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Chairman: Mr. Milko TARABANOV (Bulgaria).

Tribute to the memory of Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, Former Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs

1. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): On my arrival at the United Nations building this morning I was informed of the death of the former Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Dr. Ralph Bunche, who passed away last night in a hospital in New York.

2. Representatives know that Dr. Bunche devoted virtually his entire life to the United Nations and to peace. He was one of those who assisted the Organization to fulfil its duties, making as he did innumerable efforts to achieve arrangements that would allow the further strengthening of peace in the world. His efforts earned him the Nobel Peace Prize. He was one of the most esteemed staff members of the United Nations.

3. On behalf of the entire Committee, I wish to express our regrets at the untimely death of Dr. Bunche and to convey our condolences to the bereaved family.

4. We all share this mourning, and therefore, may I request the Committee to stand and observe a minute of silence in tribute to the memory of the late Dr. Bunche.

The members of the Committee observed a minute of silence.

AGENDA ITEM 28 (*concluded*)

Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8457, A/C.1/L.578, 579/Rev.1, 592/Rev.1 and 596)

DISCUSSION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (*concluded*)

5. The CHAIRMAN (*translation from French*): The Committee will continue hearing explanations of vote on agenda item 28.

6. Mr. MELLBIN (Denmark): I cannot begin without saying that I was deeply moved by the sad news of the sudden passing away of Dr. Ralph Bunche. His unequalled efforts for the sake of mankind in the service of the United Nations will, I know, always be remembered in Denmark.

7. I turn now to the matter before us. My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.592/Rev.1, which urges all States, pending agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, to refrain from any further development, production or stockpiling of the most dangerous of these weapons. We did so in order to emphasize our support for efforts to bring about an early ban on chemical weapons. However, such a ban, if it is to be meaningful, must be based upon broad support by the international community, including the great Powers; and I want to stress that our vote is not to be interpreted as a deviation from the principle that any arms control or disarmament measure must be properly verifiable in order to be realistic and promote disarmament. Our position on that draft resolution, therefore, does not prejudice our position on a draft convention—and in particular its verification clauses—concerning a future ban on chemical weapons.

8. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): I also should like to associate the Canadian delegation with the tribute paid by the Chairman and with the expressions of condolence on the occasion of the death of Ralph Bunche. Mr. Chairman, you said that nobody in the service of the United Nations had been so self-sacrificing—even to the extent of sacrificing his health—as Ralph Bunche. Canada will always respectfully remember him, and I wish to extend my condolences not only to Mrs. Bunche and the Secretary-General, but also to the representative of the United States for the heavy loss sustained by the American people.

9. Before we adjourned yesterday—and I do hope that we shall be able to proceed today until we have concluded voting on this item—I was about to give an explanation of why the Canadian delegation had abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.592/Rev.1. Canada supports the objective of this draft resolution; in fact Canada has gone further in this regard than most countries, as delegations will be aware from my statement at the 1829th meeting, when I informed the Committee of Canadian Government policy, renouncing chemical weapons. It is our view also that additional voluntary renunciations by other States would be helpful in reaching a consensus on which an international agreement could be negotiated.

10. Nevertheless, we have consistently maintained the position that arms control and disarmament progress can best be achieved through the negotiation of binding international agreements incorporating effective means of

international verification and control. It is because we do not believe that an unverified moratorium would be conducive to a negotiated agreement that we abstained.

AGENDA ITEM 29 (continued)*

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8457, A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1, 584, 585 and 595)

DISCUSSION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued)

11. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): With regard to agenda item 29, the Committee has the following documents before it: draft resolution A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1, draft resolution A/C.1/L.584, and draft resolution A/C.1/L.585. The amendments to that draft resolution were submitted by the representative of New Zealand in document A/C.1/L.595. I shall now call on representatives who wish to make statements on those texts.

12. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): As the Chairman has just stated, we have before us three draft resolutions and an amendment under item 29 of the agenda. First, we believe that draft resolutions A/C.1/L.584 and 585 are not mutually contradictory as regards their objective, since they represent different approaches in dealing with the same item on the agenda. We are all aware that the General Assembly has already called for halting of nuclear weapon testing many times and deplored it in one form or words or another, all to little avail. But this year, in draft resolution A/C.1/L.585, a sizable group of like-minded States is endeavouring to highlight ways of trying to come to grips with the real stumbling block and to create the foundation and climate for negotiated progress. The basic purposes of this draft resolution are simple and direct. They are also, in our view, feasible and worth-while—indeed all the more worth-while precisely because they are feasible. They also constitute interrelated parts of an integrated approach.

13. Let me simply at this point refer to the basic elements of the draft resolution and the reasons for them. First, the draft resolution tries in operative paragraphs 5 and 6 to lay a basis for actual, serious negotiations next year at Geneva in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament “as a matter of high priority” on the ending by international agreement of underground nuclear weapon testing. Real negotiations on an underground test ban have been in cold storage for little short of a decade. Nuclear weapon testing cannot be brought to a halt definitively and for all time except on the basis of a negotiated agreement. But there cannot be real progress through negotiations unless and until the principal nuclear Powers are willing to submit and discuss specific proposals, rather than standing on directly opposing positions of principle.

14. The divergencies between the formal positions of the super-Powers so far not only have defied all efforts by other Governments to devise compromises, but also have not been the object of any serious effort to narrow the gap by the two major nuclear States themselves. Contributions by members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarma-

ment have helped towards a better understanding of the parameters and the relevance of the verification problem. Moreover, important suggestions have been put forward, notably by the delegations of Sweden and by other States, on the possible contents of a draft treaty and I hope that more such specific suggestions will be made in the Conference. But, as we all know, any progress so far has been conceptual and hypothetical rather than real.

15. The reason for this is quite simply that there have been no negotiations by the super-Powers on an underground test ban, no efforts by them to overcome or split their differences on the technical aspects of verification, no bargaining efforts to narrow the gap between them by compromise; this, despite the fact that the number of on-site inspections that might prove necessary to supplement seismological means of verification has declined and is declining, and despite the fact that in a world of photographic reconnaissance satellites, the intrusive significance of on-site inspection has diminished and continues to diminish.

16. Secondly, an immediate objective of the draft resolution, in operative paragraph 3, is the adoption of restraint measures, particularly by the testing States original parties to the Moscow Treaty of 1963, to curtail in size and number or suspend their nuclear weapon tests, pending the completion of a test ban. Such interim measures of mutual self-restraint could be transitional in so far as they help to create a better climate for genuine negotiations to end all testing. They have recently been criticized, I know, in this Committee. Let me say this: such criticisms would become easier to understand and the need for interim restraints would become less apparent if those who make such criticisms were to give some evidence of willingness to undertake businesslike negotiations to reach a compromise solution on a definitive underground test ban.

17. Thirdly, the draft resolution makes clear throughout, and particularly in operative paragraph 1, the objective of ending not only underground tests but tests in all environments, and in operative paragraph 2 it urges States that have not yet adhered to the Moscow Treaty and to restraints accepted by other testing States to do so “without further delay”. It should be noted also that the call for interim restraints in operative paragraph 3 is addressed to all States and is not limited to underground testing.

18. Finally, in operative paragraph 4, the draft resolution calls on Governments to develop and make use of, to the maximum degree possible, their capabilities for seismological verification of compliance with an underground test ban. This provision is only fitting since it is now universally agreed, I think, that seismological means of detecting, locating and identifying seismic events are fundamental to verifying any underground test ban and to confirming the reality of any halting of underground tests.

19. Delegations will also be aware that my colleague from New Zealand—as you have already pointed out, Mr. Chairman—on 2 December introduced document A/C.1/L.595, containing two proposed amendments to draft resolution A/C.1/L.585. Canada and the other sponsors of this draft resolution sympathize with the points made by the New

* Resumed from the 1842nd meeting.

Zealand representative, particularly with the concern he expressed regarding the threat to the environment from continued atmospheric testing. This concern, in fact, was the basis for the negotiation of the Moscow partial test ban Treaty of 1963 and for many of the draft resolutions in the series of draft resolutions since that time calling for the suspension of all nuclear weapon testing.

20. It is our belief, however, that the testing programme of non-parties to the partial test ban Treaty has already been adequately dealt with in draft resolution A/C.1/L.585, in that the first, fifth, sixth and eighth preambular paragraphs refer specifically to the urgent need for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, noting that not all countries have yet adhered to the partial test ban Treaty and noting with special concern that nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere and underground are continuing. In addition, operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 also deal with the concern expressed by New Zealand by stressing the urgency of halting testing in all environments by all States, by urging States that have not yet done so to adhere to the partial test ban Treaty and by calling upon all Governments that have been conducting nuclear weapon tests "immediately to undertake unilateral or negotiated measures of restraint that would suspend nuclear weapon testing or limit or reduce the size and number of nuclear weapon tests". This also applies to all tests in all environments and encompasses the New Zealand amendments, which in effect call for interim measures of restraint.

21. However, a review of the record makes it clear that from an arms control point of view more weapon testing is now carried out underground than in any other environment. As a result, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been concentrating on its stated objective of completing the partial test ban by a comprehensive test ban. In line with this, draft resolution A/C.1/L.585 has called upon all countries to adhere to the partial test ban Treaty while at the same time it attempts to provide the basis for negotiations to proceed towards halting underground testing.

22. In sum, we believe that the concerns reflected by the New Zealand amendments are already covered by draft resolution A/C.1/L.585 and that the primary interest for countries involved in disarmament negotiations is for the completion of the partial test ban. The draft resolution in its present form points the way to a comprehensive ban on testing which would prohibit testing in all environments. The New Zealand concern regarding the type of testing which presents the major threat to the environment might better have been the subject of a separate draft resolution or might, we suggest, more suitably have been incorporated in other draft resolutions dealing with nuclear testing. On this basis, if the representative of New Zealand presses his amendments to a vote the Canadian delegation will abstain.

23. In conclusion, I believe, on behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.585, that we are entitled to ask all those who oppose nuclear weapon testing, or wish to do something really effective in bringing the nuclear arms race to an end, to support draft resolution A/C.1/L.585 with their vote. For we are not urging that a nuclear Power on one side or the other should lessen the power of its military establishment unilaterally, because it would be of no avail if

one side should weaken or lay down its atomic weapons without reciprocity from the other. But, recalling that if the force of atomic weapons were ever loosed on the world no one could win and all would suffer as a result, this draft resolution points the way, before it is too late, to a balanced and negotiated ending to nuclear testing and opens the way to nuclear disarmament.

24. As the world reverberates like a bell to the sounds and shock-waves of violence, including nuclear testing, let us at this moment give earnest thought to the future and to the implications of continued nuclear testing so fraught with danger to mankind. I address an appeal in particular to all testing States, and especially to the two major testing States conducting underground nuclear tests, that, as witness of the earnestness of their solemn commitments in the Moscow Treaty as well as in the non-proliferation Treaty to serious negotiation towards a comprehensive test ban, they now demonstrate a willingness to negotiate.

25. Mr. BANERJEE (India): I should first like to take this opportunity to associate my delegation with those that have expressed condolences and sympathy on the sad demise of Dr. Ralph Bunche.

26. I shall be very brief in regard to agenda item 29. My delegation will abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1 submitted by Saudi Arabia; we shall vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.584 submitted by Mexico. We shall abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.585, and I should like to take this opportunity to say a few words on this matter.

27. In our statement at the 1838th meeting we outlined our views on the question of the comprehensive nuclear test ban. The position of principle that we have consistently held ever since 1954 is that whatever be the difference on the issue of verification there must be an immediate and complete cessation of all testing of nuclear weapons in all environments. Half-hearted measures and palliatives, including the so-called restraining or transitional or even confidence-building measures, are not the answer to the problem and might even contribute to the legalization of certain categories of nuclear weapon testing.

28. The delegation of India therefore cannot support the concept of measures of restraint mentioned in operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.585, as such a concept would be a retrograde step. The only correct concept to which the General Assembly has given its endorsement ever since 1959 and which the delegation of India has consistently supported is that of the immediate and complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments. The delegation of India continues to support that as the correct answer.

29. We shall therefore abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/L.585. We shall also abstain on the amendments to that draft resolution proposed in document A/C.1/L.595, as these amendments do not modify the incorrect concept of measures of restraint.

30. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): First of all, may I very sincerely associate my delegation with the condolences which you, Mr. Chairman,

expressed at the beginning of this meeting on the death of Dr. Bunche. It was my privilege to have known him personally and, in 1947, to have worked with him very closely in the Committee that was known as UNSCOP. I understand full well the loss that the Secretariat has suffered by his death.

31. I should like now to turn to item 29 before us, with regard to which there are two points that I should like to make clear. The first is that draft resolution A/C.1/L.584, which was originally submitted by the delegation of Mexico, is now sponsored by 12 delegations: those of Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Mexico.

32. The second point that I should like to make is that, in order to fill in the blank that remains in operative paragraph 2, the date—that is to say, 5 August 1973—that I had mentioned tentatively in my statement at the 1834th meeting should be inserted. That is the tenth anniversary of the signing of the partial test ban Treaty, and the date representing the greatest common denominator of the sponsors' views. Obviously, that is a target date, and the sponsors are all convinced that the Governments of the nuclear weapon States should put an end to all nuclear tests—as that operative paragraph very clearly states—as soon as possible.

33. Mr. Van der KLAUW (Netherlands): I wish to associate myself with previous speakers in expressing our deeply felt sorrow at the death of the outstanding servant of the United Nations, Dr. Bunche. He will be sorely missed.

34. During the general debate on disarmament in this Committee my delegation made its position known with regard to the agenda item now under discussion: the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. We stated that the test ban problem now lends itself to a political rather than a technical approach, in view of the fact that the development of seismological capabilities for the detection and identification of underground explosions has scaled down the still thorny issue of on-site inspections to a problem of more modest dimensions. We expressed the hope that an international agreement for the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests will be reached within a year from now.

35. My delegation is a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.585, in which all elements are combined that could lead to a solution of the problem. The draft resolution stresses the urgency of bringing to a halt all nuclear testing in all environments by all States. It urges all States that have not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Moscow partial test ban Treaty. It further calls upon all Governments to undertake immediately measures of restraint that would suspend nuclear weapon testing or limit or reduce the size and number of nuclear weapon tests. It finally requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue as a matter of highest priority its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

36. We believe that this draft resolution is a balanced one and that it might pave the way for further progress in this field.

37. In the light of these arguments we do not feel a need for draft resolutions A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1 and 584. The former approaches the issue from an environmental angle, which is only one of the aspects of this many-sided problem. The second draft resolution condemns all nuclear weapon tests and urges the nuclear weapon States to bring to a halt all such tests as soon as possible and in any case before a certain date. We believe that this draft resolution is also one-sided in that it deals only with the urgency of bringing to a halt all nuclear weapon testing and does not tackle the problem of the conclusion and the monitoring of a comprehensive test ban treaty. This defect is also inherent in the first draft resolution.

38. For the reasons I have just pointed out my delegation will abstain from voting on draft resolutions A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1 and 584.

39. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): It was with the deepest regret that the United States delegation learned this morning of the death of Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche. We are all very proud that our country has been able for so many years to contribute the services of such an outstanding citizen to the important work of the Secretariat and, more broadly, to the work of keeping the peace and promoting the welfare of peoples in every part of the world. May I express our appreciation for the tribute to his memory paid by you, Mr. Chairman, and by the other speakers here this morning.

40. In relation to agenda item 29, on which we have three draft resolutions and one amendment before us, I should like first to explain the reason why the United States will abstain from voting on the Canadian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.585], which comes closer to our own views on this subject than any other draft resolution that has been submitted. I wish to reaffirm the long-standing policy commitment of the United States to work towards the cessation of all our nuclear weapon testing, pursuant to an adequately verified treaty.

41. Our policy on this matter has not changed. We are compelled to abstain from voting on this draft resolution because of operative paragraph 3, which, *inter alia*, calls upon nuclear weapon States immediately to undertake unilateral or negotiated measures of test restraint. If we voted for this draft as it stands, we believe that serious misunderstandings could arise since we might be expected to take some immediate and dramatic new initiative relating to our policy concerning a test ban.

42. Unfortunately, as we have explained on many occasions, this is not a problem that lends itself to easy and immediate solutions, since further progress towards restraints on testing is tied in closely with both understanding and resolving the complex problem of verification.

43. We are engaged in serious and purposeful deliberations on arms control restraints in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and the measures described in paragraph 3 of the Canadian draft resolution are included in these deliberations. Because of the complexity of this highly sensitive security area, there is no other prudent and realistic way to achieve meaningful restraints than by careful deliberations. In these circumstances we believe the

call for immediate imposition of restraints does not realistically take into account the problems involved.

44. I should also like to refer to the request to the nuclear Powers to submit specific proposals for a comprehensive test ban. The United States is actively and constructively participating in deliberations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We shall, of course, be prepared to make appropriate proposals when we feel that they would lead to progress. For the present, we feel that we can continue to be most constructive by our practical contributions towards gaining a better understanding of the verification issue in the continuing deliberations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the many issues and options involved in further negotiated restraints on testing. Notwithstanding these reservations, we wish to underscore that we intend to work constructively toward a solution.

45. With respect to the New Zealand amendments [A/C.1/L.595], we shall abstain because of our abstention on the Canadian draft, and not because of any intrinsic problems with these specific amendments.

46. With respect to the draft resolution put forward by the representative of Mexico [A/C.1/L.584], we intend to abstain because in our view the condemnation of all nuclear testing and the imposition of arbitrary deadlines are detrimental to the creation of an atmosphere of accommodation which is essential to progress toward meaningful arms control measures. With respect to the twelfth preambular paragraph of the Mexican draft resolution, we should like to point out that basic differences of principle must be resolved in order to achieve the objective of an adequately verified agreement, an objective which we continue fully to support.

47. The United States also intends to abstain on the draft resolution submitted by Ambassador Baroody [A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1]. With respect to operative paragraph 3, we should like to note that in our view the test ban issue is already complex and difficult so that an effort to relate it to the question of nuclear deployments is neither helpful nor appropriate.

48. Mr. DE SOTO (Peru) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation was deeply moved at the news of the death of Dr. Ralph Bunche this morning, and completely endorses the Chairman's expression of tribute to him.

49. With regard to item 29, I should like to say the following. Peru is a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.584 for we feel that it expresses our condemnation of all nuclear and thermonuclear weapon tests in all environments. With respect to the date that was inserted in operative paragraph 2 this morning by the representative of Mexico, my delegation would like to make it very clear that Peru considers that these nuclear weapon tests should be brought to a halt immediately, without waiting until that date. But to say that something is not expressly prohibited does not mean that it is allowed, and as the representative of Mexico pointed out, the date represents the widest common denominator that could be achieved.

50. I therefore wish to state that Peru considers itself a sponsor of the entire draft resolution, except for the date proposed in operative paragraph 2.

51. While I am speaking, I should like to explain the vote of my delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1. Although we have no doubt whatever regarding the good intentions underlying this draft resolution, my delegation will abstain from voting on it primarily because we do not consider the statement made in the second preambular paragraph to be entirely accurate and because the text of the fifth preambular paragraph seems to imply acceptance of the maintenance of the *status quo* in the question of nuclear arsenals.

52. With respect to draft resolution A/C.1/L.585, my delegation has profound respect for the technical approach adopted by the delegations sponsoring it. However, we shall not be able to vote in favour of the draft resolution since it tacitly allows a continuation of nuclear weapon tests.

53. Mr. STRUČKA (Czechoslovakia) (*translation from Russian*): Allow me to join in the expressions of sympathy which we have heard here on the occasion of the death of Under-Secretary-General Dr. Ralph Bunche.

54. Three draft resolutions dealing with the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests have been submitted to our Committee. In accordance with its position of principle on this question, the Czechoslovak delegation will vote for the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1 and will abstain on draft resolutions A/C.1/L.584 and 585.

55. We have already described in detail our position on the substance of the matter both in this Committee and in the course of the discussion in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. Although I shall not go into detail, I should like to stress once again our desire to see the immediate conclusion of a treaty on this subject based on the real international situation with regard to the possibility of ensuring appropriate effective control over the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. The world level of science and technology as applied to the construction of seismological equipment to identify and measure earthquakes makes it possible to ensure effective control with national means.

56. An increasing number of States are stressing the possibility of achieving a prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests without on-site inspection and are pointing to the fact that a solution to the problem of a complete prohibition of nuclear tests, which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are constantly striving for, depends primarily on the willingness of other nuclear Powers to take the necessary political decisions for the implementation of such a prohibition.

57. The fact that a solution to this problem must be sought in the political rather than in the technical field was stressed a few minutes ago by the distinguished representative of the Netherlands. At the same time, we must take into account the fact that as a rule—and this can be verified in practice—if one party makes it difficult to reach, or directly frustrates the possibility of reaching, a solution of any one disarmament problem, it usually does the same with regard to other disarmament questions.

58. The discussion at the United Nations during the current session of the General Assembly has shown once

again that States which oppose, for example, the convening of a world disarmament conference have also been making and are continuing to make every effort to block a comprehensive solution to the question of the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and a simultaneous joint prohibition on chemical and bacteriological weapons, and are clinging to their negative position on the matter of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests and on other disarmament matters.

59. The Czechoslovak delegation maintains that this is the true state of affairs. As such it must also be duly taken into account by the sponsors of the draft resolutions on the prohibition of nuclear tests which have been submitted.

60. In the three draft resolutions which I have mentioned there are also some positive provisions with which the Czechoslovak delegation agrees and which it supports.

61. Mr. KHATTABI (Morocco) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The passing of Dr. Bunche is a very sad event. You, Mr. Chairman, have very nobly and movingly expressed the feelings of us all. However, may I express the condolences of my delegation to the bereaved family, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the delegation of the United States on the death of this great man, who devoted his creative life to the cause of peace and understanding among nations.

62. I should like to make a short statement regarding draft resolution A/C.1/L.584. My delegation will vote in favour of that text. However, I should like to make clear that the condemnation reiterated in operative paragraph 1 should not be interpreted as being addressed to one or another of the nuclear weapon States but rather to the continuation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments despite the repeated appeals of the General Assembly and the indignation shown by world public opinion.

63. Furthermore, my delegation would like to point out that the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests will only come about with the adherence of all States to the 1963 Moscow test ban Treaty and then with the conclusion of a new treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapons tests. However, States possessing such weapons should give proof of their goodwill by suspending or discontinuing all tests within a reasonable time-limit in order to create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations on the prohibition of all weapon tests. That is the only meaning my delegation can attach to the target date set forth in draft resolution A/C.1/L.584.

64. Sir Laurence McINTYRE (Australia): Let me first of all join other representatives in expressing the deep sorrow of my delegation and Government on the death of Ralph Bunche, whose tremendous and dedicated contribution to the work of this Organization from its very first days is known, I am sure, to all of us. Having personally enjoyed the friendship of Dr. Bunche for almost 30 years, I feel a sense of personal loss, and I should like to express the profound condolences of myself and my delegation to his family, to the Secretary-General and to the Secretariat.

65. I should like to address myself briefly to document A/C.1/L.584 and to explain why my delegation will not be able to support the draft resolution it contains. First of all,

let me say clearly that we find much to commend in the text. In particular, we fully support what we take to be its main objective—the halting of all testing of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date. We would take that to be the feeling of the overwhelming majority of States represented in this Committee. On the other hand, certain provisions of the draft give us some difficulty.

66. Our first problem is with the last preambular paragraph. In the light of the attitude of the Australian Government regarding verification of the prohibition on underground nuclear testing, an attitude I last explained at the 1831st meeting during the general debate on disarmament, I regret to have to say that we would not be able to agree, in the existing circumstances, that there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban—that is, if we want such a ban to be truly effective.

67. Our next point of difficulty lies in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, which would, in fact, have the result of instituting an unverified moratorium on nuclear weapon testing. In our view, an action of this kind would only be likely to be effective as a short-term measure if all nuclear weapon Powers were prepared to endorse it. Even then, without worth-while means of verification, its efficacy would, we think, be open to doubt. In this case, however, it is our understanding that some, or perhaps all, of the nuclear Powers are unable to go along with the course of action proposed by the draft resolution and, this being so, it is difficult for us to see what sort of an advance, in real terms, towards the goal of a comprehensive test ban this draft resolution would make possible.

68. For those reasons, and despite our sympathy, as I said, with its main objective, my delegation regrets that it will have to abstain on the draft resolution. We would only add that, for our part, we prefer the approach to the negotiation of a ban on underground testing embodied in draft resolution A/C.1/L.585.

69. Mr. SCOTT (New Zealand): My delegation wishes to join other delegations in expressing our deepest regret at the death of an outstanding and dedicated international servant and Nobel Peace Prize winner, Dr. Ralph Bunche. With great sorrow, my delegation and my Government extend to his widow and family our sincerest condolences.

70. I should like to explain my delegation's vote on the draft resolutions before us under item 29.

71. First, I would like to deal with draft resolution A/C.1/L.584. We feel that the last preambular paragraph of this resolution should be interpreted to mean that this Committee hopes that the great Powers will seek to achieve an early agreement on a comprehensive test ban despite the present well-known differences on the question of verification. My delegation is unable to support any interpretation of this paragraph which implies that the question of verification is irrelevant to the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

72. It is our opinion that nuclear testing, especially underground nuclear testing, will be most rapidly ended by the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty covering nuclear testing in all environments. In this respect, we

do not feel that the call for an unverified moratorium in the last part of operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution is the best way of attacking the problem, particularly because an agreement on verification will be needed before a binding treaty can be concluded. We regard operative paragraph 1 as an expression of world opinion on nuclear testing, an opinion which my delegation shares and with which it sympathizes.

73. My delegation believes that every effort should be made to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty with the object of ending all nuclear testing as soon as possible. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.584 has the same objective, and although we have doubts as to the path it chooses, we support its objective and we will accordingly vote in favour of it.

74. I have already made my delegation's feelings on draft resolution A/C.1/L.585 clear when I introduced the amendment to that draft given in document A/C.1/L.595. This amendment corrects what seems to my delegation to be a conspicuous omission from the draft resolution.

75. We have, on instruction, maintained this amendment because we do not feel that the draft resolution adequately reflects the determination of the General Assembly to bring to an end all nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The vast majority of the members of this Committee represent States which are parties to the Moscow Treaty of 1963 which banned all nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water. Nearly every year we have adopted resolutions calling on all States to adhere to this Treaty; yet every year has seen further nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.

76. If these atmospheric nuclear tests affected only those who conducted them, we could more easily content ourselves with calling once more for the adherence of all States to the Moscow Treaty. Even if there are fewer of them than there are of underground tests, as the Canadian representative has just pointed out, it is the atmospheric tests, as everyone here knows, that affect all of us, and we must consider aspects over and above arms control. The radiation from them presents a potential hazard to our health. The environmental effects of these tests have already become a problem of concern to the great majority of members, a concern expressed in the meetings of the sea-bed Committee and by those living closer to the nuclear test sites. There is always the possibility, no matter how small, that a miscalculation by the scientists and others in charge of the tests, combined with unexpectedly adverse meteorological conditions, could result in a dangerous increase in deadly radiation.

77. My delegation cannot acquiesce in any back-sliding from the principles of the Moscow test ban Treaty. It cannot agree that, as stated in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, the "unilateral or negotiated measures of restraint which would suspend nuclear weapon testing or reduce the size and number of nuclear weapon tests" are adequate where atmospheric nuclear testing is concerned. We are firmly opposed to anything short of a call to end nuclear weapon testing in the atmosphere now, and we have accordingly submitted the amendment detailed in document A/C.1/L.595. We hope the vast majority of the

Committee will share our views and will support this amendment. In that expectation we shall then vote in favour of the draft resolution. We should like to have a roll-call vote on our amendment.

78. Mr. LISITSKY (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translation from Russian*): First of all I should like to say that the Byelorussian delegation shares the feelings expressed by previous speakers in connexion with the death of the United Nations Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Ralph Bunche. We offer our sincere condolences to the family and close associates of the deceased.

79. Before the voting begins I should like to explain briefly the votes of the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR on the draft resolutions which have been submitted to our Committee in connexion with the consideration of the item on the urgent need for a suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. We intend to abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.585, because this draft is based on the ideas of various delegations concerning a partial solution to the problem of underground nuclear tests, namely, the suspension of nuclear weapon testing or limitation or reduction of the size and number of such tests. We cannot agree to these proposals because they do not really solve the problems. They are simply half measures whereas there is a possibility right now of concluding an agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban on the basis of national means of monitoring its implementation. Undertaking the so-called measures of restraint of which the resolution speaks would in fact mean concurring in the view that the conclusion of an agreement on the basis of national means of control is impossible. Moreover—and this too is of considerable importance—the adoption of half measures would create the illusion that something effective was being done to halt the dangerous process of the perfection of nuclear weapons, whereas in reality the effectiveness of such half measures would be negligible. A partial solution would bring about some quantitative change in the situation, but would certainly not have any qualitative effect. The main element, the growing sophistication of nuclear weapons, would remain unchanged.

80. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR will likewise be unable to support draft resolution A/C.1/L.584, because the draft contains a number of provisions the substance of which we cannot agree with, and also because it does not reflect the ideas that should be included in any solution to the problem of the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. We feel that the draft resolution should first of all take note of a fact that was emphasized in the general debate on disarmament by a number of delegations, including the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, namely, that in order to reach agreement on and implement a prohibition of all nuclear tests, the only requirements are the goodwill of those who are continuing to carry out nuclear explosions in violation of the Moscow Treaty and a political decision in accordance with which all nuclear Powers would refrain from underground tests. It was also stressed in the general debate that the cause of achieving a prohibition of all nuclear tests in all environments by all States would not be facilitated by placing unnecessary emphasis on the technical aspects of the problem or by a sweeping condemnation of all nuclear Powers for any

nuclear explosion, whether or not it is prohibited in the Moscow Treaty. Nor will that cause be served by making different appeals concerning the cessation of underground nuclear tests to the countries Parties to the Moscow Treaty on the one hand and to those that have not signed that Treaty on the other. Unfortunately, these considerations have not been taken into account in draft resolutions A/C.1/L.584 and 585. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR will therefore abstain in the vote on these two drafts.

81. I should also like to say that we support the amendments submitted by the delegation of New Zealand [A/C.1/L.595], since we are in full agreement with the objective which they envisage.

82. As to draft resolution A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1, although we do not over-estimate its importance we intend to support it.

83. Mr. HAINWORTH (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom wishes to associate itself most sincerely, Mr. Chairman, with your tribute to Dr. Ralph Bunche, and with your expression of condolence to his family, to the Secretary-General and to the United States delegation.

84. I should like now to explain my delegation's votes on the draft resolutions under item 29 which we are now considering.

85. In our view, an adequately verified comprehensive test ban and the cessation of all nuclear test explosions for weapons purposes in all environments and by all countries remain an important aim of policy. I know this aim is rightly shared by all delegations. There are different views, however, on the question of the steps to be taken towards reaching that goal. The three draft resolutions before the Committee, which I know are not necessarily conflicting, represent three different approaches by delegations who seek to advance a common objective. I regret that not one of them accords with my delegation's views on what action the General Assembly should take at this stage.

86. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1, submitted by Saudi Arabia, has been much improved by the omission of a time-limit for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. An appeal by the Assembly to the nuclear Powers to desist from further testing is in itself unexceptionable if it is understood that such action would result from an agreement which is adequately verified. This important proviso is not present in the draft resolution. Moreover, it is not realistic to expect any action to be taken on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons outside an elaborate and far-reaching arms-control agreement. My delegation is, therefore, obliged to abstain in the vote on this draft resolution.

87. The draft resolution submitted by Mexico in document A/C.1/L.584 is a more extreme proposal. It contains a solemn emphatic condemnation of all nuclear weapon tests and urges their cessation by a specific date which has just been stipulated by the representative of Mexico. No matter how deeply held concern may be on the question of nuclear testing, my delegation does not believe that condemnations are appropriate or likely to contribute to producing the desired effect; they are just as likely to produce the

contrary effect. Nor does my delegation believe in "deadline diplomacy". If we are to succeed in reaching a comprehensive test ban, I am convinced that it will be the outcome of patient, persistent and constructive efforts. A moment's thought is sufficient to realize that serious problems are not solved by protestations and expressions of high feeling. My delegation will also abstain in the vote on this draft resolution.

88. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.585, submitted by a group of countries including Canada and Sweden, comes much closer to our idea of what would be useful for the Assembly to do on this issue. My delegation can see—and we appreciate it—that the sponsors have made a serious attempt to produce a reasonable and constructive draft in order to win widespread support, including that of nuclear-weapon-testing Powers. Unfortunately, these features are not sufficiently reflected in the crucial operative paragraph 3. That paragraph calls upon all Governments which have been testing nuclear weapons immediately to undertake unilateral or negotiated measures of restraint, to suspend, limit or reduce nuclear tests.

89. It will be clear from what I have said already that we believe that progress in the field of nuclear disarmament can only be achieved by agreements which are carefully negotiated and adequately verified. Since a comprehensive test ban already receives high priority in the negotiations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and, rightly, will continue to do so, I can only interpret this paragraph as being more concerned with unilateral measures than negotiated measures. We do not believe that real progress can be made in this field by unilateral action by individual Governments.

90. I do not see why those nuclear Powers party to the Moscow Treaty which have been conducting nuclear tests should be more specifically called upon to undertake these measures than other nuclear testing Powers which are not parties to that important international agreement. Nor do I see why operative paragraph 6 should particularly request those Governments that have been carrying out nuclear tests to develop specific proposals in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for an underground test ban treaty. Leaving aside the question of the composition of the Conference, this formulation seems to reduce unnecessarily the role which others have played in the past and should continue to play in the future.

91. Our objections to this draft resolution are not extensive but they are sufficiently important for my delegation, with regret, to have to abstain when it is put to a vote.

92. Mr. CHEN Chu (China) (*translation from Chinese*): In his recent statement in the General Assembly [1995th plenary meeting] the Chairman of the Chinese delegation has already comprehensively expounded the basic position of the Chinese Government on the question of disarmament and nuclear weapons. I should like to make a few remarks on the draft resolution concerning the halting of nuclear tests.

93. The Chinese Government has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. As early as 31 July 1963, the Chinese

Government issued a statement advocating the complete, thorough, total and resolute prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, and proposing that a summit conference of all countries in the world be convened to discuss that problem. We sincerely hope that an early agreement on this matter can be reached.

94. However, China cannot give up necessary self-defence before the complete prohibition and the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons are realized. My country is compelled to develop nuclear weapons because it is under the nuclear threat of the two super-Powers. China's necessary and limited nuclear tests are conducted entirely for the purpose of self-defence, for breaking the nuclear monopoly of the super-Powers and, finally, eliminating nuclear weapons.

95. The Chinese Government has repeatedly made solemn declarations to the whole world since its first nuclear explosion stating that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. We always mean what we say.

96. The two super-Powers have been working on their nuclear weapons for decades. They have conducted innumerable nuclear tests of all kinds and their nuclear arsenals have swollen immensely. In these circumstances, the partial or complete halting of nuclear tests will not inhibit the continuation of the production and use of nuclear weapons. Therefore the prohibition of nuclear tests will be of no positive significance if not linked with the prohibition and the destruction of nuclear weapons. It can only serve to consolidate the super-Powers' nuclear monopoly, deprive the other countries of their just right to develop nuclear weapons and resist nuclear threats posed by the super-Powers; it can only spread a false feeling of security and weaken the struggle of the peoples of all countries for the complete prohibition and the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. The world cannot gain peace and security from the prohibition of nuclear tests which, on the contrary, can only increase the nuclear threat and the nuclear blackmail of the two super-Powers and increase the danger of a nuclear war.

97. In the past the so-called partial nuclear test ban Treaty and the so-called Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, concocted by the two super-Powers, have already been proved to be big frauds, aimed at fooling the people of the world. Although some countries have favoured the complete prohibition of nuclear testing out of good intention, certain countries will surely turn it into a means for lulling and deceiving the people of the world. Because of this the Chinese delegation will, under present circumstances, oppose the adoption of the draft resolution on the so-called prohibition of nuclear tests.

98. I hereby reaffirm that the Chinese Government and people will, as always, continue to make common efforts, together with the people of the world and all countries that love peace and uphold justice, for the attainment of the noble goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

99. Mr. BAVAND (Iran): I should like to join with other delegations in expressing my delegation's sense of loss and

deep regret on hearing the news of the death of former Under-Secretary-General Dr. Ralph Bunche. He was devoted to the cause of humanity and was a tireless worker for peace.

100. My delegation would like to make a few brief comments on the draft resolutions before the Committee.

101. In this area of arms control there has been little progress since the Moscow test ban Treaty of 1963. Despite steadfast labour and often ingenious suggestions and working papers by members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, little has emerged. Detection clubs, the threshold treaty concept, verification by challenge, the resurrection of the black boxes, a decreasing quota system as an interim measure, among other ideas, testify to the industry of the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Yet these have not met with success.

102. Ostensibly, the problem still revolves round the question of the accuracy of verification, that is, the debate on the feasibility of the seismic and non-seismic means of detection, location and identification of low-yield nuclear weapons in a particular type of zone without on-site inspection. The problem as always rests on trust of, if you like, political will as well as technology. Most of the suggestions have quite rightly been addressed to the latter. Of course, no State large or small should assume a self-righteous tone or attitude on such an important question. We, for our part, are cognizant of the trite but often overlooked fact that no arms control measures may be better than a bad arms control measure. In this respect we are hopeful that even a limited agreement in the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks would have a spill-over effect on the comprehensive test ban treaty. Similarly, in this respect we would remind the Co-Chairmen that there is an obvious link between progress on the comprehensive test ban treaty and the ratification by certain States of the non-proliferation Treaty. The 1975 review conference on the non-proliferation Treaty thus constitutes a deadline of sorts for a comprehensive test ban treaty.

103. Finally, we would draw the attention of all nuclear States to operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.585. In the absence of formal arms control measures it is apparent that arms self-control assumes greater importance, and we would appeal to the nuclear States to exercise restraint in this regard.

104. Regarding the remainder of the draft, we have little to add to what has been previously presented by the representative of Canada. As to draft resolution A/C.1/L.580, concerning the need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, put forward by the representative of Mexico, we share his sense of urgency and intend to support it.

105. Mr. SCALABRE (France) (*interpretation from French*): I shall not speak on the draft resolutions submitted on item 29 regarding the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. The French position on this matter is well known.

106. However, my delegation would wish to express its sorrow at the news of the death of Dr. Bunche whose life, as you yourself pointed out, Sir, was dedicated to the cause of the United Nations. We offer his family, the United Nations and the United States, through its delegation, the condolences of the French delegation.

107. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Mexico on a point of order.

108. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): As we all know, rule 132 of the rules of procedure provides that:

“If two or more proposals relate to the same question, the committee shall, unless it decides otherwise, vote on the proposals in the order in which they have been submitted. The committee may, after each vote on a proposal, decide whether to vote on the next proposal.”

109. May I make it very clear, in order to dissipate any possibility of doubts on the matter, that the motion I am going to submit in no way affects the right of all proposals to be voted upon. Therefore my delegation considers that, on the strength of our motion at least, there will be no reason for the Committee to decide whether it is to vote on the next proposal or not.

110. We believe, as I said, that all the proposals before the committee should be voted upon. My motion, as it happens, is very limited and specific in scope: I should like to request the Committee, pursuant to the terms of rule 132 of the rules of procedure, to decide that the order of voting on draft resolutions A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1 and 584 be the following: to vote first of all on draft resolution A/C.1/L.584 and then on draft resolution A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1. The reason for my motion is the following, and I shall be as brief as possible in putting it forward.

111. The 12-Power draft resolution of which Mexico is a sponsor, namely, A/C.1/L.584, was prepared exclusively bearing in mind the item of the agenda which we are now considering. It is a proposal that was specifically and purposely drafted for that one subject, and each and every word in it refers only thereto. On the other hand, as all representatives will recall, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1 was originally submitted in document A/C.1/L.567 of 29 October and applied to agenda item 34 on the strengthening of international security. It was only later that it was slightly adapted and then submitted under the heading of the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

112. For this reason my delegation would request the Committee, invoking rule 132, that it give priority to the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.584 over draft resolution A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1.

113. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): The Committee has heard the procedural motion submitted by the representative of Mexico on the basis of rule 132, asking that draft resolution A/C.1/L.584 be voted on before A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1. He has also explained the reasons for his request. Does any delegation wish to make any comments on that motion?

114. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): Speaking for my delegation, which presented draft resolution A/C.1/L.585, may I say that we have no objection to the procedural proposal made by the representative of Mexico, provided that it is indeed clearly understood that we will in fact be voting on three separate draft resolutions and on the New Zealand amendments to our draft resolution. I have no particular preference as to the order in which they should be taken.

115. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): Of course I intended to put all three draft resolutions to the vote. If there is no other comment and no objection, I shall take it that the Committee agrees with the proposal made by the representative of Mexico.

It was so decided.

116. We shall now proceed to the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.584, and I should like to remind members that its operative paragraph 2 has now been completed by filling in the blank with “5 August 1973” as the date set for the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. A vote by roll call has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Congo, having been drawn by lot by the chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia.

Against: Albania, China.

Abstaining: Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, France, Gabon, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Khmer Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic.

The draft resolution was adopted by 66 votes to 2, with 39 abstentions.

117. We shall now vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.583/Rev.1.

The draft resolution was approved by 49 votes to 2, with 51 abstentions.

118. We turn now to draft resolution A/C.1/L.585. First, we shall vote on the amendments submitted by the

delegation of New Zealand in document A/C.1/L.595. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Bhutan, having been chosen by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Malta, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia.

Against: China, Albania, Algeria.

Abstaining: Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium.

The amendments were adopted by 53 votes to 3, with 49 abstentions.

119. The Committee will now vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.585, as amended. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Greece, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana.

Against: Albania, China.

Abstaining: Hungary, India, Libyan Arab Republic, Mongolia, Peru, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Chile, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France.

The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by 82 votes to 2, with 22 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.