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Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 21 January 1957, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. BELAUNDE

(Peru)

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission [22] (continued)

Statements were made in the general debate on the item by:

Mr. Pearson	(Canada)
Mr. Tans	(Netherlands)
Mr. Waldheim	(Austria)
Mr. Entezam	(Iran)
Mr. Winiewicz	(Poland)
Mr. Shaha	(Nepal)
Mr. Kiselev	(Byelorussian SSR)

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REGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS: CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION (TREATY) ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC, HYDROGEN AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: REPORT OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION (DC.83; A/C.1/783, 784; A/C.1/L.160, L.161, L.162) [Agenda item 22] (continued)

Mr. PEARSON (Canada): We are once again engaged in what must seem, in its results, to many, one of the most unrewarding activities of the United Nations: discussing ways and means of reducing arms in a climate of international fear, tension and insecurity. This climate is indeed, and the conditions which produce it, the main reason why, in spite of a rather bewildering array of proposals and counter proposals, we are still far from our goal of agreement on the major steps of a substantial disarmament programme. I think, however, that we have made some progress to that goal.

There should be a special incentive for such progress in the realization that as the years go by without reaching agreement, the problem becomes more and more complicated and difficult, particularly with respect to the question of nuclear weapons. As the destructive power of these weapons increases and as the stockpiles grow, the obstacles in the way of an adequately safeguarded disarmament scheme are magnified. Nevertheless, our long drawn-out negotiations on disarmament have, I think, been worthwhile. This persistent debate conducted in various bodies of the United Nations over the past ten years has at least ensured that the major Powers have maintained a steady contact on this subject and that world public opinion has been kept fully aware of the catastrophic consequences of the use of the arms we are trying to eliminate or reduce.

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

It is true that conflicting points of view have generally been held so tenaciously that, by the time any particular agreement on disarmament seemed to be emerging, the underlying conditions have often been changed to such an extent that the problem has had to be faced again in different terms.

Mr. Jules Moch, who has made such an outstanding personal contribution to this long search for security through disarmament, has warned us repeatedly in the past that, unless agreement was soon attained, it would become virtually impossible to devise a control system adequate to allow a secure and safeguarded prohibition of atomic weapons. And now we have reached the point -- if not of no return -- at least of no return to the possibility of accounting accurately for past production of nuclear weapons and material and of bringing them under international control.

I repeat, however, that there has been some progress. On certain fundamentally important matters of principle, the position of the major Powers concerned is now less opposed. I have in mind, for example, the fact that the Soviet Government no longer calls for the unconditional preliminary banning of nuclear weapons, but recognizes that measures of nuclear disarmament must be related to measures of conventional disarmament. There has also been a lessening of the differences of view as to the levels of forces of the great Powers. On the crucial matter of adequate and effective inspection and control of disarmament measures -- which is the absolutely indispensable condition to an acceptable disarmament agreement -- there has likewise been some progress. As a result of the discussions of the past year, it is now for the first time possible to say that there is general agreement that the international control organization should have representatives established in the territory of the States concerned before disarmament actually begins, and that these control officials should remain in place throughout the duration of such a disarmament agreement. In its latest proposals, the Soviet delegation has also apparently accepted at least the principle of aerial inspection as one of the attributes of the control organization. While it is true that this reference to aerial inspection is by no means without limitations and conditions, we certainly welcome the fact that the Soviet Government has at least agreed -- even if only in principle -- to such inspection.

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

It is also my impression that, in the last year or so, there has been a growing realism in disarmament discussions. There has been considerably less tendency to advance proposals which, like the unconditional banning of the bomb, were recognized even by their advocates as quite unacceptable to other Powers involved and were put forward for purposes which had little to do with disarmament or security.

I think that it is also increasingly recognized and accepted that disarmament measures must contribute to the security of the major Powers concerned and must not weaken the defensive position of one country in relation to another. Governments must take very seriously their primary duty to defend their own people, and they must be convinced that disarmament measures are satisfactory from that point of view.

Turning now to the present discussion in the First Committee, I should like at the outset to welcome the moderately-worded, businesslike and hopeful statement with which the United States representative opened this debate. I do not wish at the present time to go into the details of the United States proposals, although I do wish to welcome this latest contribution to our negotiations. As Mr. Lodge pointed out, further details of these proposals will be developed in the Sub-Committee. I would comment now only that it seems to the Canadian delegation that this new presentation of United States proposals is a valuable step forward in the process of negotiation. As we understand it, this is not a rigid, detailed programme of disarmament: it is, rather, a broad outline of the present United States position, realistically stated in the light of all the present conditions, and intended as a basis for further negotiation.

The dismal contrast between this opening United States statement and the intervention immediately afterwards by the USSR representative must, I think, have been painfully apparent to everyone. Mr. Kuznetsov devoted nearly half of his statement to an intemperate and irrelevant attack on the policies of certain Governments, notably that of the United States. It is, I think, very much to be regretted that the Soviet Government thought it necessary or wise to initiate the disarmament debate in a way which made it difficult to conclude

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

that that Government had any immediate serious intentions to co-operate constructively in this matter. I think that the chances for fruitful progress were damaged by this Soviet verbal assault, but the subject is one of such vital importance that we must nevertheless not be deterred by it from continuing our negotiations and our discussions.

That portion of the Soviet statement which did deal with disarmament was, in the main, based directly on the latest proposals of the Soviet Union, which were circulated on 17 November, at a time when the attention of the world was focussed more on the use by the Soviet Union of its arms to crush Hungarian patriots than on Soviet proposals for disarmament.

As my delegation indicated in the general debate at the opening of this session of the General Assembly, we are prepared to give careful and objective consideration to the latest Soviet proposals. I have already indicated that, so far as it goes, we welcome the new Soviet position on aerial inspection, even though the particular limited application of aerial photography proposed by the Soviet Union may involve some serious difficulties, including the implication of the continued division of Germany.

The Soviet Government also continues to propose the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, in spite of the fact that, according to an explicit statement of the Soviet delegation itself, it is not at the present time technically possible to devise any adequate system for inspecting such a prohibition. Incidentally, in view of the Soviet attacks on the pacific intentions and the good faith of Western Powers, their confidence in the willingness of those Powers to make effective such an unconditional, uncontrollable prohibition is as surprising as it is unconvincing.

We have also noted with interest the statement made on 15 January by the representative of the United Kingdom, who indicated that while his Government stands by the comprehensive Anglo-French plan previously submitted, it is also prepared to consider measures of partial disarmament as a first step to enable disarmament to get under way.

The representative of Yugoslavia reiterated in his statement -- a reference to that statement was made this morning -- the view of his Government that pending agreement on general disarmament we should seek early agreement and implementation of such initial measures as are now feasible. This is a point of view which has been advanced with some frequency in the last year or so, and I believe that it has very considerable merit. While disarmament cannot be dissociated from other international political problems which we face, it is true that large-scale armaments are themselves an important source of international tension, particularly

in view of the terrible destructiveness of modern nuclear weapons. I therefore agree that some start towards disarmament, however limited, might well have a salutary effect both on the international situation generally and on the prospects of further disarmament.

We are certainly not all in agreement on the substance of our disarmament programme. Nevertheless, I am sure we all agree that the United Nations must carry on with its negotiations for such an agreed programme. We shall therefore shortly have before us a draft resolution, jointly sponsored by a group of countries, including my own. This draft resolution does not seek to impose on any Government, any policy or programme with which it is unable to agree. It is based on a realistic acceptance of the fact that disarmament can be achieved only by negotiation and willing agreement. It cannot be legislated or imposed, however impressive the majority in votes may be for any particular plan.

The draft resolution, which I recommend to the Committee, therefore does not discriminate against any particular proposal in favour of others. It commits us only to renew the negotiations in the established United Nations disarmament bodies, and to carry them forward with persistence and good faith. It embraces all the proposals which have been made since the tenth session of the General Assembly, whether here in the Assembly or in the Disarmament Commission or in its Sub-Committee, and there would be a report, by a stated time, to the Commission which would then, of course, report back to this Assembly.

I trust that this draft resolution, which will shortly be before the Committee, will receive overwhelming support; indeed, I venture to hope that it will be unanimously adopted. It seems to me that this would give us the best possible basis on which to continue the desperately urgent effort to reduce the arms burden and, eventually we hope, to eliminate the terrible threat of thermonuclear war.

I now wish to turn to one particular aspect of the armaments question which has become a cause of considerable concern, and, indeed, of anxiety to many people. I refer to the effects of atomic radiation and particularly to the possible consequences of nuclear test explosions.

In his statement in the general debate at the beginning of this session of the General Assembly, the Foreign Minister of Norway proposed that there should be established some system of United Nations registration of nuclear test explosions. In the present debate in the Political Committee we have heard with serious concern and with sympathy the moving remarks of the representative of Japan on this subject. The representative of the United Kingdom also touched on this matter. He suggested that the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission should investigate the possibility of agreeing on the limitation of nuclear test explosions, either as part of a disarmament plan or separately. We also have before us the proposal submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union, calling for a cessation of tests of these weapons.

The Canadian delegation included some comments on this question in our statement in the general debate of the General Assembly on 5 December, and our position remains as set forth in that statement. While it may not be realistic to propose an immediate ban on all such tests, nevertheless, we are of the opinion, after weighing the best scientific evidence available to us -- which is by no means complete or conclusive--that the United Nations must give close and serious consideration to the whole question of nuclear tests.

Last year the General Assembly established a scientific committee on the effects of atomic radiation, the duty of which is to keep under close observation the whole problem of the levels of radiation and the possible effects on man and his environment. We look to this committee, as it accumulates the data supplied to it and makes its analyses and assessments, to serve an important role. It could be a source of objective and valid scientific conclusions which could aid all concerned in avoiding decisions or action which might prove harmful.

In any agreement on nuclear tests, we must be guided, in my view, by two considerations: first, the necessity of securing authoritative, accurate information on the effects of such tests, scientifically and objectively determined; and, secondly, the requirement to give reasonable satisfaction to the needs of defence in a dangerously divided world.

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

In our earlier statement to the Assembly, which I have just mentioned, we expressed the hope that the countries concerned might be able to agree on some annual or periodic limit on the volume of radioactivity to be generated by test explosions. And one of the recommendations of the proposed draft resolution of which I have just spoken will be that the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee give prompt attention to the whole problem of measures for cessation or limitation of nuclear test explosions.

There is, however, a further draft resolution before the Committee which deals only with the question of advance registration of nuclear test explosions, that is to say, with the proposal made in the plenary meeting by the Foreign Minister of Norway, which I have just mentioned. That resolution, which was explained effectively and concisely by the representatives of Norway and Japan this morning, stands in the name of Norway, Japan and Canada.

The proposal incorporated in this draft resolution is inspired by a belief that it may be better to do now what is possible and feasible with respect to nuclear test explosions rather than to do nothing at all because it is not possible to take more far-reaching action at this time. If a proposal of this kind can be worked out, we would for the first time have moved, if only by one step, away from dead centre on this whole problem.

This three-Power draft resolution recommends that urgent attention be given to establishing, "as a preliminary step, a system for registration with the United Nations of nuclear test explosions". The draft resolution also requests the Secretary-General and the Radiation Committee "to co-operate with the States concerned" in this registration system with a view to keeping under constant observation the world situation regarding present and expected radiation. This would, I repeat, be only a preliminary step, but I am certain it would be an important preliminary step and I hope that it too will be given most serious consideration and approval.

In conclusion, I hope that all the proposals that have been submitted to this Committee will be referred for early and effective action to the United Nations Commission which has been set up for that purpose.

I do not need to emphasize to this Committee the gravity of the problem. Man has now developed weapons capable of his own complete destruction. If he does not bring and keep them under control and, even more important, bring about a state of affairs where their use would be unthinkable and impossible, then life on this planet will indeed soon become, in the words of the English philosopher, "nasty, brutish and short."

Mr. TANS (Netherlands): In its resolution of 16 December 1955, the General Assembly was obliged to state that it had not yet been possible to reach agreement on some of the most essential aspects of the disarmament question. This came as a disappointment to the many people who had built their hopes on the so-called spirit of Geneva. However, the very fact that a solution of the disarmament problem was as far out of reach as ever before showed that this spirit of Geneva was based on hopes and not on a realistic assessment of the world situation. If any hope had still been left that the debate on this question would to some extent at least be inspired by what had been thought to be a spirit of conciliation and co-operation, it was rudely shattered on the first day of the present debate: the spirit of Geneva has been nothing more than an illusion.

Indeed, it should surprise nobody that during the past year no progress has been achieved in this important field of United Nations activity. How could one expect results when it has apparently not even been possible to carry out fully the provisions of the resolutions of the tenth session of the General Assembly? For it must be noted that, after presenting its first report to the Disarmament Commission in May of last year, a report, moreover, which contained important if divergent proposals and which received more than the usual attention on the part of the Disarmament Commission, the Sub-Committee did not meet again and has not been able to carry out the request of the Disarmament Commission to study those proposals at the appropriate time. It cannot be denied that the time has not been appropriate.

Under these circumstances, it is impossible for the General Assembly at this session to find any concrete solutions. Many delegations have expressed their regret at this state of affairs, and my delegation subscribes to their sentiments. It does not seem useful to wonder whether it could have been possible to avoid this course of events. We must face the facts as they are and not as we should like them to be. We entirely agree with the representative of Belgium who said that the disarmament problem cannot be solved by words, but only by facts.

But, in spite of our disappointment and regret, we should not close our eyes to the fact that during the past years some progress has been made. The General Assembly resolution of 1955 has noted this fact and the Disarmament Commission, in its resolution of 16 July 1956, repeated that the various views on disarmament had once again been brought closer together. In his interesting statement the representative of the United Kingdom has indicated in what respects some measure of agreement has now been reached.

From the fact that some progress has been made we can draw two conclusions: In the first place, that we are right in continuing along the road so far followed and in persisting in our attempts to bring the opposing points of view ever closer together until a beginning of agreement has been achieved. For, as the United Kingdom representative and other representatives who supported him so aptly stated, progress in these discussions will in itself be a factor contributing to increased trust and confidence between States, both necessary conditions for disarmament.

The second conclusion must be that the road to peace and security is long and difficult. Although the differences of opinion as to how the disarmament question must be tackled have become smaller, there still is no agreement. In our opinion, however, the new proposals put forward by the United States delegation have increased the chances of achieving some success in the future, and we hope that the world situation will soon allow the disarmament Sub-Committee to resume its work and to give earnest consideration to all pending proposals.

It is in this hope that my delegation wishes to make some observations which we deem essential on this point.

We believe that the prevention of surprise attacks by plans such as those advanced by President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin will be an important element in creating the atmosphere most conducive to a realistic approach of the basic disarmament problems.

(Mr. Tans, Netherlands)

Such an exchange of military blueprints, and the establishment of aerial inspection and of control posts at strategic points, will remove the present mutual distrust and suspicion to an important degree. My delegation still feels that these plans should consequently be considered and given effect with the utmost priority.

An additional advantage of carrying out the Eisenhower and Bulganin proposals will be that there will be a possibility of experimenting with a limited system of international inspection which will prove of great value when control machinery must be set up for a complete disarmament programme. A control system must be the keystone of any such programme and we fully agree with the representative of the United States who stated that an uninspected agreement or an inadequately controlled agreement or a one-sided agreement would be a bad agreement and that a bad agreement is worse for the cause of peace than no agreement at all.

Inspection and control are the prerequisites for any form of international disarmament. That is why, in the opinion of my delegation, a unilateral reduction of armaments and armed forces, however much to be appreciated at first sight as a hope-inspiring symptom, cannot be considered as a real contribution to international disarmament so long as it is not carried out under effective international control within the framework of a binding disarmament agreement.

If inspection and control are essential to a reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, they are an even more indispensable condition for the limitation and ultimate prohibition of nuclear weapons. We share the views expressed by the representative of Belgium who stated that the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production and the destruction of stockpiles, as proposed by the Soviet Union, would in present circumstances not only be ineffective but even dangerous.

A realistic appraisal of the great problems involved in the prohibition of nuclear weapons makes it clear that some degree of agreement must be reached on disarmament as a whole before we can achieve a ban or even a limitation of nuclear test explosions. This reality is extremely disappointing and a matter of grave concern for those countries which, like the Netherlands, are aware of the dangerous consequences for mankind of increased radioactivity in the world.

(Mr. Tans, Netherlands)

Another aspect of this question is the horrifying prospect of an increasingly destructive potential of nuclear weapons as a result of these experiments. For the moment, however, we are directly faced with the real danger that, as a result of these test explosions, the peoples of the world are already confronted with some of the dangers of nuclear war. For this reason, my delegation sincerely hopes that it will be possible to take a first step on the difficult road to the complete elimination of this menace by establishing a system of registration of experimental explosions, as first suggested by the Foreign Minister of Norway and now proposed in the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Canada, Japan and Norway.

I have stated that my delegation considers the prevention of surprise attacks as an important element in achieving our objectives in the field of disarmament. I have also endorsed the opinion expressed here that the continued discussions in the Disarmament Commission and more particularly in its Sub-Committee form another useful factor in bringing about the required atmosphere of mutual trust. It seems to me a self-evident truth that any progress in disarmament will have to be accompanied by progress in solving some of the political problems which keep the world divided.

The Netherlands delegation fully concurs in the views expressed by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom on this relationship and consequently we do not agree with the representative of the Soviet Union who stated that "such an approach would mean lumping together deliberately all questions, which would only make more difficult the solution of the already complicated problem of disarmament and which would only lead us into a deadlock."

In our opinion real peace and security cannot be established by disarmament alone. They must also be based on the liquidation of political problems. It is in this respect that proof can be given of the sincerity of our approach to the disarmament problem as a whole.

We can only hope that the awareness -- the torturing awareness -- of the terrifying dangers which threaten the world today, will induce all nations and especially those that have a particular responsibility in this respect, to make every effort to ensure the peace and security of the community of nations. Apart from this rather negative inducement, there is the attraction of creating a world free from the burden of armaments and with a new future of tremendous economic,

social and cultural progress for all its peoples. This future is what all mankind is hoping and living for.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Syria.

Mr. TARAIZI (Syria) (interpretation from French): I do not think that my turn has come to speak. If the Chairman would permit me, I would prefer to speak tomorrow morning.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I would inform the representative of Syria that I shall change his turn to speak to the time when the Committee discusses the resolutions; otherwise I would have to rearrange the list of speakers, which would naturally prejudice the previous rights of other delegations. I would therefore appreciate it if the representative of Syria would speak first when we take up the resolutions themselves.

Mr. WALDHEIM (Austria): This is the first time that Austria has had an opportunity to speak in the First Committee of the General Assembly on the question of disarmament. Austria is well aware of the fact that a solution of this complex question depends primarily on the great Powers and we believe that an agreement among them would greatly simplify the solution of the problem in general.

Austria is the only country which, in an international treaty, has accepted an obligation with regard to its armaments corresponding to a level envisaged as an ultimate ceiling in the disarmament proposals of the Western Powers as well as the Soviet Union.

According to the provisions of article 13 of the Austrian State Treaty of 15 May 1955, Austria has agreed not to possess, construct or experiment with:

- (a) any atomic weapon; (b) any other major weapon adaptable now or in the future to mass destruction and defined as such in the appropriate organ of the United Nations;
- (c) any self-propelled or guided missile or torpedo, or apparatus connected with its discharge or control; (d) sea mines; (e) torpedoes capable of being manned;

(f) submarines or other submersible craft; (g) motor torpedo boats; (h) specialized types of assault craft; (i) guns with a range of more than 30 kilometres; furthermore, asphyxiating or poisonous materials or biological substances of all types in quantities greater than are required for legitimate civil purposes, or any apparatus designed to produce, project or spread such materials or substances for war purposes.

Austria would be prepared to accept a system of measures of control established in the course of the disarmament action in the United Nations, provided that such a system also includes other States.

(Mr. Waldheim, Austria)

In the opinion of the Government of Austria, any kind of agreement between the great Powers in the field of disarmament would have a great moral effect upon the international situation, even if it should only offer a partial solution in the beginning, as, for instance, a limitation in the armaments race or partial control measures. We therefore believe that the United Nations should as soon as possible take the first concrete action in this direction.

It seems as if now, for the first time after ten years of deliberations on this extremely complicated problem, a certain rapprochement of the views of the great Powers has become noticeable. As can be seen from the disarmament discussions held in the past, the great Powers are in agreement with regard to the ultimate aims. However, differences of opinion exist concerning the method of reaching these goals. Therefore the realization of these aims seems to be possible only step by step.

As for tests of weapons of mass destruction, Austria is inclined to believe that such tests should be completely prohibited. This measure is contemplated both in the Soviet disarmament plan of 17 November 1956 and in the United States proposals submitted to this Committee on 14 January 1957. A first step in this direction seems now to be feasible.

The use of atomic energy holds such vast promises for the future that the intention of the great Powers to use atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes should be realized as soon as possible. All the peoples of the world want peace. As a small, neutral country, Austria appeals to all States, especially to the Powers directly involved, to undertake all possible steps in order to safeguard and strengthen the peace of the world.

Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran)(interpretation from French): I should have preferred to hear the statements of all the members of the Sub-Committee before I took the floor in this debate. However, I understand very well the reason that has delayed the so much awaited statement of the representative of France. The role that that country and its eminent representative have played in trying to find a satisfactory solution to this problem of disarmament is understood by all of us. I am convinced that by this delay Mr. Moch wishes to safeguard his freedom of action so as to be able to make a new effort to bring together the differing points of view. If that is his aim, I wish him sincerely the best of luck.

(Mr. Entezam, Iran)

If it is true that the smaller nations are as interested in this question as the great Powers -- and I should say even more so because we are less armed and therefore more vulnerable -- it is no less true that the final solution of this problem does not depend on us. In other words, whilst the Powers that have the overwhelming majority of the classical types of weapons and that also possess the nuclear and thermonuclear types of weapons do not agree on the stages and the manner in which disarmament may be carried out, the role of the smaller Powers must be limited to mobilizing world public opinion and exerting pressure on the great Powers so that the latter by their agreement will be able to dissipate the threats to the very existence of humanity. That is the only justification for my very brief statement.

Those of us who took part previously in this debate have already been able to explain the points of view of our Governments at previous sessions. I shall endeavour to avoid repetition of certain generalities which at times risks becoming platitudinous. My remarks, therefore, will be limited to new suggestions that have been submitted to us this year.

First of all, I must say quite honestly that I have noted that, despite the aggressive tenor of some of the speeches, the progress achieved in 1956, though very slight, should certainly not be overlooked. The representative of Canada has given us some concrete examples of such progress. It might have been even greater if we had not had to face the deplorable events of October. We must, however, turn away from any exaggerated pessimism. We must once again exhort the members of the Sub-Committee to meet again as soon as possible after the end of the eleventh session and once and for all try to present to us a realistic plan that will set up the composition and the powers of the control body.

My first remark refers to the need to put an end to experiments with nuclear weapons. If, because of security reasons, the total suppression of such tests is not yet feasible, these tests should at least be announced beforehand and be limited and controlled.

On this point, I entirely share the point of view and the most interesting suggestions of the representative of Japan contained in his statement. We

(Mr. Entezam, Iran)

know that the dangers arising from the explosion of thermonuclear weapons sometimes go further than the scientists and experts expect. My country is a neighbour of a country that possesses such weapons. Since that Power has only its own territory in which to test its weapons, the danger of such tests to its neighbours cannot possibly be overlooked by us. As far as I can see, the least we can demand is that these Powers previously inform the United Nations of the date and the nature of such explosions and that they take all appropriate measures, and truly efficient ones, to safeguard the populations of neighbouring countries from the dangers of radiation.

The proposal submitted by the representative of the United States -- I am thinking of the suggestion made by Mr. Lodge in his statement -- whilst going some distance, does not go as far as we should wish. Perhaps we might take into account the suggestions made by the representative of Japan to bring the United States proposal closer to that of the Soviet Union.

This morning a draft resolution was submitted to us on behalf of Norway, Canada and Japan. Though my delegation has not had sufficient time to analyse this document at great length, we nevertheless feel that this proposal has the same aim as the ideas we had in mind, and it therefore seems acceptable to us.

The second remark I wish to make refers to the composition of the Commission. As we all know, this Commission is made up of the members of the Security Council plus Canada. Such a composition, however, does not meet the needs of the present day. If we really want this Commission to become something more than a letter-box, transmitting to the United Nations the results of the work of the Sub-Committee, then that Commission should be changed in its composition. It is not large enough or representative enough to reflect the feelings of the entire Assembly. The Commission is the body that has to consider the entire problem, but those States which are not permanent members of the Security Council can make only a limited contribution because they have no sooner familiarized themselves with the complexities of the problem than their term of office expires and they must leave the Commission.

(Mr. Entezam, Iran)

In spite of these objections, we do not intend to propose any changes in the composition this year. We feel that the interval between the eleventh and twelfth sessions of the General Assembly will be shorter this year than the usual interval between sessions. The Sub-Committee will not be able to meet before the end of March, and as soon as its work is finished it will find itself on the eve of the twelfth session of the General Assembly.

Therefore, my remarks with regard to the composition of the Disarmament Commission lead me to discuss the third paragraph of the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union, which refers to the calling of a special meeting. What the Soviet Union proposes is the calling of a special session on disarmament. The ordinary sessions of the General Assembly have always had to consider the question of the reduction and limitation of armaments. The calling of a general disarmament conference should be our final aim, and in order to arrive at that goal we must go through a number of stages.

(Mr. Entezam, Iran)

First, the Members of the Sub-Committee must agree on a plan. After that, the plan must be studied by the Disarmament Commission, or at least by some more qualified body. The Preparatory Committee will have to be convoked to prepare an international covenant or treaty. Until those stages have been gone through, the calling of a special session of the General Assembly would serve no purpose whatever except to permit us to hear the same statements that we have heard over the past few years in the First Committee.

I should like to conclude by stating what I said at the beginning of my statement, namely that the solution of this problem does not depend on the small Powers; it is the great Powers that must heed the voice of humanity. If the agreement for which we all hope cannot be brought about in a few days, would it be too much to ask the great Powers to make a new effort at least to try to understand each other and to agree on a common programme which, to a large extent, would prepare the programme of work of the Sub-Committee. If they cannot first come to that agreement, then the work of the Sub-Committee will be even more difficult. Although I may appear to be very naive, I am certainly not going to abandon the hope that this can be done. It is on behalf of that hope that I wish to address a sincere appeal to the great Powers to heed our words.

Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland): The material on disarmament which we now have before us is evidence of a large expenditure of work and time, and undoubtedly constitutes an interesting analytical and historical contribution to the problem of disarmament. Unfortunately, this has not been supported until now by any specific international agreement which would at long last be the starting point for freeing the peoples of the world from the nightmare of armaments.

Our current discussion has already added a number of new suggestions and proposals, and undoubtedly still more will be added. Once again, however, history will judge their ultimate value and significance, not from the point of view of their intellectual finesse or polemical qualities but solely by their usefulness for reaching a final international disarmament agreement.

For it is true that on the disarmament problem the world expects from the United Nations not a further increase of differences but a rapprochement among points of view, not so much impassioned discussion but sober decisions. In view

(Mr. Winiewicz, Poland)

of the fact that the Disarmament Commission has not been able until now to provide us with an agreed plan on disarmament, the Polish delegation is of the opinion that it would be most useful and effective to look for areas of agreement in the different proposals offered up to the present time. Let us begin, then, by ascertaining where there is a similarity of points of view and let us take this as the starting point for further disarmament discussion and for removing the differences which still separate us.

In taking this approach, we can state at the outset that there is complete harmony on the implementation of disarmament by stages.

Since March 1955, there has also been some consensus to keep in the first stage, after formal agreement has been reached, all armed forces and military budgets on the same level existing at the time the agreement was reached. The proposal to "freeze" armaments is to be found both in the Anglo-French and in the Soviet documents. Finally, in the United States draft working paper of 3 April 1956, we also find mention of a stage in which "each State will carry out measures of a stabilizing nature", which the Polish delegation considers to be a step in the same direction.

We can also see a point of agreement pertaining to the level of reduction of armed forces in absolute figures. In its proposals of 17 November 1956, the Soviet Union accepted the United States suggestion on the level of armed forces of the big Powers towards the end of the first stage of disarmament, namely 2.5 million men for the United States and the Soviet Union, and 750,000 men for France and the United Kingdom. It is obvious that among the big Powers, People's China should be included inasmuch as both the Soviet and United States proposals have suggested for it the identical level of armed forces.

May I be permitted here to interject our view on the importance of having People's China represented in the deliberations of the United Nations on the question of disarmament. We of Poland can only join in the remarks made here by the representatives of Yugoslavia and Sweden.

Concerning the level of armed forces towards the end of the next disarmament stage, the Soviet Union has accepted figures suggested by the Western Powers in their proposals of 11 June 1954, which until now have not been replaced by any other suggestion. Finally, all proposals presented during the past year provide that such a reduction should apply not only to the numerical level of armed forces, but also to arms production and to military budgets.

(Mr. Winiewicz, Poland)

With reference to the stages for carrying out the disarmament programme, the most important problem which remains to be settled is the question of conditions and dates for passing from one stage to another. The Soviet Union, as is known, suggests the fixing of definite time limits for the duration of particular stages. In the proposals of the Western Powers the progress from one stage to another is conditioned by the fulfilment of the previous phase and by the readiness of the control organ to supervise the next.

The Polish delegation is of the opinion that these two proposals should not be considered as being in basic contradiction. For it is obvious that the next stage of disarmament can begin only when the previous one has been completed. The point is that the implementation of the previous stage and the preparation of the control organ for its new functions should be defined by a clear deadline. It is hardly conceivable that an international agreement would not foresee any fixed time limit for the execution of its provisions. That is why this should be considered as an indispensable element in the construction of the whole programme. Otherwise, there would exist not only the danger of undue prolongation of the consecutive stages of the disarmament programme but also the danger of renouncing any further disarmament.

In the view of our delegation, the undoubtedly modest experience of Poland, which in less than a year carried out two reductions of its armed forces by 97,000 officers and men -- a figure considerable for Poland -- confirms that reduction of armed forces and armaments during two years, as suggested by the Soviet Union, is, from the organizational point of view, perfectly feasible. The Polish delegation is also of the opinion that the progress from one stage to another should be as simple as possible and that the establishment of too many complex control conditions is not necessary here, since the control organ itself will have an international character deserving our full confidence.

But a much more important question was raised by the United States delegation, which explained the limiting of its proposals of 3 April 1956 to only the first stage of disarmament by the proviso that simultaneously progress must be made in the solution of major controversial international issues. We consider this view to be unjustified.

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(Mr. Winiewicz, Poland)

We know, of course, that in recent years international relations have not developed satisfactorily. Despite this, we cannot escape noticing that in the past three or three and a half years several urgent international problems have been solved in part or in whole.

To mention only a few of them: an armistice has been signed in Korea and also in Indo-China; a treaty has been signed with Austria; the questions of Tunisia and Morocco have been settled; a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union has been concluded and we have welcomed Austria, Japan, Morocco and Tunisia as Members of the United Nations; contacts between the leaders of four great Powers and their Foreign Ministers were resumed; a considerable enterprise of cultural and economic relations between East and West has taken place. We also noted recently the normalization of relations between a number of States on the basis of the principles of sovereignty, equality and non-interference. Unfortunately, a certain measure of international détente brought about by these events did not hasten the attainment of an international agreement even on partial disarmament. True enough, countries linked by the common ideas of building socialism have carried out during this period a reduction of their armed forces in advance of any international disarmament agreement. But a number of other countries have not halted their armaments race. The United States has also not reduced its armaments expenditure.

No one can deny that there still exist a number of international problems which call for solution. Each day, life confronts us with new problems requiring solution now and in the future. This is a natural and understandable process in relations among such a large number of States with different political systems and traditions, with different levels of economic development and with different economic needs. How much more easily would these problems have been solved were it not for the intensive armaments programmes and the existence of foreign military bases on the territories of many States.

In this connexion, we cannot help mentioning the situation in the Middle East. Would not the problem of the Suez Canal have taken a different course had there been an international agreement on disarmament, had not the existence of foreign military bases and the combat preparedness of big armies provided an incentive for solving an international dispute by force rather than by negotiation? Had this been so, we could easily, in the opinion of my delegation, have averted bloodshed.

(Mr. Winiewicz, Poland)

The Polish delegation is therefore profoundly convinced that one cannot make the implementation of the international programme for the reduction of armaments subject to conditions such as are envisaged in the United States proposals of last April. That is why we also disagree with the point of view expressed here by the representative of Italy. The gradual progress in the field of disarmament will, ipso facto, advance more rapidly the solution of other controversial questions. We have seen from the practice of the League of Nations that the inflexible application of the formula "security first and then disarmament" failed utterly. As a result, there was neither security nor disarmament. What we did have was a Second World War.

There is a close interdependence between these two factors, but one which is different from that which the United States delegation wishes us to accept. An effectively implemented disarmament will create better conditions for seeking peaceful solutions, will deepen mutual trust, strengthen the principle of peaceful co-existence and free the nations of the world from the dangerous situation in which powerful armies are poised against each other. On the other hand, the continuation of an armaments race can only aggravate the situation seriously. In his last statement, the United States representative declared that one of the aims of the disarmament programme should be to "ease tensions and to facilitate settlement of difficult political issues". We should like to be able to consider this statement as the beginning of a change in the attitude of the United States delegation on the point I have just raised.

In analysing further the documents of the last year, one can see that there is also a certain measure of agreement that funds obtained as a result of the reduction of armaments should be allocated to the development of peaceful economy and, among other things, to increasing assistance for economically under-developed countries. It is a well known fact that armaments hamper the solution of many economic problems. The economic impact of the armaments race is particularly severe upon smaller nations and upon States with a low national income. Their armaments involve considerable sacrifice in the basic branches of the national economy, which is usually devoted -- or could be devoted -- to peaceful purposes.

In the country which I have the honour to represent, which implements and will remain faithful to the principles of socialism, there are no groups which would profit from an armaments race or from arms production. However, I respectfully submit that in every country, irrespective of its system, armaments -- unproductive by their very nature -- are in the final analysis only a burden upon the national economy and upon the broad masses of the people. We all know that in many countries the armaments race has already resulted in a serious economic strain, as it has in many areas of international economic relations and international trade.

There was a time when the intensification of the cold war forced upon the Polish people heavy defence expenditures. It cost us a great deal of effort and seriously limited the possibilities of satisfying the daily needs of the population. We have already reduced our defence budget, but we are vitally interested in such international conditions as will permit a still further considerable reduction of this burden that weighed so heavily on our national economy.

Let us pass now to a further examination of the disarmament proposals presented hitherto.

The points of view on disarmament as it pertains to weapons of mass destruction have, regrettably, not yet been reconciled. A comparison of the Anglo-French proposals of 19 March 1956, of the United States plan of 3 April 1956, of the view presented here by the representative of the United States in his statement on 14 January 1957, and, finally, of the Soviet proposals of last March and November, indicate that there is a variety of proposals. They range from those which provide only for the limitation of nuclear tests, and for a later banning of such tests and the limitation of the production of nuclear weapons, to proposals which envisage the total prohibition of the production, stockpiling and use of weapons of mass destruction. It seems to us that the common denominator of all these plans is the acceptance of the necessity to take some steps on disarmament in this field. Searching for a basis of rapprochement and agreement in this field, I submit that the thesis of the United States representative, contained in his latest statement in our Committee, "to reduce the future nuclear threat" and to provide "against great surprise attack", should logically lead within a reasonably short period of time to a consensus on a programme for disarmament in this field. I wish we were right in this assumption.

Weapons of mass destruction are undoubtedly one of the most dangerous means of surprise attack. The character of these weapons, qualitatively different from that of the conventional ones, is such that it is not their quantity but their very existence and the threat of their use which constitute a danger to peace. Their destructive power, in the event of atomic war, menaces humanity with incalculable consequences. That is why we decidedly support the Soviet proposal because it envisages rapid and complete elimination as well as the ban on the use of nuclear weapons. The proposals of the western Powers must, as far as my delegation is concerned, be considered inadequate in this respect.

A British periodical some time ago published a cartoon depicting a man, exhausted and in rags, standing against the background of a smouldering atomic battlefield covered with ruins. The caption beneath the cartoon said, "Thank God, we have saved western civilization". That cartoon would be equally convincing in its warning of the disastrous consequences of an atomic war if the caption read, "We have saved Socialism".

May I now turn to the difficult problem of control, supervision and inspection. In this field a certain measure of progress can be recorded in bringing closer the different points and views expressed during the past two or three years.

We can consider as agreed to a certain extent the principle that "there cannot be disarmament without control nor control without disarmament". Correct as this view may be, we should like, however, to stress the important role that can be played by disarmament even without control. Let us recall once more that States-members of the Warsaw Pact have recently reduced their armed forces by more than 2 million men. This undoubtedly constitutes an important contribution to the cause of disarmament, and one should not wonder that we are hoping that other States will follow this example without waiting for a formal international agreement on disarmament.

The similarity of views in the field of inspection concerns also some particular forms and methods of control, such as, for example, the maintenance in particular States of a permanent staff of inspectors, assuring them of free access to all objects of control -- military units, stores and military bases, armaments

factories, relevant items of budgetary expenditures, and so on. To this should be added also control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and at airfields.

The proposal on aerial inspection put forward by the United States has evoked a controversial discussion. This is understandable in view of the fact that control of this type, like any other control, should be explicitly linked to a specific disarmament programme. Control cannot exist by itself. It is the function of disarmament, and not vice versa. However, in its latest proposal of 17 November 1956, the Soviet Union agreed to aerial control in a zone 800 kilometres wide on both sides of the line dividing the main forces of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact Powers. Inasmuch as the advisability of the immediate and full application of an aerial inspection system is still in doubt, it seems only proper to apply such inspection -- of course, with the full concurrence of the interested States -- within a limited area at least.

This brings me to the problem of European security -- the problem so vital and so close to Poland, the problem of the armaments race in the heart of Europe. It brings me also to the threat of the rapid remilitarization of Western Germany. It is not for the first time that my delegation calls the attention of the United Nations to the danger of the remilitarization of Western Germany to nations which, in the past, repeatedly fell victims to German aggression. Representatives can well imagine the impression made on every Pole by the fact that Nazi General Speidel has been appointed commander of the NATO land forces in Central Europe. Can we remain silent when weapons of mass destruction are being added to the arsenal of remilitarized Western Germany; when the assistance of western Powers for the restoration of the striking force of the Western German army incites aggressive German circles, now proclaiming a new programme of revenge and conquest against the peoples and countries of Eastern Europe, irrespective of the true wishes of the western Powers when they extend their help? And all this at a moment when so much emphasis is being laid in the United Nations on the pressing need for disarmament.

That is why we oppose categorically the remilitarization of Western Germany, and why, as the expression of our constructive attitude, we support -- within the framework of an over-all disarmament programme, or as a first step leading to it --

a plan of establishing an area of limited armaments in Europe, an area including, among other areas, the whole of Germany. There we should proceed, under the inspection system envisaged in the proposals of Premier Bulganin and President Eisenhower, to an immediate cessation of further armament, to the removal of all weapons of mass destruction, to the gradual elimination of foreign military bases, to a gradual withdrawal of foreign military units and, of course, to other measures of limitation of armaments.

The establishment in Europe of an area of limited armaments would create a bridge for further important decisions on security and disarmament not merely for Europe. This plan could embrace the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression between the members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Thus, the case for a European security system would gain strong practical foundation. As a result, we would move forward towards the establishment of a collective security system, towards the dissolution of opposing blocs. And this is, after all, I submit, our ultimate objective. May I recall here that it is the Warsaw Pact which provides for its own dissolution at the very moment a European collective security system is called into being.

The problem of the reduction of armaments is not purely mechanical or arithmetical in character. For it is not only the quantity of armaments which causes an increase in international tension. The danger of the quantitative stockpiling of arms is multiplied many times by another factor which I would describe as the political organization of armaments on an international scale. Today States are not rearming individually. They are linked in military blocs, and not only are military forces stationed on their own soil, but hundreds of foreign military bases are being built in other countries.

(Mr. Winiewicz, Poland)

These are the innate characteristics of the current armaments race. The danger of armaments and the threat of war, we would stress, cannot therefore be eliminated by reductions in the quantity of armaments only. This should be followed by the gradual elimination of the international political organization of armaments. Thus, in speaking in favour of disarmament here, we of Poland plead at the same time for an end to the policy of establishing military bases on foreign territories and of aggressive military blocs. In this connexion the especially dangerous areas of armaments and of concentration of armed forces require special treatment, as a special chapter of the over-all programme of disarmament.

Of course, I know that the acceptance of our view would lead towards a reappraisal of the present policy of some Powers, but I do hope that such appraisal need not necessarily be considered as agonizing.

Having dealt with a particular problem of disarmament and security, may I now be permitted to make a few remarks on the substance of some proposals presented in the course of our present discussion, and may I immediately add that we have not had the opportunity to study all of them.

The Polish delegation has given careful study to the statement of the representative of the United States. The difficulty in defining our attitude toward document A/C.1/783 presented by the representative of the United States arises out of the fact that it is worded in very general terms. The first part of the United States memorandum visualizes an agreement "under which ... all future production of fissionable materials shall be used or stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes under international supervision". (A/C.1/783)

In this connexion an important question arises as to when this agreement is to be reached and whether it is in any way dependent on the understanding as to the remaining points. Furthermore, from the formulation "agreement ... under which all future production ... shall be used exclusively for non-weapons purposes ...", one could draw the conclusion that from the moment of the coming into force of such an agreement all future production of fissionable materials should be destined exclusively for peaceful purposes. This would, in our opinion, amount to the outlawry of the production of nuclear weapons. And if this is so, we can only welcome it with satisfaction.

(Mr. Winiewicz, Poland)

But then what is the purpose of postponing the ban on tests with nuclear weapons to a later stage of negotiations, as the second point of this Memorandum envisages? Rather a different order seems logical. Either both these bans enter into operation simultaneously or the ban on tests should come earlier than the prohibition of production. In reality, since, as we know, under present conditions the problem of control of test explosions is solved automatically by scientific detection, we could introduce such a ban here and now without much further discussion.

We know that such a prohibition, of course, could not in itself, ipso facto, diminish to any extent the actual level of nuclear armaments; it would rather be a partial measure of bringing to an end a further increase in the nuclear race. But if we succeed in this, we will thereby facilitate progress towards more far-reaching measures. The Soviet proposal on the prohibition of nuclear tests offers, in our view, a very good opportunity to embark upon specific action in this respect, an action the importance of which was so convincingly emphasized here by the representative of Japan in his first intervention. But we regret that in his second intervention and in the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.162) jointly sponsored with Canada and Norway, the representative of Japan supported a minor measure on the solution of this over-all important problem.

From what I have attempted to emphasize, it is clear that on many points in the disarmament discussion there already exists if not full accord, then certainly some rapprochement of points of view. It seems to us therefore very important not to waste the gains already made and the progress achieved.

How then do we visualize the further course of United Nations activities in the field of disarmament?

First of all, the Polish delegation is of the opinion that we should undertake the task of defining and listing problems on which there is a general consensus. Then we should consider what decisions can now be taken and whether they can now become an initial step toward an over-all international general disarmament agreement. Thus our entire attention in future disarmament discussions could be concentrated on reconciling and harmonizing the still divergent points of view.

Secondly, there seem to be problems which we can solve here and now at the present session of the General Assembly. But we are of the opinion that the records of our discussion should be eventually transferred to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee with the recommendation that they should hasten their work on the basis of the views expressed at the eleventh session of the General Assembly.

Thirdly, we should consider whether it would not be advisable to bring a larger number of States into the active work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

Fourthly, it seems advisable to consider whether a special session of the United Nations General Assembly could not take up the problem of disarmament. To request the Disarmament Commission to submit concrete proposals to such a special session would, in our opinion, have a stimulating effect on its work.

During the thousand years of Poland's history our country has lived through many storms. It required tremendous effort and many sacrifices to heal the deep wounds and the vast destruction inflicted on our country and our people during the last war, which was fought with conventional arms, during which we lost -- and may I be permitted to quote it once again here -- 6 million people, one-fifth of our total population. Now we have embarked on a road to create a sound and strong foundation for a better future for our people who have had such bitter experiences in the past. We believe it also to be our contribution to the strengthening of peaceful coexistence among all nations. The Polish delegation, therefore, attaches special importance to the problem of disarmament.

Peace is indispensable to us if we are to reach our goals successfully.

The success of United Nations activities in the field of disarmament must bring direct benefits to my country and others. How much easier will the peoples of the entire world breathe once the burden of armaments has been lightened, once the tension now existing between opposing blocs has been removed and trust in the possibility of enduring, peaceful international co-operation has been restored.

A convincing experience in this respect was offered by the period when, after the meeting of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers in Geneva in 1955, the harsh climate of "cold war" became distinctly milder. Today, with a new increase in international tension, it is all the more urgent to undertake broad initiatives for the abandonment of the policy of armaments and military blocs, to eliminate the possibilities of new conflicts and to ensure the universal application of the principle that international differences and disputes must be settled only by negotiations.

A constructive disarmament programme and its implementation are decisive contributions which this Organization, the United Nations, can make towards the fulfilment of these goals.

Mr. SHAHA (Nepal): This is the first time that my delegation is participating in the First Committee's deliberations on the subject of disarmament -- a subject which has engaged the attention of this body for the last ten years.

I have listened with interest and attention to the speeches of other representatives here -- especially those of the members of the Disarmament Commission, who obviously have a greater responsibility than the rest of us. The smaller countries, like ours, find it extremely difficult to make detailed observations on the different aspects of this important and complicated problem. Conscious as we are of the fact that a small country like ours can play only a limited role in the solution of this problem, all that we can do is to request the great Powers to come to some permanent agreement in the better interests of humanity. We all know that another war may completely destroy the world we live in and the civilization of which we are so proud. It is, therefore, the responsibility of the great Powers to make a real effort to solve this problem.

(Mr. Shaha, Nepal)

My country has never in its long history indulged in an aggressive war -- although it has been called upon many a time to defend itself against foreign attacks, and on every such occasion its people have stood as a solid block in defence of their freedom and frontiers. That has been so in the past. During the first half of the present century, despite our best efforts to be left alone, we found it difficult to keep ourselves out of war, because of the exigencies of the general world situation. Our experience of the last two wars has brought us the realization that, however isolated we may be from other parts of the world, our destiny is linked to that of the rest of mankind -- and this will be particularly true in the event of another global conflagration. Although we are apparently ensconced in the fastness of the formidable Himalayas, we are as vulnerable to the modern weapons of warfare and as much subject to the deadly effects of total war as anyone else.

It is exactly the recurrence of another world conflict that we do not wish to see. No nation has a greater horror of war than Nepal, the finest flowers of whose manhood have been decimated in the two world wars. Members can very well imagine the anxiety and concern felt about this subject by the people of my country, who have a bitter memory of the loss of their sons, brothers and husbands in war. It is the sincere and genuine desire for peace in the hearts of eight million people of Nepal that prompts me to make an earnest appeal for an early agreement on disarmament.

Many speakers have expressed disappointment at the little progress made in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, despite the continuous work done by the Sub-Committee throughout the years. It is rather discouraging that the general understanding and trust created by the Western and Soviet Powers last year has slowly deteriorated. It is evident from the report of the disarmament Sub-Committee that in May 1956 the area of disagreement had been enlarged; this area still remains to be narrowed. If the same trend continues, we wonder whether the question of disarmament will ever be solved.

In my delegation's opinion, it is the growth of an atmosphere of trust and goodwill among the various nations of the world -- and especially the great Powers -- which can eventually bring about a solution of this problem. It would be naive to expect that the disarmament problem could be solved without a spirit of healthy realism and without taking into account the true nature of the world situation.

(Mr. Shaha, Nepal)

In spite of the fact that very little progress has been achieved in this regard, I think that there are certain signs of encouragement. It is heartening to find that some agreement exists among the members of the disarmament Sub-Committee on the levels of reduction of the armed forces of the great Powers. The proposals for the reduction, in the first phase of the disarmament plan, of the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic to 2.5 million men, respectively, and of the United Kingdom and France to 750,000 men, respectively, have been generally accepted. On the question of nuclear disarmament, it is increasingly realized that the objectives of such disarmament should be to protect the health and well-being of present and coming generations from the ill effects of atomic radiation. Further, the use of fissionable material for peaceful purposes would usher in an era of unprecedented prosperity in the world.

This Committee is well acquainted with the hazards of atomic radiation. The scientific reports on this subject of various countries indicate that further experimentation with atomic bombs might tend to jeopardize the health of future generations. The International Congress of Human Geneticists, which met in Copenhagen last autumn, clearly stated that:

"the damage produced by radiation on the hereditary material is real and should be taken seriously into consideration in both the peaceful and military use of nuclear energy, as well as in all medical, commercial and industrial practices in which X-rays or other ionizing radiation is emitted".

Recent experiments carried out at the University of Colorado give ominous indications that the human cells are considerably more vulnerable to radiation than had been previously imagined.

We fully realize the difficulties inherent in carrying out a comprehensive plan for the total cessation of nuclear tests, but we cherish the belief that some day in the not-too-distant future it will be possible to formulate a programme for the use and control of fissionable materials which will have the agreement of the great Powers.

(Mr. Shaha, Nepal)

It appears that differences of opinion concerning the necessity of maintaining an effective international control system have been considerably narrowed. President Eisenhower's suggestion for aerial inspection has been recognized by the Soviet Union as a basis of inspection in a limited area in Europe. Marshal Bulganin's proposal for ground inspection has also been partially accepted by the Western Powers. Since both these plans have been accepted, it may be said that the combination of aerial and ground inspection teams would reduce the danger of surprise attack.

Nevertheless, we are faced with some practical difficulties. Effective international control can be established only when an international agency has full access to all nuclear weapons and products. In this connexion, the revised Anglo-French plan of 19 March 1956, which takes into account both the comprehensive and the partial measures of control, deserves careful study by the Disarmament Commission. As was precisely stated by the United Kingdom representative, there are only two alternative approaches to this problem -- that is, through a comprehensive disarmament plan envisaging all the steps necessary to conventional and nuclear disarmament, or through a partial plan for immediate implementation, providing such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as might be possible in present circumstances. If considerable reductions in both conventional and nuclear armaments are to be effected, a comprehensive plan would be preferable; but if no agreement is possible on that basis, a different approach could be made along the lines suggested in the second alternative -- that is, agreement might be sought on a plan for partial disarmament. Even in this case, an agreement on a control system seems to be essential to ensure compliance by all States with the obligations laid down in the plan.

(Mr. Shaha, Nepal)

No system of control, however, can ever be effective if it does not take into account the modern scientific inventions of ballistic inter-continental missiles. We listened with careful attention to the five-point programme proposed by the representative of the United States. One important facet of this proposal is the testing of "earth satellites" through international inspection and participation. The United States proposals, presented to this Committee on 14 January, mark an attempt to find a limited approach to the disarmament problem, and they deserve the sympathetic and intensive consideration of all Members, especially the members of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. In fact, the Disarmament Commission should undertake a comprehensive study of the control of all types of nuclear weapons, inter-planetary, rockets, guided missiles, long-range submarines, and other deadly weapons or inventions which are a nightmare of the present atomic era.

Briefly, the following points deserve the immediate consideration of the Disarmament Commission:

First, the reduction in the armed forces of the various Powers to be brought about immediately, as there seems to be an agreement on this matter among the big Powers. Reductions in military manpower without reduction in weapons would give no security, just as control or prohibition of nuclear weapons without the limitation or control of conventional weapons would be useless. The question of reductions in conventional weapons is closely related to that of the limitation and prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Secondly, the production of fissionable material to be controlled through an international body, and to be diverted for peaceful uses. This should be done with a view to bringing about the cessation of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of stockpiles, and the destruction of armaments. The implementation of such a scheme would require all the measures and degrees of control necessary for its functioning. In the humble submission of my delegation, the question of the international control of future production of fissionable materials for non-military purposes is not related to the question of the control or destruction of the existing stockpiles. As suggested by the United States representative, once the production of nuclear materials has been brought under control, information would be available which may render possible, as a next step, the reduction of existing stockpiles.

(Mr. Shaha, Nepal)

Thirdly, the establishment of an effective international system of inspection and control along the lines suggested by President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin. The aerial and ground inspection teams should be placed at important strategic points, and open inspection of potential concentration centres should take place in order to prevent surprise attack.

Fourthly, immediate consideration of the new problems created by the modern offensive weapons and inter-planetary projectiles, so as to bring about an effective international control over the testing of such objects and to develop these outer-space discoveries only for scientific and peaceful purposes.

A programme for disarmament, a few suggestions for which I have taken the liberty to mention here, should not be delayed on the plea that other important international problems related to disarmament still remain unsolved. The question of whether agreement on disarmament depends upon the solution of outstanding international problems, or vice versa, is one which cannot be answered one way or the other. However, if disarmament is to be our goal, expediency and reason support the view that both these problems should be tackled simultaneously, as we face them. It would be very wrong indeed not to exert efforts in solving one issue just because the others remained unsolved. In fact, the question of disarmament and the outstanding international problems are inter-related, and the solution of one problem would automatically open avenues for the consideration of others, and thus contribute to the lessening of world tensions.

The race for armaments has to be stopped and a climate of peace has to be striven for. Military pacts and alliances tend towards a deterioration in the atmosphere of peace and impart an added impetus to the mad race for weapons. The race for armaments between the great Powers of the world is the result of their mutual fear and mistrust. The real danger to world peace that arises from the situation lies in the possibility of some miscalculation on the part of either of them leading to another global conflict.

Despite the difficulties encountered in trying to reach an agreement on this difficult problem, we feel that we should not be discouraged. The defeats of the past should prompt us to make fresh endeavours, especially since we are all interested in the creation of a harmonious, peaceful world. It is the earnest hope of my Government and my people that rapprochement between the Soviet Union and

(Mr. Shaha, Nepal)

the Western Powers may be possible in the light of the discussion in the present session of the General Assembly. Perhaps it would be practicable to concentrate upon a less ambitious programme which could be put into effect immediately rather than upon a plan that would require years of negotiations. This would be an important step forward in the solution of the disarmament problem, and we hope that such a step will be quickly taken.

I hope that these humble suggestions of mine will find favour with my colleagues and that, along with other ideas that may be presented in the course of the present discussion and deliberations, they will be referred to the Disarmament Commission.

I should now like to turn to the three-Power draft resolution that is before us. My delegation feels that any step forward towards realizing the common aim of ultimately banning all tests of nuclear weapons should be welcomed by all. The joint draft resolution submitted by Canada, Japan and Norway seeks to provide for advance notice and registration of thermonuclear tests, and this represents a step in the right direction and deserves the support of this body. My delegation hopes that the great Powers will appreciate the constructive spirit that inspired this draft and that they will accept it in the spirit in which it was presented to them.

Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): We are considering a problem, the satisfactory solution of which would constitute a great contribution to the settlement of the vital problems which are today of concern to the world and to mankind. This problem is the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, and the removal of the threat of a new war.

The Byelorussian delegation understands the concern and alarm which the representatives of a number of States have shown here in connexion with the armaments race, the increase in military expenditures, the increase of mutual suspicion, and the increased threat of a new war. The Byelorussian people, which suffered so greatly during the Second World War, cannot consider with indifference the fact that the disarmament problem has not yet been solved.

(Mr. Kiselev,
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Byelorussia was exposed twice to the assaults of German imperialism in the course of one generation, as a result of which it suffered enormous damages and its population suffered enormous casualties. The Byelorussian people lost more than half of its national patrimony in the last war. We will always remember the great sacrifices of our people as well as the sacrifices of the people of other countries which were made in the joint effort to overcome the aggressive Nazi forces. We are fully determined not to allow a recurrence of these past events. We would not like to see the towns and villages which have sprung up from the rubble of the past war to be the target of atomic and hydrogen bombs. That is why the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic is prepared to contribute to a positive solution of the problem of disarmament.

There is no more compelling problem than the problem of disarmament. Never in history has the problem of disarmament been before us in such acute form. The armaments race is absorbing unbelievable quantities of material resources and human labour. It is hampering the economic and cultural development of mankind. We are witnessing the creation and the continuing perfection of various types of weapons with incredible destructive power. Under these conditions there lies upon the Governments of all countries, and primarily upon the Governments of the major Powers, the major responsibility for the solution of the problem of disarmament and for the elimination of the threat of a new war.

No international problem has been the subject of so many prolonged discussions as the problem of the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. But, alas, the problem of disarmament remains as yet unsolved. The principle reason for this situation is the fact that the United States of America and the countries supporting it, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have strived over a period of many years to prevent any genuine disarmament. This became particularly apparent in the past few years when the Soviet Union, in order to reach an agreement on disarmament, has year in and year out put forward a number of constructive proposals. The Soviet Union has been tirelessly seeking to solve this vital international problem. The USSR has set itself and is setting as its purpose the saving of mankind from

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the scourge of a new destructive war and to save mankind from the heavy tax burden which it has to carry in connexion with the continuing armaments race; the Soviet Union is also seeking to reduce tension in relation to the United States. In this connexion I should like to stress that, in seeking to achieve an agreement on disarmament, the Soviet Union has repeatedly shown its readiness to meet the Western Powers half-way, expecting of course that they on their part would do the same.

Let us, for example, consider for a minute the work of the United Nations Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. As we all know, the United States, the United Kingdom and France were against the Soviet proposal in the beginning regarding the prohibition of atomic weapons because the Western Powers allegedly could not reject the use of atomic weapons as these weapons offset their backwardness in terms of conventional armaments. We see from the records of the Sub-Committee that the Western Powers insisted that in the beginning armed forces should be reduced to a level of one and a half million men for the United States, the USSR and China and to the level of 650,000 men for the United Kingdom and France.

The Soviet Union accepted this proposal of the Western Powers in May 1955. It seemed that an agreement could have been reached at that time, and yet the Western Powers went back on their own proposals. Bearing in mind that the disagreement on the problem of the prohibition of atomic weapons was particularly great and wishing to help in getting out of the impasse which had been reached, the Soviet Union proposed that an agreement should first be reached on the reduction of conventional armaments. In so doing, the Soviet Union took into account the fact that the Western Powers had proposed to begin the solution of the problem of disarmament by reducing conventional armaments and armed forces. This concept was specifically advanced by Mr. Harold MacMillan -- who was at the time the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary -- at the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in 1955. On 27 March 1956, the Soviet representative on the United Nations Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission presented the well-known proposal concerning reduction in the first place of conventional armaments. Once again there existed conditions favourable to an agreement, an agreement which is

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being awaited impatiently by all the peoples of the world. But, unfortunately, an agreement again was not reached. The representative of the United States, supported by the representatives of the United Kingdom, France and Canada, demanded that the level for troops of the United States, the USSR and China be raised from one and a half million to two and a half million men and that for the United Kingdom and France it be raised from 650,000 to 750,000 men. At the same time the representatives of the United States and of the other Western Powers linked the solution of the problem of disarmament with a preliminary settlement of other outstanding international problems.

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At the meetings of the Sub-Committee in July 1956, the Soviet Union agreed with the Western proposals regarding a higher level of armed forces. However, the representatives of the Western Powers did their utmost in order to prevent, once again, an agreement on the problem of disarmament and they attempted to place the blame for this on the Soviet Union. The question arises quite naturally in the mind of the man in the street why the United States and its friends do not wish to disarm. Why are they directing every possible obstacle, why are they causing every possible delay? The answer of course is clear. The fantastic profits of the arms firms derived from the war industry in the United States and the Western countries can be assessed on the basis of the following eloquent facts. American economic experts have ascertained that war production in the United States at this time accounts for approximately one fifth of the total industrial output of the country; in England, war orders account for approximately one seventh of the total industrial output.

Defense Secretary Wilson of the United States, speaking at a public meeting of the Senate Ways and Means Committee, informed the Committee that in 1956-57 the United States is going to expend approximately one hundred million dollars daily. We also know that the total military expenditure of the United States in the current fiscal year amounts to approximately 40 billion dollars, and in 1958, as the New York Times informed us on 17 January, 1957, United States military expenditure will amount to 43.3 billion dollars out of a total budget of 73,620 million dollars. Thus, out of every budget dollar in 1958, 59 cents will be spent on war needs.

As the New York Times told us on 6 December 1956, United States Secretary of the Navy, Charles Thomas said that "a powerful long-range defence programme in the **United** States would undoubtedly have a stimulating effect on the economy of the country."

The present nuclear weapons race going on in the United States shows that every measure has been taken in order that allocations for the production of atomic and thermonuclear devices and also for the production of a powerful air force should be the largest since the last war. The allocation for the Atomic Energy Commission for 1957-58 will amount to more than 2.3 billion dollars. It is obvious that this nuclear and thermonuclear race and its destructive force constitutes a major threat to mankind.

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The facts I have just quoted convincingly dispel the myth that the leading circles of the United States are striving for peace. The recent Eisenhower doctrine is an eloquent proof of the fact that these aggressive designs are intended to lead to an unfettered intervention in the domestic affairs of the countries of the Near and Middle East.

Our delegation would like to express its views regarding the proposal of the United States as set out by Mr. Lodge on 14 January 1957. The United States is prepared, during the first stage of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments to take as a basis the figure of 2.5 million men for the USSR and the United States and 750,000 men for the United Kingdom and France. No provision is made that during the second year the armed forces of the five major Powers be reduced to 1.5 million and 650,000 men respectively, even though these levels were originally suggested by the Western Powers themselves. Moreover, a further reduction of armed forces, according to the United States proposal, would be made contingent upon a settlement of the very important outstanding political problems about which the world is so divided.

The United States proposals do not provide for the prohibition of atomic and nuclear weapons; in fact, no atomic disarmament is envisaged at all in these proposals. The question of the destruction of existing stockpiles and the prohibition of thermonuclear tests is postponed indefinitely in these proposals. As we see it, the United States proposals do not contribute to the reduction of the threat of an atomic war.

The only thing to which the United States seems to agree is that a plan be drafted regarding the preliminary notification and recording of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. The United States representative spoke here about the American programme "Atoms for peace". But this programme can hardly dispel the atomic thundercloud which overhangs mankind. This programme does not restrict in any way those who are producing atomic and nuclear weapons. While allocating some small amount of atomic materials for peaceful purposes, the United States continues to devote the main bulk of fissionable materials to the production of new atomic and new nuclear weapons.

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One gains the impression that the United States is merely seeking to divert the attention of the peoples of the world from the problem of the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons and from the whole problem of disarmament generally.

May I now deal for a moment with the statement by Mr. Noble, the representative of the United Kingdom, who took some pains to distort the policy of the Soviet Union in matters of disarmament. He did not state his views regarding the Soviet proposal on the prohibition of the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons and on the calling of a special session of the General Assembly. On the problem of disarmament and some other matters, he preferred to pass over in silence the Soviet proposals. The representative of the United Kingdom recalled the Anglo-French plan of disarmament which was presented on 19 March 1956 and which constitutes, in the belief of my delegation, an obvious retreat from certain earlier proposals of the United Kingdom and France in matters of disarmament.

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This plan does not overcome those difficulties which were encountered in connexion with the reduction of armed forces and armaments and the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons.

The consideration of the problem of the prohibition of atomic weapons and their removal from the armaments rosters of States is being postponed until the over-all programme of disarmament is completed, and this programme is not based on any firm deadline.

Moreover, the Anglo-French plan in fact legalizes the utilization of atomic weapons inasmuch as it allows atomic weapons to be used under the pretext of defence against "aggression".

We should take into account the fact that under this plan the existence of such aggression must be defined by a majority vote of the so-called executive committee of fifteen countries, and not by the Security Council as envisaged under the Charter of the United Nations. Then it becomes obvious that the door is intended to be left open here for unrestricted, arbitrary action by the Western Powers which possess atomic and thermonuclear weapons. One cannot fail to see that the Anglo-French plan pursues the same purposes as the United States plan. It does not allow us to find a way out of the dead end in which we find ourselves, and it postpones agreement on disarmament indefinitely.

The head of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Kuznetsov, submitted to the First Committee a new proposal by the Soviet Union which provides a sound basis for achieving agreement on disarmament. The plan moved by the Soviet Union is a broad, realistic plan. It takes into account contemporary international conditions. The Soviet proposals allow the possibility of a way out of the dead end with regard to this matter.

The Soviet Union proposes a considerable reduction, in the course of the next two years, of the armed forces of the five major Powers. You know the figures. The Soviet Union proposes also the reduction by one third of the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France stationed on German territory; and, further, a considerable reduction in 1957 of the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France located on the territory of States members of NATO and of the armed forces of the Soviet Union stationed in countries that are parties to the so-called Warsaw Treaty.

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The statement by the Soviet Union on 17 November 1956 suggests that the military, naval and air bases located on territories of foreign countries be liquidated within the next two years. As we know, the Soviet Union has already liquidated all its military bases abroad. At the same time, the United States has been building new bases around the peace-loving countries. This far-flung network of military bases created by the United States throughout the world constitutes a major threat to peace and to the national independence of many countries. The very existence of these bases is incompatible with the cause of the consolidation of peace, and for this reason the General Assembly must put an end to such a situation.

My delegation also supports the proposal with regard to the reduction of the military expenditures of States during the next two years in accordance with the reduction of armed forces and armaments, the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons and the liquidation of bases in territories of foreign countries. We support the principle of strict international control over the implementation of the various clauses on disarmament, a control system that would have all the necessary rights and functions. The Soviet Union proposes during the next two years to ensure the prohibition of nuclear weapons, to put an end to their production, to prohibit their utilization and to destroy existing stockpiles of atomic and thermonuclear bombs.

As a first step, it is suggested that we put an end to thermonuclear tests. This is being demanded by all countries, which quite naturally show concern in connexion with the continuation of these tests. In the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union, it is stated that the continuance of tests of these types of weapons constitutes a threat to the life and health of the peoples of all countries of the world. Those States which are carrying out such tests are being appealed to to put an end to them forthwith.

In this draft resolution we find a reflection of the dreams and aspirations of the people of the world, who know full well the implications of the atomic bombings of the Japanese people at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Byelorussian delegation therefore warmly supports the Soviet draft resolution.

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The representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Noble, in his statement in this Committee on 15 January this year, said:

"We are aware of public anxiety about the possible effects on health of nuclear test explosions." (A/C.1/PV.822, page 16)

However, instead of drawing the appropriate conclusions, instead of speaking up in favour of an immediate cessation of these tests, Mr. Noble then referred to the reports of the Medical Research Council in the United Kingdom and of a similar committee in the United States which, Mr. Noble said, "were on the whole reassuring". (Ibid.)

In fact, there is no reason for such reassurance. Scientists connected with atomic energy in many countries of the world are continually speaking in favour of the prohibition of atomic tests and warning of the dangerous after-effects of such tests. Professor Soddy is one of the most prominent British atomic scientists. It was reported in the New York Times of 21 March 1955 that he appealed for the establishment of controls over atomic weapons and also for international supervision by an authoritative international agency over what has been done by the scientists of the world. He said that the atomic tests are poisoning the air with radioactivity and that it would be stupid to claim that they are harmless.

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Considerable concern over the harmful effects of these tests is being shown by the Japanese people, scientists and press, which is quite understandable. According to the news agency Kyo-do Tzusin, in a press release dated 5 March 1956, the Japanese National Council, in its struggle for the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, is taking steps to assist the victims of the atomic bombings of Japan, who now number 292,000 persons. It goes on to state that notwithstanding the fact that more than ten years have elapsed since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, people who were exposed to radiation during those bombings continue to die.

In this connexion, it might be appropriate to recall that in February 1956 the Japanese Parliament appealed to the parliaments of other countries to prohibit atomic weapons and to put an end to atomic tests through an international agreement. The appeal stated that the Japanese nation, which was the first victim of both the atomic bomb and the thermonuclear bomb, strongly desired that these tests should be stopped through an international agreement.

In the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists dated September 1956, the Federation of United States Scientists dealt with the need to reach an agreement on the prohibition of all future nuclear and thermonuclear tests as a preliminary step toward controlled disarmament. Many scientists in the United States and in other Western countries have objected emphatically to the attempt of the United States Atomic Energy Commission to play down the dangers inherent in radiation from nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

The New York Herald Tribune reported on 26 April 1955 that Professor Herman Mueller, professor-geneticist of the University of Indiana and Nobel prize winner, stated before the United States National Academy of Scientists on 25 April 1955 that radiation resulting from thermonuclear tests could cause tens of thousands of harmful mutations in future generations of American citizens. He added that there was no degree of atomic radiation, no matter how small, which could fail to cause harmful consequences.

A prominent British scientist, Professor Rothblatt, of London University, stated, in an article on the effects of atomic radiation published at the beginning of 1955 in the Journal of Atomic Scientists, the possible risks of genetic complications if the testing of these weapons were continued on the present scale.

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He stated that the after effects were all the more alarming as they could not be observed directly by the human eye. Nevertheless, within some period of time they could have catastrophic results for the whole of mankind.

In a book entitled The Effects of Nuclear Explosions, prepared by the prominent Indian scientist, Homi Ehabha, and Professors Kotari and Kanolkar, it is stated that the claims that these tests should be ended only after it had been established that their continuance would lead to a definite catastrophe for mankind, are a sorrowful commentary to 2,500 years of human progress. In an introductory note to this book, Prime Minister Nehru warned that the world was faced with the probability of huge numbers of victims as a result of the explosions of these nuclear weapons. He added that the world was faced with the genetic effects of these explosions on the present and future generations.

Not all the statements of Western scientists, of course, are published and are made known to the public at large. I believe, however, that the statements which I have quoted are sufficient to show that a large number of scientists in the United States and in other Western Powers consider it indispensable to put an end to atomic and thermonuclear tests.

For these reasons, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR considers that the joint draft resolution submitted by Canada, Norway and Japan to be far from adequate. It does not call upon the States which are producing atomic and thermonuclear weapons to put an end to the tests. It does not reflect the concern of the peoples of the world over the continuance of the tests of these weapons, which constitute a threat to the health and the very life of the population of the world.

The Soviet Union proposal opens the way to the end of the armaments race, to the elimination of the threat of an atomic and thermonuclear war, to the lessening of the tax burden of the population of the world and to the consolidation of peace and friendship among people. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR warmly supports the Soviet Union proposal. It considers that this great invention of the human mind, atomic energy, should not be used against civilization but should be used for its progress, not for the mass annihilation of populations but for peaceful purposes so as to increase the well being of the peoples of the world.

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The Soviet Government has repeatedly made important proposals, and has offered amendments to its own proposals, in the attempt to reach an agreement on all these matters. At this session of the General Assembly also, the delegation of the Soviet Union has submitted a proposal which is designed to secure the peace and security of the peoples of the world. Our delegation considers that the Soviet proposal constitutes a major contribution in the cause of peace. It opens the way to a practical solution of this problem.

It is now up to the Western Powers to react. The peace-loving peoples of the world await from us evidence, not on paper but in fact, of our willingness to reduce armaments and to prohibit the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons.

The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR supports the draft resolution of the Soviet Union delegation in which it is suggested that the United Nations Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee consider proposals on the problem of the reduction of armed forces that have been submitted by the Governments of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other States and that a special session of the General Assembly be convened on matters of disarmament. It is in the interests of mankind that these discussions should bring about practical results at last. The peoples of the world expect from the United Nations the urgent adoption of concrete measures that would lead to the reduction of armaments and armed forces and to the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): For a number of reasons, the other speakers on the list are unable to address the Committee at this time. Furthermore, it is near 6 o'clock, which is our usual adjournment time. I shall take advantage of this opportunity to call on the representative of France, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. MOCH (France) (interpretation from French): I did not want to interrupt our colleague from the Byelorussian SSR although I felt that he should be reminded of the rules of procedure and I therefore wanted to raise a point of order. But may I repeat here that the continuous reiteration of inaccuracies will lead us nowhere, and it is not by giving a tendentious and deformed and inaccurate shading to the Anglo-French plan that we will get ahead. On behalf of the United Kingdom and French delegations, I therefore wish to protest against the analysis that was made of our plan and of our constant efforts at conciliation.

If I wanted to proceed along the lines followed by the representative of the Byelorussian SSR, I could say that I agree that certain foreign bases have in them the seed of redoubtable massacres -- and I could mention the name of a European country that is absent from our debates today. I could also say, in connexion with the reports of scientists, that for many years so-called scientists have accused certain people of dropping candy infected with microbes and poisoned flies over

different countries. But I prefer to overlook all that. It is not along those lines that we can establish peace, which is our main endeavour. And it is because I am not going to utilize such arguments when I discuss the French point of view that I hesitated to mention this today. But I feel that silence on the part of the United Kingdom and French delegations should not be taken as expressing agreement with the so-called analysis that was just made of the Anglo-French plan.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.

