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Chairman: Mr. Otto R. BORCH (Denmark).

Statement by the Chairman

1. The CHAIRMAN: With regard to agenda item 41, that is, the question of Korea, I have been asked to inform the Committee that El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica have asked to be added to the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.645.

AGENDA ITEMS 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 AND 38

Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security

World Disarmament Conference: report of the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference (A/8990 and Add.1, A/9033, A/9041, A/9228)

General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9039, A/9141, A/9293)

Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General (A/9207)

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9141)

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests (A/9081, A/9084, A/9086, A/9093, A/9107, A/9109, A/9110, A/9117, A/9166, A/C.1/1031, 1036):

(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9141);

(b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/9208)

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General (A/9137, A/9209)

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/9029)

2. The CHAIRMAN: The First Committee will now begin its debate on disarmament. In dealing with this question, the Committee this year will consider items 29 and 32 to 37 of the agenda of the General Assembly. At the same time, the Committee will deal with item 38 on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

3. Concrete achievements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have been few during the last 12 months. Nevertheless, some groundwork necessary for further progress has been accomplished and a definitive improvement in the general state of international relations gives reason to hope that we can resume our forward movement.

4. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has entered its substantive phase. The negotiations at the Vienna Conference on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments in Europe are scheduled to start at the end of this month. In the nuclear field, the second phase of the strategic arms limitation talks is under way. Meanwhile, we can take note of the agreements reached by the Soviet Union and the United States in June 1973, namely, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Offensive Strategic Arms [see A/9293].

5. Although the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference has not functioned in the way envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2930 (XXVII), an informal exchange of views has taken place among the designated members under the guidance of Mr. Hoveyda of Iran.

6. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for the 1973 session is before this Committee

[A/9141]. For my own part, I believe that in view of the work done by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during the current year and in previous years on the questions of a cessation of nuclear weapon tests and a ban on chemical weapons, and in view of the fact that the issues have been so fully explored, there should be no relaxation in our efforts to facilitate agreement. In the days ahead it will surely be one of the main tasks of this Committee to formulate recommendations which could be helpful for the efforts to achieve further progress.

7. As far as procedure is concerned, I should like to suggest that the practice of recent years be followed again. Accordingly, all the items mentioned would be the subject of a joint general debate, it being understood that any delegation would be free, should it so wish, to make more than one statement in the course of the general debate. At the conclusion of that debate, the Committee would consider the draft proposals or resolutions under each item separately and under their respective titles.

8. If I hear no objection to this proposal, I shall take it that the Committee decides to pursue the disarmament debate accordingly.

It was so decided.

9. Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The First Committee is now embarking upon the consideration of the broad range of questions on the agenda of the twenty-eighth session of General Assembly of the United Nations relating to one of the particularly important international problems, namely, the problem of disarmament. Among these questions, each of which has its own particular importance for the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, one of the most important, as is generally acknowledged in the United Nations and throughout the world, is the question of the convening of a world disarmament conference with the participation of all countries without exception, large, medium-sized and small. The Soviet Union has been and will continue to be a staunch supporter of the convening of such a conference. This is a position of principle of the Soviet Union which has been set forth in the well-known Soviet peace programme approved at the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In presenting this programme to the Congress, Mr. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev stated that one of the most important tasks was the following:

“To intensify the struggle for a cessation of the arms race in all its forms. We are in favour of the convening of a world conference for the consideration of questions of disarmament in all their scope.”

10. Now at a time when in the world, in spite of remaining hotbeds of tension and conflict, we are witnessing a *strengthening of the process of improving the political climate and easing international tension*, the holding of a broad international conference on questions of disarmament would promote a further normalization of international relations and also further progress in the area of restraining the arms race and, in the final analysis, disarmament. A world disarmament conference would be an important step towards the strengthening of the favour-

able changes which are now occurring in the world and would help to give it a stable and irreversible character.

11. At the conference, of course, for which proper preparations would be made, all countries of the world without exception would have an opportunity actively and on an equal footing to discuss and indicate ways of limiting and checking the extravagant arms race, and ways of achieving disarmament. An exchange of views among all States at the specially convened conference for this purpose would be an additional incentive for practical negotiations and the carrying out of concrete measures on individual aspects of the problem of disarmament, which was, has been and remains one of the most topical questions of the present day and which is of vital importance for all peoples.

12. As has so often been pointed out, the United Nations, under its Charter, is obliged to deal with the problem of disarmament and to arrive at a decision on it. For three years now the proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference has been the subject of active discussion in the United Nations and at sessions of the General Assembly, and we note with satisfaction that the idea of such a conference, which has enjoyed the widest possible support, is becoming more and more an actual practical process of gradual progress towards the convening of the conference. On this question the General Assembly, at the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh sessions, adopted two resolutions, each of which has lent this process an ever more concrete character. I would remind you that at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly not a single delegation voted against the resolution on the need for convening the conference and preparing for it.

13. In the course of the general debate at this session of the General Assembly, many delegations again expressed their support for the early convening of a world forum on disarmament. For example, the Foreign Minister of Zambia, Mr. Mudenda, speaking in the general debate on 27 September this year, stated: “We remain strongly convinced that a world disarmament conference would be a most significant endeavour and perhaps a real beginning in the search for genuine disarmament.” [2130th plenary meeting, para. 99.] In his statement of 25 September the head of the Ethiopian delegation, Mr. Haile, stated: “And, in this regard, no doubt a carefully prepared and properly convened world disarmament conference could be a useful exercise.” [2127th plenary meeting, para. 134.] And the heads of many delegations of other countries expressed themselves in the same spirit.

14. It is typical that, in the course of the general debate at this session of the General Assembly, particular interest towards the convening of a world disarmament conference was displayed once again by the representatives of the non-aligned countries. And that is no coincidence. Such a representative forum as the world disarmament conference, convened on the basis of the equal participation of all countries, would provide a real opportunity for each of them to make a contribution to the general effort to call a halt to the arms race and to ensure progress in the area of genuine disarmament.

15. At the same time we fully realize that major responsibility for progress in disarmament lies with States which

possess the greatest military economic potential, primarily the five nuclear Powers. That does not mean, however, that they enjoy a kind of monopoly over the holding of talks and the preparing of agreements in this area. Disarmament is something which affects everyone and all States have the right and must have the opportunity to make their contribution to resolving the complex problems connected with the overcoming of the considerable obstacles and barriers to disarmament. In these matters it is important to take joint action and it is important for the whole world to do this. Only thus is it possible to overcome the stubborn resistance of the opponents to disarmament and to ensure genuine progress towards the main goal, that of general and complete disarmament.

16. Therefore, to oppose the convening of a world conference is tantamount to disregarding the views, the interests and the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of States, primarily the developing countries, which are directly or indirectly affected by and involved in the arms race while they have an acute need for the speedy development of their own national economies and the raising of the living standards of their peoples.

17. The proposal for the world disarmament conference fully takes into account the requirements and meets the interests of the developing countries and is something which is demonstrated by another universally acknowledged fact, namely, that the Fourth Conference of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries at Algiers categorically and firmly expressed its support for convening the conference. In the Declaration adopted at the Algiers Conference we find the following:

“The Conference demands that a world conference on disarmament, with the participation of all States, shall be convened as soon as possible.” [See A/9330.]

And that clearly demonstrates that the position of the non-aligned countries in the matter of convening a world disarmament conference agrees entirely with the view and position of the community of socialist countries and, at the same time, is in direct contradiction to the position of the opponents of the conference.

18. As we know—and the Secretary-General reminded us of this in his recently published note on the question of the world disarmament conference [A/9228]—under resolution 2930 (XXVII) of the General Assembly last year, a special committee was assembled to prepare for the convening of the conference. The Committee was instructed to study thoroughly proposals on the views of States Members of the United Nations with regard to the preparation for and the convening of a conference and to present a report to the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly. The Assembly acted in the belief that the work of the Committee should be an important stage on the road towards the practical preparation for the convening of a world disarmament conference. And that was precisely what guided the Soviet delegation in taking an active part in the work of that Committee.

19. Almost a year has gone by since the Special Committee was set up to prepare for the world disarmament conference. What has the Committee succeeded in doing

during that time? Unfortunately not much. The Committee, because of the negative attitude of some States, known to all, was unable to perform the tasks entrusted to it by the General Assembly. The Committee failed to submit a report to the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

20. At the same time, no one, particularly the members of the Special Committee who took part in its work, can deny the positive fact that the Committee held a whole series of unofficial meetings. An exchange of views took place at those meetings on a wide range of questions connected with the preparations for the conference. That was preceded by the unanimous election of Mr. Hoveyda as Chairman of the Committee or, as he was known at the unofficial meetings, the man who conducted those meetings. We must say frankly that in this special—if you like, delicate—post he did an excellent job in conducting these complicated proceedings, in guiding the deliberations of the Committee and in establishing contacts and links between members of the Committee who were dissidents and were unwilling to take part in its work.

21. He had a group of active assistants to assist him in his work. A broad exchange of views at the eight meetings of the Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. Hoveyda is registered in the records which any delegation can consult. This work by the Committee and its Chairman—and we call him its Chairman—was, without doubt, important and useful. Attempts to hinder this work were unsuccessful. In the view of the Soviet delegation, the work done by the Committee and the efforts of its Chairman yielded very definite and real advantages. Primarily, the unofficial meetings of the Committee once again demonstrated and confirmed that the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference enjoys extremely wide support. That proposal was favoured by every one of the 31 members of the Committee, down to the last man, who regularly took part in its meetings. The magnetic effect of the idea of convening the conference was so great that even its opponents and their sympathizers were unable to oppose the proposal openly. They are attempting to conceal their reluctance to facilitate its convening by all kinds of artificial trumped-up pretexts and explanations.

22. Other factors emerged during the course of the unofficial meetings of the Committee and constituted obstacles or, more accurately speaking, were used to put a brake on the Committee's normal work in performance of the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly. At the same time the exchange of views made it possible to identify ways and means of eliminating those obstacles which were, fundamentally, of an organizational and procedural character and not insuperable in substance—if, of course, we were to approach the problem of convening a world disarmament conference in a spirit of goodwill and genuine desire. The statements of many members of the Special Committee during its meetings quite clearly demonstrated that it is entirely possible to ensure the productivity of its work and hence promote progress towards the practical preparation for the convening of the conference.

23. Nor can we fail to point out that, as was indicated by the discussions in the Committee, the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference was, by its composi-

tion, an extremely well qualified and competent United Nations organ, created on the basis of equitable geographical and, what is equally important, political representation of States within the United Nations system. And this is itself an excellent precondition for ensuring compliance with the General Assembly resolution and for the attainment of the major objective of the Committee's work. It can, of course, be said that a given geographical group of States Members of the United Nations might, to some extent, be inadequately represented in the Special Committee. But there are not and have never been any grounds for converting this question into a stumbling-block and, in so doing, undermining the very work of the Committee. And we are well aware that it is not the socialist countries which are at fault. Even as far back as the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly and subsequently thereafter, those countries expressed their complete readiness to consider and settle the question of increasing the membership of the Special Committee. On the whole, we must acknowledge that that Committee was constituted on an entirely reasonable basis, determined by the relevant decision of the United Nations General Assembly.

24. The question of convening a world disarmament conference, as has already been pointed out, has evoked considerable interest throughout the world and, in our view, this is precisely what explains the wish of many States to become members of the Special Committee and make a practical contribution to preparations for convening and successfully conducting a world disarmament conference.

25. The Soviet delegation is profoundly convinced that the question of a certain sensible increase in the membership of this Committee, through the geographical groups of States Members of the United Nations that consider themselves underrepresented in it, could be resolved in the course of the Committee's work. This is a proposal that we have repeatedly made, even going so far as to name the countries that could be added to the Committee as put forward by the regional groups in question. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, primarily because of the negative attitude of certain States, this was not done at the time, that is, during the period between the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth sessions of the General Assembly. As a result this question must be settled now, and it should be settled justly, by taking into account the views of regional groups and the wishes of States that are ready to take part in the work of this organ and in strict accordance with the relevant resolution adopted at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, that is, on the basis of equitable geographical and political representation.

26. The Soviet delegation for its part is ready to pay the utmost attention to the wishes of certain countries from respective geographical groups that would like to join the Special Committee, in full recognition of its importance and the complexity of the issues involved in practical preparations for the world disarmament conference and that have a genuine desire to assist in the joint efforts to resolve those questions. The Soviet delegation does not consider that the question of a certain increase in the membership of the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference to be an insuperable obstacle.

27. We feel it is necessary to give special attention to the question of participation in the work of the Special Committee by the nuclear Powers. The Soviet delegation considers that in discussing and resolving the questions relating to disarmament all nuclear Powers should take part, since they possess great military and nuclear potential. Disarmament affects all States without exception, both nuclear and non-nuclear. At the same time we must not forget that particular responsibility in solving the problems of limiting the arms race and disarmament is borne primarily by the nuclear Powers, particularly the major military countries, including of course nuclear Powers which, as we know, are permanent members of the Security Council.

28. That is why the Soviet Union has raised at this session of the General Assembly as an important and urgent matter that of reducing military budgets of States which are permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and using part of the funds thus saved to assist the developing countries. This Soviet initiative, which is a new step in the area of disarmament, meets the interests, requirements and wishes of many States, primarily the developing countries, which represent an overwhelming majority of the membership of the United Nations. It is precisely those countries which at the present time are raising the question of how to narrow the widening economic gap between the developed and developing countries, and where to find the funds to resolve this important problem. At the 2156th plenary meeting, those countries specially raised this new and important question as an item for inclusion in the agenda of this Assembly. The fact that the developing countries have raised this question for the consideration of the General Assembly serves to convince us even more that the Soviet Union acted with perfect propriety, and at the right time in the present circumstances, when it proposed that the General Assembly consider and decide on the question of reducing by 10 per cent the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council and the earmarking of a portion of the funds saved in this way for assistance to developing countries. Now even the sceptics and those of little faith can realize at first hand the complete sympathy and accord and coincidence of the position of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with the position of the developing countries in this important matter. It should be clear and obvious to everyone that one of the proper sources of possible additional funds for eliminating the economic rift between the developed and developing countries can and must be the implementation of the Soviet proposal to reduce military budgets.

29. In this regard we cannot fail to express our regret that the instigators of the cold war, as it was known, have pushed the world into an armaments race which swallowed up tremendous resources, instead of those resources being spent on the peaceful need to increase the prosperity of the peoples of the world. From 1951 to 1971, according to incomplete data, more than \$3,000,000 million has been spent on the armaments race in the world, and today vast amounts of money are still being spent on it. They have reached an amount of almost \$220,000 million a year. Therefore the entirely timely proposal of the Soviet Union is something which would help to curb this arms race.

30. The Soviet delegation cannot agree with the idea that, in the field of disarmament and in preparing for the convening of a world disarmament conference, it is only by the efforts of the non-nuclear States that it is possible to achieve any serious practical results, without the participation of countries which in fact possess the most destructive means of annihilation: nuclear weapons.

31. Something which we consider entirely correct and something which deserves warm approval is the active search for co-operation with those nuclear Powers which have so far stayed outside the Committee, those efforts which have been undertaken by many members of the Special Committee. We also support and would highlight the tireless efforts along those lines of the Chairman of the Special Committee, Mr. Hoveyda, and some of his advisers and active assistants among the members of the Committee.

32. In adhering to this viewpoint, the Soviet delegation at the same time believes that if at this stage some nuclear Powers are not prepared to take part in the work of the Special Committee, this should not however constitute an obstacle to its work of complying with the important instructions which were given to it by the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly. Those nuclear Powers which for one reason or another have not so far taken part in the Special Committee's work can always take their places in it whenever they are ready to do so. We need not doubt that all other States, as was shown by the unofficial meetings of the Committee, will welcome their participation and co-operation in the great and important work of implementing the decisions of the United Nations with regard to convening a world disarmament conference.

33. In the view of the Soviet delegation, the basis of the work of the Special Committee and also that of the work of preparing for the disarmament conference, should be goodwill and a genuine desire and wish to achieve real progress towards halting the armaments race and bringing about general and complete disarmament and involving as many States as possible in the struggle for the attainment of this great and noble goal. The United Nations and its membership would be very wrong indeed if they did not attempt to take advantage of the favourable opportunity which is now open to them for convening a world disarmament conference, if they were to postpone indefinitely the preparations for it.

34. In his statement at the present session of the General Assembly on 25 September, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. A. A. Gromyko, on behalf of the Soviet Government stated:

“The time has come to undertake practical preparations for the convening of a World Disarmament Conference. Arrangements must finally be made so that the Special Committee provided for in the General Assembly resolution relating to preparations for that Conference can carry out the functions entrusted to it.” [2126th plenary meeting, para. 144.]

35. The Soviet delegation considers that the forthcoming discussion and decisions of the General Assembly on the world disarmament conference will make it possible to

make further progress in the matter of preparing for the actual holding of this important international meeting.

36. We entirely agree in this with the view of the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Mr. Minić, who in his statement at this session of the General Assembly on 27 September stated:

“At this session maximum efforts should be exerted to overcome the existing difficulties and to initiate preparations for convening the Conference.” [2130th plenary meeting, para. 26.]

37. The Soviet delegation wishes to express its entire agreement with that approach to this historically important matter and, for its part, it is ready to do everything in its power to proceed, in practical terms, to a businesslike consideration of measures involved in preparing for the convening of a World Disarmament Conference. We must overcome all the difficulties and obstacles and put on a practical footing the work of the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. This would be facilitated by a certain limited expansion of the membership of the Special Committee, the confirmation of the need for participation in its work of the nuclear Powers and the giving of instructions to the Special Committee to get down to the practical work of preparing for the Conference.

38. In conclusion, permit me to point out, Mr. Chairman, that in the course of subsequent discussions in the First Committee the Soviet delegation intends to set forth its position on all the other questions of disarmament that are to be considered at this session of the General Assembly. For this purpose we reserve our right to speak again in the near future.

39. Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): Writing about the atomic bomb in 1945, Albert Einstein reluctantly saw a certain merit in the spectre of danger it had introduced. He said: “It may intimidate the human race into bringing order into its international affairs, which, without the pressure of fear, it would not do.”

40. Certainly no one would question that nuclear weapons and other forms of advanced technology have had the most pervasive effects on human society. But has this technology had an influence on international affairs, as Einstein anticipated? The answer is, obviously, yes—but perhaps not as much as he expected. One reason is that the human race becomes partially inured to almost anything, including danger. Another reason is that it changes its thought habits only very slowly: many people today still think in terms of an earlier era of conventional weaponry.

41. All the more credit, therefore, seems due to those who have read correctly the implication of technology and who have laboured, against considerable odds, to bring it under control. Those who work in the arms control field should draw courage, I think, from yet another consideration: difficult and frustrating as these efforts may be, in the long run they are bound to have an effect on the thoughts and trends of governments, even before specific results are achieved.

42. As the First Committee today begins once again to explore the problems of arms control and disarmament,

there are certainly many factors on the world scene which are a source of apprehension. It is easy in these circumstances to be discouraged about the prospects for arms control. However, if we take stock of the events of the past decade we can, I believe, be encouraged by how far we have come. Only a decade ago, arms control and disarmament often seemed just another issue which, despite its importance, had become enmeshed in the cold war. Proposals were often made with no thought of their ultimate acceptance and speakers seemed intent upon scoring propaganda victories rather than achieving progress toward meaningful arms control measures.

43. This autumn we can cite more than the body of agreements already concluded. We can point to promising negotiations now under way or about to begin on strategic arms limitations, on mutual and balanced force reductions in central Europe and on security and co-operation in Europe. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament continues its efforts to come to grips realistically with important subjects, to wit, a comprehensive test ban and limitations on chemical weapons.

44. In the past year we have seen encouraging signs of further movements towards stability. The Viet-Nam and Laos Agreements have already reduced the scope of the conflict that has torn South-East Asia asunder for so long. Although fighting has taken place in the Middle East, it has been possible to arrange a cease-fire. My country will, of course, continue its efforts to help to arrange a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. Elsewhere in the world, progress has been made towards relaxing tensions.

45. Here at the United Nations we have the clear duty to move ahead in our work on arms control, whatever the difficulties facing us. It is up to us to build on the base of agreements already achieved in order to take those further steps which may now be feasible.

46. Nuclear arms control naturally enjoys priority in our efforts. In this area, as in others, the coming years hold the promise of further progress, building upon that of the past five years.

47. In 1969 President Nixon pledged to the United Nations that the United States was embarked on "a sustained effort not only to limit the build-up of strategic forces but to reverse it." In 1972 we concluded agreements with the Soviet Union limiting each side to two anti-ballistic missile sites and freezing inter-continental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missile launcher levels for five years. In the United States/Soviet Union Agreement, concluded on 21 June 1973 [see A/9293], President Nixon and Secretary-General Brezhnev stated their intention of reaching a permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of arms, as well as their subsequent reduction. They also announced that the two sides would make serious efforts to work out the provisions of a permanent agreement, with the objective of signing it in 1974. United States and Soviet negotiators are now meeting in Geneva in order to try to carry out that objective.

48. The strategic arms limitation talks represent a fundamental change in international relationships. Each side has set a goal of breaking the momentum and moderating the process of strategic arms competition.

49. On 30 October historic talks will begin in Vienna, aimed at reductions in the level of military forces now stationed in central Europe. How important those negotiations are is evident from the area involved. Central Europe has since the Second World War been a region of major East-West confrontation. It has long been a battleground of many peoples and many nations. Preserving security undiminished in that region at lower levels of force would represent a major breakthrough towards a more rational world order. We and our allies plan to negotiate in Vienna with dedication, bearing in mind that not only will the interests of the actual participants be served by our success, but international peace and security will generally be strengthened.

50. Neither negotiations on strategic arms nor the forthcoming talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe are directly concerned with the international proliferation of nuclear arms. In the end, however, their purpose is similar to that of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex]. Many nations which negotiated the non-proliferation Treaty shared the same goals as the negotiators on strategic arms limitation and mutual and balanced force reductions, that is, to achieve greater stability in a world living under the nuclear threat, to reduce the chances of nuclear war breaking out whether by design or by accident, and to lessen the burden of armaments on the world. The non-proliferation Treaty reflects the desire of its more than 100 signatories to call a halt to the proliferation of nuclear weapons before an increasing number of countries felt compelled to invest substantial resources into building their own deterrent forces. The benefits of the Treaty have flowed to nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. The world as a whole has profited from the fact that no country has joined the "nuclear club" since 1964. One can well ask where we would be today if, in addition to the other conflicts in the world, the last few years had seen a desperate action/reaction cycle as additional countries acquired nuclear weapons capabilities.

51. It will not be on the basis of the short five years of its existence but over the decades to come that future generations will judge the usefulness of the non-proliferation Treaty. Strengthening that Treaty and its underlying principles is one of our heaviest responsibilities. During the past year, the Treaty did indeed receive increasing support with the adherence of six additional States. Another important development was the signing last April of the verification agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Community, thus removing one obstacle to wider adherence to the Treaty. We earnestly hope that additional countries, particularly those with an advanced nuclear technology, will adhere to the Treaty.

52. Article VIII of the Treaty calls for a review conference five years after the entry into force of the Treaty. We look forward to that conference. We regard it as an important opportunity to provide additional impetus to the Treaty and its principles. We intend to co-operate fully with other Treaty parties in ensuring that the conference will be carefully organized. To that end, we are now beginning to consult other depositaries and parties on how best to

proceed with the arrangements for the conference in a manner satisfactory to all parties.

53. An important objective involved in the control of nuclear arms remains a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly have often drawn attention to the priority that a comprehensive test ban should receive in disarmament negotiations.

54. We share the general assessment that the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water¹ has made a substantial contribution to international arms control efforts. Our common objective of limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons would have been more difficult to achieve except for the willingness of States to accept the constraints placed on them by the limited test-ban Treaty in the knowledge that other States were accepting the same restraints. The limited test-ban Treaty, as the initial breakthrough after years of stalled arms control negotiations, improved the international climate and hence helped to make possible the later arms control agreements.

55. For all its value, however, the limited test-ban Treaty has been regarded as but a step, albeit a most important one, to a ban on all nuclear testing. The United States has always supported the objective of an adequately verified comprehensive test ban. President Nixon stated in his 3 May 1973 foreign policy report to the Congress, and I quote:

“The United States has continued to support the objective of an adequately verified agreement to ban all nuclear weapons testing.

“Some countries maintain that national means of verification would be sufficient to monitor such a ban with confidence. We disagree. Despite substantial progress in detecting and identifying seismic events including underground nuclear tests, we believe that national means of verification should be supplemented by some on-site inspection.

“The United States shares the view of many other nations that an adequately verified comprehensive test ban would be a positive contribution to moderating the arms race. For this reason we are giving high priority to the problem of verification. We will continue to cooperate with other nations in working toward eventual agreement on this important issue.”

56. Regarding our common goal of achieving a halt to all nuclear testing, we have made progress toward establishing the basis for a ban. Our understanding of seismic detection and identification capabilities has improved significantly over the past decade. My country in particular has devoted very substantial resources to research and development in the field of seismology. At this summer's session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, we submitted a working paper [A/9141, annex II, sect. 12] analysing in detail our recent progress in seismic verification research. That paper described our current plans to con-

struct 15 or 20 new seismic research stations in cooperation with other interested nations, at key places in the world. It also outlined our plans to install a data-management system to collect, store and distribute to interested Governments and other institutions and individuals the enormous quantities of data which will flow from this expanded seismic network. These plans call for seismic data to be available on a routine basis by late next year or early in 1975.

57. My country, along with others interested in a comprehensive test ban, benefited from an intensive four-day exchange of views on this subject at informal meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament last July. Those meetings, attended by experts from nine countries, were, in our opinion, among the most useful ever held at the Conference. I should like here to express our appreciation to Japan for its efforts in proposing and helping to arrange those meetings.

58. The past year has also seen progress in a less universal but nevertheless very important arms control measure. As a party to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco,² the United States was most gratified to note the adherence during the year to that Protocol of two additional nuclear-weapon States, France and the People's Republic of China. We are pleased to see the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone gain this new support. Full credit must be given to the Mexican Government and its Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr. García Robles, for dedication and unflagging support of this endeavour.

59. During the past year, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament devoted a large part of its efforts to discussing limitations on chemical weapons. At the end of the spring session a group of 10 non-aligned members presented their views on a possible treaty to the Committee [*ibid.*, sect. 8]. On 21 August 1973 the Japanese delegation tabled the outlines of a draft treaty for the consideration of the Committee [*ibid.*, sect. 21]. During the year, the Conference looked carefully at many aspects of chemical weapons, including those related to possible agreements. Such careful consideration of all relevant issues is, in our opinion, the way to make progress toward the achievement of treaty restraints.

60. The memorandum of the non-aligned countries performed a useful service to the Conference in providing detailed views on the many interconnected elements in any possible chemical weapons agreement. The delegation of the United States commented in a systematic fashion on the key points in this non-aligned memorandum. We agreed with the point in the memorandum that prohibition of chemical weapons must be coupled with adequate verification, and that verification in turn has both technical and political aspects which interact with the question of the scope of the prohibitions. We presented our views about how best to achieve our mutual objective of a balanced agreement. Thus the non-aligned memorandum served not only to put on record the views of 10 members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament but also

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 283.

gave rise to an examination in depth of many of the key elements involved in any agreement to limit chemical weapons.

61. The Japanese working paper, tabled shortly before the end of the session of the Conference, has already begun to receive wide consideration. We for our part are giving the Japanese proposal the serious and careful study it deserves. In doing so, we are conscious that the Japanese delegation had itself taken into consideration the views of other members of the Conference, including those contained in the memorandum of the non-aligned countries, in preparing its proposal. One of our own views, that is, that there must be an essential relationship between the scope of activities to be prohibited and the possibilities of verification, is reflected in the Japanese working paper. We have also considered that the alternative of a gradual approach to the problem of chemical weapons should be held open, as indeed it is in the Japanese proposal.

62. During the past year, the Conference carried out important work in deepening our mutual understanding of the elements involved in limiting chemical weapons. Its value as a forum was rarely more evident than in the detailed discussions held about chemical weapons. These discussions, in which virtually every member of the Conference joined, covered the widest possible range of issues.

63. The United States remains committed to seeking an effective limitation of chemical weapons. We shall continue our search for workable means of restricting these weapons during the coming year, while exercising restraint in our own programme. As I told the Conference on 30 August, the United States has not produced any lethal chemical weapons since 1968 and in fact has been phasing out part of its chemical weapon stockpiles.

64. I should like now to turn to the question of disarmament forums. As you all know, a number of suggestions have been advanced. We should like to make our views known on these suggestions.

65. The Conference remains, in our view, a valuable forum that has proved itself over more than a decade. Its limited size and its freedom from external pressures have permitted the participating delegations to establish close working relations with each other. They have acquired a detailed understanding of the technical issues involved in arms control issues and have evolved procedures that have permitted the work of the Committee to proceed smoothly. These factors have enabled the Conference to achieve truly constructive results. We believe that the United Nations should continue to provide full support to this Committee which has been responsible for so much of the progress that has been made in arms control.

66. Some countries have called for the convening of a world disarmament conference with preparations for such a meeting to begin as soon as possible. Other countries have stated their view that such a conference would prove useful only if all nuclear Powers agreed to participate in it. The views of the United States, which are well known, remain unchanged. While we agree that a world disarmament conference could serve a useful function at a later stage in

the disarmament process, we do not believe that such a conference at this time would produce useful results. For such a conference not to disappoint the hopes of all those wishing to see rapid progress in disarmament, the conference would have to be able to offer real prospects of agreement on significant arms control measures. However, it is not the lack of a suitable forum, but the lack of political agreement which prevents us from taking more far-reaching steps towards a more peaceful order with reduced levels of armaments. A world disarmament conference would be less likely to overcome this lack of agreement than to fall victim to it. The end result could well be a slow-down in our work combined with the dashing of expectations everywhere. Therefore we oppose convening a world disarmament conference or setting a date or starting preparations for one at this time.

67. Some speakers at this session of the General Assembly have already alluded to the possibility of reconvening the United Nations Disarmament Commission. You will recall that the Commission last met in 1965 when there had been no General Assembly session and hence no disarmament debate. We find it difficult to see how the United Nations Disarmament Commission could usefully tackle the problems facing us today. We doubt seriously that such a large conference could, despite the best of intentions, tackle the working out of concrete treaty agreements. On the other hand, if the conference were only to continue the exchange of views which we shall be having here, it is difficult to see how it could add to the debate in this Committee. Moreover, a prolonged debate might give rise to heated exchanges not relevant to the solution of arms control and disarmament problems. Such exchanges would only set back the cause of disarmament.

68. I have tried to sum up where we stand in our work. Obviously, we have not moved ahead as rapidly as we should have liked to move on all fronts. In this respect, we must recognize frankly that there are elements of division and mistrust that have existed in the world for a long time. A process of compromise, of overcoming long-standing political differences and of relegating ideological differences to their proper place will be needed before we can attain a more rapid rate of progress in all sectors of arms control and disarmament.

69. However, we must equally recognize that this is by no means a time for despair—rather the contrary. In the realm of strategic arms control there has been very substantial progress indeed, with good prospects for progress in the not too distant future. In the realm of conventional forces, we shall soon be witnesses to an undertaking of transcendental importance, with the start of actual negotiations on the mutual and balanced reduction of forces and armaments in central Europe. Of all the areas of dangerous confrontation, perhaps none over a period of time has occupied our thoughts more starkly or more relentlessly than this one, for a conflagration in this area would scarcely leave any part of the world untouched.

70. Finally, and perhaps above all, we can draw encouragement from the growth, world-wide, of an idea—an idea that is the cardinal principle of all work in arms control and disarmament: that limitations can ensure security and stability better even than the highest levels of armaments.

71. Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran) (*interpretation from French*): The instruments of war that we are endeavouring to reduce and abolish and those talents and resources that we trust will be safeguarded have once again been brought into action in the field. We have even seen the deployment of the destructive effects of the most recent gadgets, with the sombre and lengthy list of the victims. Is it not ludicrous therefore to speak of disarmament? The least one could say is that our debates on this item of our agenda today are being started in a discouraging atmosphere that somewhat invites pessimism.

72. Yet these contradictory manifestations—I would say, on the one side, the propensity of the human genius to utilize the most sophisticated weapons and, on the other side, his parallel inability to avoid bloody confrontations—these contradictory manifestations should give us pause for thought. In fact they show the basic dilemma that underlies the very question of disarmament, namely, can weapons be abolished so long as the roots of friction and hatred exist, so long as injustice and greed subsist?

73. These manifestations remind us that not only should we attack the effects but, over and above all, we should grapple with the causes. Until the conditions for security are met, how can we expect the general and complete disarmament under effective control that we so much desire? In the present stage of events, no country can neglect its defensive needs. On the contrary, each country is bound to build its own defensive system in order to be able to count upon itself and itself alone.

74. In fact the problems of security and of trust have always been at the very nub of relations among States. The absence of these two factors creates a gap which no true disarmament measure can bridge. This is the reason for the enormous gap between our efforts to prevent the arms race and the minimal and partial results obtained so far. This is the reason, too, for a certain attitude that I would refer to as absenteeism or apathy with regard to the efforts made towards disarmament.

75. It is obvious that there is no miraculous panacea to all these problems and our choice is limited to the continuation of the lengthy process leading to the creation of confidence. The events of these last few years have turned this process into a structure which has been made manifest primarily in the concept of *détente*. Now that the effects of the war in the Middle East have been felt on this structure of *détente*, the latest indications seem to suggest that that structure has perhaps passed its first test of solidity.

76. The question confronting us is to find out the best way of exploiting interaction between the *détente* and the process of arms control. The concepts of confidence and security, in their relationship with the problem of disarmament, become particularly crucial when we arrive at the central point, namely, the question of verification. Last year we welcomed the agreements on the limitation of strategic arms as an historic event. They did in fact spell a significant stage in the building of confidence, since the super-Powers seem to have agreed on the concept of parity based on the national means of verification.

77. But at the present level of science and technology, we are confronted by a situation that leads us to feel that we are involved in a race against time. New facts appear and new developments take place which might force us to backtrack or which might entirely wipe out areas of common ground so arduously reached. It is therefore essential that we retain a parallel rhythm, keeping up with scientific progress in order to avoid any stumbling-blocks. It is consistent with this view that we welcomed the Washington agreement of 21 June 1973 [*see A/9293*] which carried the promise of a second agreement on the limitation of strategic arms before the end of 1974. We should like to believe that the intention is to arrive at a major agreement before the 1975 conference on the revision of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*].

78. In the last two years, with the Moscow Agreement of May 1972 and the Declaration of Principles elaborated in June last in Washington, substantial progress was achieved in the building of confidence among the super-Powers. Yet that confidence does not seem to have overflowed into the necessary peripheral areas, such as the agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear tests or the convention on chemical weapons. The failure of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in their efforts to arrive at an agreement on these accords gave rise to much disappointment within the Conference and in the General Assembly itself. These two questions, having been given to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the General Assembly as a matter of “primary importance” and of a “high priority”, were discussed respectively for ten and eight years. The main obstacle to the conclusion of such agreements rests, as we know, on the inability to agree on adequate means of verification. But while this may be understandable for the Convention regarding the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, which poses complex problems, it is far less clear that there should be failure in the search to find an agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear tests. Our views on this question are the same as those of the great majority of Member States and I shall therefore not repeat them here.

79. Various attempts have been made to break this deadlock. Unfortunately, none has succeeded. Therefore, we are justified in wondering whether technology has not wiped out many of the objections concerning the means of verification. The least that one can say is that both sides have displayed an incredible lack of enthusiasm over getting around the difficulties. But if the specialists can understand this attitude, I must say that it is very difficult to explain it to the man on the street. The latter quite reasonably asks himself why, 10 years after the adoption of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and two years before the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it has still not been possible to arrive at an agreement on the total prohibition of tests.

80. And here another question arises, namely, the impact of this failure on the States that have thus far refused to become parties to the partial test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on non-proliferation.

81. With respect to chemical weapons, we have followed the discussions and studied the documents and working papers proposed by a number of delegations, including a very constructive proposal of Canada and an equally constructive document submitted by Japan in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. But even if these efforts have not as yet overcome the impasse, we still hold that in time they will be successful.

82. Without underestimating the complexity of existing problems, we should like to make two comments of a general nature. First—and incidentally I said this last year—it would be regrettable if insistence on a specific method of verification that was unacceptable to one State were made the pretext to maintain the impasse. The combination of different methods should ensure the establishment of a system of verification acceptable to all. We know full well that there is no technical panacea that can miraculously deprive the question of its political context.

83. But, on the other hand—and this is my second comment—peace is far too precious for us not to take certain risks at times in order to ensure that we have it. On this matter the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, stressed the point, with her usual moving eloquence, last August in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. She said: why do we always insist on the dangers inherent in a series of proposals concerning verification and never stress the much graver danger which lies precisely in the absence of an agreement on the prohibition of tests?

84. And since I have just referred to Mrs. Myrdal, may I be allowed to make a parenthetical comment. I do not know whether the rumours concerning her forthcoming departure are well founded or not, but I can assure Mrs. Myrdal that we would be very sorry to see her leave the disarmament arena. We are convinced that her contributions, so valuable in this field, will be indefatigably continued.

85. The British Government, if my memory serves me aright, when a few years ago it submitted one of the rare concrete proposals adopted by the Committee, showed very persuasively that to oppose the conclusion of two separate conventions on bacteriological and chemical weapons was tantamount to forgetting the old adage that “the best is the enemy of the good”. We follow that logic and we support the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [*resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex*]. But we merely ask ourselves one question, and that is, whether the quest for an ideal convention on chemical weapons might not ultimately become an obstacle to the speedy conclusion of an adequate agreement?

86. The control of nuclear weapons, despite all its importance, is not the only question that must concern us here. There are other fields in which measures should be adopted and thus, for example, the political context seems today more encouraging than ever for us to try to reinforce the 1925 Geneva Protocol.³

³ Protocol for the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, No. 21:8, p. 65).

87. And we believe too that the United Nations should make an effort to limit the use of certain particularly cruel weapons. On this point it is imperative to maintain the distinction between military and civilian targets.

88. Finally, we support the regional measures, such as the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

89. I now come to the question of the world disarmament conference. Last year I informed the First Committee of the position of my Government and while apologizing for quoting myself, I am afraid that I must do so. At that time I stated:

“We do not want to believe that the conference will lose the promise it potentially holds because of a lack of interest on the part of the major Powers or the absence of adequate preparations. We dare not be over-optimistic about such a conference, yet a defeatist attitude is similarly untenable.

“If the conference should bring us even one step closer to our goal it would certainly be worth while. Let me stress, however, that this could only be achieved if all States, including nuclear and threshold Powers, would participate, following timely and adequate preparation. In this vein we look forward to the convocation of the conference.” [*1881st meeting, paras. 34 and 35.*]

90. Our position on this matter has not changed. I have nothing to add to what I said at the time. But on this question I am in a somewhat curious position. As you know, Sir, and the Secretary-General's note in document A/9228 bears me out in this, the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference convened by the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 2930 (XXVII) of the General Assembly and pursuant to a letter of the President of the twenty-seventh session, was unable to hold normal meetings. The designated members agreed to carry out private exchanges of view and they did me the honour of selecting me to moderate in these exchanges. They finally agreed that I should, on a purely personal basis, report to the General Assembly regarding the tenor of those unofficial discussions.

91. I wish here to thank the representative of the Soviet Union who earlier spoke words of praise regarding me and my role as Chairman of the Committee, I believe. The fact of the matter is that to a certain extent I was the non-chairman of a non-committee entrusted with submitting a non-report on what perhaps did not happen, and it is for that reason that I said a few seconds ago that I was in a somewhat curious position. I am almost sure that it is an unprecedented position.

92. So my task is all the more difficult since from the very first day of exchanges of private views it was agreed that unofficial notes on the evolution of the private discussions would be prepared but that those notes could not at any time be quoted. How then, in those circumstances, could I sum them up? In other words, I was entrusted with a “Mission Impossible”. If I was willing to assume it, it was perhaps because the programme of the same name has now been dropped from the television screens.

93. But be that as it may, in order to fulfil the hopes or wishes of my colleagues, I shall endeavour to make a very succinct summary by trying to remain within the limits imposed upon me. In advance, however, I must stress that my comments on this matter are purely personal and must not and cannot in any circumstances be deemed a report in the usual sense of the word. May I now doff one hat and don another and speak no longer as representative of my country but as a private individual whom a number of delegations have asked to embark upon a perilous undertaking.

94. Eight unofficial meetings of consultation took place between 26 April and 14 September 1973. The Secretary-General made available all the necessary means and facilities to allow those meetings to take place.

95. In the course of the first unofficial meeting it was understood that unofficial notes, including summaries of statements made by the participants, would be prepared by the Secretariat under my supervision. It was also understood that States non-members of the Committee could be present during the exchanges of view but the public and press would be barred. It was also established that notes could not be quoted or be considered in any way as expressing the official views of the delegations concerned.

96. The main questions that were examined dealt with the composition of the Committee, the summary report to be prepared by the Secretary-General, consultations with the representatives of nuclear Powers which had not participated in the exchanges of view that took place at those unofficial meetings, and the preparation of a report to the General Assembly.

97. The question of the participation of nuclear Powers which had not been expressly nominated as members but for which seats were reserved in the Special Committee was tackled by all the participants in the course of these unofficial meetings. I felt that it was generally accepted that the participation of four nuclear Powers that were absent from the work of the Special Committee would be eminently desirable but that opinions were divided regarding the effect of their absence.

98. Some speakers, proceeding from the premise that nuclear disarmament was to be the fundamental question that any future world conference would have to discuss, felt that in the absence of the nuclear Powers the undertaking of preparatory work might jeopardize, rather than encourage, the achievement of the target, namely, a world disarmament conference.

99. Thus, a number of representatives indicated that, if they supported resolution 2930 (XXVII), it was because they felt it to be clearly understood, as the statement made in the General Assembly on behalf of the sponsors of the resolution implied, that the participation of the nuclear Powers in the work of the Special Committee was in fact necessary.

100. However, other representatives felt that because of the limited scope of the mandate, the Special Committee was not entrusted with undertaking the preparatory work for the world disarmament conference and that, that being

the case, the Committee could and should fulfil its mandate, even without the participation of the four absent nuclear Powers.

101. On the other hand some representatives expressed the view that, even if the Special Committee could fulfil its mandate without the participation of certain nuclear Powers, the co-operation of these Powers was nevertheless a *sine qua non* condition for the effectiveness of its work.

102. I have thus covered the question of the participation of the nuclear Powers and now go on to the next point, namely, the composition of the Special Committee. Discussion on this point centred on the question of reserved seats and the possibility of increasing the membership of the Special Committee. Some representatives held the view that, since there was no hope of the four absent nuclear Powers immediately participating in the Special Committee's work, the four empty seats should be allocated to other delegations that had expressly stated their wish to be allowed to participate in the Committee's work.

103. Other representatives felt that the aforementioned empty seats should remain reserved for the nuclear Powers, each of them being allowed to participate in the Committee's work whenever it was deemed possible to do so. These representatives indicated also that they were ready to envisage the possibility of increasing the membership of the Special Committee anyway.

104. Some participants indicated that the composition of the Special Committee did not allow certain regional groups to enjoy sufficient representation. On this point, the reference in resolution 2930 (XXVII) to "adequate political and geographical representation" could not, according to them, be interpreted as waiving the provision of the Charter that equitable geographical representation must always be respected.

105. It was recognized, however, that increasing the membership of the Committee was a matter that fell within the purview of the General Assembly.

106. I turn now to the question of a summary report to be provided by the Secretary-General. Some speakers suggested that a report could be prepared by the Secretariat, making known the views of Member States on the convening of a world disarmament conference; but the opinion was also expressed that the Secretariat might set up a comparative table of opinions received from all Governments in response to resolution 2833 (XXVI) of 1971, as well as the opinions voiced in the course of last year's debate in the First Committee. However, no consensus on the subject was arrived at.

107. In order to create the conditions necessary and conducive to the implementation of resolution 2930 (XXVII), we agreed that it would be desirable for me to contact the representatives of the four absent nuclear Powers, with the assistance of a group of advisers, to study how these Powers might be induced to agree either to form part of the Special Committee or to co-operate with it. I was also asked to seek the views and desires of regional groups regarding the composition of the Committee.

108. I therefore undertook private consultations with the representatives of the four absent nuclear Powers and on 29 May 1973, I reported to my colleagues on the results of those consultations. During one of our unofficial exchanges of views, I informed them that the representatives of the four nuclear Powers had declined the offer to form part of the Special Committee or to co-operate with it in the present circumstances, but that they had not given me a precise reply to the question of what conditions they would require in order to co-operate with the Committee.

109. Consultations undertaken with regional groups, through a contact group composed of five members, on the question of increasing the membership of the Committee, largely confirmed the opinion generally shared by the members of the group that this matter had to be grappled with by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session.

110. I come now to another question. Paragraph 2 of resolution 2930 (XXVII) states that the Special Committee would, on the basis of consensus, present a report to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session. But profound differences of view have emerged from the discussion devoted to the question of the presentation of such a report. While some speakers eagerly hoped that a report would be submitted, others felt that the Special Committee, not having been able to function in a normal fashion because it did not elect a Bureau, was therefore unable to draw up a report for presentation to the General Assembly.

111. It was finally recognized that, in these circumstances, the Secretary-General might transmit a note to the Assembly in which he would make known the measures adopted by him in implementation of the pertinent provisions of resolution 2930 (XXVII). It was also agreed that, in order to keep the Assembly fully informed, I should devote part of my statement on the question of disarmament to what had occurred during the course of the unofficial exchanges of views.

112. It is obvious that the foregoing summary that I have given in order to meet the request made of me is an entirely unofficial and private one, as I stressed at the beginning.

113. I would now like to add that at the end of our unofficial exchange of views it became apparent to me personally that there was general agreement on the following three points: first, that the unofficial exchange of views among the designated members was deemed useful, since it had pinpointed questions and defined the areas of agreement and disagreement; secondly, I felt that the participants were in favour of the convening of a world disarmament conference, with the participation of all States and after adequate preparation; and thirdly, it appeared to

me that the participants recognized that a limited increase in the membership of the Special Committee was a basic condition for any committee to fulfil the mandate that resolution 2930 (XXVII) entrusted to it.

114. Many participants stated that they were convinced that, for the Special Committee to fulfil its duties, the participation or at least the co-operation of all nuclear Powers was essential.

115. These are the different opinions that I gathered from the unofficial exchanges of view that were held. I trust that I have thus acquitted myself of the task entrusted to me by my colleagues within the limits of what I will still call my "non-mandate". Obviously, I shall be at the disposal of all members of the Committee if, in private, they wish to ask me any questions, in order to give them any additional information.

116. Now, Sir, with your leave, I shall go back. I shall again don my hat as Permanent Representative of Iran, and conclude my general statement. To do this I shall have to go back to my first comments.

117. At the very heart of the disarmament problem, we believe, lie the problems of security and confidence. We cannot separate the efforts for general and complete disarmament under effective control from our efforts to maintain peace and security in the world. Until the conditions of security are met, no country can neglect its defensive needs. To be sure—and my delegation has often proved this point—we support all efforts, however meagre their results, that will lead us along the road to disarmament; but what we must aim at first and foremost is to wipe out the causes of the conflicts, as mankind has been able to wipe out the causes of so many endemic diseases.

118. The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Iran for his statement, and I am sure that the Committee will agree with me if I extend to him both respect and appreciation for the manner in which he has discharged his unusual and, I am sure, delicate mission.

119. It is my intention to close the list of speakers on disarmament by the end of Tuesday of next week, if I hear no objection. I think that gives a reasonable time for reflection and at the same time it is better not to have it closed too late in the debate.

120. The Netherlands delegation has become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.647, that is, the draft resolution on the sea-bed.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.