



CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 40 (concluded): Reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction and use of their resources in the interests of mankind, and convening of a conference on the law of the sea: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction . . . . .	261
Agenda items 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 (continued): Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security World Disarmament Conference: report of the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; (b) Report of the Secretary-General Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report of the <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on the Indian Ocean . . . . .	262

Chairman: Mr. Otto R. BORCH (Denmark).

AGENDA ITEM 40 (concluded)\*

Reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction and use of their resources in the interests of mankind, and convening of a conference on the law of the sea: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction

1. The CHAIRMAN: As I informed the Committee at the 1946th meeting, Mr. Amerasinghe has requested that the question of the dates mentioned in operative paragraphs 2 and 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.647/Rev.2, adopted at the 1939th meeting, should be reconsidered by this Committee in the light of consultations carried on under his

chairmanship in the contact group relating to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. This request falls within the purview of rule 125 of the rules of procedure, which reads as follows:

“When a proposal has been adopted or rejected, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the committee, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, so decides.”

2. May I take it that the Committee agrees that the conditions stipulated in rule 125 are fulfilled and that the revised draft resolution adopted at the 1939th meeting may now be reconsidered?

*It was so decided.*

3. Mr. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka): I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee for making it possible to reconsider this item. It is not on a very substantial matter; it relates to the dates of the inaugural session and of the summer session to be held in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1974.

4. As members of this Committee will recall, certain doubts were expressed on the suitability of the dates, especially the dates for the summer session, because of the difficulties that confronted the Secretariat in regard to the provision of facilities. It was for that reason that we had to hold further consultations, and it has now been agreed that the dates should be as follows: for the inaugural session, 3 to 14 December 1973; for the summer session in Caracas, 20 June to 29 August 1974.

5. I thought that if those dates could be decided upon here, then the changes could be made in the revised draft resolution before it went to the plenary Assembly, thereby avoiding a cumbersome procedure.

6. The CHAIRMAN: As members are aware, the amendments just referred to by Mr. Amerasinghe apply to operative paragraphs 2 and 4 of the draft resolution. In operative paragraph 2 the dates “26 November to 7 December 1973” would be replaced by the dates “3 to 14 December 1973”; and in paragraph 4 the dates “14 May to 19 July 1974” would be replaced by the dates “20 June to 29 August 1974”.

7. Mr. WARIOBA (United Republic of Tanzania): The United Republic of Tanzania was one of the sponsors of the revised draft resolution that is now being amended. After the intensive consultations which have taken place, we would not like to place any obstacles in the path of the agreement which is emerging in the Committee, but we

\* Resumed from the 1939th meeting.

should like to make our position clear. We do not agree to these revised dates and we would not like to be associated with any amendment to the draft resolution. We will not cast a negative vote, but for sound fundamental reasons we feel that we cannot go along with these revised dates.

8. During the consultations, we had tentatively agreed on certain other dates, that is, 30 November 1973 to some time in December for the inaugural session, and 18 June 1974 to some time in August for the substantive session. What has emerged is something quite different. We understand that the dates for the inaugural session have been changed simply because it is inconvenient to start during a weekend: so instead of starting on a Friday, we are starting on a Monday. But it is amazing that for the substantive session the same reasoning has not been followed. It seems we are going to start very close to a weekend. Now, although we had consented to the earlier agreement that we start the substantive session some time in the middle of June 1974, and the inaugural session on 30 November 1973, we had not anticipated that in one instance a date would be rejected because it was close to a weekend, while in the other instance a date close to a weekend would be suggested. For that reason we feel that somewhere there was not good faith in those consultations, that it was not the logic behind those dates which dictated their choice, but rather convenience in certain fields which to a large extent ignored our own concern. We feel that as a sponsor of the revised draft resolution we must dissociate ourselves from these revised dates.

9. Mr. WAPENYI (Uganda): Speaking on behalf of the group of African States, I should perhaps state that the Tanzanian representative had made clear to the group his intention to point out for the record his delegation's objections to these revised dates. But most of the members on whose behalf I am now speaking have accepted those dates.

10. The CHAIRMAN: As there are no other speakers, may I take it that the Committee agrees to the amendments of the dates in paragraphs 2 and 4?

*It was so decided.*

11. I should like at this stage to refer to our position on the draft resolution as a whole now that amendments thereto have been made. First, I believe that the question of the dates is a technical question. Secondly, the Committee voted on the draft resolution at the 1939th meeting in full knowledge of the uncertainty regarding the dates in operative paragraphs 2 and 4. Therefore I do not think that it is necessary to take a formal vote again on the draft resolution as a whole, but for the record may I take it that the Committee agrees to confirm the vote taken previously on the draft resolution?

*It was so decided.*

12. We have now concluded our consideration of draft resolution A/C.1/L.647/Rev.2. I take it that this item will come before the plenary Assembly at an early date, so that members who will be participating in the organizational session of the Conference on the Law of the Sea may have as much advance notice as possible.

## AGENDA ITEMS 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 AND 38 (continued)

**Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security**

**World Disarmament Conference: report of the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference (A/8990 and Add.1, A/9033, A/9041, A/9228)**

**General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9039, A/9141, A/9293, A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1)**

**Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General (A/9207 and Corr.1, A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1)**

**Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9141)**

**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests (A/9081, A/9084, A/9086, A/9093, A/9107, A/9110, A/9117, A/9166, A/C.1/1031, 1036, 1039, A/C.1/L.651):**

**(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9141)**

**(b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/9208)**

**Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General (A/9137, A/9209)**

**Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/9029)**

13. Mr. ENE (Romania) (*interpretation from French*): Once again the General Assembly is considering the whole series of disarmament questions. With very few exceptions, we find at each session the same, similarly worded items on the agenda of the First Committee; we adopt almost the same resolutions; and the debates on disarmament problems are beginning to take on the appearance of an habitual exercise. The reasons for this are well known, and we must say in all candour that this critical situation in which the United Nations finds itself is due to the fact that the Organization itself and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva are kept outside the most urgent problems involved in genuine efforts for disarmament. The result of this is also well known. What we are witnessing is an unbridled arms race, particularly in the nuclear field without, however, the degree of security throughout the world and in each of our States, having advanced to any extent at all; quite the contrary.

14. The consequence of this state of affairs is an ever-growing awareness that real security cannot be built on force or on the instruments of the exercise of force: weapons. Security means military disengagement and disarmament; it means the establishment of new relations

among States—democratic relations based on confidence, equality of rights and respect for independence and national sovereignty.

15. The profound changes that have occurred in international life, particularly the growing awareness and sense of responsibility on the part of all nations with regard to the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security, and the increasing role of small and middle-sized countries in the solution of international problems, require a new approach to disarmament matters. The signs of détente and the trend towards the development of co-operation among emerging nations must necessarily be accompanied and consolidated by effective disarmament measures, particularly with regard to the elimination of nuclear arsenals. Hence disarmament is today the cause espoused by all States and all peoples.

16. Any attempt to determine the lines along which United Nations efforts should be directed in the future can stem only from a critical evaluation of the ground already covered and the results achieved, in comparison with the major tasks to which current developments in international relations give rise in the disarmament field.

17. The disarmament debates in the General Assembly over the course of a quarter of a century and the 12 years of negotiations in the specialized organ, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, have resulted in just a few partial agreements. While these agreements are certainly significant, as has often been mentioned in our debates, we must recognize nevertheless that the partial agreements concluded thus far have not offered answers to major disarmament problems, nor do they solve questions of nuclear disarmament, or remove the risks and dangers of nuclear war. They are far from meeting the demands of those who are in fact bearing the heavy burden and serious consequences of the arms race: the peoples of the world.

18. In our view, genuine disarmament must necessarily lead to the total outlawing of nuclear weapons, their destruction and the achievement of general and complete disarmament. This requires persevering and tireless efforts in order to adopt measures that will gradually bring us closer to this final objective. Furthermore, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water<sup>1</sup> solemnly proclaimed that the primary objective of the parties thereto was: "the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons." Along the same lines, five years later, the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons undertook: "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." [*Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.*]

19. Those stipulations, not to mention a number of similar demands expressed in General Assembly resolutions, have

not been effectively followed up so far. It is quite legitimate, therefore, for the vast majority of States and all peoples to be worried—as the debates at this session have shown once again—in the face of the stagnation of disarmament negotiations and the lack of progress in the Geneva Committee and of the ceaseless escalation of the armaments race. The Romanian delegation fully shares that concern. In our view, the way of meeting the deep concern over the lack of real progress towards disarmament is to revitalize United Nations activities in this field and give a new fillip to the disarmament negotiations, channelling them towards the solution of problems of the highest priority.

20. Like many other countries, the Socialist Republic of Romania is resolutely in favour of according highest priority to nuclear disarmament problems. This conviction rests on two fundamental reasons.

21. First, we have in mind the extremely grave dangers and risks to human civilization entailed by nuclear weapons, and the ceaseless increase in nuclear arsenals, whose constantly growing destructive force has reached unbelievable dimensions. So much has been said about the capacity of existing nuclear weapons to annihilate our planet several times over, that it is hardly necessary for me to repeat the statistics here.

22. Secondly, even if we manage to avoid the dangers of nuclear war, nuclear weapons still remain in the hands of aggressive, reactionary circles—instruments of the policy of force, domination and intimidation. Experience itself has shown that the nuclear arms race has negative repercussions on the international political climate, compounding tensions in relations among States.

23. Although the primary importance of nuclear disarmament has been widely recognized in recent years, negotiations have failed to come up with effective measures to that end, in spite of the many proposals for action made in the General Assembly. As we have repeatedly stated in Geneva and elsewhere, the high priority of nuclear disarmament requires that immediate attention be given to the implementation of a programme to that end which would include in particular.

24. First, banning of the use of nuclear weapons as a measure of the highest priority. An agreement to this end, with binding force and of universal character, and totally in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations, would have positive effects on the process of nuclear disarmament as a whole. As we said also, an agreement of this nature might take the form of a common undertaking of States or of separate statements, whereby the States possessing nuclear arms would solemnly undertake not to use these arms or to threaten to use them against anyone whatsoever and in any circumstances whatsoever.

25. Secondly, the settlement of the problem of the guarantees for security for States that do not possess nuclear arms—which had not been dealt with by the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear arms. In renouncing the intention to acquire or produce nuclear arms, the countries that do not possess them have the legitimate right to ask for and to receive firm guarantees as to their own security.

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

They must be certain that never in any circumstances whatsoever will they fall victims to a nuclear attack or will be the subject of threats on the basis of nuclear arms.

26. We have always maintained that equal guarantees should be granted for the security of all countries, great or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, and that the non-proliferation of nuclear arms should lead to the elimination of the division of the world into nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, the strengthening of equality among States and the genuine reduction of the danger of war.

27. Thirdly, the creation of zones of peace and denuclearized zones in various parts of the world is something that is very closely linked with non-recourse to nuclear arms. In connexion with the freeing of any group of countries or of whole regions from the nuclear danger, the idea of creating denuclearized zones has aroused great interest among States. Evidence of this is the denuclearization of Latin America, which has been enshrined in the Treaty of Tlatelolco,<sup>2</sup> that Romania welcomed, and also the proposals made to establish similar zones in other parts of the world, in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Indian Ocean. Romania itself, wishing to see peace and co-operation consolidated in its own region, has made proposals concerning the transforming of the Balkans into a zone of peace and co-operation, free from nuclear arms.

28. Fourthly, an end to the production and perfecting of nuclear arms.

29. Fifthly, the reduction and total elimination of the arsenals of nuclear arms and their carriers, as a logical consequence of this whole process.

30. This is a series of proposals which could constitute the principal landmarks of a concrete nuclear disarmament programme. If we stress the importance and urgency of dealing with these problems with the utmost seriousness, it is because we are firmly convinced that nuclear disarmament is the only sure and concrete guarantee of the prevention of nuclear war.

31. Romania is determined to work hard with other States, to achieve progress towards that end.

32. In our view, in accordance with what I have just said, the elimination of nuclear arms should constitute an absolute priority for United Nations activities in the field of disarmament. At the same time, as we agree, efforts must be made to ban and to destroy all other weapons of mass destruction, without exception.

33. On this basis, Romania has made its contribution to negotiations on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the General Assembly two years ago [*resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex*]. It is in the same spirit that my country supports the preparation of a convention on the prohibition, improvement, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on the destruction

of existing stockpiles and supported the draft that was presented to the Committee at Geneva.<sup>3</sup>

34. The final objective of all efforts devoted to disarmament is, and must be, general disarmament. That objective seems sometimes to have been lost sight of because for too many years the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva have been oriented towards peripheral aspects, often concentrated on a single question, questions which are peripheral to the fundamental and urgent problems of disarmament.

35. If as a result of the realities of the day general disarmament is still a distant goal, we nevertheless believe that all States must intensify their efforts and work perseveringly to achieve progress towards that end. Disarmament negotiations must be inspired by a unitary concept, while providing for the final objective, general disarmament, but should make possible the adoption of partial measures to strengthen the security of all peoples, to ease tension, to promote confidence among States and to improve the international climate.

36. As a European country, Romania attaches particular importance to military disengagement measures and disarmament in Europe.

37. The Romanian delegation has already had occasion to express the satisfaction of the Romanian Government at the positive trends that have emerged on the European continent and the importance that we attach to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

38. In our view, the complex process of the building of European security cannot leave aside the fundamental problems of the life of the continent and particularly, those relating to military disengagement and disarmament. The Romanian Government considers that in the examination of these problems our point of departure should be an over-all view of the need to prepare and make effective gradually a comprehensive programme of measures for military disengagement and disarmament, both on a continental level and on a regional level.

39. Thus, with respect for the equal sovereignty of all States, it is proving extremely important and indeed, essential, for the true security of our continent, that in all cases where such measures are discussed, that they should be pan-European or subregional in nature, and that all the States of the continent should be systematically kept up to date with regard to the progress of negotiations as well as the related implications. In this way all interested States may present their points of view and ensure that the measures adopted are not detrimental to the security of any country.

40. The Romanian delegations at the general European conference and in Vienna, have been instructed to act consistently so as to increase the contribution of our country to the work of these meetings. Proof of this is the primary importance which we attach in Geneva to measures aimed at making effective the non-recourse to the threat or

<sup>2</sup> Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9(168), p. 283).

<sup>3</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1972*, document DC/235, annex B, sect. 5.

use of force in relations among States participating in the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the proposals submitted for that purpose.

41. Our conception of military disengagement and disarmament is governed by the same principles, whether it be a regional or a comprehensive approach to questions of disarmament. It is on the basis of this conception that Romania intended to make its active contribution to all negotiations on disarmament in which it participates.

42. We have always received with interest and have always been receptive to the many proposals, ideas and suggestions submitted at the Geneva Committee and elsewhere, the implementation of which could prepare the ground for true disarmament. In our turn, we have submitted our own initiatives and put forward ideas and proposals which, in our view, deal with problems that are of high topicality.

43. Thus, in the Geneva Committee and in other forums the Romanian Government has suggested a whole series of measures for military disengagement and disarmament whose application would constitute, in our view, genuine contributions to the achievement of the goals which we are all seeking. I am speaking of the reduction and, in the final analysis, the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed on the territories of other States within the limits of their national frontiers; the elimination of military bases on the territories of other States; the renunciation of military manoeuvres, demonstrations of force, the concentration of troops near the frontiers of other States; the reduction of military budgets, beginning with the budgets of the major countries that possess powerful armaments, and the cessation of the arms race; gradually proceeding to the reduction of troops and armaments of national armies; the creation of conditions permitting the elimination of military blocs and, finally, their total liquidation; the taking of concrete action against war propaganda, against discord between States and against all forms of propaganda hostile to peace.

44. At this stage, of particular importance from the economic and political point of view would be the conclusion of appropriate agreements to put an end to the arms race, to the extravagant waste of material resources for destructive purposes, and to see to it—and this is also extremely important—that those resources are devoted to economic and social development and to raising the standard of living of peoples.

45. Disarmament is the cause of all peoples and all States. In the view of the Romanian delegation, all negotiations on disarmament can yield effective and positive results only if this work is undertaken in a spirit of complete equality, if all those participating enjoy the opportunity to express their views and if some consideration is given to their points of view. Only thus, in our view, can the measures advocated be such as to respond properly to the interests of peace and security of all countries, great and small, nuclear or non-nuclear, developed or developing.

46. It is in the light of this fundamental conception that Romania sees the need to improve the framework of United Nations negotiations in the field of disarmament.

47. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has not responded satisfactorily to the mandate entrusted

to it by the General Assembly. Leaving aside the high priority problems of disarmament and particularly those of nuclear disarmament, the Committee to an increasing extent lost its sense of perspective and neglected the most urgent problems involved in a true effort at disarmament. Other shortcomings and deficiencies relating to the method of pursuing the negotiations can be added to that, and the total result has been that the Committee has not proceeded entirely in accordance with the changes that have occurred in the world today.

48. These fundamental and practical reasons prompted my country to present on various occasions proposals to improve the work of the Disarmament Committee, proposals to make it more democratic as a forum for multinational negotiations under the control of public opinion, proposals like those put forward by other Member States, which we have always supported, with the same purposes in view and which are still as topical as ever.

49. For the same reasons, we consider that the General Assembly must assume and exercise more actively the responsibilities incumbent upon it under the Charter. Indeed, Article 11 of the Charter authorizes the General Assembly to consider the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and to make recommendations on the subject. Within this context, Romania supports the idea of reactivating the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which should occupy within the United Nations system a place that would correspond to the magnitude of the problems. Like other delegations, we feel that at the present stage the Disarmament Commission offers the appropriate practical conditions for the examination on a universal basis of the whole range of problems involved in disarmament.

50. Always in the same spirit and with many other States, we continue to believe that the convening of a World Disarmament Conference, open to all States, on an equal footing and after proper preparation, could contribute effectively to the adoption of practical disarmament measures and, primarily, to the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it goes without saying that every step towards action of this type would necessarily have the agreement of, and benefit from, the co-operation of all States.

51. In conclusion, my delegation would like to reaffirm the determination of Romania and the Romanian people to continue to do their best to make their active contribution to the achievement of general disarmament and, primarily, of nuclear disarmament. This determination is an integral part of the over-all foreign policy of my country, which is resolved to fight tirelessly for the elimination of hotbeds of conflict and sources of tension throughout the world, for the solution of all controversial problems by means of negotiation and for the strengthening and building of new relations among all States.

52. Mr. KOOIJMANS (Netherlands): During the past few weeks the world has witnessed another outbreak of armed conflict, which has brought great sorrow and untold personal and material losses to several States Members of this Organization and which could easily have spilled over to other parts of the world. Initially, this Organization was

at a loss to bring hostilities to an end. Only the concerted action of the United States and the Soviet Union could bring about the present cease-fire and their continued co-operation is necessary to help solve the underlying problems. In the light of the experiences of the past weeks the question may be raised: what is the significance of our deliberations in this Committee, what is their impact on the mainstream of events? A casual visitor entering this room after having listened to the debate in the Security Council might deem himself in another world.

53. The present moment, therefore, seems to be appropriate to reassess our aims and to reformulate our goals for the immediate and for the more distant future. It may be safely assumed that unless the cause of disarmament gains new momentum, the world will not offer a brighter picture for the next generation. Reduction of armaments, arms control, the prohibition of the use of certain weapons—all these are not aims in themselves. They are means to establish a world which is a more secure, a more peaceful, a more human place to live in. To lay the foundations for that world is not only the responsibility of the big Powers, although they have a special responsibility because of their advanced technology and their huge amount of sophisticated weapons. It is our common responsibility, to which we should rededicate all our efforts at a time which calls for courageous leadership and for new and bold initiatives in the field of disarmament as well as in other respects.

54. Ten years ago the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, was concluded in the aftermath of a crisis that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. At the time the conclusion of that Treaty could be regarded as a major breakthrough and a definitive turn to the better. It seemed the starting-point for a new era in which the nuclear arms race could be stopped and reversed, an era in which our common efforts could be aimed at shaping a more secure, a more peaceful and a more human world in accordance with the purpose of our Charter. It is my intention to examine where developments have led us since then.

55. On the world-wide level the picture is rather bleak. For the second year in succession the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has not been able to report agreement on any of the items on its agenda. In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament itself, and outside, this situation has given rise to sharp criticism. Many suggestions have been made for restructuring the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, while on the other hand the idea of convening a world disarmament conference gained wide support. But in actual fact we have not moved an inch in either direction. The reason seems obvious. It is not the structure and format of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that is to be blamed for the lack of progress towards disarmament. It is doubtful whether at this juncture any other forum could have yielded results of greater quality and more substance. What matters is the determination of governments to come to grips with the security problems that are common to us all.

56. On many occasions in the past the Netherlands has expressed the view that one of the essential conditions for progress in the field of multilateral disarmament is that

China and France, both nuclear-weapon Powers and permanent members of the Security Council, participate in the negotiations. Modelling the proper framework for a negotiating body would then be a comparatively easy task. I urgently appeal, therefore, to these two nuclear Powers to start participating in disarmament negotiations. These countries shoulder a considerable responsibility by shying away from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or other forums for disarmament. However, I sincerely hope that the other nuclear-weapon States will not use this situation as an excuse for making less progress in the disarmament field.

57. The problem just referred to is at the root of the difficulties concerning convening the World Disarmament Conference. My Government always had and still has a positive attitude to such a conference, but only on two conditions, namely that all nuclear-weapon Powers must participate fully in the conference and its preparation and that this preparation should be thorough. After consultations, especially by Mr. Hoveyda of Iran whose skilful and most valuable contribution I greatly respect, it has become clear that at present there seems no possibility of obtaining the full participation of all nuclear Powers. This may be regrettable, but this lack of progress we have, for the time being, to take into account.

58. On the regional and bilateral level there are some developments, which—though they should not divert attention from world-wide multilateral disarmament negotiations—are of a more promising character. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, now convened in Geneva, represents an historic effort to level the barriers that still divide our continent. It is too early to predict what its outcome will be, but the very fact that the Conference could take place is an unmistakable sign of an evolution towards a new relationship between the nations involved.

59. According to my Government, this evolution towards new relationships should also manifest itself on the military level. For this reason the Netherlands has always and wholeheartedly supported the concept of mutual and balanced force reductions. It is a sign of hope that, after long preliminary talks, negotiations started last week in Vienna to achieve the goal of lowering the level of military confrontation in Central Europe. We welcome these negotiations as an opportunity to translate the many expressions of goodwill and détente into concrete measures of arms limitation.

60. Meanwhile the strategic arms limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States are following their own course. This year the two Powers also reached an Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War and on a set of Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms [see A/9293]. We attach particular importance to the undertaking by the two Powers to make serious efforts to work out a permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of offensive nuclear arms with the objective of being able to sign it during the course of next year.

61. It goes without saying that the world community as a whole stands to benefit from a definitive cessation of the nuclear arms race between the countries that still have such

an overriding influence on the issue of global peace or war. Mankind expects that they will live up to their heavy responsibility by making every possible effort to avert the danger of nuclear war, first of all by limiting and reducing today's excessive nuclear armaments.

62. One wonders whether these efforts, which represent a serious intention to arrest a process that, in the words of the former Secretary-General, U Thant, has gathered its own mad momentum, could not and should not be supported by a more general undertaking. Here I have in mind a cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. These tests are clear evidence that the nuclear arms race still goes on unabatedly. As the qualitative improvements that are the object of these tests lead to an ever greater accumulation of nuclear arms, their cessation is an essential prerequisite for bringing this race to a halt. The Netherlands Government and people are anxious to see a cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests coming about at the earliest possible date. The completion of the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 by a ban on underground tests should be given the highest priority.

63. The main problem concerning an underground nuclear test ban is the issue of on-site inspections. Our own approach to this issue is flexible. The position we take should not be interpreted as a dogmatic rejection of on-site inspections in the context of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. If such inspections could contribute to mutual trust and confidence between the parties, they could be a very useful tool for upholding the viability of an underground test ban. The main point is that we have to find a reasonable solution of the problems involved as soon as possible.

64. In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament I have stated our position on the issue of an underground test ban, which I may summarize as follows: first, an obligation to allow on-site inspection would not add significantly to the present and potential verification capabilities, consisting of seismic monitors and other national technical means; secondly, these capabilities seem to be sufficient to deter a would-be violator of a ban on underground tests, except perhaps for low yield explosions; and thirdly, a ban on underground testing will always contain the risk of some small explosions going unnoticed, whatever kind of verification is agreed upon.

65. Yet, as I stated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the main consideration is that this risk will have to be weighed against the risk of major testing programmes being carried out without restriction, thus constantly adding fuel to the nuclear arms race.

66. We are fully aware that the question of a ban on underground nuclear tests is complex and not easy to resolve. What is needed now is the prompt start of serious negotiations, with the object of a determination to come to an agreement at the earliest possible date, based on specific proposals for a draft treaty to be agreed upon. Positions that in past years have become more and more rigid should be reconsidered and no reasonable approach or proposal should be rejected out of hand.

67. The achievement of a ban on underground nuclear tests, apart from being an important collateral measure in

relation to the strategic arms limitation talks, would mean a real breakthrough in the present stalemate in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and would be a major contribution to the success of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As is largely recognized, a proliferation of nuclear-weapon Powers would be detrimental to world security interests. The Netherlands has supported the non-proliferation Treaty from the start. This year, the safeguards agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the non-nuclear-weapon countries of the European Communities was signed. My Government is now seeking parliamentary approval for the non-proliferation Treaty and the safeguards agreement, which will probably be given in the first half of next year.

68. In accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the non-proliferation Treaty, a conference of Parties shall be held in 1975 in order "to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized." In our view, that conference will be of vital importance for the future of the non-proliferation Treaty and for the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in general. The danger of nuclear proliferation is evidently not warded off by the non-proliferation Treaty once and for all. So there are good reasons not to approach the review conference as a mere holding operation, but as a unique opportunity to demonstrate that the question of non-proliferation and the Treaty itself are of world-wide interest.

69. To be successful the conference will, therefore, have to be prepared carefully. We trust that the depositary States will in due course initiate such preparations, taking into account the view of all interested States. Also consultation with the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Board of the International Atomic Energy Agency, both closely associated with the non-proliferation Treaty, may be advisable. The Netherlands delegation will give its support to a draft resolution that would create the most favourable conditions for the review conference and its preparations.

70. Another aspect of nuclear arms control is the creation of the nuclear-free zone in Latin America. As Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles belong to the region in question, the Kingdom of the Netherlands is a party to Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Kingdom has already concluded safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency connected with the Treaty, indicating the importance we attach to it. For this reason we welcome the signing by China and France of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which considerably strengthens its purpose. We sincerely hope that the only nuclear Power which has not yet signed Additional Protocol II will do so in the near future.

71. The overriding importance of nuclear disarmament must not lead us away from other significant potential disarmament measures, such as a ban on chemical weapons. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has made no noticeable progress in this field, notwithstanding the real efforts that have been made. We welcome the proposal made by Japan at the end of the summer session this year [A/9141, annex II, sect. 21]. The Japanese

working paper on the chemical weapons problem has the merit of attempting to break through the existing deadlock on this subject. Therefore, we will study the Japanese working document very carefully.

72. As representatives are aware, the question of on-site inspections plays an important role in the chemical weapons negotiations. Before going further into this problem, I should like to make one general remark on the issue of on-site inspection. The Netherlands delegation fails to understand, at this stage of the negotiations on chemical weapons, why certain States seem to reject on-site inspections even as a matter of principle, namely, as an encroachment on national sovereignty and an intervention in the internal affairs of States. I may point out that in the past several agreements on arms control have been concluded in which on-site inspections are part of the verification system. An undertaking to refrain from certain military activities, for which we are indeed looking, would in itself be a more substantial limitation of national sovereignty than the right of some inspectors to visit some places or facilities. One wonders why the concept of on-site inspections should be held anathema with regard to future disarmament agreements.

73. Reverting specifically to chemical disarmament, it has to be recognized that chemical weapons are a threat to the security of many nations. In this regard, chemical weapons cannot be equated with biological weapons and, consequently, the verification system to be devised for a chemical weapons convention should not be a copy of the rather loose system acceptable in the context of the biological weapons convention.<sup>4</sup> Verification will have to be stricter and organized in some way or other with an international component in it.

74. Let me draw attention to a suggestion made by the Netherlands delegation in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in the context of the discussions on a chemical weapons convention. We started from the assumption that such a convention would need an organizational framework to keep it operational. The underlying argument concerns the difficulty that, in dealing with chemical disarmament, we are trying to eliminate the potential for chemical warfare while knowing that complete elimination will not be possible. A control system for the chemical industry and all its ramifications would be unworkable but, in order to uphold mutual confidence, a standing body with tasks in the fields of examination of technical questions, consultations, fact-finding and mediation, could play a useful, if not an indispensable, role.

75. In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament we suggested the creation of such an international organ to which a chemical weapons convention could entrust certain functions, but with a built-in capacity to assume responsibilities in other fields of disarmament. In a way, such an organ could be regarded as the nucleus of an international disarmament organization. Its framework could be set up by a special instrument, while specific tasks could be allocated to it, first of all, by a chemical weapons

convention, and also by future disarmament agreements—for instance, a treaty on the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests that might call for international co-operation in the seismological field.

76. Furthermore, the review conferences of existing treaties might as well be brought into the picture, the most far-reaching idea being that these conferences would delegate their responsibilities to the organ. In the years ahead we will have to face a proliferation of such review conferences, as provided for in the non-proliferation Treaty, the sea-bed Treaty,<sup>5</sup> the biological weapons Convention and, possibly, also by a chemical weapons convention. The need for streamlining this pattern of uncoordinated efforts in the field of disarmament seems obvious.

77. We are fully aware that these suggestions on organization offer no cure for the present standstill in the negotiations on chemical weapons, because they do not touch upon the substance on which there is still disagreement. There is no need to say that we, for our part, will support every effort to overcome this lack of agreement.

78. I should like now to make some observations on napalm and other incendiary weapons. As to the question of napalm, we are not inclined to approach it as a topic of disarmament in the proper sense of the word. In the concluding paragraphs of the Secretary-General's report on napalm [*A/9207 and Corr.1*] it is suggested that the aim should be to strive for measures prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of those weapons. Notwithstanding our comprehension of the motives that led to that suggestion, we do not think it would be the right course of action. Effective disarmament in this field seems to be unattainable. Even if all States were to agree to dispense with this kind of weapon—an agreement which, by the way, could never be satisfactorily verified—napalm and other incendiary weapons can be produced with such relative ease that an agreement on disarmament could be nullified almost instantaneously. So, in our view, a disarmament measure in this field would tend to be an undertaking the practical value of which is doubtful.

79. In the second place, we have to recognize that the basic motive of seeking disarmament, that is, to enhance international and national security, is absent in this field. One could not validly argue that napalm and other incendiary weapons are a particular threat to security. Those who are looking for restriction or limitation are primarily moved by motives of quite another kind, to wit, restraining certain kinds of warfare that cause excessive suffering or have indiscriminatory effects. For those reasons we are of the opinion that the question of napalm and other incendiary weapons should not be regarded as a matter of disarmament or arms control proper but should be tackled in the context of the ongoing efforts to strengthen humanitarian law in armed conflicts.

80. As stated in our reply [*ibid.*] to the Secretary-General's questionnaire, the Netherlands is ready to parti-

<sup>4</sup> Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex).

<sup>5</sup> Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (resolution 2660 (XXV), annex).

cipate in a search for restrictions on the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons, especially with a view to banning the indiscriminate use of those weapons against civilians and preventing excessive suffering to civilians and combatants. War is an evil in itself, but when it occurs man should not be free to disregard all norms of humanity and civilization. In this context we are ready to look also into the question of other weapons which cause excessive suffering or have indiscriminatory effects.

81. A practical question which we shall have to solve relates to the proper forum in which possible restrictions on the use of napalm and other particularly cruel or indiscriminate methods of warfare should be discussed. In the light of what I have just said it will be clear that we are of the opinion that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would not be the most suitable place. We know that the general problem of preventing the use of excessively cruel or indiscriminate weapons and methods of warfare belongs to the subject-matter of the forthcoming Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts a conference which will be convened by the Government of Switzerland and has been prepared under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross. We feel, however, that the conference when it meets next February in Geneva will not yet be in a position to work out the general prohibitions into concrete rules regarding specific types of weapons. As the issues involved have not been sufficiently studied, the ground is not sufficiently well prepared for that purpose. We are therefore in favour of the suggestion made by the International Committee of the Red Cross that a group of governmental experts should be convened to study the problem. We are, of course, open to other suggestions, but to our mind this should be regarded not as a diversionary manoeuvre but as the most practical way of achieving concrete results.

82. To conclude, I should like to make some observations on the item on our agenda entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security". Although an over-simplification, it may be said that our world is beset by two enormous problems, namely, that of underdevelopment and that of over-armament. The world is still far from dealing successfully with the two big challenges of our time: the establishment of collective economic security and the establishment of collective political and military security. Although the solution of the one problem should by no means be made a condition for the solution of the other, there is a close interrelationship in our handling of those two problems. There is a Dutch saying that a guilder can be spent only once. The same is true of that most precious thing, the human mind.

83. In this context I should like to recall what Mrs. Myrdal said when she was presented with the Wateler Peace Prize last month in the Peace Palace in The Hague. In her address she said:

"If we could achieve at least a freeze on the further technological development of new types of weapons—'product improvement' as it is cynically called—the world would stand to gain the most precious of all resources, namely, scientific and technical ones . . . then a

'product improvement' might be started on a grand scale such as is crucially necessary in order to feed the hungry peoples of the world and satisfy crying basic needs of human beings everywhere."

84. Negotiated disarmament and arms control agreements not only contribute to more stable power relations, and consequently, to greater security, but also set free vast intellectual, technological and economic resources which are badly needed for the solution of other pressing problems.

85. In this respect we have taken note with interest of the Soviet proposal for a cut in the military budgets of the big Powers. Although that proposal is not on the agenda of this Committee, I should like to make one short remark on it. My Government deems it necessary to give high priority to the supply of financial means for development aid, in accordance with the International Development Strategy approved by the General Assembly in 1970 [*resolution 2626 (XXV)*] and irrespective of military expenditures. In the meantime we should continue all our efforts to bring about negotiated disarmament and arms control agreements, in order to enhance international stability and security. Those agreements might in turn set free new, additional resources to help reduce the gap between rich and poor.

86. In his address to the Second Committee some days ago on the problem of development, the Netherlands Minister for Development Co-operation mentioned the existence of a crisis in analytical thinking, a crisis in international relationships and a crisis of will in political leadership. We may ask ourselves if we are not confronted with a similar crisis in the field of disarmament. In spite of many resolutions of the General Assembly, on the international scene no tangible results have been achieved during the last few years. We share the impatience of many that words are so slowly transformed into action. That impatience is fully justified, and it will be beneficial if it inspires us to strengthen our efforts.

87. In the meantime we shall have to guard against frustration, which engenders immobility. Our labours are part and parcel of a continuous effort to shape a more secure, more peaceful and more human world—a task that calls for progress not only in the field of disarmament but also with regard to the over-all purposes of our Organization, that is, the establishment of peace in an all-comprehensive sense. As the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs stated in the plenary meeting on 26 September:

"The Charter of the United Nations establishes a clear link between the maintenance of international peace and security, the creation of conditions of economic and social well-being and the promotion of universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without discrimination." [*2128th plenary meeting, para. 169.*]

88. The awareness of the interrelationship of those principal aims of the United Nations should give us new impetus to strengthen our efforts.

89. Mr. PEREZ DE CUELLAR (Peru) (*interpretation from Spanish*): In this second statement on the items

relating to disarmament, I shall refer to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/9141] and specifically to the two items for which the General Assembly requested priority consideration, namely, the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction and the urgent need to suspend nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

90. Most of the delegations which have participated in this debate have been obliged to admit that in the past year there has been no advance in respect of those two priority objectives, since perusal of the report has shown that the fundamental obstacles to such progress in these two areas continue to exist.

91. It is true that the separation of the consideration of the question of biological weapons from that of chemical weapons made possible an agreement on the former. But it is a well-known fact that such an agreement was made possible not by that methodological division of the work but by the decision of the Powers possessing such weapons to abandon them, a decision taken outside the United Nations and not as a result of the decision of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

92. It would appear that, as far as chemical weapons are concerned, we are not close to that stage. It is to be hoped that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as a negotiating body, will take truly effective steps in this field and will not have to await unilateral decisions by countries possessing such weapons once those countries consider them obsolete or when they are prompted by a sincere desire for disarmament. The Peruvian delegation will give its support to any draft resolution guiding the Conference towards that goal.

93. As regards the suspension of nuclear-weapon tests, the Conference still appears to be subject to political events from which it is far removed and which are quite beyond its competence.

94. This year the tenth anniversary of the partial test-ban Treaty was observed. Only three of the five nuclear Powers are parties to that Treaty. It must not be forgotten that they are parties thereto mainly because the Treaty was prepared when they no longer needed to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere. But all the parties to the Treaty undertook further to take effective measures for the total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. As is shown by the report of the CCD, the technical obstacles connected with verification and other obstacles to the preparation of a treaty on total prohibition still exist, but we believe that, as affirmed by the General Assembly in its resolution 2934 C (XXVII), sponsored by Peru, "there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban". For this reason, the conscience of peace-loving peoples rebels when it notes that, apparently, once again the conclusion of an agreement is being postponed until such time as the three nuclear Powers members of the Conference arrive at the conclusion that underground testing of nuclear weapons is no longer necessary. In this field as well, the Conference is becoming a sort of drafting committee where all procedural problems are resolved only when the nuclear Powers achieve outside the Conference a level of development and stockpiling of quantitative or qualitative weapons

enabling them to make symbolic concessions in respect of arms "limitation" or "control".

95. On the other hand, two nuclear Powers are not parties to the above-mentioned Moscow Treaty because when that Treaty was negotiated they had not obtained a sufficient level of nuclear development to enable them to conclude that the era of atmospheric nuclear tests had passed. Those Powers, then, are conducting atmospheric tests in an endeavour to achieve a position of independence and defence, especially vis-à-vis the two super-Powers.

96. I should like to state, in this connexion, that Peru unequivocally condemns, and has always condemned, not only all nuclear-weapon tests, regardless of the environment in which they are conducted, but also the very existence of such weapons. Our condemnation is general and indiscriminate. However, I do not believe that the legitimacy of our deep concern over atmospheric tests in the Pacific, which, irrespective of their degree, to us constitute a direct threat and are becoming increasingly polluting, can be questioned. One cannot give the benefit of the doubt to something that may well affect life itself. For this reason, during the twenty-seventh session we sponsored resolution 2934 A (XXVII), by which the General Assembly stressed anew the urgency of bringing to a halt all atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific—in our region, our ocean—or anywhere else in the world.

97. In our view, the fact that a State is not party to the Moscow Treaty is no justification for nuclear tests in the atmosphere, all the more so since the Treaty, after ratification by an overwhelming majority of States, has engendered universal moral responsibility. Neither do we believe that such tests can be vindicated by considerations of *realpolitik*, independence and deterrence.

98. As a Member of the United Nations, my country disagrees with any policy that is not based on the principles of the Charter. Independence and security must be based on the creation of conditions of over-all collective security encompassing the renunciation of hegemonies or sub-hegemonies, and the creation of such conditions demands the democratization of world power deriving from general and complete disarmament and, first and foremost, nuclear disarmament.

99. The stalemate in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, precisely in regard to items of high priority, is an irrefutable fact, as stated and emphasized here by some of its most active and distinguished members, and we cannot but agree with them.

100. Negotiations aiming at disarmament, when they do take place, are conducted outside the Conference, far from it and over and above it, as I said a moment ago. The General Assembly, to which the Conference is bound by a relationship whose nature it is difficult to define, appears to have no influence over the Conference; and when results are obtained, these are imperfect because they only affect three of the nuclear Powers.

101. The détente between the great Powers, which was interrupted by the resumption of war in the Middle East, has not yet reached the Conference negotiations, nor any of

the negotiations conducted outside it, except in a tangential, superficial and subsidiary manner. And this is because the so highly vaunted *détente* has acquired a highly restricted meaning, both conceptually and in space terms. It only embraces certain fields: mutual reductions between European blocs, strategic arms limitations, and so forth, and leaves intact other fields, including the battlefields, as we have seen in some cases. The continuing arms race is not only unaffected by the easing of tension, but it would appear that the arms race is a part of the system, or rather non-system, of *détente*.

102. The flaws in the functioning of the Conference stem from this political root, for despite its name, it is many years since the Conference has devoted itself to disarmament—that is to say, general and complete disarmament. Rather, it gets bogged down in a spiralling chain of collateral measures, the effects of which we are examining at present as we have on other occasions.

103. But the General Assembly has an essential role to play in disarmament, and should play that part. We represent world public opinion, and we are duty bound to give operative shape to that opinion. Let us try to set up a mechanism that will help to consider in a rational but uninterrupted manner, within a representative body comprising all the nuclear Powers, the problems that confront us. In my earlier intervention I explained that my delegation considered the activating of the machinery for the world disarmament conference as a catalyzing element for the negotiations. Let us seek, at the same time, a means of giving a new character and structure to the Conference negotiating forum.

104. Mr. SARAIVA GUERREIRO (Brazil): It would seem that, in relation to the disarmament questions we are, at this moment, faced with frustrating dead-ends and almost insurmountable difficulties.

105. To a very large extent those difficulties result from the perplexing problem of striking a balance between two supplementary factors: mechanisms for verification of compliance, on the one hand, and trust among Governments, on the other. Complete trust among Governments has an aura of Utopia while, more often than not, direct verification seems unattainable both politically and in practice. It is therefore a real challenge to find the point of intersection of the two co-ordinates, as this point, of course, shifts with progress in technology and with changes in the international situation. Although this identification of the point of balance or equilibrium in considering concrete measures of disarmament does seem to elude us, we cannot give up our quest.

106. If we look at what has been accomplished in the field of disarmament and control of armaments since the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was set up under its original name of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee we are led to make two observations, one positive, one negative. The first is that we can be relatively *optimistic, in the sense* that more has been accomplished in these matters during that time than perhaps in any previous period of history; and the second is that it is disillusioning to note that what has been achieved, with the not too significant exception of biological weapons, involved only

collateral measures or measures of non-armament, and never resulted in a new agreement on actual disarmament. The fragmentary and piecemeal approach to the problem has always been presented as the only possible one, considering that neither of the two co-ordinates of trust and verification ever moved very far away from their original zero. While such relatively timid steps were taken, the distance to be covered towards our ultimate goal of disarmament has been increasing at a much faster pace.

107. During the past debate several delegations, including my own, have stressed that disarmament is only one aspect of international peace and security, albeit a fundamental one. Taking into account past sterile experiences, the United Nations has tried to avoid the interminable chicken-egg type of discussion on what should come first, security or disarmament. We all recognize that one objective cannot be fully attained without simultaneously ensuring the other. However, the recognition of this interdependence has not prevented us from endeavouring in the appropriate forums to go as far as we can towards each objective.

108. There is some rationale for accepting specific, partial measures related to disarmament. It has been said that even very limited measures of a preliminary or collateral nature would improve the international climate, strengthen confidence, and therefore lead to the creation of conditions that might propitiate actual disarmament. This may seem rather doubtful today. At this stage, when there has been a relaxation of tensions, despite its limitations, the acts and deeds which have taken place are of greater importance than the relatively modest collateral measures it has been possible to negotiate up to now. In fact, if we look at such measures, although they constitute undeniable achievements in themselves, their main significance lies in what they foreshadowed, but unfortunately what they foreshadowed never materialized. A feature common to all of them, and which indeed made them possible, was the absence of direct international verification of compliance, with a single exception that I will mention later.

109. In point of fact, the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water was signed 10 years ago last August, but the general framework of world-wide general disarmament in which the Moscow Treaty should find its place is perhaps even farther from reality than at the time of its conclusion. The Moscow Treaty, significant as it was from a political point of view and from the point of view of the preservation of the environment, has never been considered as anything but a starting-point, although a promising one. It is the feeling of my delegation that, because this Treaty has stood as an almost isolated achievement, one can hardly pin the responsibility for its failure to command universal adherence exclusively on those who kept aloof from it. However we may deplore nuclear weapons explosions that are still taking place in the atmosphere, as well as those that are taking place underground, we cannot fail to be aware that effective negotiations, involving all States Members of the United Nations, to end for all time such tests can hardly be successful if they are not accompanied by real progress in nuclear disarmament and, one might add, general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

110. It is the absence of follow-up that tends to weaken the meaning of partial measures.

111. In discussions on a comprehensive test ban the same old question of trust versus verification presents itself again. I need not enter into the details at this point. Everyone knows to what I am referring. It has become clear that a partial solution to the problem of underground nuclear tests that might conceivably be verified by national, and therefore politically acceptable means, would not include the small explosions that are extremely difficult to detect and identify, but which according to the opinion of experts, are of considerable military significance.

112. How can one be satisfied that enough trust exists, or suggest an acceptable international verification procedure, or find a combination of the two that would make possible the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban? Even if a comprehensive test ban were to be concluded one can hardly imagine that there would be the required universal adherence to it unless far-reaching progress in actual disarmament and destruction of stockpiles is expected.

113. In the field of nuclear non-armament it was possible to negotiate the single convention in which mutual trust was discarded as a superfluity and strict controls were considered by both super-Powers politically feasible and indispensable for reassurance; but then such controls were applied to non-nuclear-weapon States alone. I am referring of course to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It would perhaps be unrealistic to expect that legal instrument to survive indefinitely if, like the Moscow Treaty, it is allowed to stand in isolation from real and general nuclear disarmament.

114. May I turn now to another example. We were able to conclude the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction because no control was thought necessary by the major Powers, since they were convinced that biological weapons of warfare were not suitable for military uses. On that occasion we accepted the idea that biological weapons could be dealt with separately from chemical weapons, having in mind the obvious differences in military usefulness and in the processes of production and, therefore, of verification. We are now bogged down in the negotiation of effective measures to prohibit chemical weapons which, as expressly agreed upon, should complement the biological Convention. Here, if there is lack of trust, direct international procedures of some sort might be needed, but they appear lamentably to be non-viable politically and difficult to devise in practice. Are we to look for a partial solution as a way of making some progress? Would a partial success, which would again probably remain as an isolated achievement in the field, prove worth our while? In this sense, the Canadian working paper [A/9141, annex II, sect. 22], tabled shortly before the end of this year's session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, deserves careful consideration. It introduces some refinement concerning the definition of agents, employing technical criteria to qualify the general purpose criterion which we continue to support. My delegation has doubts, however, as to the advisability of other suggestions of partial solutions based on the prohibition of development and production

which, by leaving existing stockpiles intact, may have the practical effect of creating an imbalance in the situation of armed States contrasted with the situation of unarmed States.

115. At this point, I feel it appropriate to refer to the 10-nation memorandum [*ibid.*, sect. 8], which the Brazilian delegation subscribed to and continues to support. It is stated therein that a partial solution with respect to the scope of the activities to be prohibited, which would only ban the development and production of chemical weapons, will be particularly discriminatory and will not be acceptable to many countries, especially those that have abstained from procuring such weapons.

116. As far as activities to be prohibited are concerned, however, our attitude has been flexible towards the possibility of gradual solutions.

117. For these reasons, last year we suggested that perhaps some opportunity for greater progress in negotiations on chemical weapons would be found in the hypothesis of a "two-step treaty". This would provide initially for the destruction of all stockpiles and, as a second stage, the definite cessation of production, once it has been proved by means of direct international verification that all the chemical weapons in the arsenals of States have been completely eliminated. In a statement made at the 625th meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 28 August 1973, the Brazilian representative advanced an alternative solution to the requirements of destruction of stocks as a first stage, while showing continuing concern with the same point: "Perhaps the undertaking not to develop and produce chemical weapons should be nullified after a fixed period of time, unless there is evidence that stocks have been effectively destroyed." In other words, the destruction of stocks should be either a prior condition or a subsequent condition after a definite term, but always a condition *sine qua non*.

118. I shall turn briefly now to agenda item 34 on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use. As a signatory of The Hague Convention of 1907, the Government of Brazil has always supported the prohibition of the use of certain weapons or means of warfare, which according to the general consensus of civilized countries have been deemed to cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering or to produce indiscriminate effects. My country fully adheres to the principle that belligerent parties do not have an indiscriminate right to use all the means at their disposal to inflict harm on the enemy.

119. In principle, all available weapons may cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects, depending on whether or not they are utilized for legitimate military purposes. We all know that the practical application of the principle gives rise, sometimes, to complex controversies, but that is not a reason to weaken or renounce it. Thus my Government believes that there are good humanitarian reasons, at the very least, to restrict the use of incendiary weapons against targets not having an exclusively military character. Indeed, the damage that may be caused by these weapons is of such nature that we are convinced that measures against their use should be agreed upon by the international community.

Although such measures could be encompassed by negotiations on disarmament and arms control, they also fall, quite appropriately—and there is a tradition in this sense—within the scope of international humanitarian law. My delegation therefore agrees that the question of the prohibition or restriction of the use of inhumane weapons could be considered by the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, to be held in February 1974 at Geneva.

120. For these reasons, my delegation supports the 14-Power draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1.

121. The horrors of the use of inhumane weapons bring to our mind a question that was raised during the last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Swedish delegation. I refer to the so-called exotic weapons—that is to say, weapons that are still on the planning boards or in the stage of testing and that once developed would change completely the present outlook of warfare. Here again we are confronted with an issue which is not at the core of the disarmament question, but which deserves careful consideration. My delegation is thus prepared to co-operate in any international efforts to tackle this problem, in the appropriate forum and under appropriate circumstances.

122. Finally, my delegation believes that the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean is a very interesting document, and that the chapter containing excerpts from statements made in the general debate in that Committee is especially worth reading. Those statements are evidence of the high calibre of the members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. As an example, I can hardly resist the temptation of quoting from a statement made by the representative of Sri Lanka:

“... the freedom of the high seas will continue to be guaranteed for peaceful purposes, including commerce and merchant ships, and the passage of warships across the Indian Ocean would be permissible provided that their presence is not a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States or prejudicial to the good order or security of these States”.  
[A/9029, annex II, sect. A.]

123. Although Brazil is geographically distant from the Indian Ocean zone, we cannot but appreciate efforts, in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations, for the peaceful settlement of disputes according to the wishes of the States directly concerned, and in accordance with the peculiar characteristics of the region.

124. As you will have noticed, I may perhaps have given some emphasis to difficulties instead of concentrating on facile solutions. This should not be considered as a symptom of disillusion but, on the contrary, should be construed as evidence of my country's willingness to squarely face the problems as they present themselves. We believe this to be the only way eventually to overcome them.

125. The CHAIRMAN: I wish to announce that the Libyan Arab Republic and Madagascar have been added to

the list of sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.644, dealing with the question of Korea. Similarly, Liberia has been added to the list of sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.645, also dealing with the question of Korea.

126. Mr. RESHETNYAK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, like other peace-loving States, attaches tremendous importance to disarmament problems. Guided by the words of that great thinker and founder of the first Soviet State, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, that the idea of socialism is disarmament, the socialist countries have consistently favoured disarmament and a halting of the arms race so as to create conditions in which mankind's dream of universal and durable peace can be transformed into a natural reality.

127. We note with satisfaction that in the course of the disarmament discussions in our Committee many delegations, regardless of differences in approach or in their assessments and proposed methods of resolving the problems under discussion, have indicated that at the present juncture in world affairs, in spite of individual sources of tension and conflict, more favourable conditions have been created which promote solution of the urgent problems of disarmament and the armaments race. In this favourable international climate, the task obviously is to find ways and means which would enable each State to make a concrete contribution to the noble cause of disarmament.

128. We realize that in spite of the progress achieved the arms race has still not been halted; it is going on, to the detriment of the cause of strengthening peace and security. Moreover, the increasing world military budget, which has now reached the \$220,000 million-a-year mark, is diverting vast material resources necessary for economic development, social progress, improvement of the well-being of peoples, and preservation of the human environment.

129. In this regard we should like to draw your attention to the timeliness and urgency of the Soviet proposal, submitted for the consideration of this General Assembly session, on the reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent, and the use of the funds thus saved for the providing of assistance to developing countries. There is no need to demonstrate that a reduction in military budgets would be a concrete disarmament measure which could give a boost to the efforts at a cessation of the arms race and the achievement of genuine disarmament.

130. Although the Soviet proposal on reduction of military budgets directly affects the permanent members of the Security Council, it should be stressed how extremely desirable it is for this measure to be carried out by others, especially the militarily powerful States. Thus this disarmament measure would result in the universal reduction of military expenditures, would slow down the arms race throughout the world, and would enhance the favourable conditions for subsequent, more radical steps towards disarmament and arms limitation.

131. There is no need today to go into detail regarding other positive aspects of the Soviet proposal because it still

remains to be discussed by the General Assembly. I should just like to stress the significance of this proposal in the context of the questions of disarmament under discussion.

132. The Ukrainian SSR whole-heartedly supports this important initiative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a concrete practical approach to resolving the problem of disarmament and we hope that it will be supported by all peace-loving States, Members of the United Nations.

133. Many speakers here have expressed their support of the speedy convening of a World Disarmament Conference. The Ukrainian delegation is also in favour of convening it as soon as possible. And in this regard we whole-heartedly share the view of a number of delegations with regard to the need for getting down to a businesslike consideration of measures for preparing the World Disarmament Conference.

134. It is well known that the idea of convening this Conference was welcomed and broadly supported at the sessions of the General Assembly in 1971 and 1972. At last year's session of the General Assembly a Special Committee was set up to examine all points of view and considerations with regard to the convening of a World Disarmament Conference and problems relating thereto. We note with satisfaction that the members of the Special Committee, at its unofficial meetings, expressed their support for taking all the necessary measures that would promote an early convening of a World Disarmament Conference.

135. And we find unconvincing and strange the manoeuvres of those who have done so much to attempt to undermine the work of the Special Committee and preparations for the Conference. The artificially invented obstacles to the carrying out by the Special Committee of its functions play only into the hands of those forces that are against détente and disarmament and are in favour of the arms race and the tensions arising therefrom and hinders the joint efforts of all States to reduce the arms race.

136. We consider that the various arguments put forward against convening the World Disarmament Conference amount only to one thing: stalling and undermining the preparations for the conference.

137. It is said, for example, that the Special Committee cannot begin its work without the participation of all nuclear Powers. We agree that the participation of all nuclear Powers would be of substantial importance for the successful conclusion of preparations for the conference. But if for various reasons any of the nuclear Powers is not yet ready to take part in its work, it can associate itself with this work at any time which it may deem appropriate. This should not prevent the Special Committee from beginning its work and performing its functions which, under General Assembly resolution 2930 (XXVII), *inter alia*, include: "to examine all the views and suggestions expressed by Governments on the convening of a world disarmament conference and related problems", and the presentation, on the basis of consensus, of a report to the General Assembly.

138. As we know, the most varied points of view were expressed, and the report of the Special Committee to the

General Assembly will constitute a precise basis for enabling it to determine, in the light of all the opinions expressed, subsequent steps to be taken to prepare for and to hold the World Disarmament Conference.

139. Furthermore, this resolution was adopted by the General Assembly when some nuclear Powers had already stated their reluctance to take part in the Committee's work. It might have been expected that the convening and normal functions of the Special Committee would have constituted the necessary basis for overcoming the difficulties that arose in connexion with the refusal of certain nuclear Powers to take part in the joint efforts on disarmament.

140. We cannot agree, therefore, with the policy of inaction, nor can we agree with the idea that a Special Committee should consist exclusively of non-nuclear Powers.

141. The Ukrainian delegation realizes that the preparations for and the holding of the World Disarmament Conference is a serious, major and complex undertaking and that it must be approached with the utmost responsibility. The holding of this conference, as is quite obvious, would serve the vital interests of all who genuinely aspire to progress in disarmament. Since the Second World War there has not been a more propitious occasion for the making of efforts in this area.

142. In the view of the Ukrainian delegation there are no serious grounds, even procedural grounds, for postponing preparations for the World Disarmament Conference or for complying with the General Assembly resolution.

143. For some years now, at sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations and at meetings of the Disarmament Committee, a considerable amount of attention has been devoted to the question of the banning of chemical weapons. Lengthy and comprehensive discussions of this important problem have shown that a majority of States of the world are convinced of the need for the total prohibition of this kind of weapon—and that is quite understandable. Banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and destruction of them, is one of the most urgent problems of the present day since this weapon is relatively accessible to many States from the point of view of production and dangerous, compared with the weapons which are in the possession of mankind today.

144. General Assembly resolution 2933 (XXVII), adopted at the last session of the General Assembly, as a high priority question, laid down as its task to continue "negotiations . . . with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction".

145. It is well known that the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925.<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, this extremely im-

<sup>6</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, No. 2138, p. 65).

portant international document, although it has been opened for signature for almost 50 years now, has not become genuinely universal. Not all countries yet, particularly the United States which possesses considerable stocks of chemical weapons, have associated themselves with it. Accordingly, the task of getting as many States as possible to associate themselves with the Protocol, particularly the militarily powerful States, is just as important as ever—and this is what resolution 2933 (XXVII), adopted at the last General Assembly session, calls for.

146. With other socialist States, the Ukrainian SSR has for many years been making efforts to resolve the question of the total elimination of the threat of chemical warfare and the elimination of chemical weapons and the destruction of chemical stockpiles.

147. Four years ago the socialist countries, including the Ukrainian SSR, submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons and on their destruction. For certain reasons at that time it was not possible to achieve a ban on both forms of weapons and there was worked out and approved a convention on the banning of bacteriological weapons, which has already been signed by about 110 States. The implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction would lead for the first time to an elimination from the military arsenals of States of one of the forms of weapons of mass destruction and would consequently be an appreciable step forward towards the resolving of other disarmament problems.

148. On 28 March 1972 the delegations of the socialist States submitted for the consideration of the United Nations Disarmament Committee a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.<sup>7</sup> In the view of our delegation, this document could provide a good basis for the achievement of agreement with regard to the banning and elimination of chemical means of warfare.

149. We should also like to point out that in the course of the detailed discussion that took place for more than five years on the total prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, various questions connected with the prohibition of chemical weapons were subjected to scrupulous analysis and study, as has been repeatedly indicated by the delegations of many countries here at sessions of the General Assembly and in the Disarmament Committee. Furthermore, talks on arriving at agreement on the Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons have made it possible to produce many proposals and formulations that could successfully be used in preparing a convention on chemical weapons and their prohibition.

150. Nevertheless, the United States and certain other Western Powers have in practice adopted a negative attitude to the urgent prohibition of chemical weapons. Without putting forward any concrete or constructive proposals, they have attempted to show the need for further study of

the question so as to drag it into the quagmire of lengthy and fruitless discussions on various technical aspects. Along with this, we have witnessed all kinds of exaggerations of the complications and difficulties connected primarily with the scope of the definition of chemical weapons and their control.

151. The draft convention of 28 March 1972 contains a number of provisions for a control system based on a combination of national forms of control with certain international procedures, including the right to complain to the United Nations Security Council about violations of the convention and the authority of the Security Council to carry out investigations of the complaints. In the development of those provisions, the socialist countries submitted to the Disarmament Committee on 28 June 1973 a working document on ways of exercising control over the implementation of the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction [*A/9141, annex II, sect. 11*]. In our view, that document constitutes a necessary basis for resolving problems affecting the implementation of national methods of control and would facilitate concrete talks on the question of banning chemical weapons.

152. We should also like to pay a tribute to the contribution of neutral countries in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that have favoured the speedy conclusion of agreement on the banning of chemical weapons.

153. At the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh sessions of the General Assembly resolutions were unanimously adopted urging Governments to do everything in their power to facilitate the successful outcome of talks on achieving agreement on effective measures to prohibit chemical weapons and on removing them from the arsenals of all countries.

154. The task is to see to it that those resolutions are actually implemented. Putting an end to chemical weapons would mean sparing mankind from the disasters that would inevitably follow in the wake of their application.

155. We should also like to say something about what has been considered, not unjustifiably, as a major danger confronting mankind, indeed, something that endangers the very existence of our planet, namely, the threat of thermonuclear warfare. It is no accident that many speakers here have spoken of the importance of adopting effective measures to spare mankind the horrors of thermonuclear war.

156. Existing international agreements and also the most recent Soviet-American agreements have been an important contribution towards that end. We feel now that the task lies in bringing about the participation of as many States as possible, and primarily all the nuclear and what are known as the near-nuclear Powers, in the Treaty concluded banning nuclear tests in the three environments and the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Only in these circumstances will it be possible to achieve total effectiveness in the existing agreements on limiting nuclear arms and making any progress in talks in that area.

<sup>7</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1972, document DC/235, annex B, sect. 5.*

157. An important step towards restraining the nuclear arms race was the adoption last year on the initiative of the Soviet Union, of resolution 2935 (XXVII) on non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. That resolution reflected the determination of States Members of the United Nations to remove forever the threat of nuclear warfare.

158. We entirely and wholeheartedly support the recommendation in that resolution that the Security Council should take, as soon as possible, appropriate measures for the full implementation of the declaration of the General Assembly on the renunciation by States Members of the United Nations of the use or threat of force and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

159. There is no need to say anything about the tremendous amount that all States, large, small and medium-sized, nuclear and non-nuclear, would stand to gain if they were to comply with the provisions of that resolution. A great deal was most cogently said about that last year.

160. In this regard, we fail to understand the statement made here that the question of the nuclear Powers assuming the obligation of not being the first to use nuclear weapons should be subjected to the most serious high priority consideration here. No one can possibly have any doubt that the very raising of this question is a step backward in comparison with the fundamental proposals that were made earlier and with the recommendation adopted on prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons permanently.

161. Like other socialist countries, the Ukrainian SSR is in favour of banning everywhere and by everyone the carrying out of nuclear tests, including underground tests. The resolving of this question would place substantial limitations on the development of nuclear arsenals and would, by the same token, reduce the threat of nuclear warfare and facilitate further measures of disarmament. In this regard, we must realize that an agreement on banning all testing of nuclear weapons everywhere and by everyone can be effective only with the participation of all nuclear Powers.

162. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR shares the view of many delegations which have stressed the position that technical problems cannot constitute an obstacle to an all-embracing prohibition of nuclear weapon testing, including underground testing. In this regard we entirely agree with the statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations made in his message to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 29 February 1972 when he said that all technical and scientific aspects of prohibition have been so exhaustively studied that at the present time it was only necessary to adopt a political decision in order to achieve a final agreement.

163. Some delegations have proposed as a way out of this deadlock the idea of adopting partial measures, particularly the banning of nuclear tests above a certain level of explosive power and of reducing the number of nuclear explosions. However, that approach, in our view, is not effective and, furthermore, it would give rise to technical difficulties since in any partial ban there would be a serious undermining of the factor of restraint and it would be

practically impossible to establish whether or not a given explosion carried out by a potential offender fell within the scope of the ban. Furthermore, such a decision, and indeed the proposal on a moratorium, unilateral measures, and so on, would violate the very principle of equal security, which is so important for an agreement in the field of disarmament.

164. Finally, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would like to set forth some of its preliminary comments on the draft resolution submitted by a group of countries and contained in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1, concerning napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use. The sponsors of that draft resolution propose that the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts should consider the question of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons and seek appropriate international legal measures to prohibit or restrict the use of such weapons. We have certain doubts about whether the diplomatic conference would be able to consider the question, which requires further prior study and profound preliminary consideration. In our view, the most appropriate organ to consider this would be the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which has acquired sufficient experience in the study of the technically complex problems of disarmament. Furthermore, we should bear in mind that the question of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons, as well as specific conventional weapons which might be considered as weapons which cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects, should be resolved within the whole context of the problems of disarmament and, therefore, referring this item to the diplomatic conference on the reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law might be detrimental to the work of the organs that deal directly with disarmament problems.

165. It goes without saying that a solution of the multifaceted problem of disarmament is an extremely complex and difficult task requiring constant, consistent effort and patience and, of course, a genuine desire on the part of all to have talks that will yield positive results. We appeal to all States of the world to adopt this approach.

166. Mr. ZENTAR (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): It is distressing that the debate on disarmament should take place in the United Nations just when one of the greatest armed confrontations since the last World War has occurred in one of the most sensitive regions of the world, the Middle East. One cannot even say that that confrontation has really come to an end.

167. The massive use of means of destruction, including napalm and phosphorous bombs, anti-personnel bombs and the entire so-called sophisticated arsenal, which brings useless suffering to both troops and unarmed civilians, has been one of the main characteristics of that conflict. The information that we possess has convinced us that the panoply of weapons used in battle is limited only by the immediate needs of the causes that are defended; and this probably means that we shall have unpleasant surprises in the near future.

168. If I have wished to begin my statement on disarmament with an exposition of such discouraging realities and prospects, it is because it would have been either naive or hypocritical to embark on theoretical lucubrations on disarmament without mentioning the conditions of that conflict that has threatened and continues to threaten world peace.

169. That aggression was armed and financed by cliques which take little notice of the imperative, vital needs of the nations of the world, such as peaceful development, ways and means of communication and rapid economic exchanges, access to sources of energy which condition the pursuance of economic development for the benefit of the largest possible number of human beings.

170. The non-aligned countries, of which Morocco has the honour to be a part, have for more than a decade been denouncing the propensity in the world to use force in the solution of disputes that arise in the international arena. The non-aligned countries essentially are in favour of recourse to peaceful settlement of disputes through the United Nations. But these same non-aligned countries have always come up against objections justified by the so-called need for balance, objections which finally destroy any constructive regional or general solution or proposal.

171. We all know, however, that limited agreements have none the less been concluded. But, in our view, they do not encompass all the areas or all the techniques that arouse our concern, and above all, they are not binding on all countries already in a position to produce the weapons in question.

172. Morocco is a member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Allow me to say quite frankly that the high-level scientific discussions—at times purely academic—that have been taking place in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for many years are, in our view, no more than a convenient screen behind which, probably with a clear conscience, the manufacture, development and stockpiling of the most awesome atomic, chemical and bacteriological weapons continue.

173. We all know also why other nuclear countries do not wish to join the Geneva talks or other efforts aimed at general and complete disarmament. One might readily understand—without, of course, condoning—the reluctance of the nuclear Powers, or countries about to become nuclear Powers, to be parties to international commitments already concluded in this field.

174. In regard to disarmament, it is obviously impossible to lose sight of certain political or economic circumstances obtaining in the world. Justice, equity and freedom should be ensured for all, just as there must be equal chances of survival for all.

175. However, in the domain of disarmament, our fundamental options are clear and unchanged. We are in favour of general and complete disarmament. We are in favour of a World Disarmament Conference without exemptions or exclusions. We are in favour of the adoption of a charter on disarmament, binding on all, in the same

conditions and with equal guarantees for the powerful and the less powerful.

176. We consider that a number of positive steps have already been taken in that direction. I can enumerate them quickly because they are well known. I refer to the Vienna talks, the renewed appeal for massive signature of the Convention on bacteriological weapons, the Moscow Treaty on nuclear weapon tests, the Treaty of Tlatelolco concerning Latin America, the resolution 2992 (XXVII) making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, and other endeavours relating to peace in the Mediterranean Sea, a sensitive area *par excellence*.

177. The Conference on Security in Europe also deserves special mention, not only by reason of the universal repercussions of such a confrontation of ideas and goodwill, but also with a view to the gradual and real disarmament that may be the result of that Conference.

178. Morocco—a Mediterranean, Atlantic, African and Arab country—finds itself, as a result of the present world situation, in a position that imposes on it special obligations.

179. Our country was called upon to give its views at the European Conference. Morocco will speak of the tensions aroused in that region as a Mediterranean country, but it will also speak as a country concerned with security, co-operation and the essential interests of all the peoples of the world. This obviously implies the need to eliminate everything that leads to or calls for the presence or strengthening of fleets and other foreign forces in regions where they have no reason to be or to remain. Peace is a fundamental objective that we all seek with faith and determination. General and complete disarmament is an obvious corollary to that determination. However, let all the countries in the world beware: no true disarmament, no lasting peace, can be established on the basis of flagrant injustices, generators of dangerous tensions and instability. The international community must take care to correct excesses, to bring extreme points of view closer, to reject abuses and to restore the fundamental rights of peoples, before demanding that weapons be left in the cloakroom. Fortunately, there are certain movements in that direction under way at present.

180. It may be that countries that are in a position to develop and to perfect weapons on a large scale will not make all the desirable efforts to speed up the conclusion of limitations agreements or to join or accede to existing ones. We must avoid acting like those who advocate the “all or nothing at all” theory. Every step taken in the right direction is an achievement to which we must cling unreservedly, while demanding still more until we achieve our final aims.

181. The Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference established last year by the General Assembly is still tottering despite the very laudable efforts of Mr. Hoveyda. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament itself lacks realism and effectiveness. The reasons are more or less the same: possibly an excessive attachment to formality or to technological demands. But that may perhaps after all be merely the manifestation of substantive reservations.

182. The General Assembly must give a healthy impetus to those two bodies without delay; otherwise it must resign itself to considering them both as mere alibis, designed to give our Organization the clear conscience it desires. Our responsibility will be no less heavy because the United Nations is, above all, a fundamental body of peace. The reduction, if not the elimination, of the reasons underlying international conflict is one of the immediate imperative duties of our Organization. But the reduction and the elimination of means of mass or inhuman destruction are equally urgent tasks.

183. If organs such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva or the Disarmament Commission of the General Assembly are neither adapted to nor in a position to discharge their tasks, then it would be better to open a debate within the United Nations to clarify the situation. If that is not the case, then imperative decisions must be taken without delay to relaunch and to guide their actions along the desired constructive path.

184. I would not wish to conclude this brief statement without saying that my delegation views favourably the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union for a reduction by 10 per cent of the military budgets of the powerfully armed countries, not only as a first contribution to the disarmament effort, but also in the hope—even if somewhat daring—of seeing the sums thus saved devoted to the economic development of the insufficiently developed countries.

185. A similar but even greater and deeper hope has always been in the minds of the developing countries as the final objective of their sustained action in favour of general and complete disarmament. The possibility of even the partial realization of that hope deserves at least our interest and consideration.

*The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.*