



CONTENTS

Agenda item 41 (<i>continued</i>):	Page
Question of Korea:	
(a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;	
(b) Creation of favourable conditions to accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea . . .	419

Chairman: Mr. Otto R. BORCH (Denmark).

AGENDA ITEM 41 (*continued*)

Question of Korea (A/9027, A/9145 and Add.1-5, A/9146, A/C.1/1034, 1038, A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1 and 645):

- (a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;
- (b) Creation of favourable conditions to accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea

1. Mr. FACK (Netherlands): Almost unnoticed at this twenty-eighth session, the General Assembly, when it dealt with the report on the scale of assessments, deleted the traditional wording that consideration should be given to the economic consequences of the Second World War. There was no discussion, and a decision was taken unanimously. It was not such a spectacular decision as the admission to membership of the two German States but it was another sign that the United Nations is moving out of the post-war stage into a new era. Détente is the word most used to describe the present transitional period. Détente of course means only a lessening of tension, involving a willingness primarily to consider positive and encouraging aspects of international relations and a tendency not to focus essentially on negative aspects; but we should be less than honest if we lulled ourselves into the belief that a mood of détente alone could overcome the problems of the post-war era and establish world-wide peace and security. There is plenty of hard work involved.

2. I make those introductory remarks because the Netherlands Government believes that these considerations should also guide us when dealing with the Korean question. We consider it the duty of the Members of the United Nations acting on the international level, to bring this question definitely out of the post-war era, out of the cold-war atmosphere, and into that of détente. I stress "on the international level", because on the national level the Koreans themselves have already taken the initiative by their historic South-North Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972.¹ The importance of that Communiqué was two-fold.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No.27, annex I.

In the first place, it announced a dialogue on many outstanding questions and, secondly—and I should like to stress this—the Koreans themselves took over where we, the General Assembly of the United Nations, had failed. This Korean action is one of the most encouraging developments on the long and arduous road ahead towards unification. It is an expression of the principle of self-determination. Alien governments and international organizations may help, and they are indeed willing to help, but every nation has to struggle for its own identity. Only through a dialogue by the Koreans of North and South can a solution to the Korean question in all its aspects be found.

3. In the light of those considerations and in view of the decision of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take these matters into their own hands, the Netherlands Government is of the opinion that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) has outlived its usefulness and therefore should be dissolved. As a member of UNCURK, on which we have been proud to serve, the Netherlands has been intimately involved in the development of the Korean question. If ever we can be of service in the cause of achieving Korean unity and if the parties wish us to do so, we shall be happy to oblige.

4. With the dissolution of UNCURK, the direct political involvement of the General Assembly and of this First Committee in the Korean question will come to an end. The United Nations will still be concerned with the question of the United Nations Command and its position with regard to the armistice. Those questions, of course, belong in the realm of the Security Council. It is the sincere hope of the Netherlands Government that it will be possible for the Security Council to consider in due course and in consultation with the parties directly concerned those aspects of the Korean question which fall within its responsibility.

5. What will henceforth be our duty as members of the Assembly with regard to Korea? Our duty is, on the one hand, when invited by the parties, to help them in their search for national unity and, on the other hand, to refrain from any action which might jeopardize the common efforts of the two Korean States.

6. It is in this spirit that the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in the Assembly document A/9146 have drafted their text. In this Committee the draft resolution has been tabled as document A/C.1/L.645, and my delegation has the honour and the pleasure to be amongst the 26 sponsors.

7. Previous speakers have addressed themselves to some aspects of this draft. As the draft has not yet been formally

introduced into the Committee, I wish at this stage only to refer to it very briefly. In our view, the text of this draft is clear and simple. It welcomes promising and encouraging new developments in a question that has retained the attention of the General Assembly for over a quarter of a century. It would also terminate the General Assembly's involvement in the matter. If the draft were accepted, the perennial agenda item "Question of Korea" would thenceforth no longer find a place in provisional agendas of subsequent annual sessions.

8. Our draft resolution—and here I touch on a point that has been raised by a number of previous speakers—leaves the question of future Korean membership in the United Nations exclusively to the parties concerned. It is of course entirely up to them to consider and decide whether to submit separate applications for membership now or in the future, or alternatively to delay any application until unification has been achieved. It is the view of the sponsors that the relevant decision of the parties concerned should be fully respected and that no outside pressure should be brought to bear upon them one way or the other.

9. We feel, therefore, that our draft is uncontroversial. We cannot find anything in our text that might cause difficulties for anybody. It is brief and factual; it is welcoming and encouraging in tone and character. At this stage that is all I want to say about this matter, but my delegation wishes to reserve its right to ask for the floor again on any text that may be or may come before this Committee at the appropriate time.

10. The CHAIRMAN: Before giving the floor to the next speaker may I, in response to the point raised this morning by the representative of Algeria, inform members of the Committee of the following. The list of sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.644 will be found in that document and in document A/C.1/L.644/Corr.1. Over and above that, I have announced in the First Committee at previous meetings that the German Democratic Republic, the Libyan Arab Republic and Madagascar have been added to the list of sponsors.

11. With regard to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.645, the list of sponsors will be found either in that document or in the verbatim record recording my previous announcements. According to those announcements, the following countries have been added to the list of sponsors: Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Liberia. I think that I have thus fulfilled the wishes of the Algerian delegation by making sure that the names of sponsors of the draft resolutions on the item now under discussion will now be included in the verbatim record as we discuss that item.

12. I have been informed by the Secretariat that it operates according to guidelines whereby it makes sure that the presiding officer shall make these announcements. However, it does not feel that circulation of addenda merely to indicate the additional sponsors is necessary, since the information will be found in the official record of the relevant meeting and in the report of the Committee when that report is brought to the plenary Assembly. If the Committee would allow me a personal comment, I think

that it is essential that the names of sponsors not mentioned in the relevant draft resolution should be read out when the item to which the draft resolution relates is under discussion; but I also find it eminently sensible not to spend money and effort just to reissue papers of that sort. I therefore hope that the practice that the Secretariat follows will find the general agreement of the Committee, with the addition that I have made here.

13. Mr. GROZEV (Bulgaria) (*translation from Russian*): I should like to begin by extending a hearty Bulgarian welcome to the representatives of the fraternal Democratic People's Republic of Korea who have now arrived among us and whose delegation is headed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Comrade Li Jong Mok.

14. The very fact that representatives of the free and independent Democratic People's Republic of Korea are seated in the United Nations with us is a major historical event. It is a major victory. It is a deserved acknowledgement of the peace-loving policy and sincere aspiration of the Government of this ancient and yet at the same time youthful socialist State towards peace, understanding and co-operation with other peoples towards peaceful unification of their artificially and unjustly divided homeland.

15. It is also a victory for the socialist and all other peace-loving peoples which for over 20 years now have struggled here in the United Nations and outside it for a just solution to the Korean question.

16. The granting of observer status and permission to participate in the twenty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly afforded to the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is further reaffirmation and proof of the major changes that have taken place both in the international arena and in our Organization. It is thanks to these changes that it has become possible for the General Assembly now to consider the question of Korea, one of the most important items on the agenda of the twenty-eighth session.

17. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that now, for the first time, this Committee and the General Assembly have an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the views of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of South Korea through the direct participation of their delegations in the actual discussion of the item.

18. It is perfectly natural that the discussion of this important problem should be taking place at this historical moment when the principles of peaceful coexistence are winning ever-wider recognition and are being imbued with practical significance and turned into universally recognized norms of international relations.

19. We are considering the question of Korea at a time when the prospects for the maintenance and strengthening of peace throughout the world are becoming ever more realistic and more lasting, at a time when great changes are taking place in the world; and perhaps the first thing that one should mention is the change that has taken place in relations among States in Europe. Without any doubt that is having and will continue to have a substantial effect on the general trend towards the relaxation of tension, the

strengthening of security and the peaceful settlement of international problems.

20. The end of the Viet-Nam war is a major historical act; that is not only a deserved victory for the heroic Viet-Namese people but also a victory for all the forces of peace, a great success in the struggle against imperialist aggression. That and other facts and events illustrate in the most vivid fashion possible that solutions for the most acute international problems can be found. This is possible only if the policy of force is set aside, if political realism is displayed and if there is respect for the legitimate and inalienable rights of the peoples themselves to determine their fate, to decide their problems in sovereignty and without interference from outside and to regulate freely and in accordance with their own interests all problems arising from or connected with the existence of their national States. All those are rights enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

21. History has repeatedly demonstrated that peace is indivisible. International détente cannot be the privilege of only some regions of the world. The task today is to turn the international détente which has been achieved in certain key areas of developing international relations into a lasting and durable phenomenon and, even more, to make it irreversible and a process that reaches to the very ends of the earth.

22. It is our hope that the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly will succeed in taking decisions on the question of Korea which will open broad prospects for the peaceful and independent unification of the Korean people and, at the same time, constitute an important contribution to the strengthening of peace and security in the Far East. We all had an opportunity at the 1957th meeting to hear the well argued and far-reaching statement by the head of the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We have available to us memoranda and other documents of the two parties; we also have two draft resolutions on this item before us for consideration.

23. My delegation is a sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1, which, we would like to believe, will receive the support of the overwhelming majority of our Committee and of the General Assembly.

24. With so many documents and facts at our disposal, each one of us can and should now conscientiously and without prejudice set forth his views and make his contribution to a truly just solution of the question of Korea.

25. This is all the more incumbent upon us because our Organization enjoys a far from enviable reputation with regard to the question of Korea.

26. It is time to remove the stain from the high and noble purposes and ideals for which the United Nations was created and has continued its struggle. The standard of the United Nations is the standard of all its Members, of all the peoples that fight for freedom and independence, for peace and international security, and no one will ever be allowed to besmirch that flag or to use it for his own selfish purpose of oppressing other artificially divided brothers and sisters.

27. For years we have had to listen to the most diverse, unconvincing attempts to justify the artificial division of Korea and to justify flagrant abuses of the name and the flag of the United Nations. Some are trying in vain to convince us that it is still necessary to maintain the status of this factual occupation of the country by foreign troops. I do not suppose that anyone will agree that that is really the wish of the people of Korea themselves.

28. The truth is that, being faithful to its peace-loving policy of principle, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has undertaken important political initiatives in recent years aimed exclusively at normalizing relations between the North and the South and at laying stable foundations for the country's peaceful unification.

29. On the basis of the interests of the entire Korean people, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its Chairman, Comrade Kim Il Sung, have for the past 25 years pursued an unswerving course towards peaceful unification of the country. For that purpose they have put forward numerous initiatives, guided by their concern to pave the way for the lasting settlement of the problem, which, for their part, is possible only if the main obstacle—interference from outside—can be removed.

30. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has consistently and unswervingly put forward such proposals as the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea; a cutback in the armed forces of North and South Korea; the elimination of artificial obstacles to broad economic, political and cultural exchange; the holding of free general elections; the establishment of a confederation between North and South Korea. Those and a number of other proposals have met with a favourable reception and have found support among the entire Korean people, for they are in keeping with its crucial interests. They are completely in keeping with the Charter and the principle that international problems should be settled by peaceful means.

31. As we know, as a result of this whole-hearted support, talks began for the first time between the Red Cross Organizations of North and South Korea. Thanks to the correct political approach and to this realistic assessment of the situation, a major step forward was made. The two delegations adopted three basic principles of national unification. Those principles, which are contained in the South-North Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972, are in keeping with the most sacred aspirations of the Korean people. This document has once again borne out the correctness and farsightedness of the policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

32. Imbued with an awareness of the great historical task that awaits the Korean people, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is conducting an uninterrupted struggle to give effect to the aforementioned proposals and principles. In 1973, with even greater political confidence, it put forward a more specific five-point programme [see A/9027, para. 19] touching upon all the vital problems on which the peaceful unification of Korea depends. The first step towards the peaceful unification of Korea, as proposed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, is the elimination of the causes of

armed confrontation, the carrying out of a multilateral exchange between North and South Korea and the ensuring of conditions for the participation of all sections of the population in the work of unification. On the way to unification the creation of a confederation is envisaged between North and South Korea under a single title, and the admission of Korea to the United Nations after unification or, if it is mutually desired, even before unification, but only as a confederation.

33. It is regrettable that these consistent peaceful proposals and initiatives on the part of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have not yet met with a corresponding response from the South Korean authorities. Furthermore, in a number of instances the South Korean leaders have unambiguously shown that they do not aspire to the unification of the Korean people and to a single peace-loving Korea, but rather are undertaking steps aimed at perpetuating the division of that beautiful country with its history of thousands of years.

34. A legitimate question arises: why do the South Korean authorities, after agreeing to the peaceful principles of unification, continue their negative policy? What are the real concealed reasons for this, and who stands behind this policy of the South Korean authorities? First of all the main reason for the continuing division of Korea is the fact that the southern part of the Korean Peninsula continues for all practical purposes to be dependent on foreign troops. This factor is unquestionably having a key influence on the policy of the South Korean authorities who are continuing their course aimed at further disunity. Together with certain of their patrons, they are now even proposing the simultaneous admission to the United Nations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of South Korea. Such a policy has nothing in common with the interests of the Korean people. It is aimed at turning the southern part of the Peninsula into a protectorate of one foreign State, into a bridgehead for its military and other interests in that part of the world.

35. What, in our opinion, should be done? What should and could the United Nations do in order actively and effectively to foster a peaceful and just solution of the Korean question? Here I should like once again to emphasize that the United Nations bears a special responsibility for the difficulties that lie in the path of a just solution to the problem of Korea. Some of the decisions taken by our Organization at a time when it had less than half its present membership did much to impede the process of removing the artificial barriers between the two parts of Korea and the barriers to a peaceful, independent unification of the country.

36. First and foremost we should like to express support for the recommendation in document A/9027 that the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should be dissolved. That Commission, as the history of its existence has demonstrated, has never played any positive role in helping to solve the problem of Korea. In accordance with the powers entrusted to it, the Commission should have helped to bring about the unification and rehabilitation of Korea. Facts demonstrate, however, that it has never been able to do either of those things for the simple reason that it was established for

purposes that have nothing in common with either the unification or the rehabilitation of the country.

37. It is in no way strange, therefore, that the Commission itself has long been passing through a deep crisis. Some of its members, being aware of the harmfulness of the Commission's activities, have either left it or no longer take part in its work.

38. In deciding the question of the Commission's future, we must not forget the fact that it is a rather expensive organ of the United Nations. It is an additional item of expenditure in the budget of the Organization, which is already overburdened. The cost of maintaining it annually is equal to the annual contributions of over one third of the Member States whose contributions are on a small scale of assessment.

39. A second key measure that could be carried out by the United Nations would be to remove from the United States troops stationed in South Korea the right to use the United Nations flag and also to dissolve the so-called United Nations Command. We firmly believe that the present membership of the Organization cannot allow further use of the United Nations flag as a cover for a few tens of thousands of American soldiers in South Korea. It might be relevant to mention here that recently the delegation of that same country which maintains its troops in South Korea under the United Nations flag and which prevents the country's peaceful unification fought tooth and nail in the Security Council against the participation of permanent members of the Security Council and of the socialist countries in the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East. Should one yardstick be applied to the Middle East and a different one to the Far East? Where is principle here? Where is justice here? It is high time to relegate to the past the golden age for certain imperialist Powers when they could lord it freely over others in the United Nations, including matters concerning the Korean question.

40. The past two decades have convincingly demonstrated that the presence of foreign troops in South Korea has merely complicated the situation and prevented the peaceful unification of the country. The demand for the immediate withdrawal of those troops is lawful and just. It is in keeping first and foremost with the interests of the Korean people themselves and will help fully to correct the situation in that part of the world. The withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea is appropriate to the situation in North Korea, where for over 10 years there has not been a single foreign soldier. It is fully in keeping with the provisions of the historic South-North Joint Communiqué, in which both parties solemnly declared that they would not use force of arms against one another. There can be no doubt that the withdrawal of foreign troops, above all American troops, from South Korea will help to eliminate a potential threat of armed conflict between North and South Korea.

41. It should once again be stressed that the Korean People's Democratic Republic is ready to do everything in its power to bring about the country's peaceful unification. For the sake of unification it is prepared unilaterally to reduce its troops to 200,000, not to have recourse to force of arms to solve the problem of unification, and not to attack the South.

42. Recently there was an official visit to the Korean People's Democratic Republic by a Bulgarian delegation headed by the Chairman of the Council of State of Bulgaria, Comrade Todor Zhivkov. The delegation enjoyed an extraordinarily warm reception from the fraternal Korean people and its leaders, for which we should like once again to thank them.

43. The representatives of our country had an opportunity to see for themselves the tremendous results achieved by the people of the Korean People's Democratic Republic in all areas of their economic, political and cultural life. Under the leadership of the Korean Labour Party, the Korean People's Democratic Republic has transformed itself from a backward country into one of the industrially most advanced countries of Asia. The consistent policy of the Korean People's Democratic Republic of struggle against imperialism, of struggle for the peaceful unification of its homeland, for peace and socialism, has enhanced its international authority, which is illustrated by the fact that it now maintains diplomatic relations with more than 60 countries and trade relations with more than 90.

44. In the joint Bulgarian-Korean communiqué of 29 October, we read:

"The Bulgarian side again declares its support for the consistent policy of the Korean Labour Party and the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic aimed at independent peaceful unification of the country and in particular the five-point programme announced by Comrade Kim Il Sung on 23 June and emphasizes that for the unification of Korea the South Korean leaders should accept these just proposals."

45. "There are not, and cannot be, any moral, historical or legal reasons for a further stay of North American troops in South Korea," declared the Chairman of the Council of State, Comrade Todor Zhivkov, on 28 October. Accordingly, we are in favour of their immediate and unconditional withdrawal. The People's Republic of Bulgaria is also in favour of the dissolution of the so-called UNCURK, because the Korean people themselves have the lawful right to settle their domestic problems.

46. Faithful to the traditions of the relations of fraternal friendship and co-operation between the Bulgarian and Korean peoples, we once again express our warmest support for the programme of the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic as holding out the best chance of the relaxation of tensions both in the Korean peninsula and throughout the Asian continent.

47. The unification of the Korean people is a great and just cause, and it will therefore be achieved.

48. Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): The Polish delegation wishes, at the outset, to extend its warm, fraternal welcome to the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, headed by Comrade Li Jong Mok, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In so doing, I would also echo, on behalf of the Polish delegation, the sentiments expressed by the President of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, Stanisław Trepczynski, who, in his opening address to this

session of the Assembly two months ago, greeted in our midst the first permanent observer to the United Nations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [2117th plenary meeting].

49. The delegation of Poland notes with particular satisfaction the entry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea into the United Nations system. I am referring to the decision taken at Geneva last May by the World Health Organization.

50. Some weeks ago Poland celebrated a quarter of a century of diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In the annals of the history of the two countries it is but a short moment when one bears in mind that Poland's statehood is over a thousand years old and that Korea goes back a few millennia. But for both our countries it was a momentous period, since both People's Poland and People's Korea, some 30 years ago, embarked on a programme to construct socialism, to defend permanent world peace and to raise the standards of living of their respective peoples through unflagging efforts.

51. People's Korea's record in all these respects has been very impressive. Emerging from the ravages of war, People's Korea has built up, through the selfless toil of its industrious people, a modern industry; has modernized its agriculture, bringing it to high levels of efficiency; has introduced a universal 10-year education system; and has recorded remarkable achievements in all fields of economic and social life. People's Korea is a good illustration of how the socialist system helps an underdeveloped, post-feudal, post-colonial, war-ravaged country to advance rapidly in all domains of human endeavour.

52. Internationally, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has followed a policy of peace and co-operation with all States in the spirit of peaceful co-existence. This steadfast policy, as well as People's Korea's firm adherence—declared on many occasions and proved by its international practice—to the principles and purposes enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, won it, in the climate of a growing world détente, high prestige and recognition in the world community. Maintaining diplomatic, consular and other relations with some 80 States, developing trade exchanges with well over a hundred countries, being a member of many international organizations, People's Korea recently joined also the organizations of the United Nations system. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, loyal to the best traditions of the Korean people who contributed much to the world's cultural heritage, by virtue of its domestic and international record, is a worthy member of the international community.

53. The Polish delegation wishes to express its satisfaction over the good spirit in which the question of Korea has been tackled so far during this General Assembly session. We have included the questions into the agenda smoothly, without the traditional, controversial debates in the General Committee and in the Assembly. In this Committee we have witnessed the unprecedented concord over the question of inviting the delegations from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and from South Korea. And, without much ado, we have agreed on the timing of our discussion of item 41.

54. Last but not least, the presence in our midst of the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as that of South Korea, should facilitate our discussion and assist the Assembly in arriving at correct decisions.

55. Why is it that after so many years of acrimonious debates in the United Nations such progress has been achieved in the recent months? In attempting to answer this question my delegation stresses that it is the policies of peace and détente, forcefully advocated and followed by socialist countries, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, that are the prime underlying reason. As is well known, the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea has for many years indefatigably tabled its constructive proposals, addressed to South Korea, with the consistent desire to achieve a relaxation of tension in the peninsula and thus to contribute to a wider amelioration of the international atmosphere in the Far East. After years during which those proposals went unheeded, an apparent breakthrough was attained when the representatives of North and South, after having started their dialogue, signed the Joint Communiqué in July 1972, in which, *inter alia*, they agreed that the reunification of both parts of Korea should be achieved independently, without interference from the outside, and that the reunification should be achieved by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of arms against the other side.

56. However, after some tangible progress had been achieved in the dialogue in Korea during 1972, obstacles have subsequently arisen through no fault of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

57. The Polish delegation is of the opinion that the removal of those obstacles would be facilitated by the appropriate steps which should be taken by the United Nations at this session. In this context I would emphasize that the United Nations has the duty to contribute to the process of détente which, in the specific case of Korea, came into being as if in spite of the United Nations, whose prestige there has been damaged as the result of the existence of UNCURK, the presence of the so-called United Nations Command and the abuse of the United Nations flag by the foreign forces stationed in South Korea.

58. What I have in mind is that the United Nations should discontinue and wind up its deplorable involvement in the Korean question. Therefore, we welcome with satisfaction the proposal that UNCURK—that ill-conceived body which we have always held illegal from its inception and which never really attempted to live up to the ideals which its beautiful name might have implied—should be dissolved.

59. That step, long overdue and demanded for years now by my delegation as well as by many other delegations, is now about to be taken, and this is a welcome development. Thus, operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution entitled "Creation of favourable conditions to accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea" [A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1], of which Poland is a sponsor, will be implemented. The next logical step to be taken—and operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution just referred to provides well for such a course of action—should be the decision to annul the right of the foreign troops stationed

in South Korea to use the United Nations flag, and to dissolve the United Nations Command.

60. We hope that the opponents of this proposal, who for years have questioned our demand that the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea be dissolved, and who now have come round to proposing the very same solution, which in this particular case is dissolution, will be consistent and will support the next logical steps along this correct path; namely, that the United Nations flag should cease to be abused in Korea and arrangements should be made for the disbandment of the so-called United Nations Command in Korea.

61. This Organization should put an end to the perpetuation of the fiction in which the United Nations flag in South Korea serves to cover up the continued stationing of foreign troops there.

62. The flag of our Organization, under which Poles are now serving the cause of peace in the Middle East, must not be abused and should not be flown in the wrong places, to which it has been illegally carried.

63. Finally, the ultimate step which would help remove the obstacles to the progress of the North-South dialogue in Korea and best serve the interests of the process of détente in the peninsula, would be to have all foreign troops stationed in South Korea withdrawn. If that were done a situation would be reached in which in both parts of Korea there would be no foreign troops—and everybody is aware that there is not a single foreign soldier in the northern part of Korea. Such a situation would facilitate the further steps to be taken for accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of that country.

64. This is provided for by paragraph 3 of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1, sponsored by almost 40 States, including my own. We hope that this draft resolution will meet with overwhelming support in this Committee and in the General Assembly.

65. I submit that to raise the question of the entry of a State into this Organization, in the way done by the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.645, when the State concerned has not intimated its desire—in accordance with the wishes of its people—to become a Member of the United Nations, is ill-advised and inopportune. I have spoken about the climate of détente in the world and in Korea. Discussing the matter of United Nations membership in this context, against the well-known position of the State concerned—and we know full well the procedure for admission of a new Member—could only raise suspicions about the real motives prompting such an idea.

66. The United Nations has an opportunity now to contribute to the positive evolution towards détente in the Korean peninsula and in the Far East in general. For the sake of the brave and talented Korean people who have suffered so much in the course of their history from foreign aggressors—feudal and imperialist alike—and who have now made brilliant progress under the socialist system in the North, we should now clear their path to a peaceful settlement in accordance with the aspirations of the Korean people themselves.

67. In the interests of peace and relaxation of tension in Korea and in the Far East, and in the interest of its own prestige, the United Nations should do away with the remnants of the cold-war policies into which—in contravention of the provisions of the Charter—it was once drawn; it should disengage itself from the Korean problem by adopting decisions that would put an end to the illegal use of the United Nations flag in Korea and to the fictitious presence of the United Nations there.

68. For the continuation of the present state of affairs cannot but affect adversely the progress of the North-South dialogue in Korea. Its continuation is also the source of the unnecessary friction among United Nations Members and of cold-war style sentiments and oratory in the debates in this Organization.

69. We shall be discharging our duty well, in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter, by adopting the draft resolution entitled "Creation of favourable conditions to accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea", as contained in document A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1.

70. Mr. SAITO (Japan): In the name of the Japanese delegation, I wish to extend a sincere welcome to the representatives of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, who have been invited to take part in the discussion of the question before this Committee. It is my earnest hope and expectation that the participation of the parties directly concerned in the discussion will contribute to the constructive deliberation of this important problem in this Committee and to the achievement of fruitful results.

71. Japan is located in an extremely close geographical position to the Korean peninsula, separated from the peninsula by only a narrow strip of sea. It has also, for centuries, had very close relations with Korea in all fields, including political, economic and cultural. Thus, it would be no exaggeration on my part to say that the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula and the welfare of all the Korean people are of the greatest concern to my country. Based upon this long and close association with Korea, I should like to make known a few points which Japan regards as essential on the Korean question in the United Nations.

72. My delegation believes that, as all the members of this Committee here present will no doubt agree, the essential questions that we should be asking ourselves in our consideration of the Korean question in the United Nations are how to bring about the peaceful unification of Korea, and what the role of the United Nations should be in achieving this goal. Japan has consistently supported the United Nations which has long been engaged in activities aimed at the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea by peaceful means and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. In the same spirit, my delegation warmly welcomes the South-North Joint Communiqué as a significant initiative towards this objective.

73. My delegation welcomes the fact that both South and North Korea, in spite of enormous difficulties, have been

exerting their utmost efforts to achieve the supreme objectives of great national unity and eventual unification. It is sincerely hoped that these efforts on the part of both South and North Korea, upholding the spirit and fundamental principles of the Joint Communiqué, will bear fruit and that the long-cherished aspiration of the Korean people for unification will be realized.

74. My delegation believes that, on this cardinal point, there is fortunately a common awareness shared by practically all the members of this Committee. If that is the case, as my delegation believes it to be, then it is important for us in this Committee, in dealing with the question of Korea at the present session, to help promote the dialogue between South and North Korea and, at the same time, to refrain from taking any action which might obstruct this dialogue. For that reason, my delegation is deeply gratified to note that the South-North Co-ordinating Committee has been established to provide a forum for the continuation of this South-North dialogue and that both South and North Korea have reaffirmed their determination to continue the dialogue despite the many difficulties which lie ahead.

75. In the light of these recent developments in the Korean peninsula, my delegation considers that UNCURK has accomplished its task and approves the dissolution of the Commission as recommended by the Commission itself in its recent report [A/9027]. On this occasion my delegation wishes to pay tribute to the Commission for the constructive role it has played through the long and difficult years. Parallel with the new developments in the Korean peninsula, a question which arises is how to secure the participation of the Korean people in the activities of the United Nations.

76. My delegation, in the spirit of promoting the principle of universality of membership of the United Nations, earnestly hopes that the Korean people will be represented in this world body. In this spirit, my delegation will welcome it if South and North Korea, divided as they are now, wish to join the United Nations as a further means of paving the way towards peaceful unification. My delegation believes that this will contribute to the further progress of the dialogue between South and North Korea and will in no way prejudice the attainment of the goal of the unification of the Korean people. However, it goes without saying that participation in the United Nations is a question to be decided primarily by the parties concerned. It is quite clear that nothing can force the parties to join the United Nations against their will.

77. I wish to turn now to an all-important question—the question of maintenance of peace and security in Korea. This is a matter too important to be treated lightly by the Members of the United Nations whose primary purpose is to maintain international peace and security.

78. I think everyone here will agree that the maintenance of international peace and security in the Korean peninsula is of vital concern to all the Members of the United Nations. It was with that consideration in mind that the Security Council, as the principal organ under the Charter entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, took the decision, in 1950, to establish the United Nations Command in Korea.

The Korean Armistice Agreement, which was concluded in 1953, was signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command. Thus, the United Nations Command, as the sole signatory representing one of the two sides to the Armistice Agreement, has been an integral part of the armistice structure and, as such, has since been instrumental in the fulfilment of the United Nations responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the area, as established by the Armistice Agreement.²

79. I wish to emphasize the necessity for the States Members of the United Nations to take these facts under careful consideration and to examine the problem in a most responsible manner. Should the United Nations Command be dissolved without full consideration of the facts and without regard to the necessity of ensuring the maintenance of peace and security in the area in some form or other, an extremely unstable situation would develop in the area in view of the fact that the present armistice structure has been playing an indispensable role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, the dialogue between South and North Korea can be said to have been made possible by the existing political and military circumstances in Korea. Should the United Nations Command be dissolved unilaterally, the stability of the Korean peninsula would be threatened and this would create conditions which would make it difficult to continue the dialogue.

80. Thus, unless and until a substitute framework is worked out for the effective maintenance of the present armistice structure, my delegation cannot agree to a unilateral dissolution of the United Nations Command.

81. I wish to take this occasion to touch upon the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in Korea.

82. I am aware that there are diverse positions and policies among the members of this Committee on the question of allowing the stationing of foreign troops on another country's territory. However, this question is one that has to be decided by each country in the context of the concrete situation in which the country in question finds itself, taking into consideration the will of its people.

83. As for the Republic of Korea, there is no justification whatever for a demand by a third party for the withdrawal of foreign troops from its territory in disregard of the desire and the will of its people.

84. I hope that what I have been trying to bring forward by way of clarifying the basic position of Japan on various aspects of the Korean question will be sufficient to explain why my country has become one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.645.

85. In conclusion, my delegation strongly hopes that this Committee, guided by wisdom and impartiality, will try to avoid unproductive arguments and a head-on confrontation and instead will come to a fruitful and constructive decision

which will genuinely serve the interests of all the Korean people.

86. Before ending my statement, I wish to say a few words in clarification of the position of the Government of Japan relating to Korea, in view of the references to Japan in the statement made by the representative of North Korea at the 1957th meeting.

87. Japan, in pursuance of one of the important goals of its Asia policy, gives high priority to an appropriate contribution to the further reduction of tension in the Korean peninsula.

88. In accordance with this goal, Japan has exerted great efforts to develop good-neighbourly and friendly relations with the Republic of Korea since diplomatic relations between our two Governments were normalized in 1965. I wish to emphasize that this development of friendly relations with the Republic of Korea is completely in accordance with the desire of the people of that country.

89. As regards North Korea, a gradual but noteworthy expansion in economic, cultural and other contacts between Japan and North Korea has been taking place. My delegation wishes to emphasize that in the past year there has been a significant increase in the number of North Koreans visiting Japan, and vice versa.

90. Mr. ABDULLA (Sudan): I wish to start by extending a hearty welcome to the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to express special joy at their being given the chance to state in a forceful way their just case in the United Nations for the first time after a number of years of denial.

91. The United Nations is in Korea to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. Those are the declared aims of the Organization as they were stated in Security Council resolution 82 (1950). But it is common knowledge to us that the name and the flag of this Organization have been used to cover up a blatant foreign intervention. The police action, the limited war, the useless war or the travesty of a certain President, or whatever might be the phraseology assigned to it by the phrase-makers, was an American affair, fought by the United States and its allies. The question was rushed to the Security Council to exploit the collective nature of a United Nations intervention. The legality of that resolution is highly questionable. To us the resolution is illegal, but the wrongdoer maintained that it has a legal alibi. The so-called legal alibi through the years has not absolved the wrongdoer from his responsibility.

92. The United Nations intervention is a United States intervention. Do we need to quote even from the so-called United Nations force commanders to support our contention? General MacArthur said:

"My relationship with the United Nations was only nominal. Everything I did was controlled entirely by the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . even my routine reports had to

² Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079, appendix A.

be censored by the United States State and Defence Departments”.

A later commander was more frank when he said:

“The United Nations has not the capability of carrying out any of the high-flown decisions that it makes. I was the Commander-General of the United Nations forces in Korea, and I do not recall getting orders in whatever form from the United Nations during the entire war . . . No, I would not count on the United Nations for anything.”

93. Some delegations still try to persuade us to believe that the United Nations has been in Korea. For argument's sake, let us assume that the United Nations has forces in Korea. Do Members of this Organization, or does the Secretary-General know the number of those forces, their composition, their deployment, their plans or their equipment? What has the so-called United Nations presence achieved in fulfilment of the declared aims of this Organization? Has it achieved unity, when Korea has remained divided for more than half a century? Has it achieved the institution of a representative democracy? Do we forget that the people of the southern part overthrew Syngman Rhee, who had dominated the South Korean scene for so long under the protection of the so-called United Nations presence, because of his undemocratic rule? Has the United Nations presence contributed to the reduction of tension in the area? Every delegation here is aware of the ever-mounting tension in the area since the United Nations has been present in Korea.

94. In fact, the United Nations presence in Korea has turned the southern part into a military depot for the arsenal of the United States. The country has become a staging post for espionage activities. Have we forgotten the Pueblo or the EC-121 incidents? South Korea has also become a reservoir for recruitment of innocent Koreans to support foreign intervention and a war of aggression in Indochina. The role of the South Korean contingents in Viet-Nam need not be recounted.

95. This is the balance sheet of the so-called United Nations presence in Korea. What an insult to our intelligence! It is time to call a spade a spade and to designate things by their proper names: the so-called United Nations presence is nothing but a United States intervention.

96. The agency that operates on behalf of the United Nations, the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, is an organization born in illegality. The United Nations has not been called upon to act in Korea, and the resolutions establishing UNCURK and its predecessors was adopted against the will of a substantial majority of the Korean people. The proposed programme budget of UNCURK for 1974-1975 amounts to \$529,000, according to document A/9006. My delegation would like to inquire: has this impoverished Organization solved its problem of solvency, to spend such a sum of money on such a useless organization? What useful work have UNCURK or its predecessors achieved through their existence? Their reports to the Assembly have been a compilation of propaganda and irrelevant material. This year's report, contained in document A/9027,

is a glaring example. Out of 107 paragraphs of the report, 45 are devoted to development in South Korea, including such subjects as wages and employment, external resources for development and so on. Well, such information could easily be obtained from the United Nations Library or, for that matter, from any other library. In comparison, the report devotes only 13 paragraphs to political development in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The report contains a detailed table of 6,485 violations committed, of course, by the army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. There is not a single incident committed by any soldier north of the 38th parallel. We would have wondered if the report had contained such information. How could we expect the Committee to be impartial? Have the reports of the agency contained the Pueblo and the EC-121 incidents, for example? Have we not been told by the agency that the régime of Syngman Rhee was a model of democracy? Its verdict was falsified when the populace in southern Korea overthrew his Government because of its undemocratic nature. The only positive contribution in the agency's report is what is stated in paragraph 106, which provides:

“Giving due weight to these considerations and to developments during the past year, the members of UNCURK express their considered judgement that the presence in Korea of UNCURK is no longer required and they accordingly recommend that UNCURK should be dissolved.” [A/9027]

97. We say in Arabic: “It is a virtue to obey at last the dictates of justice”. Let us hail on this occasion those who reached such a conclusion some time ago and accordingly have stopped participating in UNCURK activities.

98. We are concerned with the independence, unity and peace of Korea. For this reason we have followed closely the recent developments in the area. We have hailed the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972, signed by the two sides. The Korean peninsula has never seen such a period of calm and peace as was the case after the signature of the Joint Communiqué. Thus it has been demonstrated that peace would prevail only when the two sides were able to sit together to chart the way for their future, without any outside interference.

99. The dialogue and negotiations between the two parts during the three meetings held between them demonstrated also the genuineness of each side. One side was negative in its attitude towards the question of peace and unity in the area and did not go further than procedural matters. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, consistent with its declared policy towards the question of peace and unity in the area, had put forward a complete plan for unification and peace. It was a simple plan to reduce armed forces, to conclude a peace treaty and to achieve contacts between political and other organizations of the two parts of the country. This is the same realistic road traversed by two States in Europe after they had first settled their major political differences pending increased contacts between their peoples. How can people of the two parts of Korea achieve contact and co-operate in economic and cultural fields in the shadow of military confrontation, in a state of war and with a foreign military presence?

100. The dialogue between the two parts of Korea, hailed the world over, has been interrupted by a sudden switch over to the idea of creating two Korean States and a call to admit them to the United Nations. Many reasons were given to support this move. The European case has again been cited as an example. It has been said that the two States had been admitted to the Organization without prejudice to their future unity. Well, while the European scene has similarities to the Korean peninsula the two are not identical.

101. While the United Nations had no role in the European case, the Organization is not only implicated in Korea but also must achieve unity in that country and not disunity. In Europe the peoples and the Governments of the two countries concerned has agreed to join this Organization; but that is not the case in Korea.

102. We should ask the advocates of this policy why should the United Nations, which was called to unify Korea, retract from its declared aims, and declare publicly the division of Korea. What is the wisdom behind this new move when the two parts have just started to negotiate their differences and to settle their dispute to achieve their unity? Why would the same forces that in the past advocated a policy of non-admission to the United Nations of the two European States until those States had settled their differences today advocate the admission of the two Koreas before they have settled their disputes?

103. It is an open secret that the two Koreas cannot be admitted to this Organization as a unified State or as two States unless the two parts settle their differences. May we be permitted to inquire whether the people of Korea have been consulted on whether they prefer to join the Organization as one unified State or two States? How can the United Nations arrogate to itself the right to be arbiter of the Korean people where it has no right at all? May we also ask about the motive behind the call for the two-Koreas policy: is it a genuine desire of those advocating the theory of the two Koreas to achieve representation of the people of Korea in the Organization or a design to split the country? If it is a genuine desire to achieve Korean representation without prejudice to its unity in the Organization, then why not consider the suggestion of the Democratic People's Republic that Korea be admitted as a confederal State of Korea, thus achieving representation and enhancing the cause of unification that the United Nations is purported to hold aloft?

104. The unity of Korea, deeply rooted in a common background of history, ethnology and civilization, existed for more than 4,000 years. There is no force on earth that can stand in the way of its unity. The struggle of the Korean people towards unity is part and parcel of the struggle of the people of the third world against colonialism, racism, Zionism and foreign intervention. This was why the fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Algeria, declared in the forty-second paragraph of its political Declaration:

"The Conference supports the action of independent and peaceful reunification undertaken by the Korean people, requests the withdrawal of foreign troops from

South Korea and considers that the Korean problem must be solved without foreign interference."

The same Conference adopted a resolution mapping the way for the solution of the Korean question. This just declared policy is our manifesto for handling the Korean question.

105. It is time to end the so-called United Nations presence in Korea; it is time to remove a badge of infamy from the chest of the United Nations. For those reasons, Sudan has sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1 and will reject and vote against draft resolution A/C.1/L.645.

106. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. Chairman, I have not had an opportunity to say how much I congratulate myself on having you in the Chair. Having watched you in the past conduct the business of the Security Council and, I believe, also—if my memory does not falter—one of the Committees of the General Assembly, I am sure that efficiency will be the hallmark of your chairmanship.

107. I should like to congratulate myself also on having the so-called two Koreas present in this room, for this happy event has been long overdue.

108. It is however significant that the delegation of North Korea is seated in the northern part of the room whilst that of South Korea occupies seats in the southern part of the room. Both these delegations are separated by the horse-shoe-shaped tables at which 135 representatives of Member States of the United Nations are seated. Are we going to be the bridge between North Korea and South Korea? Or shall we emphasize the differences that, unfortunately, exist? For once I should say that there are rifts, and those rifts continue to be highlighted—unfortunately. One has only to listen to the speeches to see champions of one Korea and champions of the other Korea. I will be champion of neither; I want the people of Korea to be their own champion.

109. The Korean people are a homogeneous nation and it should never have been divided by the two major Powers—recently we have been calling them super-Powers, but then they had just emerged from a war and they were "major Powers", because they had been weakened by the Second World War, so I will say the major Powers of that era—which were instrumental in the separation of the same people, the Korean people, on ideological and strategic grounds.

110. I have been concerned with this question for the past 23 years, and I have a contemporary sitting with us today: Ambassador Malik of the Soviet Union. I do not know whether he is nostalgic about what happened 23 years ago. It was at a turbulent meeting of the Security Council when our illustrious colleague saw no escape from walking out of the Council Chamber for the mere reason that, at that time, the Member States numbered over 50 and, needless to say, there was what at that time the late Mr. Vyshinsky called "the mechanical majority". The United States had the majority. At that time some of our Latin American colleagues were, to a large extent, manipulated by the United States—and so were some of our own Arab States

manipulated by the United States, so that our Latin American colleagues should not take exception or think they were the only States manipulated by the United States.

111. But someone might question—and I question—why did the representative of the Soviet Union in 1950 walk out of the Security Council chamber and not exercise his veto? Well, I shall keep confidences and I shall not disclose that, but maybe one day when someone writes a serious book I shall tell him why.

112. I want to go to the roots of the question to show how the question of Korea was created and how we were beset with it at that time. The representative of the United States at the time—I think it was Henry Cabot Lodge—thought that it was a good opportunity to shift the Korean question from the Security Council to the General Assembly. I was asked for my humble opinion. I said that it would not work because the Soviet Union would not participate in the work of the General Assembly, but would withdraw. So a little Assembly of 46 members was constituted, minus the socialist States—there were the three Soviet States then and a couple of other States that did not participate. So we were talking to the wall, talking to ourselves, listening to our echoes, because the Soviet Union did not participate in the debates on Korea. After all, it was the prerogative of the Security Council to deal with the question, and not of the General Assembly. I myself got tired of the little Assembly and many a time my seat was vacant.

113. Finally, the war broke out. The United States was the protagonist of that war and it dragged 15 nations with it. To mention a few, there were the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand and poor Turkey. What did Turkey have to do with that war in Asia? But of course it was a matter of balance of power—communism and capitalism. And the manipulation was by whom? I must say by both blocs of Powers. There was also the Philippines, which would have suffered a great deal if it had not joined. Aid would not have been forthcoming, so they had to join to fight their brothers, the Koreans. Ethiopia, of all countries, also was dragged into the conflict. I do not know what the inducement was in that case. And for Australia and New Zealand the bugbear of communism was the reason. So they had to fight communism.

114. But I shall now turn to the genesis of the Korean War, to how and why the Korean people were separated.

115. Mind you, I am using the word "separated" and not the word "partitioned". From the research I have done, we go back to the days of the late President Truman and the late Mr. Stalin. The *dramatis personae* for President Truman were Messrs. Hopkins and Harriman. I knew both of them, but I did not discuss Korea with them. The astute alter ego of President Truman—and, before him, of President Roosevelt—was Mr. Hopkins. Mr. Harriman was a diehard conservative representative of his country whose ancestors made money on the railroads, and people who make money in this country on the railroads become great politicians. There are the Rockefellers, as you know. There are people as capable as Rockefeller, but they do not have his money to wage campaigns. And so Harriman became quite a

negotiator on behalf of the United States with Mr. Stalin. He persuaded Stalin that there should be a trusteeship for Korea under China, Great Britain—you see, they put them in alphabetical order—the Soviet Union and the United States. My information has been corroborated by me from different sources, among them the memoirs of the late President Truman.

116. Then something went wrong. I do not want to go into the details, because my statement is not a historical dissertation. But members should know what was done. After this trusteeship arrangement backfired it was agreed that, without mentioning nationalities, the communist forces would move from the north to the 38th parallel, and the western forces—call them by whatever name you wish, the capitalist forces—would move from the south to the 38th parallel, creating the separation of the Korean people.

117. Was it to serve the interests of the Korean people? That is my question. It was a strategic arrangement—leave aside the fact that the by-product was ideological—communist and capitalist.

118. The Korean people are one nation and should never have been divided by the two major Powers, which were instrumental in the separation of the Korean people on ideological and strategic grounds. That sentence bears repetition a hundred times. That separation was arranged before the end of the Second World War by the two Heads of State whom I have mentioned. That separation was tantamount to the partitioning of Korea. You can say "separation". They separated the people or they partitioned the land. And as if the United States and its Western allies and those that were in need of the United States had not suffered enough during the Second World War, the partition of Korea presented such an unsatisfactory situation that it finally necessitated military intervention. Hence, we had the Korean war and the 16 Powers, some of which I enumerated, dispatched troops. But who bore the brunt of it? The United States. I believe it sent—and I stand to be corrected by the representative of the United States—200,000 troops finally. Turkey sent 5,000 troops, of which 2,000 were killed—and I stand to be corrected by my brother from Turkey.

119. The poor Filipinos, who had suffered during the war, had to dispatch troops. Of course, Australia and New Zealand were part of the Commonwealth of Nations—the British Empire, on which the sun never set. Somebody told me God was very wise not to let the sun set on it, because had it set the colonialists would have done many things in the dark. So the sun was all over the British Empire because God did not trust the colonialists. Someone from Asia told me that recently.

120. I am talking objectively, dispassionately, with no axe to grind. Sixteen Powers sent troops to South Korea to repel an alleged—mark you that: "alleged"—incursion of North Korean forces into the territory of South Korea. That was in 1950, and I have told you what happened in the Security Council. And the United States asked many of us Member States—including Saudi Arabia, because I remember them approaching me—"Aren't you going to send troops to raise high the standard of democracy?" They had asked me that question 10 years earlier, during

the Second World War, and I said it was a sham democracy. Any democracy that had colonial possessions was no democracy. Any “democracy” that lorded it over others was not a democracy. They were fooling themselves.

121. Of course, I did the necessary with my Chief of State and with the Government of Saudi Arabia, and—I think wisely—we kept out of the conflict.

122. Oh, Saudi Arabia was the friend of the United States just because we had oil and it happened that some American oil companies came and developed it. So we were friends. They used that word loosely. It was as though it was between a brother and a brother when it came to interests. It was a matter of reciprocity of interests, not friendship. It was a journalistic term. I said, “What friends? What friends? Send our boys to die in a conflict about which we know nothing?” We were not sheep to be driven into the slaughterhouse.

123. We never took sides, and I could tell you about the pressures that were brought on me personally for having broached this subject in this very Committee since 1965, when it became even ludicrous. It was ludicrous to ask that if representatives of North Korea were sent here they should behave; they should respect the provisions of the Charter. And if they did not behave—then what? Who was the schoolmistress? The schoolmistress was the United States: “If you behave, you will be allowed to come here, and if you do not...” And they never behaved in accordance with the wishes of the schoolmistress United States. They never behaved, and that is why they were delayed until now, after co-existence and then détente. And I am going to tell you something that will shock many of you. Those who were interested in the Korean question always placed the Korean item at the end of the agenda. And under what title? “The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.” And from which countries was that Commission constituted? The protagonist was the United States. So we were really faced with something that should have read, “report of the United States Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea”, for the rest of them were dragged into the conflict. But that fiction still remains, at least in phraseology, with us today.

124. Baroody tells you the facts as they obtain. I have no axe to grind. Let anyone challenge me and I shall be happy to be corrected if I am mistaken.

125. So this Korean question was always placed at the end of the agenda of the General Assembly. And one day I asked my colleagues then around this table, “By what mode of transportation do you want to send the North Koreans if they behave—by an American rocket or a Russian rocket—that they may arrive here in 24 hours?” How could they discuss the question?

126. This draft resolution attests to what I am saying. It is dated 20 December 1965—almost eight years ago. I submitted it solo, when I got fed up with the machinations of the major Powers. It was suspended, because while I was addressing the Third Committee they sent the Chairman of the First Committee to say, “For heaven’s sake, we cannot

work any more. Please, Baroody, suspend this; withdraw it.” I suspended it.

127. They sent a mission to His Majesty the King—you know who sent who, so I am not going to tell you—to say, “Baroody is interfering too much with Korea. What has he to do with Korea?” The King had to question me, and I answered him. He said, “Go along; go along. But slowly, please. Treat them with kid gloves a little.” I said, “I do not have any kid gloves.”

28. My draft resolution read as follows:

“The General Assembly,

“Taking into consideration that 12 years have elapsed”—it was 1965—“since the Korean armistice was signed and that no significant progress has been achieved for the unification of Korea,

“Noting that the General Assembly would not be in a position to play a constructive role in the unification of Korea unless it hears both the views of the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the representative of the Republic of Korea,

“Recalling that the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea expressed certain strong objections in its reply to the invitation that was addressed to it by the First Committee of the General Assembly at its sixteenth session (A/C.1/864) and thereby refused to accept the said invitation in the light of these objections,

“Noting that any intervention on the part of the representatives of both Korean Governments would clarify the situation to all members of the United Nations,

“Decides

“(a) To send a new invitation to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea compatible with its dignity”

I stood on dignity. I am a monarchist; they are communists. But I stood on dignity. Who are we to tell them they are behaving or not behaving? If we used that yardstick of good behaviour for every Member, I think we would all get low marks. Nobody is perfect.

“(a) to send a new invitation to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea compatible with its dignity and the dignity of the people of that Republic so as to enable its representative with the representative of the Republic of Korea to take part in the discussions during the next session of the General Assembly or earlier if the Assembly so agrees;

“(b) to allow, in the meantime, the representative of the Republic of Korea”—or those sitting down south—“to make a statement solely for clarifying the position of his Government pending the appearance of both representatives before the General Assembly.”³

³ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 32, document A/6221, para. 7.

129. It took 12 years for the First Committee of the United Nations to come to its senses. It took 12 years for what I called for in 1965 to happen. And why did it happen? Because of coexistence and détente. Had there been no détente those people would still be divided. So we are at the mercy of agreement between the major powers when we have a dispute in which they have an interest.

130. Is that fair, is that the United Nations? Where is our conscience? Are we clients of any of the two Powers or are we independent sovereign States which should scrutinize every question on its merits and thereby address ourselves to solutions that are based on justice and not on political arrangements?

131. I am vindicated by this document and I thank a member of the Bureau for having produced it for me, because I could not find it in my files. It is dated 20 December 1965, and if anyone wants to read it again, it is in document A/C.1/L.366 although it will be in the verbatim record. I do not have to repeat it.

132. So what happened? I will tell you what happened later. You should understand this question because it has found no solution yet. And then, as I mentioned, I will recapitulate.

133. The United States requested many Members not only to take sides politically but to join in the crusade of chastising the communist hordes of the north, as they were called. Is that a nice way to call your fellow communists who are sitting next to you, my good friend from the United States? By whom are you separated now? You used to sit by the side of each other. I see that your being separated now by the admission of other States did not at all work out to the detriment of your détente.

134. Many of us, including Saudi Arabia, as I said, refused to be duped and fall into a pseudo-ideological *mêlée*. To say the least we were not impressed by Senator McCarthy, the inquisitor of alleged American communists. I saw him operate 23 years ago. If anybody said something good about Russia or, for that matter, China—I am talking of Communist China, not of Formosa or Taipei—he had his Watergate, he was spied on and tried by this inquisitor McCarthy.

135. McCarthy started his inquisition significantly in 1950, and that was the advent of the Korean war. "We should punish those communists whether they are Chinese or Russians", he said. And I, a Royalist, would say "take it easy". Thank God, I am not an American. I would have been lost with McCarthy. I am sure that now, if his spirit is floating somewhere—I do not know—and he is above détente, his bones in his grave would rattle.

136. To put it succinctly, the major Powers had no business to partition Korea, which led Korean brothers to fight and kill one another. The military, as well as the ideological, commitment of these major Powers should be terminated forthwith. But how can you reconcile between capitalism, so-called free enterprise, and communism, which is a sort of "etat-ism".

137. It is very easy. We do not have to do it. Revolutions have to come to a standstill lest the people involved in them get dizzy; and usually, after they get dizzy they begin to think aloud and perhaps swing towards a happy medium.

138. For I can assure you today that capitalism is in the process of being socialized by taxes. And communism is acquiring capitalism by an accelerated process. So all these ideological differences are resolving themselves. People want to eat and live at peace no matter what their ideologies. This is essential to peoples regardless of their ideologies.

139. Otherwise, we would not have missions from the Western world visit the so-called communist world and vice versa. They dine and wine and even eat caviar. In Russia they eat caviar and drink vodka; and the others drink bourbon and whisky in Washington. I do not know whether they deceive each other surreptitiously, but at least for all appearances they seem to get along very well together. And today none other than Mr. Kissinger is in Peking, or is he in Tokyo? He is in Tokyo today; I do not know what he is up to.

140. There should be one land in Korea and one people—not communism that starts with a "c", not capitalism that starts with a "c", but "Korea-ism" that starts with a "K", and a big "K". We are fed up with communism and capitalism. What we need is another "ism", humanism. And then our problems would be resolved, and you would not be false witnesses here debating in clichés, in prefabricated speeches, to please one side or the other.

141. How can we achieve or work out a solution? Having involved myself for 23 years in this question, may I succinctly leave with you or, better still, think aloud with you about what can be achieved under the present circumstances, separated as they are, these Korean people, from one another. Decide, by way of resolution or any other way, that there should not be two Koreas but only one Korea, one people, one culture, one language, one way of life, common interests.

142. This is our continent, Asia. You did what you wanted by dividing Germany: East Germany, West Germany, four zones in Berlin. What a shame. The victors should lord it over a great people like the German people who have had achievements. Forget Hitler for a little moment. You play all the time here in this country the music of Beethoven and Mozart, and there is an array of musicians. Your philosophers, your Western life, derive a lot from German philosophy. You only see the bad spots in an apple. But have you looked at the bad spots in your own apple? Just because you were victors you divided Germany. You partitioned the land and separated the people on ideological grounds, to serve your strategic purposes.

143. But that is your continent. Why do you bring this malaise to our continent, Asia? And I am talking as an Asian now. I believe I express the sentiments of my African brothers who have had problems with colonialism, leave aside lording it over them under so many pretexts, as once you colonial Powers said: "we bear the white man's burden". You were there to exploit the land. Come out with it. This is *passé*. It is an anachronism now. The lions of

Africa are all awake and they will defend their land and they will expel the remnants of colonialism from Africa.

144. Why do you want to play now with the destiny of Asia? What business had you Western Powers to wage a war that made the Second World War pale in comparison with your diabolical weapons, which you deployed in Viet-Nam. And the war is not over.

145. How many miles is Viet-Nam from you? From the United States it is perhaps 15,000, from Europe perhaps 10,000—I do not know, it depends on the geographical position of those countries. And you are still toying with the destiny of the Korean people. What business have you got in Korea? We are Asians. Leave us alone to solve our problems alone. What interest do you, the United States, have? You are becoming bankrupt by spending so much money. Six per cent of the world's population wants to police the whole world. And the Soviet Union: you beware also. You are cleverer because you are older—not in years individually perhaps but in civilization. You sent only advisers to North Korea. Somebody asked me why the Chinese sent volunteers to North Korea. Because they were afraid that the Western Powers would invade China. They still had vividly in their memory the incursion of the West into China—the Boxer Rebellion. In 1896 the Queen of England sent a deputation to the Emperor of China bringing some tinsel and some wares from Sheffield. The Emperor was not impressed. Look at the vases that existed then in China. Look at the art of China. They wanted to trade. Who went? The merchants went and after them the Bible and the missionaries and then the flag, the Union Jack.

146. What business have you Western countries got in the continent of Asia? Leave the Asians alone and they will settle their problems. But it seems we have to face the facts. You will not leave us alone so we will try to reason with you. And you will find that done in a draft resolution on this question which I had to suspend. This time the title has been expanded into the following:

“Question of Korea: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

“Dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

“Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations.”

And what a debate we had in the General Committee to have the last sub-title included. The following is the Saudi Arabian draft resolution which is still pending, suspended until somebody takes it over and tries to make something out of it. It states:

“The General Assembly,

“Noting that the partition of Korea arose from the military arrangements made by the two major Powers, namely, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, before the United Nations

came into being in 1945 and before it began to function as an international organization,

“Taking into account that it was primarily the clash between the strategic interests of the said two Powers in Asia which led to the Korean War in 1950,

“Considering that the partitioning of any territory inhabited by the same people is bound to create internal as well as external power conflicts as has been manifested in the case of Korea,”—

and I should have said parenthetically “and in the case of Palestine”—

“Mindful of the fact that since the United Nations was first involved in the Korean question its membership has more than doubled and therefore it is incumbent upon all the Members of this Organization to review the situation with a new constructive approach,

“1. Appeals to the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to use their good offices with the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with a view to removing the obstacles standing in the way of the unification of Korea;

“2. Requests the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to prevail upon the Governments of the Republic of Korea and of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea not to set prior conditions to the appearance of their respective representatives before the United Nations;

“3. Calls upon other Member States directly involved in the Korean question to co-operate with the two major Powers and other Powers in the area with a view to promoting conciliation and creating an atmosphere conducive to the ultimate unification of Korea.”⁴

147. Pressure was brought on me to suspend that draft resolution. That was an *avant garde* draft resolution. What shall we do now? China is in the area. China sent volunteers because it was apprehensive—and rightly so—that those Western Powers might invade China. They did not like China. All of a sudden now it is China, China, China: Chinese culture, Chinese dancing, Chinese ballet. Yet only about 10 years ago they were monsters. The Soviet Union was the first monster and China was the dragon, I believe. Now they are floating angels. We know this power game, this politics game. You leaders of the Western world, we know your game. At least the Chinese people are dignified. They are the inheritors of a civilization which dates back 6,000 years. When they speak they call a spade a spade. The Soviet Union, which is both Asian and European, can also do that because it has the advantage of both mentalities, so to speak.

148. You Americans, you are only 200 years old and you know it all. “Might is right. We know everything”. Democracy, what a hoax! A way of life? Yes, but what a way of life judging by New York—group sex, swapping

⁴ *Ibid.*, Twenty-third Session, Annexes, agenda item 25, document A/7460, para. 13 c.

wives, pornography. Leave us alone. We Asians have evolved our civilizations in peace. Keep your miniskirts and your hot pants. Leave Asia to work out its own destiny in co-operation with you—if you do not interfere in our affairs. You used to rattle your sabres but now you rattle your nuclear weapons. If you want to put an end to mankind, do it swiftly. To heck with it. It is better to live with our dignity rather than to bow our heads to injustice. Man lives once on this earth, not twice. But we are all going to be in the ditch in 30 or 40 years. No one will be here unless some of you live to the age of 100 and become senile. Western Powers, leave us alone. Balance of power, spheres of influence—we have had enough of them. We will live in peace and love you as brothers if you do not threaten us, if you do not rationalize your interests. Because we do not have bombs and we cannot send armies, and we say that anyone who is against us will not be a most favoured country for receiving oil, your press wants to wage war on the Arab world. They say that oil is a trust for the whole world. I am not digressing; we are part of Asia, and what I am saying applies also to Africa and Latin America for that matter because they do not exercise world power. All of us are brothers under the skin, but we do not want tyrant brothers.

149. What shall we do with Korea, to come back to that question?

150. I suggest, Sir, first, that we should ask the major Powers to get together. I am not using the word “super-Powers”. I hope my colleagues from China will accept the epithet of “major Power”. With 700 million or 800 million inhabitants, what can we call you but a major Power? “Super-Power”—we do not like that appellation. Those three countries should get together—and I am sure China would be the umpire between the United States and the Soviet Union, an Asian country. Under the auspices of—or if not under the auspices, then on the basis of a common understanding between—those three major Powers, a conference should be set up or convoked in Geneva to bring together both régimes—and I do not want to call them North Korea and South Korea—representatives of both the North Korean and the South Korean Governments, after they have thrashed out many of their differences; and whatever differences might still exist, at the right time there would be a conference in Geneva to unify the country.

151. Secondly, steps should be taken, first mentally and then actively, to consider Korea a neutral State, with no outside interference by communists or by capitalists, by Western Powers or by Eastern Powers. We succeeded—and I did my little bit then—when we were talking about the neutralization of Austria. What is wrong with that? Austria is one of the most civilized States in Europe—and it has been for three or four centuries, I would say. I am not talking off the top of my head; I have known Austria very well for the last 40 years. Why should we not neutralize Korea? The details, whether there should be a plebiscite to find out what form of government they want, and all that, could be worked out later. To do that now would be putting the cart before the horse. Stop jockeying for influence, you major Powers. Have China play an active part with you and be a sort of umpire to balance your views and see what is valid and what is invalid.

152. Thirdly, let steps be taken as early as possible with the idea that ultimately there should be a neutral Korea. Otherwise, 23 years from now, when I shall not be with you here, you will still be concerned with the Korean question—as I have demonstrated—after having been concerned with the same question and having been stymied in finding a solution for the last 23 years.

153. That, Sir, is my statement. I would ask you to keep my name on the list to address this Committee on what I think of the draft resolutions. I had other duties in other committees and could not find the time to scrutinize them. And I promise you, Sir—and you have known me for a number of years—that I shall not veer towards the one or the other. Dedicated as I hope I am to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, I would go against my own brother if he appeared and tried to tell me, “Please, my brother, do me a favour and vote for me.” Never. On the merits of the case, divesting ourselves of our petty national interests, we should all stand as one behind the truth, so that we may indeed pave the way for a lasting peace.

154. The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Saudi Arabia for the gracious words he addressed to me.

155. I now call upon the representative of Algeria on a point of order.

156. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): First of all, Sir, I beg you to believe me when I say that I am truly embarrassed to have to raise a point of order a second time, since I am now going to speak again on the question that I raised this morning. I do not believe I have the reputation of one who is prone to raise points of order or to prolong meetings unduly, nor would I want anyone to think that I am attaching undue importance to what is a secondary matter or that I wish to blow up a small question into a large problem. That is not at all the case.

157. But this morning I raised a problem in certain terms, and I believe it is my duty towards you, Mr. Chairman, and all my colleagues in the Committee to make this matter clear so that our work will not be upset, since we have to turn our attention to more important aspects of the questions we deal with here.

158. I am sorry that I was not present at the beginning of this afternoon's meeting when you, Sir, announced the names of delegations that had become sponsors of our draft resolution. I thank you for having done so, however, and if by that statement you have thereby solved the problem that I raised this morning I shall, of course, respect your decision, since I do not intend in any way to be disrespectful of you. You correctly understood that the question I asked this morning was addressed not to you but to the Secretariat. This morning I told all my colleagues that the Secretariat had informed me that the decision not to issue addenda containing modifications in the list of sponsors of a draft resolution was the result of a resolution adopted by the General Assembly. I thought that I would be given some information regarding that resolution this afternoon.

159. However, this afternoon I have heard that there was no such resolution but that there was a set of rules that had

to be implemented at different levels of the Secretariat. Among them was one that stated that in the Main Committees, such as the First Committee, publication of these addenda could be waived if the name of the delegations to be added as sponsors of a draft resolution were read out by the Chairman and thus appeared in the record. I believe that the decision of the Chairman is correct on that level. However, I must say that in that case it would have been normal for the conditional tense used in the text submitted to me not to be used and for the rules of the game to be clearly defined at the beginning of our work.

160. I also felt—but this was not the case—that, if a delegation asked that another procedure should be followed, namely, that addenda should be issued, presumably that request would be met. However, this is not the problem. I wanted these facts to be put before our colleagues, so that all members would be aware that, as far as I am concerned, I was not endeavouring to create difficulties but, on the contrary, trying to define precisely how the different bodies work in the United Nations. This morning, at the same time, I spoke of the refusal so far by the Secretariat to issue the non-aligned documents as official documents of the United Nations. It was clear that again it was not a question of posing this matter to you, Sir. I was still addressing the Secretariat, which is omnipresent at all our meetings and which is an indivisible whole. I presumed that the Secretariat would be good enough to reply to my first question concerning the list of sponsors and could also give me some clarification regarding this refusal to issue the documents of the non-aligned countries as official documents of the United Nations. So far I have still received no answer on this matter. It may well be that the Secretariat may not wish to reply, and we shall draw the necessary conclusions. Or, it could reply to Algeria simply. Or, again, it could reply to all the Members of the Organization so that each and every one would be informed of the way in which our problems are tackled. We know that the primary responsibility of the Secretariat is in fact to implement our decisions.

161. I do not know whether on this question of the publication of documents as official documents of the United Nations there also are precisely defined rules. If so, I should be very happy to be informed of them. If not, again, I should also be happy to know precisely why, on this question of the documents of the non-aligned nations, the Secretariat has adopted a position that is an unusual one for it.

162. The CHAIRMAN: As the representative of Algeria has said, this is, I believe, primarily a question between him and the Secretariat. I would not disagree with that. However, perhaps for the sake of good order I should just

mention what I said this afternoon at the beginning of the meeting, after having informed the Committee, or re-informed the Committee, of the names of the sponsors that had been added to the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1 and 645.

163. If you will allow me to say so, in my past endeavours here I have been closely connected with the Committee on the Rationalization of the Procedures and Organization of the General Assembly. It was part of that Committee's work also to deal with the question of documentation. Therefore I take somewhat of a personal interest in the problem that has been raised here. It does seem to me that it is a question of a general nature, and I do not believe that decisions on questions of that sort should be decided upon from case to case or should find different solutions from committee to committee. The flow of documents is a problem of almost unfathomable magnitude, as the report issued in 1972 by the Joint Inspection Unit clearly demonstrates, and its magnitude is not only in terms of finance, though certainly that is not negligible. Thus I believe that the best course would be that questions of this sort should be raised in the Fifth Committee, which under its agenda deals not only with the question of documentation but also with the question of money. I believe that it is reasonable that the membership should have up-to-date information concerning lists of sponsors but as I suggested at the 1957th meeting and again this afternoon, it can be done by mentioning the names of new sponsors when the item is under discussion. This information will then be reflected in the verbatim records. But considering that addenda are issued in 4,556 copies, I believe that we should do well to follow what is recommended in several General Assembly resolutions, the last one being, I believe, of 1967, which was reaffirmed when the General Assembly in 1972 approved the recommendations of the Committee on the Rationalization of the Procedures and Organization of the General Assembly to consider ways to reduce documentation as far as possible.

164. Now, clearly, if amendments are made to a text, I take it that the Secretariat sees to it that in the revision the names of the new co-sponsors will be added. Apart from that, I for my own part feel that the practice we have evolved today should be satisfactory. The Secretariat assures me that the practice mentioned is followed in each and every instance of issues that relate to the First Committee. I hope that I have satisfied the representative of Algeria, even if we may not completely agree.

165. I would make one further announcement. Lesotho should be added to the list of sponsors of the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.645 and 656.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.