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Chairman: Mr. Otto R. BORCH (Denmark).

AGENDA ITEMS 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37  
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**Economic and social consequences of the armaments race  
and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and  
security**

**World Disarmament Conference: report of the Special  
Committee on the World Disarmament Conference  
(A/8990 and Add.1, A/9033, A/9041, A/9228)**

**General and complete disarmament: report of the Con-  
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**Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report  
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**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear  
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**A/9109, A/9110, A/9117, A/9166, A/C.1/1031, 1036,  
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**(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on  
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**(b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/9208)**

**Implementation of General Assembly resolution  
2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification  
of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohi-  
bition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of  
Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General (A/9137,  
A/9209)**

**Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report  
of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/9029)**

1. Mr. HANSEN (Denmark): The prevailing impression that one derives from this year's general debate on disarmament is a sense of contradiction between, on the one hand, the undeniable progress towards international détente and, on the other, the lack of manifest, concrete progress in the field of disarmament.

2. It is indeed distressing that the question of disarmament, which is more urgent than ever, does not seem to attract significant attention in world opinion and has even tended to engender a feeling of despondency. It is equally distressing that the past year has seen no substantive progress in areas that have now been under deliberation for a long period of time.

3. During the past decade we could, at regular intervals, recommend a number of limited but significant agreements in the area of arms control. Today, however, it seems as if we have lost momentum. This is deplorable not only because the existence and the threat of absolute weaponry capable of eradicating human life have made disarmament, or at least arms control, imperative but also because technological progress in armaments, both nuclear and conventional, entails today such an enormous drain on resources that there is a growing need to establish rules and limitations on military capacity and to bring armaments under full political control.

4. In spite of these evident facts, full agreement on general and complete disarmament remains, unfortunately, a long-term vision. Conventional thinking in international affairs, lack of mutual trust with resultant legitimate concern for national or collective security and lack of adequate means to prevent causes of conflict have so far seriously impeded the valuable, patient and persistent efforts that are being made to put an end to the general arms race, which is so harmful not only to peace and stability but also to general economic and social development. It is indeed depressing to

note that actual world military spending represents a cost of nearly \$60 per year per person on earth, which is more than the annual income of millions of people in the least developed parts of the world.

5. Against this general background, it is however promising that progress has been achieved with regard to the situation in Europe. Due to the growing détente, and equally to the persistent efforts of all countries involved—Eastern and Western—to develop and expand peaceful co-operation in all fields, the thoroughly prepared second phase of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe is now under way in Geneva. As a European country, Denmark has, within its possibilities, contributed actively and consistently to these efforts at both the bilateral and the multilateral level.

6. Concurrently, negotiations have been initiated in Vienna on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe. The goal of those talks is to achieve a more stable military balance at lower levels of forces in Central Europe while maintaining undiminished security for all parties. It has consistently been a paramount aim of Danish foreign policy to explore all possibilities of attaining a durable détente in Europe and we have from the outset supported the idea of seeking mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe. An agreement on reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe acceptable to all parties would serve to build up confidence among the countries involved. Moreover, because European security is in our view indivisible, it would have a positive impact on the over-all security situation in Europe by furthering stability and détente.

7. I should like now to make some comments on some of the important items relating to disarmament on this year's agenda. The lack of progress to which I have just referred is clearly reflected in the annual report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In taking note of that fact, we do not in any way fail to appreciate the efforts of that Committee, nor do we find that its role in disarmament questions has diminished. It remains the opinion of the Danish Government that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should continue to be the principal forum for multilateral negotiations on disarmament. We realize that the reasons for any stalemate lie outside the scope of the Committee itself.

8. One of the most urgent problems to which last year's General Assembly requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to give first priority was a ban on nuclear tests in all environments. Last year the General Assembly, in resolution 2934 C (XXVII), urged the nuclear Powers to bring all nuclear weapon tests to a halt not later than 5 August 1973. It further requested the Secretary-General to inform it of any measures taken by those States in that respect. None the less, tests continue to take place, both underground and in the atmosphere. With due respect for legitimate interests of national security or responsibilities for collective defence, we share the opinion that continued nuclear tests in all forms should be brought to an early end, and that increased efforts should be made to reach agreement on a complete nuclear test ban. Heavy responsibilities in this respect rest on all nuclear Powers, in particular towards the non-nuclear States which have

assumed special obligations and limitations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] and towards those pre-nuclear States which have not yet acceded to the Treaty. A comprehensive test ban would promote the cause of a new international order and consolidate the non-proliferation Treaty.

9. As stated on previous occasions, the Danish Government is of the opinion that the main problems relating to a complete nuclear test ban are of a political rather than a technical character. In spite of technical improvements and advances in seismological means of verification and other monitoring capabilities, coupled with increased international co-operation in those fields, and in spite of renewed efforts within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, substantive steps towards an agreement even on underground tests are not yet in sight.

10. A second priority task to which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has devoted careful study and activity during the past year is the elimination of chemical weapons. An early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction, as urged by the United Nations in resolution 2933 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972 is, in the view of the Danish Government, a matter of urgency. While recognizing that chemical weapons present far more complex problems than biological weapons, particularly in terms of the verification and technical aspects inherent in chemical substances, my delegation would urge that the most intensive efforts be made with the aim of presentation, at the earliest possible date, of a draft treaty on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, their development, production and stockpiling and the destruction of existing stocks, and providing satisfactory guarantees relating to verification of the observance of the treaty. In this connexion we should like to express our appreciation of the constructive Japanese initiative [A/9141, annex II, sect. 21]. It deserves further careful study, and it could revitalize the deliberations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on this important issue.

11. A related problem concerns the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons causing unnecessary suffering or having indiscriminate effects on civilian populations. Denmark stated its views on this important matter in its comments of 28 August 1973 on the report of the Secretary-General [A/9207 and Corr.1]. I shall not elaborate on the issue here, but merely repeat that in view of the highly technical character of the Secretary-General's report and the problems it raises the Danish Government finds that certain aspects of the problem might usefully be submitted to further study in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which has developed a special expertise in questions related to arms controls.

12. At the same time we have with great interest acquainted ourselves with the proposal embodied in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1 and the explanatory comments which Minister of State Alva Myrdal made after introducing the draft at the 1941st meeting. We well understand and sympathize with the arguments in

favour of allowing the forthcoming Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts to deal also with this important problem. We find a great deal of merit in the various ideas that have been advanced to ensure full treatment by the conference of the draft protocols prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross. If the suggestions relating to a special sub-committee to deal with the weapons issue, arrangements that would allow such a sub-committee to continue its work independently of the schedule of the conference and the elaboration of a separate instrument dealing with the prohibition or restriction of use of specific conventional weapons, were accepted, we could hope that the various reservations voiced in this debate would be fully overcome. We for our part find that considerable progress has been achieved in the draft resolution.

13. As stated by several previous speakers, there is increasing impatience and bitterness around the world because of the fact that no effective steps can be taken to halt the senseless arms race, both nuclear and conventional, and that the arms race is monopolizing vast amounts of energy, resources and money badly needed for the economic and social advancement of mankind. In spite of the positive, although limited, progress made over the last 12 years since the Zorin-McCloy Agreement,<sup>1</sup> the world is still living under the law of the stronger.

14. It is therefore only natural that the idea of a world disarmament conference has met with a great deal of interest in the hope that such a conference might give new impetus and a new sense of urgency to the disarmament efforts.

15. My own country did entertain such hopes with regard to a world disarmament conference. Accordingly, we voted in favour of last year's resolution 2930 (XXVII). We did so in the expectation that the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference might ultimately prove capable of paving the way for a well-prepared conference in which all nuclear Powers would participate.

16. For various reasons that I shall not dwell upon here, the resolution did not really take effect. It is now for this Assembly to make another try at reaching a compromise satisfactory to all the major interests involved. The experience gained during the talks conducted under the patient and skilful guidance of Mr. Hoveyda, as well as the various suggestions put forward in the course of this debate, should form a useful background to a renewed effort. We shall now see whether this Assembly will succeed in taking the idea a step forward with the support of the membership at large, and, in particular, with that of the nuclear Powers, whose co-operation is essential.

17. It is our hope that the deliberations on disarmament may be imbued with a new sense of urgency, allowing us to move forward again and thus, through realistic measures, to decelerate the arms race and further the cause of disarmament.

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

18. Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The group of items on disarmament and arms control cannot be examined in proper perspective unless they are placed within the context of the political realities that condition them.

19. Furthermore, these items bespeak problems and realities that give rise to profound interest in public opinion since they involve questions which directly affect the lives and security of human beings and mankind's survival. These two factors underlie the duality of the items the First Committee is now examining, namely, their unchallenged importance and, at the same time, their delicate complexity. They also explain the tiresome repetitiousness of these debates and, at the same time, the unavoidable necessity of persevering in our efforts, so that these may culminate in results that will be in keeping with the supreme interests of all peoples and their ever more eager quest for world peace.

20. Peace, disarmament, and international understanding and co-operation constitute the age-old and universally sought goals of all peoples. The eagerness to achieve those goals grew, with justified intensity, in the heat of the great conflagrations of war that, in this century, had their principal setting in the European continent. It is for this reason that mankind received with feelings of relief and hope the news of the achievement of important agreements aimed at putting an end to the climate of cold war that the imperialists were still seeking to impose on that continent. Thus, the prospect of the holding of a European conference on security and co-operation is a source of rejoicing and encouragement to those who wish to achieve genuine international co-operation. Thus too we must greet the ending of the discriminatory policy directed against the German Democratic Republic, a peaceful State, whose contribution to the international community and to progress can be unknown to no one, and also the admission into the United Nations of the two German States.

21. In a wider context, the agreements arrived at between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States have to be assessed against this same positive yardstick.

22. The successes achieved in the last few years represent indubitable triumphs for those peoples that have been fighting untiringly for peace and international détente. But, in strict fact, we have to admit that they have been achieved primarily because of the consistent policy of peace invariably pursued by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. It should be pointed out that today, 7 November, we commemorate another anniversary of the glorious Bolshevik Revolution, which not only started the contemporary revolutionary process destined to liquidate colonialism, dependency and exploitation all over the world, but also marked the opening of an era in which mankind will be able to aspire to genuine peace as a practical objective. If, 56 years ago, Soviet Power was born proclaiming a decree on peace, today the Soviet Union, imbued with the same Leninist ideals, rises as a powerful bastion against the aggressors and merchants of war.

23. Nevertheless, there still remains a long road ahead before we can transform into genuine reality what today appears only as promising trends limited in their scope to

certain regions of the world. Despite the agreements signed in Paris, imperialist aggression continues to scourge the peoples of Indo-China. The recent events in the Middle East serve to prove that stability in that region still remains precarious. Colonialism and racism continue to rear their heads. In Latin America, North American imperialism unleashes a fierce, reactionary offensive.

24. In those circumstances it must be emphasized that negotiations on disarmament, to be useful, must be carried on within a framework that will guarantee the rights and interests of all peoples. Disarmament would be neither admissible nor effective unless it is achieved under conditions guaranteeing the independence, security and territorial integrity of all States, great or small. Peace, in a word, would be neither acceptable nor capable of achievement if it did not mean total respect for the rights of all peoples to self-determination, independence and sovereignty.

25. General and complete disarmament, furthermore, presupposes the liquidation of all military bases on foreign soil that serve the policies of aggression and subversion pursued by imperialism all over the world. With regard to this matter, I should like to recall what the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries approved at Algiers in September of this year. Paragraph 53 of the Political Declaration of that Conference reads as follows:

"The Conference demands that the military bases of the United States on Cuban, Panamanian and Puerto Rican territories be restored to the countries which are their rightful owners."

26. Along this same line of reasoning, Cuba has always spoken out in favour of the convening of a World Disarmament Conference with the participation of all States. It is for this reason that we co-sponsored resolution 2930 (XXVII), that we have supported the successive appeals made by the Conferences of the Heads of State of the non-aligned nations for implementation of this resolution, and that at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly we endorsed the praiseworthy initiative of the Soviet Union to that end.

27. My delegation agrees with the position made clear by the Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries at their recent conference at Algiers, namely that the World Disarmament Conference should be convened as soon as possible. For that reason, and in accordance with the terms of resolution 2930 (XXVII), the General Assembly must continue the necessary preparations and, above all, must decide to speed up forthwith the work of the Special Committee set up by that resolution. We believe that it would be sound for all States, including the nuclear-weapon States, to co-operate with the Committee and participate actively in the preparations for the Conference. But we are also firmly convinced that the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on such important matters, supported as they are by such strong international opinion, must also be complied with and implemented. We cannot allow any State or group of States, regardless of the volume or quality of its weapons, to assume the right to paralyse the implementation of

decisions adopted by a wide majority of Members of the United Nations.

28. Those who insist on putting obstacles in the path of the prompt holding of the Conference would be well advised to listen to the voice of the peoples of the third world, which for more than a decade have constantly pressed for such a Conference to be held.

29. My delegation considers that the World Disarmament Conference would be the appropriate forum in which to examine matters of capital importance in conditions which would allow all States to debate them on an equal footing.

30. There can be no doubt that the examination of the disarmament question calls for a new impetus and a more dynamic approach. Nothing would be more appropriate to this end than to channel our efforts towards the organization of that Conference. My delegation is ready to give its support to any initiative leading to that end.

31. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): My statement today will be concerned with agenda item 33, the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/9141]. I want to concentrate on its discussion of the two issues which are of most immediate concern, namely, the test ban on nuclear weapons—agenda item 36—and the production ban on chemical means of warfare—agenda item 35. However, I do not want to repeat what others have said, or what I myself have said during the last 10 years. On both items I wish to give special emphasis to the risks pertaining to new developments. This accent on qualitative disarmament then leads on to certain comments also in regard to reductions of military expenditures. Of course I do not intend to deal with agenda item 102 in its totality and certainly not with the question of draft resolutions, which is to be handled in plenary meetings. But I would wish, rather in connexion with item 29 on the agenda of this Committee, to discuss realistically what link exists between specific disarmament measures and a possible reallocation of resources; in brief, the link between disarmament and development.

32. The report from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament marks once more a dismal failure to come to grips with the tasks of disarmament, which are growing more serious every year. The very items which have been transmitted to the Conference with highest priority by the General Assembly, namely, achieving a ban on production and so forth of chemical weapons and a ban on testing of nuclear weapons, simply reappear in the report as vexing perennials without any promise of a solution being within reach.

33. Let me here open a parenthesis. We all fully understand that the immobility of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is not caused by its structure. I have had occasion to underline that in conversations with the two Co-Chairmen, frank and friendly as always. Nevertheless, I might suggest that a becoming gesture of generosity could be that they propose that some kind of steering group be substituted for the co-chairmanship this coming year. It might well be elected by the Conference for its spring and summer sessions respectively, each time comprising, for instance, a representative of a nuclear

weapon Power, a representative of the other alliance, and a non-aligned representative. This is but a very tentative suggestion, made in all humility. There may well be other solutions which could result in a good balance and any proposal should most fittingly come from the Co-Chairmen themselves.

34. On disarmament in regard to chemical weapons I need not repeat here the contributions which my delegation, together with many others, and particularly the non-aligned ones, have brought forward in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. They include not only strong recommendations to conclude a treaty and searching questions as to the political trustworthiness of the great Powers in this field but also practical proposals in rather great technical detail.

35. I want to concentrate here on two aspects where both debate and action seem very timely just now.

36. One refers to the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva in 1925,<sup>2</sup> which already prohibits the use of chemical weapons while we are now attempting to prescribe their physical elimination. This sequence is one which we might well follow also in regard to napalm and other specific weapons. First, outlaw or restrict their use in war; thereafter, tackle questions as to their elimination from arsenals.

37. The Geneva Protocol—that cherished heritage from a lucid interval in the period between the two world wars—has always been a subject of considerable concern in this Committee. What has been and continues to be most important, is the emphatic appeal to all States which have not done so to ratify and adhere to the Protocol. Exhortations to that effect in resolutions emanating from this Committee have already met with such good response that it is a true success story for the United Nations. Of the 90 or so States which are now parties to the Protocol more than half have ratified it since 1960 and no less than 25 in the years since the General Assembly in 1969 took a major step to vindicate the Protocol as being comprehensive in scope [*resolution 2603 A (XXIV)*].

38. Hope is now growing that the United States—one of the original signatories—will complete its ratification. We may recall that the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has subscribed to the view that the Protocol should be interpreted in a comprehensive way so as to cover also tear gas and herbicides, and that its Chairman, Senator Fulbright, wrote accordingly to the President a couple of years ago. What welcome news, then, to learn that that very distinguished professional body, the American Chemical Society, with its orientation towards both the academic and the industrial world, has now recommended that such a total ban be accepted by the United States. Thus the very body which helped to block ratification some 40 years ago has now endorsed the interpretation which the United Nations General Assembly has given to the Protocol.

39. At a time when ratification without reservation as to content is becoming more universally achieved, my delegation thinks it is appropriate to proceed also to a pruning of some of the ungraceful encumbrances which in the form of formal reservations make the picture of the true applicability of this international instrument such an unclear one.

40. Some 60 of the 90 parties have felt that they are able to abide by the Protocol without any reservations. Why, then, not the remaining third?

41. Most in need of cancellation, it seems to me, are the reservations by which some parties declare themselves bound only as regards other States that are parties to the same Protocol. This is *per se* redundant, as the Protocol formally was concluded by parties “between themselves”. *De facto*, however, these reservations now appear obsolete, as the rules of the Protocol are deemed to constitute general international law, binding upon all.

42. Another reservation that must be queried, and certainly calls for reconsideration in the light of this last-mentioned development, is the reservation as to a specific right of retaliation “in regard to an enemy State whose armed forces or whose allies”—I stress “whose allies”—“fail to respect the prohibitions”. How are “allies” defined nowadays, so as to justify a biological or chemical attack on a country that may have a more or less clearly recognizable “ally” which misbehaves?

43. The existence of reservations to the Geneva Protocol, and the resulting uncertainties as to who is bound by what, could also create hesitation to accede to a comprehensive ban on production etc., of chemical weapons if such a ban should not attract universal subscription.

44. I am quite convinced that at least a good deal of the reservations could be withdrawn if the parties took a good look at them. Without asking for a special resolution, I hope delegations will join me in this appeal. Such acts of simplification would make the Geneva Protocol stand out in a much more clear-cut fashion as a comprehensive and compelling prohibition against the use of biological and chemical weapons.

45. The specific issue I want to raise in regard to our attempts to negotiate a production ban on chemical means of warfare is of much greater importance and also greater urgency. Through the years of attempting to legislate disarmament we have learnt the bitter wisdom that once a weapons system is established, it is practically impossible to pry it loose from the interests that have become vested in it. The most promising time for action against a weapons system is in its very early phase, preferably before it goes from blue-print to prototype or, if that point is already passed, before it is authorized for production.

46. Now our experts on chemical weapons have recently come to be much worried by plans to produce lethal nerve gas by a new method—a so-called binary form—which might escape all attempts at control. Two non-lethal components would be produced and even loaded into a shell, but in two separate containers. The components might be brought to mix only when the shell is fired. In this way the moment of

<sup>2</sup> League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, No. 2138, p. 65.

use would coincide with the moment of production of a chemical weapon—that is, a composite gas with lethal characteristics.

47. Indications that production plans are under way have recently been published in the United States by the Secretary of the Army. However, a debate as to the advisability or even permissibility to proceed with production of such binary nerve gas has been opened in a sub-committee of the United States House Armed Services Committee. I would like to note in parentheses that if I refer only to United States sources in this and several other contexts it is because the United States is the most “open” of the major Powers. That is still only a relative virtue; the international community should press for much greater right to insight in the planning of new weapons in all countries.

48. Once more we are forced to be concerned with the discriminatory effects which so evidently are inherent in this kind of technological race, which would widen the gap between the big military Powers and others. We must issue a fresh call for action in the United Nations against the development of binary chemical weapons—this in addition to our recommendation for continued efforts to reach agreement to stop all production, and so on, of chemical means of warfare in general. The frightening prospect of new developments would make the Swedish delegation more sympathetic to the Japanese proposal, if that would assure very rapid action. I might remind my colleagues that the Swedish delegation in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament launched a move to delimit as one category of chemical weapons exactly those which were at one and the same time highly toxic and produced for military purposes only. But in order for us to subscribe to any proposal for their deletion in a first stage, the proposal would have to be coupled with a prescription that existing stocks of such ultra-horror weapons should be destroyed in order not to preserve a discriminatory situation.

49. A critical turning-point threatens to be approaching also in the nuclear weapons field. There are, as I have recently had occasion to emphasize in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, ominous trends in military technology which might affect the viability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, often regarded as the main bulwark in regard to nuclear non-armament.

50. Since the very acceptance of the non-proliferation Treaty there has been widespread recognition that the Treaty could come under severe strain because of its inherently discriminatory nature if the super-Powers did not take “effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date”. When I say this I do not wish to be misunderstood. I do not underestimate the value of the Treaty on non-proliferation. On the contrary, I wish to strengthen the Treaty. Obviously the non-proliferation régime would be strengthened if more countries acceded to the Treaty, but it would also be strengthened in its foundations if the super-Powers lived up to their commitments. The bilateral agreements on the limitation of strategic arms reached in Moscow last year and the intentions expressed in Washington this year to proceed further along similar lines have rightly been hailed as

promising steps in the right direction. At the same time, however, arms developments seem to be under way which threaten to render the non-proliferation Treaty even more discriminatory against the non-nuclear-weapon States. I am referring to news items that major nuclear-weapon States may be about to launch a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons systems, the so-called “mini-nukes”.

51. It is disturbing to learn that ongoing research and development might lead to such a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons with yields in the subkiloton range, which would thus overlap the yields of the most powerful conventional charges. These weapons systems are said by their proponents to be like conventional weapons also in that they are usable on the battlefield, and even preferable as providing cheaper fire-power. Such a development would drastically aggravate the nuclear threat against non-nuclear-weapon States everywhere.

52. Most important as a question of principle is, of course, the fact that an introduction of such mini-nuclear weapons would blur the present distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons. We are strongly of the view that an absolute “firebreak line” must be kept between nuclear and conventional war.

53. Obviously the introduction of mini-nukes and a decline of the nuclear threshold would create widespread proliferation risks. The main purpose of the non-proliferation Treaty—that is, to contain the risks of spreading capabilities for nuclear war—might be countered. This would occur at a time when in many countries a growing nuclear industry would produce considerable stockpiles of excess plutonium. Military arguments for acquiring nuclear weapons might then again come to make themselves heard in some nations. This problem, that of stopping the elaboration of a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons, is obviously connected with the comprehensive test ban issue.

54. When the General Assembly, under the draft resolution which the Swedish delegation is sponsoring, is to renew its appeal to the nuclear weapon States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament immediately to start negotiations for elaborating a comprehensive test ban treaty, I wish to remind this Committee that a draft for such a treaty already exists. It was submitted by the Swedish delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament first in 1969. A revised draft was presented in 1971 and annexed to the report of the Conference that year.<sup>3</sup> It should be noted that that draft treaty has a very realistic structure—it asks for an immediate decision to stop testing, but allows implementation to be phased according to a time-table. Thus, by avoiding a rupture of the ongoing series, it might avoid a veto from the military planners. But of course immediate cessation of all tests, so often condemned in their totality by the General Assembly, is much to be preferred.

55. A comprehensive test ban has for the last 20 years—since 1954, if I may remind my colleagues—been regarded as the master key to impede the onward course of the

<sup>3</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1971, document DC/234, annex C, section 30.*

nuclear arms race. That qualitative aspect of the disarmament issue has, however, a much broader scope when it calls for the freezing of all kinds of new weapon developments. I have a strong conviction that it is more imperative to achieve qualitative disarmament even before quantitative disarmament. This is so because the destabilizing factor is first and foremost the competitive element in the armaments race. To counteract that which may be labelled a "technological imperative", which now seems to force a continued spiralling upwards of new generations of nuclear weapons, would therefore mean a gain in terms of security much more considerable than what could be achieved through some reduction of the excessive stockpiles.

56. But there is yet another gain to be obtained. I have stated it before, and most recently in the Peace Palace at The Hague. If we could achieve at least a freeze on the further technological development of new types of weapons—"product improvement", as it is cynically called—the world could realize a considerable saving of the most precious of all resources, that is, scientific and technical ones.

57. This should have a direct bearing on all proposals to cut military budgets, and particularly on those proposals which aim at coupling such cuts with a redirection of resources to development purposes. If the brainpower of hundreds of thousands of scientists and engineers could be turned over to work on constructive instead of destructive tasks, then a "product improvement" on a grand scale might be started, such as is crucially necessary in order to feed the hungry peoples of the world and satisfy crying basic needs of human beings everywhere.

58. To my mind, a transfer of technological resources from the rich to the poor nations is the one most promising of all measures to start filling the gap between the privileged and the under-privileged peoples. And from where could we better remove those resources than from the competition to produce ever more destructive tools of war?

59. This is the link that I want to see forged between our several agenda items on disarmament and any action that may emerge from agenda item 102 on a reduction of military budgets. When the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, speaking in the general debate of this session of the General Assembly [2126th plenary meeting], introduced a proposal, made many times earlier over the years, to recommend certain reductions of military spending, he certainly touched one of the essential aims of disarmament, one which is whole-heartedly shared by all of us, namely, that resources—financial, material and human—should be less devoured by the war machines and more dedicated to progress and the pursuit of human happiness.

60. Today, I would not want to go into details of that proposal and the particular conditions it seems to seek to establish. Whatever nations wish to do to reduce their military expenditure should be welcomed by us all. The representative of the USSR, in his statement at the 1934th meeting reminded us that from 1951 to 1971 some \$3,000,000 million had been spent on arms in the world. We must ask: why was it spent? It has certainly not increased the security of the world or of any one State. As

always, we should expect the major share of reductions of such expenditure to come from the two super-Powers, as they are so way above everybody else in respect of what they spend and what they possess, especially of the most costly military hardware and the wide network of military installations overseas. As much of their military capabilities belongs to undertakings beyond what is needed for defence of their own nations or for deterrence against nuclear attacks on themselves, these two Powers could well afford, by mutual or by unilateral decisions, to cut down on their military budgets without risking undue exposure and without requesting reciprocity.

61. A very important question, particularly interesting to countries hitherto less favoured by development, is what amounts might become available for foreign aid. The present Soviet Union proposal seems to imply that only a tenth of the funds envisaged to be released should be used for development assistance—in other words, 1 per cent of the military budgets. Any such transfers, welcome as all contributions are, should of course not be viewed as taking the place of the 0.7 per cent net of the gross national product, which is the acknowledged target of the United Nations for official development assistance by the middle of this decade.

62. While the fulfilment of that target would entail annual transfers from richer to poorer nations of some \$20,000 million, the magnitude of transfers mentioned in the Soviet Union proposal can be calculated rather to be at the most some \$1,500 million. This is not just a lofty exercise in figures. In the report, *Disarmament and Development*,<sup>4</sup> submitted last year by the Group of Experts which I had the honour and privilege to chair, we stated as an imperative conclusion that the United Nations targets for development aid should be met now, without waiting for disarmament.

63. While acknowledging that any transfer of funds, like any reduction of arms expenditures in general, is to be welcomed, the Group of Experts found it more appropriate to compare what donor countries are spending on their military apparatus, that is, some 6.7 per cent of their gross national product, with the development assistance they officially provide, which is some 25 times smaller. That must be much more interesting in the eyes of would-be recipient countries.

64. To take but one example: the less developed countries are now, on the Swedish national budget, allotted around \$370 million, while our military budget is around \$1,800 million. Thus, they obtain from the Swedish exchequer about one-fifth of what our own defence establishment obtains; what they could get as 10 per cent of our savings on that latter budget would obviously be little in comparison. The underprivileged part of the world should not have illusions and believe that being allotted 10 per cent of eventual fiscal savings on the military expenditures of the rich countries, or 1 per cent of that budget, would be of any real significance for reducing the gap between rich nations and poor.

65. But, finally, I come to a point where prospects are more hopeful. There does exist a very strategic link

<sup>4</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1.

between that specific part of expenditures which is devoted to military research and development work, that is, for the purpose of generating new weapons, on the one hand, and technological development for peaceful purposes on the other.

66. Moreover, the human and technical resources which are employed to keep up the arms race correspond to the most intransigent bottlenecks in the less developed countries. Seeking, as I admittedly and deliberately do, those ways to pinpoint action which should be particularly effective in order to secure disarmament, and at the same time most specifically beneficial to the underprivileged countries, I must once more underline the importance of qualitative disarmament.

67. To this report on disarmament and development, which I have already mentioned, are annexed quite detailed lists exemplifying what peaceful purposes could be served if various sections of military research and development capacities were redirected, for instance by a comprehensive test ban. May I just quote the paragraph in the main text referring to gains to be made by stopping further development of chemical means of warfare:

"Biological disarmament has always released resources that are valuable for research into disease, animal and human. Chemical disarmament would add resources useful for ecologically acceptable pest control and toxicological research".<sup>5</sup>

Here I may make a reference to the annex where further examples are enumerated: high-yielding varieties of staple food, edible protein, pest and vector control, communicable diseases control, including parasitic diseases, toxicological research and cancer research. I shall now continue with the quote from the main text:

"If the laboratories used for chemical (or biological) warfare work were converted to civil uses and opened up, they would not only offer first-class technical facilities, but might also help to engender confidence that disarmament was being observed, the more so if international exchanges were encouraged."<sup>5</sup>

68. I have a deep conviction that it is in qualitative disarmament that our world community would find its great "disarmament dividend", which could also be transformed into a dynamic "development multiplier". This ought to be self-evident when we reflect on the fact that the great spur for the development of the rich countries, which is sorely lagging in the poorer ones, has been precisely the utilization of scientific and technical resources, and that it continues as a near-total monopolization of these resources for the further enrichment of the wealthy, seemingly without end.

69. Without wanting to tie my comments too closely to the latest Soviet Union proposal, which is rather general and vague and certainly would not pre-empt the burning issue of disarmament and development, I wish that we could secure a recommendation to return in future sessions to a more penetrating and general consideration of item 29 of the agenda.

<sup>5</sup> *Idem.*, para. 44 (b).

70. Most important is, however, that our disarmament debates and negotiations generally turn purposively to the question of qualitative disarmament, that is, freezing the development of new generations of weapons. This is the very key that might open the gateway for a concerted attempt at effectively stopping the otherwise self-perpetuating armaments race—a race which can only end in catastrophe. Not least unreasonable is a continuation of the self-destructive exploitation of the economic and human resources of this world. So may I end this last official statement of mine by asking my colleagues: when is some action for disarmament to start in earnest?

71. Mr. UPADHYAY (Nepal): The search for disarmament is in essence a search for human survival itself. It is in this spirit that the problem of disarmament has to be understood. It is in this belief that the question of disarmament should be faced and solved. It is for this reason that disarmament has to be universal as well as lasting. However frustrating and protracted it may be, we have to deal with the question because the United Nations General Assembly acts as the conscience of the world.

72. The compelling need for disarmament has been dictated by two basic considerations. First, mankind has become capable of producing weapons of mass destruction of awesome capabilities as a result of the highly advanced scientific knowledge and technology in its possession. The world today has accumulated stockpiles of armaments sufficient to destroy itself many times over. In the 1940s, explosive power was measured in terms of the kiloton, equivalent to 10,000 tons of TNT. Today the measure is in terms of the megaton, or one million tons of TNT. We may find some facts chilling if we only recall that a mere 20-kiloton bomb dropped on Hiroshima killed about 250,000 people. Some estimates put the current stockpile of nuclear weapons at about 15 tons of TNT for every inhabitant of the earth. Moreover, according to the estimate of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 1971 16 countries had 128 nuclear power reactors with a total capacity of 35,000 megawatts of electricity. By 1977, 32 countries will have 325 power reactors with a total capacity of 174,000 megawatts, and by 1980 the figure may reach 350,000 megawatts. As a by-product, nuclear power reactors produce large quantities of plutonium. In 1972 about 13 tons were produced. By 1980 about 130 tons of plutonium are expected to be produced, which will be sufficient, in theory, to produce about 300 nuclear weapons of nominal size every week.

73. Secondly, while astronomical sums have been and are being spent on this arms build-up, a great majority of the people of the world go hungry and naked. The annual expenditure on armaments passed the figure of \$200,000 million in 1970 and it continues to grow every year. If military expenditures continue to grow at current rates, the figures are expected to reach \$280,000 million in 1980. According to the report of the Group of Experts on the economic and social consequences of disarmament, the present expenditure on armaments constitutes 6.5 per cent of the gross national product of all countries. The military expenditure of the countries that provide aid for developing countries is 6.7 per cent of their gross national product. This is 25 times the amount these countries spend for development aid.

74. My delegation has in the past welcomed some of the encouraging developments in the field of disarmament. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 1963, the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons of 1968, the sea-bed Treaty of 1971, and the Convention on biological weapons of 1972 have been important landmarks on the road towards the goal of disarmament. Apart from the Treaty on strategic arms limitation, the Soviet Union and the United States have taken two more steps of considerable significance. The first is the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, and, second, the document on the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms [see A/9293].

75. Under the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, the two super-Powers undertake an obligation to conduct themselves, not only in their mutual relations but also in their relations with other countries, in such a manner as to exclude the possibility of nuclear warfare anywhere in the world.

76. As a result of the increasing atmosphere of détente in Europe, talks have been going on for the reduction of military forces in Central Europe. Substantive talks began last week in Vienna on the question of mutual and balanced reduction of forces. Mankind has witnessed the tragedy and horror of two world wars erupting from Europe. It is, therefore, only natural that Europeans should be seriously engaged in negotiations with a view to minimizing the risks of military confrontation.

77. However, an over-all view of disarmament questions leads us to believe that the progress has been far from satisfactory. All the limited agreements during the past decade appear to be guided mostly by a desire to achieve token arms control for public consumption while maintaining a steady expansion of the nuclear arms race. According to figures published by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, world expenditures on armaments increased by 82 per cent from 1961 to 1971—from \$119,000 million to \$216,000 million in 1971. It can be safely assumed that the major portion of the additional expenditures on defence budgets has been spent on sophisticated armaments. My delegation tends to agree largely with the view that the super-Powers have been more interested in balancing each other than in planning genuine disarmament.

78. The Moscow partial test-ban Treaty has been in existence for just over a decade. Yet some of the nuclear Powers have not adhered to the Treaty. On top of that, they have continued to test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere with total disregard for world opinion and the various General Assembly resolutions. Be it for reasons either of prestige or of power, such tests will not create a conducive atmosphere for real disarmament. There are, again, quite a few States which are not nuclear Powers already but have the capacity to become so within a short time. If today's nuclear Powers continue to show disregard for world opinion and go on improving their nuclear arms, the potential nuclear Powers of tomorrow may also be tempted to go nuclear and the disease may spread so quickly that it becomes very difficult to control it.

79. The agreement on the limitation of strategic arms envisages a balanced nuclear relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. But these agreements have very limited scope and effect. Though the agreement establishes a maximum arms level with regard to certain weapons, it does not impose arms reductions on the super-Powers in any category except for anti-ballistic missiles in the case of the United States. Secondly, certain important categories of weapons such as strategic bombers and intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles are totally excluded from any control under the agreement. Thirdly, the agreements deal with the quantitative and not the qualitative aspect of the arms race. Thus, it remains open for the super-Powers to continue and concentrate on the qualitative development of their armaments.

80. No substantial progress seems to have been made towards the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation holds the view that the question of the prohibition on development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction should be taken up on a high priority basis. If for reasons of the complexity of the problem a complete ban on chemical weapons may not be possible, an attempt should be made to reach agreement on a partial basis. Some useful working papers have been presented in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament regarding the ban on chemical weapons and among them of particular interest and relevance seems to be the 10-nation working paper [A/9141, annex II, sect. 8]. They should prove a reasonable basis for working out an agreement on a chemical ban.

81. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been subjected to many criticisms for its failure to come up with any remarkable contributions towards disarmament objectives. My delegation, however, is of the opinion that it is not the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament but the attitude of the States, both inside and outside that Committee that has made it what it is. It is futile to talk about doing away with the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament unless a better and more satisfactory arrangement can be made. There may, however, be some ground to review and readjust the membership of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament so as to reflect the present realities of the world situation more correctly.

82. The question of the World Disarmament Conference has been before the United Nations for a number of years. The views of my delegation in regard to this matter have been clearly made known on several occasions both within and outside the world Organization. We are in full support of any idea that is motivated by the achievement of a genuine and lasting peace, which is so essential in the world, particularly for a small and developing country like mine. While we understand the genuine fear expressed in some quarters about the monopolization of power by the two super-Powers of the world and hence their mistrust and lack of faith in the World Disarmament Conference because they think it would be more of a propaganda forum, my delegation feels that a World Disarmament Conference, if held after adequate preparatory work, is bound to create a favourable atmosphere for disarmament even if it may prove to be incapable of solving all problems at one stroke. The holding of such a conference will involve universal

participation in the discussions relating to the problem of disarmament and will help to rally public opinion all over the world in favour of disarmament.

83. Some countries try to give preference and priority to bilateral negotiations and agreements in the field of disarmament and cast doubts upon the usefulness of a World Disarmament Conference. But matters as vital as nuclear weapons and complete and general disarmament are of concern to all countries, big or small, rich or poor, and therefore need to be discussed and solved in a conference where everyone has a chance to make his views known. The success of such a conference necessitates the participation of all nuclear Powers. Moreover, all countries should be invited to such a conference.

84. It was with those considerations in mind that my delegation supported General Assembly resolution 2930 (XXVII), which established a Special Committee for the World Disarmament Conference. My delegation would like to put on record its deep appreciation of the skill, tact and devotion with which my colleague Mr. Hoveyda of Iran carried on the seemingly impossible task of the Special Committee under most adverse circumstances, because of which the Special Committee could meet only for informal consultations.

85. My delegation also supported General Assembly resolution 2992 (XXVII), which established an *ad hoc* committee to study the proposals contained in resolution 2832 (XXVI) regarding the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, with the full hope and belief that the establishment of zones free from naval or arms build-up would eventually contribute towards the enhancement of a proper atmosphere for peace.

86. To conclude, my delegation would like to reiterate its belief that only universal goodwill and a sense of confidence can lead us towards general and complete disarmament, which is so essential for lasting peace.

87. The CHAIRMAN: I would remind members that the general debate on the disarmament items will be closed at the end of tomorrow afternoon's meeting. Thereafter, and until we start the debate on the question of Korea, we shall be discussing draft resolutions on disarmament. A few have already been submitted. I should like to urge that any members intending to introduce other draft resolutions should do so as soon as possible.

88. At a subsequent meeting, I shall take up with the Committee the question of the order in which the draft resolutions should be dealt with. But in any case I would again urge members wishing to submit draft resolutions to introduce them as soon as possible. That will facilitate their discussion and also will help us to plan our work.

89. Mr. GHAUS (Afghanistan): The General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session invited the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and the issue of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

90. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/9141] indicates that this year once again,

in spite of the continued efforts of the participants and the wealth of ideas and the constructiveness of the proposals, the difficulties which have so far hampered the reaching of an agreement on those matters remain unresolved.

91. The lack of results in the efforts to reach an agreement to extend the ban on nuclear testing to all environments is seemingly caused by the disagreement existing particularly between the big Powers with regard to the questions of control and verification.

92. While this controversy lingers on, the underground testing by nuclear Powers parties to the partial test-ban Treaty continues unabated, giving rise to the speculation that the reason for stalling the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty should be sought not in the differences over the problems of control and verification but rather in the developmental targets that this or that nuclear weapon State has set for itself with a view to completing and perfecting its nuclear weapon system before agreeing to a total test ban.

93. The conclusion and the implementation of a comprehensive test ban treaty is significant not only because it hampers the development of new varieties of nuclear weapons but because it constitutes a measure of self-restraint for nuclear weapon States, in conformity with the obligations they have contracted in becoming parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

94. That important instrument obligates the nuclear Powers to start negotiations with a view to achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This undertaking will lose its credibility if nuclear weapon States continue their testing, the aim of which could obviously be nothing else but the further development of their nuclear weaponry and the perfection of its deployment.

95. It is therefore essential that, as a matter of priority, the nuclear States should agree to the halting of all tests in all environments in order to make a beginning in fulfilling their contractual obligations resulting from their acceptance of the non-proliferation Treaty.

96. The non-nuclear States, in becoming parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, have accepted an obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons. This means that these countries have agreed to give up a category of weapon that they actually did not possess and most probably, in the majority of cases, would have never opted to acquire. It is therefore high time that the nuclear-weapon States which, after all, are the only ones possessing nuclear weapons, should start discharging their obligations in this regard. Nuclear disarmament, to which all of us aspire, is undeniably their exclusive responsibility. It is of paramount importance that as a collateral measure of disarmament an agreement be reached as soon as possible extending the present nuclear test ban to all environments. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament indicates that the elements of such an agreement exist. What is now needed is an appropriate political decision.

97. It is our hope that all nuclear Powers without exception will adhere to a binding arrangement rendering the prohibition of nuclear tests effective and total.

98. The efforts of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to preparing a treaty banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons are noteworthy but, regrettably, that body was unable during its past session to make any progress in negotiating such an agreement. Here again the difficulties of control and verification seem to be the stumbling-block which at present prevents any accommodation. We are of the opinion that effective measures for the banning of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons should be found as a matter of priority, because of the great danger that these indiscriminate means of warfare present, especially for non-combatants.

99. In addition to moral and humanitarian considerations, the undertaking in article IX of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction [resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex] obligates the parties to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

100. We believe that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during its next session should continue the consideration of the question of the banning of chemical weapons as an urgent matter and present to the General Assembly, at its twenty-ninth session, a draft treaty in this respect.

101. The working paper presented by the non-aligned countries to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/9141, annex II, sect. 8], constitutes a useful basis from which such a treaty could be evolved.

102. The conclusion of a treaty banning chemical weapons will be a positive and important step towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. In the interim period before such a treaty comes into force, we hope that the provisions of the General Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare will be fully carried out and observed by all countries. It has to be emphasized here that no provisions of the future treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons should limit or detract from the obligations assumed by the parties under the aforesaid Protocol.

103. The delegation of the Republic of Afghanistan welcomed the report of the Secretary-General entitled *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use*,<sup>6</sup> which was submitted to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly. We are in general agreement with its contents and we believe that it is imperative that ways and means be found with a view to a speedy banning of the use and production of these terrible weapons which can cause unnecessary suffering to combatants and non-combatants alike. International action on the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons acquires an urgent nature owing to the fact that, unlike nuclear weapons, their production and development at present is relatively inexpensive. They can therefore be produced and

developed by a greater number of countries and be used on a larger scale.

104. In our view, the measures for banning the development, production and use of napalm and other incendiary weapons can advantageously be discussed and worked out in an appropriate body of the United Nations.

105. The forthcoming Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, which is to take place in 1974 in Geneva, could also usefully examine the matters related to the prohibition of the use of napalm and other weapons that are particularly inhuman as inflicting unnecessary suffering and are indiscriminate in their effect.

106. The delegation of the Republic of Afghanistan supports an early convening of the World Disarmament Conference. The stagnation with which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is at present faced could be removed by the universalization of disarmament talks in a forum such as the World Disarmament Conference where negotiations between countries, including all the nuclear-weapon States, could result in the emergence of new ideas and approaches and the fixing of new priorities in the field of disarmament. The World Disarmament Conference, in reviewing and assessing the whole range of disarmament efforts and achievements, could bring about a breakthrough in the present stalemate. General and complete disarmament is of such vital importance to mankind that for its attainment every avenue should be thoroughly explored and no stone left unturned.

107. We agree with previous speakers that the two prerequisites for the success of the World Disarmament Conference are, first, that it should be attended by all States, including the five nuclear-weapon States, and, secondly, that it should be well prepared. In spite of laudable efforts by Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran to whom, availing ourselves of this opportunity, we wish to pay a warm tribute, the Special Committee established last year by the General Assembly to examine all views and suggestions expressed by Governments on the convening of a World Disarmament Conference and related problems could make no progress in its work. The organic and political difficulties which brought about the paralysis of the Special Committee are well known and there is no need to mention them here. Our delegation is flexible as to the methods and means to be used for solving the questions related to the convening of the Conference and its adequate preparation. The Special Committee could be reorganized to that end, or another body could be created for that purpose, or perhaps the United Nations Disarmament Commission could be entrusted with this work. If the latter be the case, the Commission, which is at present falling into oblivion, would then function as a preparatory committee for the Conference.

108. We read with interest the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean [A/9029]. Afghanistan supports the establishment of zones of peace as an instrument for advancing the relaxation of tensions and as a positive measure of disarmament. The decision to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace is supported by us. The great Powers should halt the escalation and expansion of

<sup>6</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.I.3.

their military presence in that ocean and dismantle all their military bases and installations in the hinterland and on the bordering coasts and islands of that ocean. The existence of foreign military bases implies the possibility of intervention whenever the interests of the Power maintaining them in a given region so warrants. These bases impose limitations on the sovereignty of States of the region, jeopardize their security and impede the development of better understanding among nations. The strengthening of international peace and security requires that ways and means be sought for the speedy elimination of all foreign military bases and installations everywhere.

109. We welcome the success of various stages of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the Soviet Union and the United States, aimed at freezing at certain levels and within certain limits the development and the deployment of some of their strategic weapons. Although the agreement reached between the two Powers in this respect is an arms control arrangement rather than a concrete disarmament measure, and does not affect either their huge nuclear arsenals or the continued stockpiling of nuclear weapons, we consider it to be an important step towards the relaxation of international tensions. We likewise welcome the treaty on the non-use of nuclear weapons recently concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States in Washington as a worthy contribution to the cause of peace. The negotiations preceding those arrangements were conducted outside the framework of the United Nations. It is our belief, however, that no effort should be spared to use the machinery of the United Nations to the fullest extent possible for arms control and disarmament negotiations and agreements. That would enable all countries, big and small, to participate fully in finding solutions to these problems which are of vital concern to mankind as a whole.

110. Not only would a world free of nuclear weapons be an assurance against a nuclear holocaust but also the resources released as a result of disarmament and the use of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes would prove of great benefit to the well-being of all peoples and the social and economic advancement of the countries of the third world. The measures adopted for improving the economic situation of the developing countries, especially the least developed ones, during the Development Decade did not, regrettably, yield satisfactory results. It is necessary and urgent to find new sources of development financing for those countries. We therefore believe that the funds that could be obtained by the ending of the arms race and the reduction of military budgets could be used advantageously for narrowing the gap between the developed and the developing countries. It is in that spirit that we welcome the inclusion in the agenda of this session, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, of the item entitled "Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the United Nations Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries".<sup>7</sup> We hope that meaningful measures will be adopted this year by the General Assembly in order to translate this timely proposal of great significance into reality.

<sup>7</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 102, document A/9191.

111. During all the years that we have been discussing as a matter of priority—for obvious reasons—the question of nuclear disarmament, the stockpiling of conventional weapons, their development and the need to prevent the spread of those weapons has not received due attention. The conventional-arms race and the stockpiling of conventional weapons by nuclear and non-nuclear States have acquired such dangerous proportions that this Organization must, I am sure, concern itself very seriously with the matter.

112. In the present context of international relations, the security of smaller non-aligned countries is quite often threatened not by the eventuality of the use of nuclear weapons but by the possibility of the use of conventional armaments, whether by a nuclear-weapon State, which could destroy several times over a small non-nuclear country without resorting to its nuclear capability, or, more probably, by a non-nuclear-State which has acquired an important stockpile of conventional weapons through its privileged geographical or political position or through belonging to a military alliance, or simply because of its financial strength.

113. The acquisition of enormous quantities of sophisticated conventional armaments by some non-nuclear countries in our region, far exceeding the requirements of self-defence, is very disturbing for a non-aligned country like Afghanistan, which has geared all of its meagre resources to its social and economic advancement. The Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries noted with concern in its Political Declaration the threat posed to the security of non-aligned countries by the unhampered flow of conventional armaments to some regions. The relevant paragraph of that Political Declaration reads:

"The Conference noted with concern that the flow of conventional arms to certain non-nuclear States, which is a threat to the security of the non-aligned countries and which gives rise to tension in some regions, is continuing. It demands that an end be put to the flow of such armaments."

114. The continuation of the nuclear and conventional arms race, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, and the horizontal proliferation of conventional weapons in particular, which disturbs the balance of power, not only poses new threats to the security of various countries but also engages immense material resources and human potential which could best be used for the economic and social progress of the countries concerned.

115. The main threat to international peace and security lies in the increase in armaments, whether nuclear or conventional. The holding by countries of ever-larger quantities of weapons undermines confidence and may prompt others to indulge in the arms race, which thus becomes a never-ending process. The vertical and horizontal proliferation of weapons creates a situation of uncertainty and instability, in which no country can feel secure and no attempt aimed at the relaxation of tensions will seem real and genuine.

116. There is at present an inclination among the big Powers towards détente, and a tendency to solve problems

by consultation and negotiation. But that détente will remain precarious if it does not take into consideration the interests of all peoples and if it does not encompass all regions and relations between all countries. The détente will not be a dynamic and outward-looking phenomenon if it does not result in a rapid and favourable impact on those areas of human endeavour which are of vital importance to all mankind such as disarmament. It is therefore our expectation that in the present era, which is characterized by the amelioration of relations between some of the big Powers, concrete decisions will be taken that will demonstrate that the goal of general and complete disarmament is not merely an ideal to which all of us remain morally committed but an attainable reality.

117. Mr. MARTINEZ-SIMAHAN (Colombia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The days that have just passed have shown how terrifyingly fragile is the détente that had been received so eagerly by the world. The two super-Powers, committed to supplying weapons to the combatants in the Middle East, were on the verge of a confrontation, and one of them even alerted all its military forces. Even today the danger has not entirely disappeared and, from the agreements and treaties that were held up with persistent rhetoric as examples of diplomacy and pointed to as showing the true road to peace, we passed to the brink of a threatening war that would have jeopardized the existence of mankind. The monstrous spectre of a world conflagration appeared when we least expected it. My delegation believes that this fact is sufficiently grave for all the resources of the United Nations to be mustered in order to promote immediate negotiations, under conditions of security for all States, leading to the adoption of true measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, under effective international control.

118. It is within this context that we must analyse the disarmament items at the present session of the General Assembly, since if it be true that the bilateral procedure has received a body blow, it is no less true that the machinery of this world Organization has a very unfavourable balance-sheet.

119. We had hoped that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would have submitted something positive at long last, but it is well known, from a reading of the Committee's report and from listening to the debate here, that very little progress has been made on the subjects that, last year, the General Assembly stressed as deserving priority consideration, namely, a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear tests and the negotiation of an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for the destruction of existing stockpiles.

120. It would be unjust to deny that those matters are of special importance and that they are therefore surrounded by difficulties. The question of verification of underground nuclear tests has become a Gordian knot and, while some nuclear Powers oppose on-site verification, others do not believe that scientific credibility can be attached to seismological methods or observation by satellite or measurement of radioactivity carried by the winds. At the same time two nuclear Powers continue to carry out nuclear tests in the atmosphere, despite the world clamour against such

tests because of the countless dangers inherent in radioactive fallout. My Government, for one, has protested most strongly, and in a joint declaration made by the Foreign Ministers of Peru and Colombia, signed in Lima, there is a paragraph 8 which reads as follows:

"We condemn nuclear weapon tests, particularly in the atmosphere, which are being carried out in the South Pacific region, because of the dangers and the damaging effects to health and the human environment, and because they are incompatible with the efforts being made to achieve a policy of détente in international relations."

121. With little hope but with great conviction, we once again urge the nuclear Powers to show their desire for peace by putting an end to all types of nuclear-weapon tests and even by doing away with all such weapons. We agree with the French delegation in its statement that the main danger lies in the very existence of nuclear weapons. It is for this reason that we oppose the very possession of nuclear weapons and, further, the conducting of tests for the purpose of acquiring and perfecting them. And we in no way agree with the defence implicit in the old aphorism: If you want peace, prepare for war. Man has never failed to do that for which he is prepared. Therefore, international security requires that we prepare for peace, not war. And how? By participating enthusiastically and with goodwill in the organs of the United Nations, or by proposing other such bodies or coming forward with initiatives, but in no case by constantly staying away from world disarmament bodies or making their functioning more difficult. Dialogue continues to be the only possible answer.

122. The other item of priority for the Conference, negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, is also of serious concern to my delegation, and we deplore the fact that here too there has been no political progress. However, the working paper submitted by 10 countries, together with the Japanese suggestion [*A/9141, annex II, sect. 11*], which are not really incompatible, can open the door to success in these negotiations. This is a matter of interest to each and every State, and my delegation understands the innumerable questions implicit therein concerning exchange of chemical equipment and agents, scientific and technological information, and thus industrialization itself, in addition to verification of violations of the Treaty. For these reasons we consider that every effort that may result in agreement is worthwhile.

123. I shall now refer to the World Disarmament Conference and the Special Committee created by resolution 2930 (XXVII). The Colombian delegation was a co-sponsor of that resolution, and, as Chairman of the group of Latin American States at the time when it was being negotiated, took an active part both within the Group and in discussions with other delegations, particularly in consultations with the negotiating group of the non-aligned countries. We cannot deny that the adoption of the resolution and the prior conversations led us to believe that we had made a good start along the difficult road leading to the convening of a world disarmament conference. But from the very day that the President of the Assembly named the Special Committee, two fundamental problems

arose: the disappointment of the geographical groups because of the inadequate representation they had obtained, and the absence of four nuclear-weapon States.

124. In the course of the debates the need for the presence of the five nuclear Powers or, alternatively, that the Committee should be set up without any of them was stressed. But these alternatives did not arise. The group of Latin American States, aware of this situation, addressed a letter of 2 February 1973, to the Secretary-General [A/9041]. From it I wish to single out the following:

"The Group considers that the situation created by the announcement made by the President of the Assembly in his letter of 20 December 1972 addressed to the Secretary-General (A/8990) is such that, for the present, the initiation of the Committee's work, far from contributing to the attainment of the objective sought, would make that attainment more difficult and might indeed severely jeopardize it.

"....

"In addition to these basic observations, the Group also wishes to state that it considers the numerically inadequate representation of Latin America in the Committee to be unjustified."

125. Nevertheless, the Committee was convened. The rest of the story was told us objectively and in masterly fashion by Mr. Hoveyda, and to him I wish to pay a tribute of gratitude and admiration for his incomparable work as Chairman of a Committee that met informally and that did not wish to have a Chairman but which nevertheless had one, thanks to the lofty diplomatic and human qualities of Mr. Hoveyda. From his important statement I would like to quote the following:

"... at the end of our unofficial exchange of views it became apparent to me personally that there was general agreement on the following three points: first, that the unofficial exchange of views among the designated members was deemed useful, since it had pinpointed questions and defined the areas of agreement and disagreement; secondly, I felt that the participants were in favour of the convening of a world disarmament conference, with the participation of all States and after adequate preparation; and thirdly, it appeared to me that the participants recognized that a limited increase in the membership of the Special Committee was a basic condition for any committee to fulfil the mandate that resolution 2930 (XXVII) entrusted to it." [1934th meeting, para. 113.]

126. My delegation feels that there is something positive in what I have deliberately brought up because, as I said at the beginning of my statement, the world situation forces us to marshall all the machinery of this Organization. A one-year postponement might be helpful if we possessed the ability to foresee the situation 365 days from now. But while the situation could be better, it might also be worse. My delegation has taken note of the fact that almost all countries voted in favour of a world conference, and we emphasize that such a conference is not only necessary but urgent as well. Views regarding what type of conference it

should be and a possible programme of work for it should be examined very carefully so that all States may feel certain that they can participate in it.

127. Such an analysis was and continues to be the mandate of the Special Committee, assigned to it in paragraph 2 of resolution 2930 (XXVII).

128. In any case, this kind of preliminary work is necessary and must be done by some organ of the United Nations. We even believe that that organ might well be the Special Committee, expanded, of course, so as to give more adequate representation to the regional groups, a point that no one denies.

129. We say this for the following reasons: first, because the proposal to convene a United Nations Disarmament Conference received a certain amount of criticism from one of the nuclear super-Powers, which considers that the Committee would delay progress in the matter of disarmament. Secondly, because the creation of a new body with a mandate similar to that of the Special Committee could not be justified, and we presume that it would meet with serious reluctance on the part of the super-Power that agreed to participate in the Special Committee. Thirdly, because to achieve a mandate fundamentally different from that of the present Special Committee does not seem feasible.

130. On the other hand, it is obvious that the four nuclear super-Powers that have refrained from participating in even the informal debates are not going to find it any easier to accept the Special Committee than it was before. But their differences, at least those they have expressed, concerning the conditions in which they would attend a world conference on disarmament are not entirely insurmountable.

131. With her usual perspicacity, the representative of Sweden, on 30 October last, stated that her Government recognized that the interests of the majority of nations had been defined by the Chinese Government and that the Swedish Government had advised that the Chinese view be taken very seriously. She went on to say:

"I have in mind the view that the first step should be that the nuclear-weapon Powers—all of them—undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor ever to use them against non-nuclear-weapon countries and nuclear-free zones. This Chinese position should be dealt with in a positive and reasonable way.

"One solution might be that the question of the pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons be inscribed with the highest priority on the agenda of the World Disarmament Conference. To demand, on the other hand, that such pledges be made prior to the Conference is hardly reasonable." [1941st meeting, para. 99 and 100.]

132. The Colombian delegation has very carefully examined the idea contained in the paragraph that I have read out and we consider that perhaps it might be helpful if we smoothed the way for a possible negotiated resolution which would mention the question as one of those related matters to be dealt with by the Special Committee.

133. Although we may be guilty of over-optimism, we shall not hesitate to make suggestions, to welcome initiatives, or to participate in negotiations that may facilitate an agreement at the present session. We have felt that the very structure of international security was crumbling, that confrontation between the nuclear Powers is not as improbable as we would have it, and we despair because non-nuclear weapons are killing inhabitants of our earth every day.

134. Disarmament or an agreement on disarmament must be achieved because mankind itself demands it. It may be a "Mission Impossible", as the representative of Iran said, but fortunately we note that in the television series he mentioned the good men always carry out the mission which appeared impossible.

*The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.*