budget had risen from £1,590 million to £1,650 million; that of France from 16,560 million new francs to more than 18,096 million new francs. Military expenditure by the Federal Republic of Germany had also shown a considerable increase in recent years. From 6,850 million marks in 1958, it had almost doubled in a single year, reaching more than 11,000 million marks in 1959, slightly less than 12,000 million in 1960 and more than 12,000 million in 1961.

16. It seemed obvious, therefore, that the Western Powers had used the Geneva negotiations as a smoke-screen to conceal the acceleration of their war preparations and the resulting increase in the danger of war. The substantial rise in the military budget of West Germany during the same period showed that the negotiations had also been used to conceal the efforts being made to remilitarize the Federal Republic of Germany, which was the main source of aggression in western Europe.

17. For all those reasons, the Romanian delegation considered it extremely urgent that priority should be granted to the question of general and complete disarmament.

18. Mr. OKAZAKI (Japan) said that the Committee should discuss the cessation of nuclear tests as the first item of its agenda, as a matter of urgency, and separately from disarmament. The Japanese delegation agreed that the problems relating to nuclear testing could be regarded as aspects of the broader question of general and complete disarmament, and that strenuous efforts to reach agreement on that broader problem should continue to be made. However, it would be unwise to permit the question of nuclear tests, on

which so much progress had already been made, to be submerged in the context of a debate on disarmament. When the three-Power negotiations had started at Geneva the world had placed great hopes in them; but those negotiations had been frustrated by the insistence of the Soviet Union on merging the question of a ban on testing with that of general and complete disarmament, and had finally been disrupted by the resumption of testing by the USSR.

19. In discussing the procedure to be followed with regard to the two items on nuclear testing, the Committee should bear in mind, first, that the Assembly had a moral responsibility to follow up the resolutions it had adopted at the fifteenth session on the cessation of tests and the conclusion of a test-ban treaty (resolutions 1577 (XV) and 1578 (XV)), and secondly, that a *de facto* suspension of testing, while it might help towards the conclusion of a treaty, was not in itself a permanent or effective solution. Any appeal for the restoration of the *de facto* suspension of tests should be considered by the Committee in the context of the need for a test-ban treaty. Unfortunately, that objective would not be achieved by the Indian proposal (A/C.1/L.282), which appeared to call for the separate consideration of the two items on testing.

20. For those reasons, Japan would support the United States proposal (A/C.1/L.281). Once the Committee had decided to debate the two items on testing simultaneously as the first item on its agenda, it could leave the question of how to deal with specific draft resolutions to be decided at a later stage.

21. Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) said that his delegation could not support the proposals made by the United States (A/C.1/L.281) and India (A/C.1/L.282) that the nuclear test items should be considered before the question of general and complete disarmament. The question of nuclear testing was far less urgent than that of disarmament, and could not be resolved without a solution of the problem of disarmament. Delay in the consideration of the disarmament problem merely provided time in which weapons could be further accumulated and perfected and in which other States could acquire or develop nuclear weapons. The United States proposal to give priority to consideration of a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests meant putting the cart before the horse; once the stockpiles of nuclear weapons were destroyed, the problem of testing would also have been solved. His delegation supported the Soviet proposal that agenda items 19, 73, 72 and 81 should be discussed in that order, as at the previous session of the General Assembly.

22. Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom) said he had gained the impression from the Soviet representative's statement at the previous meeting that the Soviet Union had decided not to press its proposal to combine the questions of disarmament and nuclear testing in a single item, since little support for it could be expected from other delegations. In that connexion, he wished to recall the statement made by the Soviet representative in the First Committee on 10 October 1958^{1/} that the Soviet Government thought it essential to consider the question of nuclear testing separately from that of disarmament. What the Soviet representative had said at that time was even more valid now, after agreement had been reached at Geneva on most of the provisions of a draft treaty banning tests.

23. The Soviet representative however contended that the Committee must deal with disarmament first, since the question of nuclear testing could be resolved only after agreement had been reached on disarmament. He had attributed sinister motives to the United States representative's statement that the process of achieving such agreement would be lengthy and complex. But the experience of past negotiations gave little cause for optimism. The Soviet representative had appeared to suggest at the last meeting that the question of nuclear testing should not be taken up until an agreement on disarmament had been concluded and put into effect. He wondered whether the Soviet representative believed that agreement on all the details of general and complete disarmament could be reached during 1961. If not, there was the more reason for the Committee to give priority to the cessation of nuclear tests, inasmuch as a draft treaty on the subject was ready for signature.

24. The Romanian representative had cited figures on the high level of armaments as an argument in favour of giving priority to the question of disarmament. He wondered why the Romanian representative had failed to give any data for the Soviet Union, which, according to Mr. Khrushchev himself, had had 3.6 million men under arms in 1960 as compared with 2.5 million in the United States. The United Kingdom delegation remained convinced that the complex nature of the disarmament problem made it advisable to aim first at the more limited objective of banning nuclear tests. Most of the members of the Committee appeared to share that belief, and the others would surely be convinced by the action of the Soviet Union in recent weeks in polluting the atmosphere at an unprecedented rate.

25. With regard to the question which of the two items on nuclear testing should be considered first, his delegation could not accept the Indian proposal (A/C.1/L.282) that item 73 should be given priority over item 72. He shared the Indian representative's desire to see nuclear tests halted. However, the approach based on a voluntary moratorium had proved a failure, after a trial period of almost three years; the resumption of testing by the Soviet Union had shown disregard for the express wishes of the General Assembly and had indicated that at the very time when negotiations had been under way, the Soviet Government had been preparing to violate the moratorium. Any future cessation of testing could not be based again on purely national undertakings, but only on an internationally binding agreement containing adequate safeguards against violation.

26. While his delegation still believed that the item sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom should retain its present position ahead of the Indian item, it agreed with the United States representative's statement at the previous meeting that the two items were closely related and should be discussed together. The question which item would more effectively further the objective of halting nuclear tests could be argued out during the debate, after which the Committee could decide the order of voting on the draft resolutions relating to each of the two items.

27. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) thought that the order in which the various items should be discussed was of relatively small importance compared with the overriding importance of attaining results. It was most unfortunate that the two sides primarily concerned with the problems relating to disarmament and the dis-

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, First Committee, 945th meeting.

continuance of nuclear tests should have failed to reach agreement on procedure.

28. The question before the Committee had various aspects. One was that of practical possibilities. Since the whole was more important than its parts, it might be considered desirable to reach agreement on the question of disarmament before that of nuclear tests; after all, an agreement on disarmament would necessarily include an agreement on tests. However, the Committee must be guided by past experience: negotiations on disarmament over the last sixteen years had yielded no results, and it would be over-optimistic to expect that rapid agreement could now be reached on that complex question. On the other hand, the question of the cessation of nuclear tests had been the subject of negotiations for only three years; yet it seemed that the Powers concerned had been very near agreement before the talks had broken down. Practical logic therefore seemed to argue in favour of giving priority to the question of nuclear tests.

29. The second aspect to be considered was that of urgency. Although there was no doubt that an agreement on disarmament, in view of the increasing dangers created by the arms race, was an urgent necessity, the dangers resulting from nuclear tests were also great. Nuclear testing was the worst form of war preparation, since its aim was not merely the accumulation of weapons but the perfecting of weapons of greater destructive capacity. There was also the question of the actual harm to mankind resulting from nuclear tests. It had been scientifically proved that the effects of strontium-90 and carbon-14 were cumulative for a period of at least twenty-eight years, and every test added to the radio-activity created by earlier tests. It would be no exaggeration to say that nuclear testing already represented a form of war against humanity, in that it undermined the health and endangered the lives of present and future generations. No objective person therefore could dispute the need for the immediate cessation of nuclear tests.

30. The two opposing sides had completely reversed their positions with regard to the urgency of the cessation of nuclear tests and the priority to be given to that question over the question of disarmament. The reasons for that reversal were immaterial and for its part Cyprus was prepared to endorse the arguments put forth by both sides in favour of the cessation of the great evil that nuclear testing represented for mankind.

31. His attitude would be identical on the question of priority as between the moratorium and the treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests. A treaty was far more important than a moratorium, just as disarmament was more important than the problem of nuclear tests. But there again, practical considerations arose. A moratorium would clearly need far less discussion than a treaty on the cessation of tests. Priority should, therefore, be given to the item entitled "Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal"—although that was something of a misnomer, since there was at present no suspension to continue. There was no reason why the two items relating to nuclear tests should not be discussed at the same time, since they were interrelated; indeed, such a course would save considerable time. However, a combined discussion of the two items should not prevent the speedy adoption of a resolution on the question of a moratorium.

32. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal) said he simply wished to endorse the plea made at the previous meeting by the representative of India that the Indian item should be given priority. The resumption of nuclear tests by the two great Powers made it a matter of urgency to bring about a cessation of such tests. The Soviet argument that the suspension of tests should be discussed as part of the general question of disarmament was far from convincing. Similar arguments had been used a few years ago by the United States delegation, when it had considered that approach expedient.

33. Nepal was in favour of considering the item on the suspension of tests before the item concerning the need for a test-ban treaty. In the first place, it was clear from the wording of the former item that it should take precedence over the latter. Nepal did not minimize the need for a test-ban treaty, but felt that negotiations toward the conclusion of such a treaty would take considerable time, whereas a cessation of tests could be brought about immediately and would create a better climate for negotiations. It was true that a moratorium on tests, whether voluntary or mandatory, could not be an effective substitute for a treaty, but his delegation could not help feeling that an immediate suspension of tests would give added impetus to the negotiations for a treaty. Moreover, the United States representative had himself suggested that his delegation had no objection to the item on the suspension of tests being taken first, so long as the general debate dealt with the two items simultaneously, and on the understanding that the draft resolutions would be considered separately. For those reasons, Nepal would support the proposal submitted by the representative of India (A/C.1/L.282).

34. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising his right of reply, referred to several questions asked by the United Kingdom representative. The latter had asked, first of all, why he, Mr. Zorin, had favoured the separate discussion of the question of nuclear testing in the First Committee at the thirteenth session of the Assembly but was taking a different position at the current session. The Soviet Union had favoured the separate consideration of nuclear testing in 1958 because at that time the United States and the United Kingdom had been reluctant to negotiate on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests and the Soviet Union had sought to induce them to enter into immediate negotiations on that specific question; it was only later in the Assembly session that, under the pressure of events and of public opinion, they had finally agreed to do so. At that time, moreover, the United States and the United Kingdom had been unwilling to begin working out a concrete programme of disarmament, and the Soviet Union had been obliged to exert pressure on them in that direction. Hence, to discuss the question of nuclear testing together with the general question of disarmament would merely have confused matters and made it more difficult to solve either problem.

35. The situation now was completely different. The Geneva negotiations on nuclear testing had shown that it was impossible to reach agreement on a separate treaty on a test ban because the United States and the United Kingdom did not wish to halt all nuclear weapons tests but wanted to reserve the right to conduct underground tests; moreover, those countries had permitted their French ally to carry out tests in the atmosphere. Furthermore, since 1958 major events had taken place in regard to disarmament. In 1959, the Soviet Union had presented a broad programme for general and com-

plete disarmament (A/4219) and the General Assembly had unanimously adopted resolution 1378 (XIV) urging the speedy solution of that problem. Just recently, moreover, the Soviet Union and the United States had reached agreement on the basic principles for disarmament negotiations (A/4879). Since the basis had thus been created for a practical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, it seemed advisable to discuss that problem together with the question of nuclear testing.

36. The United Kingdom representative had also asked whether he, the Soviet representative, felt that the question of general and complete disarmament could be resolved in the next few months. He believed that it could; but success or failure in that regard did not depend in the first instance on the Soviet Union. The latter had submitted its programme of general and complete disarmament as early as 1959; but the United States and the United Kingdom had long opposed any discussion of that concrete programme, and it was only very recently that the United States had presented its own programme and had reached agreement with the Soviet Union on the principles of general and complete disarmament.

37. He recalled that at the First Committee's 1084th meeting, on 18 October 1960, Mr. Ormsby-Gore had suggested that all four items relating to disarmament should be combined as a single item. He wished to know whether the present United Kingdom representative supported the position taken at that time by Mr. Ormsby-Gore.

38. The United Kingdom representative had referred to the pollution of the atmosphere and the violation of the moratorium on nuclear testing by the Soviet Union. He wondered why the United Kingdom representative had raised those matters now, when the Soviet Union had resumed testing, but had said nothing about them when France had carried out its nuclear tests. The United Kingdom representative had also failed to mention the fact that President Kennedy had clearly in-

dicated that the United States planned to resume tests in the atmosphere.

39. He also wished to reply to the representative of Nepal, who had stated that the Soviet representative was taking virtually the same position in the present debate as that taken four years previously by Mr. Lodge, the United States representative at that time. It was wholly inaccurate to compare the present Soviet position with that of Mr. Lodge, since the latter had opposed both the discontinuance of nuclear tests and disarmament in general, whereas the Soviet Union favoured both, and was prepared to sign a treaty on general and complete disarmament and halt nuclear testing forthwith.

40. Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom) said he merely wished to reiterate the view of his delegation that the actions of the Soviet Union since the debate in 1960 had so increased the urgency of the question of the cessation of nuclear tests as to require that at the current session—in contrast to the previous session, held at a time when negotiations were continuing at Geneva—the question should be given priority in the First Committee. Moreover, the Soviet Government was daily providing fresh reasons for an urgent and substantive discussion of the matter. In violation of United Nations resolutions, it had conducted more than twenty nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.

41. Mr. Zorin had not been alone in the past in holding the view that the discussion of nuclear weapons tests and the discussion of disarmament could most fruitfully be separated. According to an official Soviet note to the Western Governments, dated 30 August 1958, Mr. Khrushchev had stated, in reply to a question from a Pravda correspondent, that there was no surer way of sabotaging the suspension of nuclear tests than by making disarmament a condition for a treaty to ban nuclear tests.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.